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Scholarship on the history of early modern madness agrees on the fact that madness 
was largely a family matter during the period. Not only confinement was used as a last resort, 
but the range of public provisions to respond to mental afflictions were eminently temporary. 
Furthermore, although medical practitioners developed increasingly relevant contributions in 
the field of diagnosis and treatment of mental afflictions, during the eighteenth century 
madness was still primarily identified, experienced and managed by the families. Building on 
these arguments, this dissertation is concerned with how early modern understandings of and 
responses to madness were negotiated between families, medical and legal professionals, 
authorities and the communities.  
Intersecting the history of madness and medicine with legal history, the history of the 
family and gender and the history of emotions, the dissertation examines the spaces in which 
madness made an appearance in eighteenth-century Tuscany, paying particular attention to the 
circulation of languages, both across legal and institutional spaces, and between lay society, 
medical practitioners and magistrates. Through its study of the itineraries of madness, the 
dissertation suggests that litigants and witnesses adapted their notions of mental affliction and 
changed their language according to each space of appearance. The core of the discussion is 
based on interdiction procedures, the civil law inquiries into mental capacity handled by the 
Magistrato dei Pupilli et Adulti, which are examined against criminal procedures, hospital 
records, medical consultations, and records of the police.    
The dissertation argues that the Tuscan legal framework provided open and 
deliberately vague categories of madness and mental incapacity derived from a long legal 
tradition which remained mostly unchanged. However, while in terms of legal vocabulary 
long-term continuities seem to predominate, eighteenth-century records show a shift in the 
meanings of madness, opening to new social concerns and to new codifications of familial 
conflict. Initially bound primarily to patrimony and financial mismanagement, the 
understandings of madness became increasingly open to the emotional and relational 
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The eighteenth century has been identified as a turning point in the history of 
madness, as a period that gave madness unprecedented visibility. From initial studies mainly 
centred on the rise of the asylum and the birth of psychiatry, research into the history of 
madness has by now come to encompass a wide variety of aspects related to the 
understanding, responses to and experiences of madness. Studies that initially focused 
exclusively on the development of medical knowledge of madness, or on the 
institutionalization of the insane progressively gave space to studies that illuminated the wide 
spectrum of public provisions available for families to cope with the problems posed by 
madness. It has now been established that during the eighteenth century, asylums were used 
only as a last resort, calling into serious question the so-called “rise of the asylum.” Besides, 
mental disturbances were not an exclusive medical prerogative and, although medical 
practitioners developed important contributions in the field of diagnosis and treatment of 
insanity during the century, mentally disturbed people were not necessarily treated by medical 
practitioners. Furthermore, medical practitioners were not necessarily involved in the 
labelling of mental afflictions. As the specialized scholarship has been suggesting for over 
thirty years now, madness was primarily identified, experienced and managed by the families 
themselves.  
Mental disturbances were first displayed and discovered in the bosom of family life. 
To identify mental disturbances, families had first to shape an understanding of what it meant 
to be mentally disturbed, then to decide how they would handle it, and eventually where they 
would turn to in case they decided to seek external help. As Michael MacDonald rightly 
framed it, “ever since antiquity, insanity has been defined by experts but discovered by 
laymen. Physicians and lawyers have devised more or less rigorous definitions of mental 
disorders, but they have been obliged to rely upon laymen’s loose conceptions of insanity to 
enforce them.”1  
However, the fact that madness was largely kept at home did not result in it being 
conceived as a private problem. On the contrary, early modern responses to madness, from 
legal mechanisms to control financial mismanagement, institutionalization, imprisonment or 
                                                
1 Michael MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety, and Healing in Seventeenth-Century England 




other forms of confinement, to police admonishments, religious predicaments and any private 
solution were conceived as a collective response to a shared responsibility. Intrinsic to mental 
afflictions is that they constitute an individual affliction the experience and resulting 
configuration of which are inseparable from its social and relational consequences. 
Particularly in early modern Europe, madness was conceived as a social problem not only 
affecting the entire family group, but society as a whole. In this sense, understanding and 
responding to madness was a socially embedded process, involving family members and 
sufferers, the community with its particular cultural values, medical practitioners, judges and 
governmental policies. Understandings of madness circulated between different cultural 
communities and professional traditions, in a model of mutual adaptation and negotiation that 
produced what we could call the eighteenth-century knowledge of madness. The interactions 
between families, public provisions, the law and medical practitioners in this way provide a 
more nuanced model for understanding the experience and management of madness in the 
eighteenth century. 
These crucial questions, however, have been mainly applied to the early modern 
British context and, to some extent, to early modern France but they remain largely 
unexplored for the early modern Italian peninsula. This thesis intends to chart the spaces in 
which madness made an appearance in early modern Tuscany in order to examine how 
notions of mental affliction adapted and changed according to each institutional space of 
appearance. It explores the understandings and experiences of madness primarily by drawing 
from civil law inquiries into mental capacity, but also by encompassing other institutional 
spaces where madness was disclosed, such as hospital records, criminal records, and special 
requests to the central administration of the Grand Duchy.  
The thesis examines the language of madness found in each procedural space, paying 
particular attention to its lexicon, meanings and mutual influences. It builds upon the 
contention that definitions of mental incapacity should be approached as a collective and even 
consensual category constructed upon different narratives and interests. Family members, 
witnesses, medical practitioners, magistrates and government officials shaped and adapted 
their language according to each procedural space. The meanings of madness were carefully 
negotiated according to each context, taking into account where and why families turned to 
the authorities, the sufferer’s biography, the circumstances surrounding the identification and 
disclosure of the given mental disturbance, the characteristics of each household and family 




its enquiry, approaching it as the connecting piece between the private and the public 
response to madness, and as a decisive authority in the shaping of agreed understandings of 
madness. Mental afflictions appeared in the relational and emotional space of the household, 
where it was first recognized, understood and experienced. So long as madness was 
entrenched in the emotional system of the early modern family, public, medical or legal 
understandings should not be separated from the conflicts and vicissitudes suffered by the 
families.  
Historiography of Early Modern Madness: From Mental Institutions to the Family 
Following the publication of Michel Foucault’s Folie et Déraison. Histoire de la folie 
à l’âge classique in 1961, historiography remained strongly attracted to his teleological 
approach to the history of madness, defined as a process towards the birth of psychiatry and 
mental asylums. According to Foucault, from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, madness 
started to be condemned, excluded, and confined throughout Europe. So significant was this 
change in the attitude towards unreason, that “locking up the insane is the structure most 
clearly visible in the classical experience of madness.”2 This new “practice of confinement” 
targeted not only the mad, but with them any other individual who defied the new principles 
of reason, making no distinction between the insane, paupers, criminals, libertines, those 
suffering from venereal diseases, homosexuals or blasphemers. Thus, the “Age of Great 
Confinement”, following a bourgeois rationale, gave way to the “invention” of mental illness 
by psychiatry at the opening of the nineteenth century.3 A dark veil had fallen over the 
paradisiacal lives that the mentally disturbed supposedly enjoyed, commanded by “the sinister 
accord between Reason and Absolutism.”4  
Post-Foucauldian historiography, whether debating or approving his assertions, has 
definitively consecrated the significance of the eighteenth century for the history of madness. 
The model of the great confinement has been largely criticised, but there is a broad agreement 
regarding the new position occupied by madness during the century. It seems clear that 
madness and deviant behaviours in a broader sense gained visibility and that specific 
                                                
2 Michel Foucault, History of Madness (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 48. 
3 A useful outline of Foucault’s critics and interpretations can be found in Gary Gutting (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Foucault (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also Arthur Still and Irving 
Velody (eds.), Rewriting the History of Madness. Studies in Foucault’s Histoire de la folie (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1992).  
4 Roy Porter, “The rage of party: a glorious revolution in English psychiatry?”, Medical History 27, no. 1 (1983), 




strategies, both private and public, were developed to handle them. The discussion has 
focused on: 1) the role of the growing power of the state in the management of insanity; 2) the 
birth of medical institutions to confine or cure the mad, with particular attention to its 
admission procedures and purposes; 3) the degree to which medical knowledge became 
involved with mental disturbances; 4) religious, social and individual responses to the 
condition of madness; and 5) cultural representations of madness. Although the limited scope 
of mental institutions before 1800 has long been established, still more research is being 
produced on the history of asylums and psychiatry than on madness “outside” mental 
institutions, with the exception of the work done by British scholars.5 
The rise of the asylum throughout the eighteenth century has fascinated historians, 
first so as to prove the existence of the great confinement and, later, to prove that both mental 
institutions and a specialized medical knowledge to cure its patients had developed earlier 
than when Foucault had proclaimed. British historian Andrew Scull has claimed that the 
century witnessed the efforts of state power to control and confine indigent deviance, devising 
mechanisms to isolate all sorts of lunatics, beggars and physically disabled people in prisons, 
workhouses and hospitals. According to his view, the rise of the asylum went hand in hand 
with the new scenario of capitalism. While capitalism was to blame for the household’s 
growing incapacity to keep the insane at home, it at the same time allowed for the state to 
achieve the financial capacity of being able to afford (and control) mental institutions. This 
“radically novel social control apparatus” run by physicians but controlled by the state, served 
to demonstrate the collapse of the family-based system of care of the mentally disturbed. 
Asylums, and the new alliance between medical knowledge and the upper orders of society 
had come to prevail, and functioned as, a system of social control.6 
This purported dark age for insanity was also supported by Michael MacDonald who, 
in his otherwise innovative study into the casebooks of the astrological physician Richard 
Napier, identified the great “cataclysm” of the English Revolution as the turning point that 
                                                
5 For a comprehensive analysis of the European historiography, see Rafael Huertas, “Historia de la psiquiatría, 
¿Por qué?, ¿Para qué? Tradiciones historiográficas y nuevas tendencias”, Frenia 1, no. 1 (2001), pp. 9-36. The 
most important titles for the scope of this thesis are examined below. A brief overview of the indexes of journals 
specializing in the history of medicine proves this point. See Medical History, Journal of the History of Medicine 
and Allied Sciences, Social History of Medicine, History of Psychiatry, Frenia or Medicina e Storia. 
6 Andrew Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions. Madness and Society in Britain, 1700-1900 (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 42. The strong influence of his assertion is still measurable in the 
current historiographical discussion, in allusions to either of the two versions of his study: Museums of Madness, 




marks the end of “the older system of therapeutic eclecticism and family care.”7 Mostly 
agreeing with the model of the great confinement, for MacDonald “the eighteenth century was 
a disaster for the insane.”8 The combination of the rise of public and private asylums for 
managing the insane and the triumph of a “secular” medical monopoly was supported by the 
governing elite, which as a whole entailed the abolishment of family care. “As the eighteenth 
century progressed, more and more people were subjected to incarceration in madhouses and 
to medical brutality.”9 
Nevertheless, despite his pessimistic view of the consequences of the changes he 
identified in the eighteenth century, Michael MacDonald’s study has been fundamental in 
expanding the field of enquiry for the history of madness. Aimed at examining what he called 
the psychological stresses endured by seventeenth-century English people, MacDonald delved 
into Napier’s casebooks to “find out what insanity meant in the lives of people who actually 
experienced or observed it.”10 Using radically original sources for his time, he intended to fill 
the gap he believed was missing in Foucault’s Histoire de la folie: the consideration of how 
actual, ordinary people experienced madness in their daily lives. His study suggested that 
mental disorders were widespread in English society, with no specific stratification according 
to social background, and affecting a clear majority of young people and women. He charted 
the causalities that Napier’s patients themselves identified as being responsible for their 
mental disturbances, which led him to suggest that they were “as convinced as we are that 
social and psychological stress disturbed the minds and corroded the health of its victims.”11 
Family-related situations – whether conflicts with a spouse or lover, the loss of a loved one, 
fear of poverty or disputes with neighbours – are the most commonly recognized sources of 
stress and anxiety for seventeenth-century English men and women.12 
The attempt to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the social and cultural 
understandings of madness was undertaken by Roy Porter in his seminal Mind-Forg’d 
Manacles. Through a proposal that positioned madness as immersed in society, he aimed to 
                                                
7 MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam, p. 2. MacDonald argued that until the mid-seventeenth century the care of the 
insane was left completely in the hands of their families, regardless of their social condition. During this time, 
the intervention of the state was concentrated in the Court of Wards, the institution in charge of the guardianship 
of lunatics. The court was suppressed after the English Revolution, and the jurisdiction over lunatics was 
transferred to the Chancery. For more on this see Chapter 1.  
8 Ibid., p. 230.  
9 Ibid., p. 11.  
10 Ibid., p. xii.  
11 Ibid., p. 72. 




elaborate on the connections between lay and medical understandings of insanity, political 
responses, the law and medicine. Strongly opposed to the negative view of the eighteenth 
century and to Foucault’s approach, Porter claimed that no centralized power acted “to 
sequestrate unreason.”13 The management of madness remained largely private throughout the 
century, and the insane had remained largely under the care of their families or the 
community. The English state, he asserted, had not shown any special interest in managing 
and even less in constraining, madness, which became a public problem only when 
dangerous. Given that madness was a reality immersed in social experience, the making of 
“psychiatry” could not be understood as a “plot” to discipline and control society, but rather 
as the result of a social process. Madness thus appeared as shaped from below, which 
presupposed that historians had to go beyond the medical records to study it.  
Roy Porter’s studies signified a fundamental call to expand the scope and 
interpretative keys of the history of madness. Not only was he able to shift the view from 
hospitals to society, but he also aimed at “discovering how madness appeared, not only to 
doctors, magistrates, and bureaucrats, but within the knotted skeins of personal and social 
relations.”14 However, despite the undeniable importance of Roy Porter’s contribution in 
terms of including the voices of the sufferers in the history of medicine and insanity, his 
attempt was finally limited to the voice of some exceptional, privileged and notable mad 
persons, and was ultimately unable to address the family dimension of insanity.15 His major 
contributions are situated in his approach to madness as a socio-cultural phenomenon 
(without discrediting its biological existence), which was constructed, understood and 
managed by a variety of actors in eighteenth-century Britain. Porter sought to study the 
cultural configurations of mental disorders by including different voices, widening the spaces 
where such meanings could appear. 
The argument that madness was immersed in social life and not confined in mental 
institutions extended and enriched the scope of the history of madness. The study of madness 
could thus be approached by going beyond the history of scientific thinking, and of medical 
institutions and their rationales, to become a history of the cultures of madness, one that was 
                                                
13 Roy Porter, Mind-Forg’d Manacles: A History of Madness in England From the Restoration to the Regency 
[first ed. 1987] (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 111.  
14 W.F. Bynum, Roy Porter and Michael Shepherd (eds.), The Anatomy of Madness, Vol. I, (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2004), “Introduction”, p. 1. 
15 See, for instance, Porter, Mind-Forg'd Manacles, and Roy Porter, “‘The hunger of imagination’: approaching 





able to connect scientific thinking with lay perceptions, and public provision with medical 
practices and the patients’ responses. Beyond – and behind – medical knowledge and growing 
political power was the experience of madness, the family gaze and a wide array of social 
responses, as the influential studies of Roy Porter and Michael MacDonald first exposed.  
What studies such as that undertaken by Andrew Scull had neglected was precisely the 
complex world existing before and after madness appeared in mental institutions. His 
assertion that the rise of the asylum demonstrated the exhaustion of domestic care had failed 
to examine madness beyond the asylum, or to provide evidence as to why the so-called 
family-based system had allegedly failed. Quite the contrary, as later studies suggested, “the 
asylum, though increasingly important in the range of options open to communities, did not 
replace the family as the central locus of care of the insane. Rather, the household remained 
an important locus of care for the insane, and families maintained a central role in the 
decisions over treatment and supervision.”16 These studies, produced at the end of the last 
century, stressed the participation and the power of negotiation exerted by families in the 
formulation of care provisions for the insane.  
Strongly focused on the medical gaze, Italian historiography has approached madness 
mainly from its institutional dimension and the rise of psychiatry. Italian scholars have tried 
to demonstrate that asylums created in early modern Italy developed as increasingly 
medicalized spaces to treat and not only control madness.17 The stress was placed on the 
spread of specialized institutions throughout the Italian peninsula, medical labelling and 
management of madness and the involvement of medical practitioners in judicial practice. Yet 
the non-institutional dimensions of the experience of madness were almost completely 
neglected. For instance, Lisa Roscioni, in her thorough and comprehensive study of the rise of 
mental institutions in early modern Italy, examined the reasons for forcing a person to petition 
                                                
16 Peter Bartlett and David Wright, Outside the Walls of the Asylum. The History of Care in the Community 
1750-2000 (London: The Athlone Press, 1999), p. 4.  
17 Lisa Roscioni, Il governo della follia. Ospedali, medici e pazzi nell’età moderna (Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 
2003); Graziella Magherini and Vittorio Biotti, L’isola delle Stinche e i percorsi della follia a Firenze nei secoli 
XIV-XVIII (Florence: Ponte alle Grazie, 1992); Graziella Magherini and Vittorio Biotti, “Un luogo della città 
per custodia de’pazzi”. Santa Dorotea dei Pazzerelli di Firenze nelle delibere della sua congregazione (1642-
1754) (Florence: Le Lettere, 1997); Vittorio Biotti, É matto e tristo, pazzo e fastidioso. I saperi sulla follia: 
magistrati, medici e inquisitori a Firenze e negli Stati italiani del ‘600 (Florence: Nicomp L. E., 2002). See also 
Alberto De Bernardi, (ed.), Follia, psichiatria e società; Mario Galzigna (ed.), La follia, la norma, l’archivio: 
prospettive storiografiche e orientamenti archivistici (Venice: Marsilio, 1984); Vinzia Fiorino, Matti, 
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papi al '900: lineamenti di assistenza e cura a poveri e dementi (Bari: Dedalo, 2003); and Genesis 2, no. 1 




for a relative’s confinement in the Tuscan mental hospital, Santa Dorotea. As a result, her 
study was strongly focused on the institution, and thus, devoted to the dangerous mad. 
Although the archive of the Santa Dorotea Hospital, her main source for the Tuscan scenario, 
is extremely useful for examining the shaping of medical understandings of (dangerous) 
madness, it is less useful when examining lay understandings. Moreover, the petitions of 
internment, scant and repetitive, offer a still photograph of the furious mad who had become a 
danger to themselves or to the community.18 Furthermore, if we take into account that 
madness was confined only as a last resort, we must conclude that her study left outside the 
more common aspects of mental disturbance, which was largely kept at home.    
As a result, these approaches are restricted precisely because they isolate insanity from 
its context, studying madness only once it had left the family domain, and circumscribing the 
analysis to medical records and, in some cases, criminal records. The problem with this is that 
historians from different academic traditions agree that the confinement of mentally-afflicted 
relatives in Early Modern Europe was used only as a last resort. For instance, this has been 
proven in the cases of the confinement of wives or other problematic relatives in convents or 
workhouses, and for the mentally disturbed who were committed to mental institutions.19 For 
the specific case of Tuscany, Roscioni argued that madness in the eighteenth century was still 
a family issue, “nel senso che solo nell’assenza, nell’impossibilità o non volontà di 
provvedere a un parente pazzo si finiva per rivolgersi a un’istituzione esterna.”20 This fact 
reminds us of the absent variable in the history of confinement – particularly in the case of 
mental deviance: how were those problematic relatives handled when they were not confined? 
In other words, what has been neglected by this historiography is the household as the space 
(both physical and emotional) where madness was first identified, experienced and handled. 
Furthermore, precisely given that madness was largely kept in the domestic space, the family, 
and particularly certain members of the family structure, acted as intermediaries between the 
public and the private spheres.  
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Finally, it is striking that Lisa Roscioni’s comprehensive study focuses strictly on the 
institutional space of confinement, making no reference to any other public responses to the 
phenomenon. The Tuscan state offered two mechanisms for the management of madness: one 
was confinement while the other was interdiction. For this reason, exploring interdiction 
procedures, the core sources used in this thesis, illuminates a side of the early modern reality 
of madness that has been largely left in the dark. By the same token, most of the existing 
studies are also limited in so far as they fail to follow the itineraries of madness, producing a 
static picture of a reality that was unstable and flexible. The study by Magherini and Biotti, 
who did follow madness through its different spaces of appearance, tends to overstate the 
significance of confinement before 1750, neglecting other institutional responses to the 
problem of madness, such as guardianship and direct mediation.21  
The recent study by Elizabeth Mellyn offers an interesting contribution towards a 
more nuanced approach to madness. Placing also the family at the centre of her analysis, 
Mellyn studied the different legal provisions devised between the fourteenth and seventeenth 
centuries by the Tuscan administration to address the problems caused by madness. Her study 
suggests that madness was addressed through a collaborative exchange between families and 
government officials in a common effort that aimed at finding the most appropriate solutions 
for the problems posed by madness. Rather than serving as proof of the “expanding 
mechanisms of control”, the civil and criminal court records of Tuscany suggest that public 
institutions played a limited role in the care of the mentally disabled.22  
Given the records of madness between the fifteenth and the seventeenth century are 
far more scant and lacunose that those of the eighteenth century, Mellyn’s study does not pay 
particular attention to the connections that can be drawn between the different mechanisms 
devised to tackle the problems posed by madness. For the same reason, although she 
examines the cultural meanings of madness by challenging the supremacy of medical 
knowledge over lay understandings, her study does not differentiate between the different 
voices that composed the language of madness, nor does it elaborate on the ways in which 
litigants, medical practitioners or magistrates adapted their language according to each 
context. This thesis aims to address these two issues.    
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The study of madness has benefited from the expansion of historiography into new 
sources, resulting from historians’ quest to extend their investigation beyond the walls of the 
asylum. We can point to two main areas covered by this endeavour; one is the inclusion of 
criminal records, and the other the introduction of civil court records and parish records 
dealing with requests for poor relief, which were able to illuminate the history of madness 
from a different perspective. Criminal and civil law records have in particular proved 
invaluable. Civil capacity, confinement, criminal prosecution or any other available provision 
for the mentally ill were governed and regulated by the law. According to Peter Barlett, the 
concern of legal measures devised to address the problem of insanity is twofold. They 
constitute a mechanism that directly affected the insane and at the same time they reflect how 
societies conceived of madness: “The law might thus be very much a part of the life of the 
insane person, and an understanding of the dynamic between the individual and the law is 
pivotal to understanding the life of the insane person.”23  
Scholars such as Marco Boari have claimed that the law preceded psychiatry and 
medicine in the development of a knowledge of insanity in the early modern period. In his 
study on the reception and reshaping of Roman law by Italian Renaissance jurists, Boari 
asserts that the law acted as an organizing element of the knowledge on madness that fed from 
social life, and articulated political aims. This in the context of the limited authority that 
medicine held over madness, compared to that of jurists, judges and lawyers. This, in turn, 
entailed that the diagnosis of madness relied almost entirely upon the law.24 In fact, legal 
provisions for handling madness predate any centralized medical or welfare measure in Italy, 
as well as in the rest of Europe.  
However, later research has suggested that specialized legal or medical knowledge had 
a limited involvement in the assessment of madness, particularly in the British contexts, 
where much of the role in determining the validity of the testimonies fell to the jury. Given 
that the “interrogations were designed to assess a subject’s practical understanding of the 
world, and their ability to deal with it”, there was no need for expert opinion.25 The effects 
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and consequences of mental afflictions were gauged by plain common sense rather than 
through medical diagnostic categories. And thus we return to lay society and the family.  
Most of the studies that examine the legal management of madness in history have 
focused on criminal justice, leaving largely understudied the possibilities offered by the 
records of civil justice.26 The study of inquiries into mental capacity, which constitute the 
core of this thesis, should be understood as part of the endeavour to expand the view of the 
study of madness. The study of interdiction procedures, the legal mechanism that deprived a 
person of his or her rights to administrate their patrimony and manage their affairs, shed light 
on the involvement of the law with family life, illuminating issues such as the uses of justice 
and the debate over proper and improper behaviour. Given that interdiction procedures 
demanded that authorities and families discuss how mental incapacity was to be understood, 
they constitute a privileged arena in which to study the negotiation of what madness 
amounted to.  
 Inquiries into mental capacity remain largely unexplored, except for the studies of 
Robert Allan Houston, Elizabeth Mellyn, Akihito Suzuki, Thierry Nootens and Laurent 
Cartayrade, whose studies are discussed in detail below.27 The neglect of these records has 
perpetuated a somehow distorted view of early modern notions of insanity, given that most 
studies that draw on criminal or medical records illuminate madness almost exclusively 
during its moments of crises, and thus provide a static picture of a decontextualized moment. 
On the contrary, inquiries into mental capacity are able to give a more flexible image of 
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insanity, illuminating the phenomenon along its different phases. This, as a consequence, 
allows the historian to draw more nuanced interpretations of madness as a phenomenon that 
encompassed a wide variety of behaviours, attitudes, emotional displays and social reactions.  
Legal inquiries into mental capacity also provide the possibility to examine the 
shaping of notions of madness and mental incapacity that were embedded in practical 
concerns for the daily and, particularly, financial behaviour of the defendant. As a result, the 
historian is able to delve into the understandings of madness and the varied languages of 
madness, liberated from the constraints of medical categorizations, examining them within 
their own contexts. All of the existing studies, in fact, have stressed the particularity of 
madness as a social and relational illness, which “must be understood in social terms relevant 
to the period in which a person lived.”28 In so doing, the study of madness works as a mirror 
for the study of its normal counterpart, in so far as the discussion about madness entails a 
debate on expected behaviour and normativity.  
An advocate of the family as the primary locus of care for the insane has been Akihito 
Suzuki, who has carried out valuable research that stresses the importance of the family in the 
experience and management of madness. Aiming at examining the interactions between 
domestic and institutional care of the insane, Suzuki conducted research by drawing from 
sources that had not initially been taken into account by previous studies, such as parish 
records of poor relief and inquiries into mental capacity.29 These kinds of studies enabled 
historians to assert that institutional assistance was only resorted to once familial and private 
provisions had failed. Furthermore, so important was the family in the study of madness, 
Suzuki claims, that it illuminates the origins of the nineteenth-century moral treatment from a 
different dimension. The study of the domestic care of the insane suggests that many 
characteristics of the moral treatment developed in the early nineteenth-century asylums had 
their basis in home care. The use of persuasion to control the patient, the importance of 
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establishing a relationship of power and of creating a “channel of communication” with them 
are all mechanisms that were already present in domestic care.30  
Studies on the wide array of public and private provisions for addressing the problems 
posed by madness and unruly family members have served to demonstrate that responses to 
madness in early modern Europe were predominantly temporary and far more flexible than 
what Foucault had envisaged. For instance, Houston’s study on the Scottish inquests into 
mental capacity suggests that families could turn to a wide range of measures to deal with 
their unruly and insane relatives. Cognition, the legal mechanism that in Scotland deprived a 
person of her or his rights to administer property and manage their own affairs, was one 
among many other available mechanisms, such as home restraint, imprisonment or 
institutionalization. These mechanisms could be used alternatively or simultaneously, 
repeatedly or only once, depending on each particular case. Having in mind that measures to 
deal with the insane were flexible and eminently temporary enriches our understanding of the 
experience and perception of madness in the Ancien Régime. This thesis draws from this still 
largely unexplored approach, and proposes the notion of the “itineraries of madness” to study 
the formulation of negotiated mechanisms for dealing with the problem of madness. 
Historians have stressed the extent to which the disclosure of madness in the public 
realm was dependant upon the dynamics of household life and family conflicts. Cases of 
madness would have remained unknown to us if not for a circumstantial disturbance in family 
life, that may even be disconnected from the existence of those deemed mentally 
incapacitated. R. A. Houston has termed these as contingencies, drawing on Erving 
Goffman’s Asylums, which marked the appearance of madness in the records. As Houston 
puts it, “Appearing before an inquest, entering an insanity plea, or being committed to an 
asylum were exceptional experiences. Furthermore, the timing of an appearance depended on 
much more than a person’s mental state. (...) Certain triggers or ‘contingencies’ like the 
intrusiveness of behaviour may precipitate action by authorities, neighbours, or kin.”31   
Thus, the household can be approached as the place of convergence between different 
understandings of insanity, as the epicentre of the lay construction of madness that at the 
same time entailed a debate on the boundaries of normality. In shaping what was to be 
considered abnormal behaviour, people were defining normality, constructing their identities, 
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and shaping their interiority. Improper behaviour was identified according to specific values 
that assigned the level and kind of “rationality” people were supposed to observe.  
Dialogues Between the History of the Family and the History of Madness 
The characteristics of the early modern family, the reduced involvement of medical 
opinion, and the fact that madness was largely kept at home makes the family an inescapable 
starting point for the history of madness. The family shaped the framework against which 
madness was understood, and created the possibilities for external intervention, be it 
communal, religious, medical, legal, or governmental. And yet, madness is a largely 
unexplored factor in the history of the early modern family. Taking into account that madness 
was kept largely at home during the early modern period, it is striking to acknowledge how 
we still lack studies on how mental afflictions tainted the course of familial life, changing the 
experience of family relationships, interfering in the distribution of power among its 
members, forcing them to devise special strategies or even affecting the forging of 
affectionate bonds. But the presence or identification of madness could also influence how the 
private life of families was exposed to the public, either in civil or criminal litigation, or in 
discussions regarding normativity within a changing scenario.  
The lack of a connection between the history of madness and the history of the family 
reflects a mutual disregard for the concerns of each field, a situation that some scholars have 
tried to change. Fundamental to an opening up to the history of the family were the studies by 
Akihito Suzuki, which aimed to breach these two historiographies by examining the history of 
madness through the lens of the development of a domestic ideology.32 In Suzuki’s analysis, 
domesticity shaped the experience of madness, and it is fundamental to understanding how 
madness was understood and how families reacted to its presence. Following Suzuki’s lead, 
this study draws from studies of the early modern family to build a larger cultural framework 
into which understandings of madness can be inserted. By taking into account some of the 
particularities, developments and changes undergone by the eighteenth-century family, it 
sheds light on the perceptions of and responses to madness.    
The overlap between madness and the family as objects of historical inquiry is in fact 
twofold. On the one hand, madness was a reality profoundly embedded in family life, as I 
have said. In a sense, therefore, to study madness outside the walls of mental institutions 
                                                




necessarily presupposes that we start from the familiar realm. But, the study of madness also 
sheds new light on some of the traditional problems of the history of the family. Let me 
demonstrate this by examining how the study of family litigation, one of the most 
fundamental and productive areas in the history of the family, can benefit from a study that 
takes into account madness as a category of analysis.  
The early modern family has been a particularly productive research field in the last 
decades, inspiring a variety of approaches and a lively discussion. Particularly central to the 
history of the family has been the increasing recourse to studying the use of litigation in 
resolving private affairs between spouses, siblings or parents and children, and between 
different households and different family lines. The relational conflicts exposed in the courts 
of law demonstrate that litigants sought government arbitration to negotiate a wide range of 
issues, including personal expectations and compliance with behavioural norms, property 
management and economic practices.33 
An important point of concern in this discussion has been marriage, as the 
foundational institution of the European family, with its symbolic, economic and emotional 
significance. Marriage has been examined as an entry point for illuminating religious, 
political or social control, judicial norms and judicial practice, public and private 
relationships, agency, emotions, patriarchy and inheritance, distribution of powers and gender 
relations. Influenced also by the eruption of subjectivity and the “emotional turn”, recent 
studies have stressed the importance of the emotional dimension of the history of the family, 
incorporating the individual experience into the analysis. Marriage disputes, inter-
generational and sibling conflicts, inheritance litigation, and any other family conflicts began 
to be examined as means of entry into the private experience of family members.  
The historiography that draws from family litigation and which examines the family 
as it was represented in the legal records throws up particularly interesting aspects for a study 
of the history of madness. Early modern litigation illuminates issues as diverse as paternal and 
intergenerational relationships, the negotiation of behavioural norms according to age and 
gender, conflicting conceptions about economic management and transmission of the 
patrimony, the building of strategies and alliances between and against family members, the 
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roles of kinship, the experience of marriage, the distribution of power, and gender relations.34 
In all these aspects of familial life, the presence of madness, and the notions and reactions to 
it, left an indelible mark. Conversely, the characteristics of the family, its debates, its conflicts 
and its strategies of litigation profoundly shaped not only how madness was understood and 
how family members reacted to it, but also how madness was registered in the records.  
The experience and development of marital disputes or intergenerational conflicts, to 
give just two examples, could be profoundly altered when one of the actors was held to suffer 
from a mental disturbance. Alternatively, mental disturbance could be argued to have 
instrumentally changed the outcome in a family dispute. For instance, studies on family 
litigation frequently examine disputes that placed drunkenness, extravagance and furious fits 
among the arguments raised against a spouse or a family member.35 However, scholars have 
generally not explored these kinds of accusations from a perspective that takes into account 
how drunkenness, fury or extravagance were increasingly connected to madness during the 
eighteenth century, or how similar descriptions appear in inquiries into mental capacity 
precisely to argue denunciations of madness. This is particularly interesting if we bear in 
mind that some scholars suggest that drunkenness and certain forms of fury were not deemed 
to be signs of mental disturbance in family litigation before the eighteenth century.36 
The introduction of madness into matrimonial disputes has been touched upon by 
some British scholars. Laura Gowing has suggested that seventeenth-century English 
matrimonial litigations give little evidence that wives or husbands would have recourse to 
“madness, mental distraction, or drunkenness [to] explain violence.”37 However, it is possible 
to find the association between wife-beating and irrationality in witness accounts, and, if we 
follow Joanne Bailey, the association between extreme forms of violence, irrationality and 
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madness was entrenched by the eighteenth century.38 However, these constitute generally 
marginal commentaries, mostly associated with the problem of marital violence, within a 
research trend that is much more interested in other aspects of marriage breakdown than in the 
manifestations and understandings of mental incapacity. Drawing from these random pieces 
of evidence and based on the findings of the civil and criminal records examined in this 
thesis, I suggest that a deliberate intertwining of the findings of the history of madness with 
the findings of the history of the family could be immensely useful for a better understanding 
of how family disputes were argued in front of a court of law. Madness, particularly during 
the eighteenth century, seems to have been more visible or, at least, families decided to 
disclose it more often. Furthermore, notions of madness were not reduced to its furious types, 
encompassing instead various gradations and manifestations. What the records under 
examination in this thesis show is that litigants made instrumental use of the argument that 
their spouse was mad or that their son exhibited behaviours that were associated with 
madness.   
Judicial practices were negotiated and even manipulated by family members to 
achieve their means.39 Fundamental to this discussion are the contributions of Martin Dinges 
and Mario Sbriccoli, who suggested the approaches of the uses of justice and of the 
interconnections between hegemonic justice and negotiated justice. Entangled with 
discussions about bottom-up models of social disciplining and negotiated forms of social 
control, the historiography of justice and family litigation opened up a new line of inquiry, 
which increasingly took into consideration the agency of litigants, the role of intermediaries 
in settling private disputes, and the range of alternative solutions for solving conflicts that did 
not necessarily entail following judicial procedures as the law had intended them to be 
followed. In this sense, scholarship on matrimonial litigation has claimed that the fact that 
litigants knew how to manoeuvre and manipulate justice, and that the judicial narratives were 
                                                
38 Joanne Bailey, Unquiet lives. Marriage and Marriage Breakdown in England 1660-1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 116. See also Lawrence Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 199.  
39 See Marco Bellabarba, Gerd Schwerhoff and Andrea Zorzi (eds.), Criminalità e giustizia in Germania e in 
Italia. Pratiche giudiziarie e linguaggi giuridici tra medioevo ed età moderna, (Bologna-Berlin: Il Mulino, 
2001), particularly Martin Dinges, “Usi della giustizia come elemento di controllo sociale nella prima età 
moderna”, pp. 285-324 and Mario Sbriccoli, “Giustizia negoziata, giustizia egemonica. Riflessioni su una nuova 
fase degli studi di storia della giustizia criminale”, pp. 345-364. Revealing for the role of mediators of justice is 
Ottavia Niccoli, Perdonare. Idee, pratiche, rituali in Italia tra Cinque e Seicento (Rome: Laterza, 2007). 
Regarding matrimonial litigation, see Daniela Lombardi, “Giustizia ecclesiastica e composizione dei conflitti 
matrimoniali (Firenze, secoli XVI-XVIII)”, in Silvana Seidel Menchi and Diego Quaglioni, I tribunali del 




manufactured with specific aims does not rule out their historical value. Litigants had to adapt 
their narratives to the legal scripts required in the legal space they turned to and to produce 
“plausible” stories. However, this does not transform them into mere fictional artefacts. 
Matrimonial litigation as well as the inquiries into mental incapacity studied here demonstrate 
that petitioners knew how much they were required to say, and how they were supposed to 
say it; but, beyond the script, we always find glimpses into private life, subjectivity and 
agency. Litigants had to adapt their narratives to the required legal script, but they nonetheless 
produced narratives that are unique and one of a kind.40  
I would like to draw attention to the shaping of behavioural normativities that can be 
grasped in the judicial archives, particularly the use and abuse of the judicial instruments by 
private citizens. Litigation involving family life, in the words of Julie Hardwick, “engaged 
fundamental questions about household dynamics, about understandings of the relations 
between gender and authority, and about the significance of public discussion of personal 
behaviour.”41 Thus, recourse to litigation, being an intrinsic part of the mechanisms for 
exerting social control from below, enables us to study social debates about accepted 
behaviour and about the consequences of breaching the norms.42   
Historians have stressed the fact that an overwhelming majority of the matrimonial 
disputes in early modern Europe derived from petitions by women.43 The predominance of 
female petitions connects historians to issues such as female sensibility, agency and women’s 
emotional expectations of their family worlds, regardless of whether they were written to 
“muovere a compassione l’interlocutore.”44 The way in which women appear in the trial 
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records is far from the common image that depicted them as weak, passive, helpless or 
victimized by men. On the contrary, they demonstrate a clear awareness of their power as 
“un’esperta conoscitrice non solo dei canali istituzionali cui rivolgersi, ma anche delle 
modalità più corrette per ottenere determinati scopi.”45  
Family litigation gives voice to personal expectations regarding the proper behaviour 
of a husband, of a son, of a wife, shedding light on the agencies of the different members of 
the early modern family. Scholars have enquired into what moved family members to 
denounce each other in front of a court of law, given that usually what was being denunciated 
had been occurring for a long time before. This same problem also applies to the disclosure of 
madness in the Tuscan records, which also connects the historian with profound issues about 
expectancies, unfulfilled desires, frustrations and auto-determination.46  
Family disputes disclose behavioural disorders that were acknowledged as being 
responsible for the fracturing of familial harmony, as well as conduct that was identified as 
improper, dishonourable or contrary to the precepts ordained by gender roles. Thanks to 
significant contributions to the re-examination of patriarchy, gender identities have been 
approached in new ways that highlight the flexibility of their meanings according to the 
cultural context. In this regard, historians have called attention to the necessity of connecting 
the prescriptive discourse on gender roles to the experienced gender identity.47   
One excellent example of this is the growing fear that arose in Georgian England 
against profligacy. Nicola Phillips used the memoirs of a father who had recorded the descent 
of his profligate son into financial ruin, delinquency and moral depravation as her point of 
entry in order to examine intergenerational conflicts and clashing conceptions of social status, 
gentlemanly behaviour, masculinity and financial values.48 The father of the profligate son 
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was at first desperate and then firmly condemnatory of his son’s behaviour, until he 
eventually decided to observe and keep note of his son’s depravity by writing it down. 
Although Phillips only touches upon the connection between moral depravation and insanity 
(the profligate son of her study posed challenges to society that his contemporaries often took 
to be the result of mental affliction), her study does make a valuable point for the issues under 
discussion in this thesis. Mental and emotional disorders were conceived in terms of and 
recognized as a disruption of femininity and masculinity, filial duty, honour, fatherhood and 
motherhood, and so forth. Furthermore, her study brings to the fore what other studies have 
suggested regarding family disorders in that period.  
The eighteenth century witnessed a clash between the generations over divergent 
ideals and conceptions of financial behaviour, autonomy, the value of social status, and 
proper manifestations of affection.49 Enlightenment discourse tended to place increasing 
attention on disorders of the family, with the proliferation of moral literature promoting 
particular family values: maternal love, paternal love, parental virtues.50   
The family disputes that are disclosed in the denunciations of prodigal behaviour and 
of mental incapacity, both of which constitute the bulk of the cases examined in this thesis, 
shed light on the active relationships between family members, disclosing day-to-day 
mechanisms for resolving discords or for devising obstacles to the implementation of 
patriarchal power. In her discussion on the limits and dynamics of patriarchal power, Linda 
Pollock has examined the hidden nuances behind a family dispute over patrimony and 
inheritance.51 Power relations were not static, and patriarchal power could be hindered by 
alliances and strategies such as declaring the head of the family as “mentally incapacitated”, 
and accusing him of “deranged behaviour.”52 In this context, as I will argue, the study of the 
records of madness sheds light on the emotional world of the early modern household from a 
new perspective, that of the resources employed to deal with disruptive relatives, and, at the 
same time, reflects the abuse of such labels to win a family dispute. 
It is precisely this connection between the definition of gender roles, family conflicts, 
and madness that has been missing for the early modern period, save for the studies on 
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inquiries into mental capacity cited above.53 In this regard, the history of the family, with its 
special concern for gender as an analytical category, can enrich the discussion on the 
construction of psychiatry and the shaping of new notions of mental incapacity in the 
eighteenth century. At the same time, the examination of social perceptions and meanings of 
madness may shed new light on the experience of the early modern family, how gender roles 
were debated and performed in practice, the mechanisms by which the allegedly weak 
members of the family could change the balance of power, and, to give a final example, the 
concerns and management of conflicts within the eighteenth-century family.    
 
Interdiction Procedures and the Itineraries of Madness 
This thesis deals with the itineraries and languages of madness in eighteenth-century 
Tuscany, taking into account the connections between lay, legal and medical understandings. 
It has two primary aims. Firstly, to examine how mental afflictions were identified, 
experienced and understood by Tuscan families and, secondly, to explore how, when and with 
what outcome families resorted to the public provisions devised to respond to the problems 
posed by madness. The study of the itineraries of madness sheds light on how public 
provisions to tackle the problems of madness served as a space of encounter between families, 
medical practitioners and government officials in order to negotiate the meanings, indicators 
and languages of madness.  
We have seen that, before the nineteenth century, the mentally disturbed were kept 
largely at home. However, this does not mean that madness left no trace in the records during 
the period. In eighteenth-century Tuscany, there were various courses of action that families 
could resort to when they had to deal with a mentally disturbed relative. They could seek 
medical help, or they could turn to family networks, priests or neighbours. They could try to 
make different household arrangements, and change, for instance, the distribution of roles or 
the household disposition. Many of these arrangements, as one might expect, left no trace. 
But there were a range of other resources available for families that did leave a mark, some of 
which constitute the core of this study. Depending on the case and the conflicts caused by the 
mentally disturbed, families could request that a government official visit them and try to 
produce a change in behaviour, or they could ask the local authority or the chief of police to 
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issue an official reprimand. When these failed, they could combine legal admonishments with 
temporary imprisonment, house arrest or internal exile. They could press criminal charges 
when the behaviour breached the law or they could commit the disturbed person to a mental 
hospital. Finally, they could also request for them to be interdicted and placed under 
guardianship.    
The itineraries of madness in this thesis start with interdiction procedures, which 
experienced a notable increase during the century. This is followed by a discussion of 
criminal insanity and mental institutions, to then examine special requests and other 
temporary measures. By following the itineraries of madness, I examine how families 
negotiated understandings and responses to madness with governmental authorities, medical 
practitioners and judges. The thesis suggests that the understandings of madness were socially 
embedded, eminently contextual and relational, and codified through culturally meaningful 
definitions. The narratives of madness show that lay society relied upon its own cultural 
background in order to identify and explain madness. Strongly conditioned by the purposes of 
the legal procedures and the foundations of Tuscan society, definitions of madness had been 
traditionally centred around property and economic behaviour. I argue that the Tuscan legal 
framework provided open and deliberately vague categories of madness and mental 
incapacity (prodigo, demente, mentecatto), which derived from a long tradition and remained 
mostly unchanged. However, while in terms of legal vocabulary long-term continuities seem 
to predominate, the eighteenth century brings to the fore new concerns and a new codification 
of familial conflicts, which resulted in a shift in the meanings of madness. The understandings 
of madness became increasingly open to other aspects of familial and social life, and more 
importantly, ascribed new roles to tackle its consequences.  
Given that the legal language was based on a basic set of categories that remained 
mostly unchanged, narratives of madness and mental incapacity were able to include new 
meanings, and expanded to encompass the new social and familial concerns of the century. 
The eighteenth century saw challenges to patriarchal authority, conflicting expectations over 
marriage, motherhood, fatherhood and the responsibilities of a first-born, intergenerational 
conflicts and new forms of affection. All of these, combined with the anxieties generated by 
disobedience and sexual permissiveness, were the gauges of the debate around mental 
deviance. To expose these issues, the narratives of madness increasingly delved into the 
relational dimensions of mental disturbance, paying particular attention to certain forms of 




prodigo, we can observe the appearance of the culturally meaningful stravaganza 
(extravagance), inquietudine (uneasiness), alterazioni and soppressioni di spirito (alterations 
and oppressions of spirit) or carattere irregolare, volubile and incerto (irregular, changing or 
uncertain character). These eminently lay forms for describing mental instability are coupled 
by the changes observed in the medical language, with the appearance of new terminologies 
that pointed to a diseased brain as the origin of mental affliction, and also paid increasing 
attention to emotional disturbances in the aetiologies of madness.   
It has been pointed out that a constitutive feature of early modern justice was that it 
was predominantly used to resolve conflicts that had been engendered in the familial realm. 
Early modern societies turned to the judicial apparatus for mediation in their familial 
conflicts. The eighteenth century witnessed the explosion of family conflicts in the 
administration of justice, exposing to the public the private Désordre des familles.54 The 
particularities of this new exposure in Tuscany lie in the channel employed, the kinds and 
contents of the conflicts disclosed, and the solutions followed to resolve them. On the one 
hand, the increasing number of interdiction procedures suggests that families had found a new 
channel through which to vent family conflict. But, the changes observed in the languages of 
madness also suggest that the concerns of the families were increasingly being placed on the 
relational dimension, and were centred around emotional instability. Finally, in a context 
where the majority of the reported sources of conflict were produced by male insanity, the 
solution to family disorder and to patrimonial mismanagement was placed in the hands of 
women, who were entrusted with the task of domesticating male irrationality. Thus, I suggest, 
interdiction procedures positioned women as “rational” agents of the family group who had to 
control the effects of male irrationality.   
The basic source of this study is the archive of the Magistrato dei Pupilli, the Tuscan 
Court of Wards concerned with administrating the patrimony of orphans whose fathers had 
died intestate, and of adults with physical and mental disabilities. Although inquiries into 
mental capacity were part of the public provisions devised to respond to the problems posed 
by madness in various European scenarios, this archive can certainly be taken to be a 
remarkable exception. The existing studies in the field suggest that European records of 
inquiries into mental capacity are more generous in providing a nuanced and lively picture of 
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madness than the image usually provided by hospital or criminal records. However, they 
generally lack the long-term perspective offered by the records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli.55 
The time framework covered by the Pupilli archive is, for this reason, remarkable. The bulk of 
the studies on inquiries into mental capacity have focused on the records left by the 
procedures undertaken before it was decided that the person needed to be placed under 
guardianship. This means that, although these studies focus on narratives that illuminate not 
only the present of the reported mental condition but also its past, they are usually silent about 
what happened afterwards. On the contrary, the records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli do not 
stop once the interdiction was decreed, but rather begin with it.  
This archive provides an invaluable opportunity in which to trace the different layers 
that composed the understandings of madness. We not only find the petition, testimonies, the 
inquiries and opinions of the authorities, and the interdiction decree, but also a wide range of 
subsequent records that continue to shed light on many aspects of the life of the interdicted 
and their families.56 As a result, the historian is able to examine how madness was understood 
and experienced at different times of a person’s life, sometimes throughout their entire adult 
life. Furthermore, the voices recorded are varied, providing different perspectives and 
experiences, from the point of view of different members of the family, neighbours, medical 
practitioners, priests and authorities, to that of the allegedly mentally afflicted. Furthermore, 
these voices appear during different stages of a person’s life. For this reason, we are able to 
grasp how perceptions of a person’s madness changed with time, adapting to different 
contingencies and expanding in response to changing concerns. The greatest bias of this 
source derives from its very purpose. Given that its primary purpose was to protect property 
from mismanagement, it only informs on the mental affliction of property holders, keeping in 
the dark not only the experience of madness suffered by the poor but, to a great extent, by 
women too. This does not imply that women are silent, as I have already explained, and in 
fact it provides an interesting view that takes issue with the notion of the feminization of 
madness, as I will discuss further below.  
To counterbalance the limitations provided by the Pupilli records, the thesis also 
examines the appearance of madness in the criminal procedures of the Otto di Guardia e 
Balìa, the Tuscan criminal court, the records of the Pia Casa di Santa Dorotea dei Pazzarelli, 
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the Tuscan mental hospital, and in special requests to the Grand Duke handled by his chief of 
Police, the Auditore Fiscale.57 This thesis is particularly concerned with lay (meaning here not 
specialized or professional) perceptions of insanity, and the ways in which social language 
came to use legal and medical terms to describe insanity. For the same reason, medical and 
legal languages are approached as embedded in the social realm, and feeding off the families’ 
experience and perception of the phenomenon. In other words, insanity is examined from the 
bottom up, which also explains the structure of the thesis. This strategy allows me to examine 
the echoes of lay language that can be found in medical testimonies of insanity, and to trace 
the extent to which medical language evolved as detached from the social. For the same 
reason, I have decided not to examine eighteenth-century medical treatises on insanity in 
depth, although these will be used as references to the linguistic backgrounds.   
The thesis employs gender as a category of analysis to examine the distribution of 
power inside the household. In this realm, the study of the mechanisms available to families 
to cope with the problems posed by madness offers particularly interesting results. As the 
thesis will later show, the pattern that emerges when families came under the strain of the 
presence of mental affliction in the head of the family is for women to take this post. In 
response to the disorder produced by mental affliction, government officials and families 
negotiated the temporary empowerment of women, who were generally appointed 
administrators to their husbands or son’s patrimonies, and were the preferred interlocutors of 
the authorities.         
Mental incapacity and madness in general constitute objects of historical inquiry that 
mirror wider phenomena, from the negotiation of behavioural norms, the settling of age-
specific and gender-specific expected behaviour and emotional reactions, to family 
relationships, medical practice and the social experience of disease. In this sense, although 
this thesis is concerned with a Tuscan problem, its main questions and theoretical approaches 
come from other European frameworks. Although this study does not openly employ a 
comparative or transnational perspective – even if I do make connections to the European 
context and discuss studies on other geographical frameworks – it does benefit from some of 
its theoretical and methodological approaches.  
Scholarship on the history of science has been occupied over the last years with 
transnational circulations of scientific knowledge in the early modern period, inside Europe 
                                                




and, increasingly, across empires.58 The model of interconnected intersections and circulation 
is of significant value in shedding a new light on the problem of madness, even if at a “local” 
level. Using this model allows me to examine the multilevel interactions between lay society, 
medical knowledge, judicial practice and governing dispositions from a point of view that 
takes into account mutual accommodations, negotiations and rejections.59 This thesis is 
largely concerned with the circulation of languages among different spaces and cultural 
communities (i.e. the household domain, neighbourhood, medical profession, legal 
profession, government officials). The underlying idea is that notions of madness were shaped 
by a multilevel crossing of factors, including a shared cultural understanding regarding proper 
and improper behaviours, and the circulation of judicial principles and medical knowledge, 
which at the point of interaction were adapted and reshaped in manifold ways.  
In terms of its temporal framework, the thesis covers the period roughly from 1700 
until 1780, but the margins are flexible. Various chronologies coincide in this decision. The 
broader reasons for placing the study in the eighteenth century have already been discussed, 
both in relation to the chronologies of the history of madness and the history of the family. 
But, other practical considerations were also taken into account. The beginning of the century 
was marked by the disastrous end of Medici rule and the beginning of the Lorraine period in 
1737. However, the characteristics of the Regency entailed that institutional changes were not 
immediately perceived. In terms of the management of madness during the first half of the 
century, the biggest change was produced by a reform of the statutes of the Magistrato dei 
Pupilli, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the numbers of interdictions starting from 
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1718. However, the other spaces of madness remained mostly unaltered until 1750, when a 
law changed the procedure of admission to Santa Dorotea by making it open to any patient 
regardless of whether they could pay the required fee or not. This produced a radical increase 
in the number of patients, which augmented the visibility of madness already resulting from 
the interdiction procedures.  
The mid-eighteenth century was in fact a landmark period also for the changes that 
can be observed in the languages of madness, when a turn to more nuanced conceptions can 
be observed. The decision to limit the search to the 1770s was motivated by two factors: on 
the one hand, the decade constitutes another turning point in the history of madness, with the 
introduction of a series of reforms for the management of madness that definitively changed 
its face. In 1767 interdiction procedures were declared free of charge (significantly widening 
their range of impact), and in 1785 Vincenzo Chiarugi assumed the direction of Santa 
Dorotea, while in 1789 he wrote the new regulations for the management of mental patients in 
the new psychiatric hospital of San Bonifazio.60     
The thesis is structured into seven chapters. The first chapter is concerned with the 
foundations of the Magistrato dei Pupilli and the characteristics of interdiction procedures in 
Tuscany, providing also a contrast with other European inquiries into mental capacity. The 
second and third chapters examine the categories and languages of mental incapacity, 
explaining why petitioners resorted to interdiction, how they framed their denunciations, and 
how interdiction procedures functioned within the debate on expected codes of behaviour. 
The fourth chapter explores some of the consequences of the fact that women were seldom 
interdicted in early modern Tuscany, providing insight into how female mental affliction was 
perceived, and why women hardly appear in the records. These first four chapters constitute 
Part One of the thesis, which is concerned with the familial experience of madness and the 
process by which families chose to resort to the Grand Ducal administration to request 
mediation.   
The remaining chapters examine the other elements that complete the experience of 
madness in eighteenth-century Tuscany. The fifth chapter expands its view into other 
institutional spaces where madness was recorded (criminal records, mental institutions and 
special requests to the Grand Duke), to propose that provisions for addressing the problem of 
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madness formed a network of itineraries to which families could resort. The sixth chapter 
explores the counterpart to the familial language examined in the first part of the thesis, 
examining the role of medical opinion in the legal assessment of madness, the circulation of 
medical categories, the role of priests as recurrent witnesses and, finally, the role of the 
Auditore Fiscale. The latter appears as a new expert on madness, who functioned as the 
central piece connecting the networks of understandings of madness that circulated within the 
different institutional spaces. The final chapter examines the circulation of lay, medical and 
legal understandings of madness through the new role ascribed to emotional disturbances as 





















Chapter 1. Interdiction Procedures: A Context for Public Intervention in 
Family Life 
 
Interdiction is a legal measure with ancient roots that is still in force today, devised to provide 
protection and care for the mentally impaired. An interdiction sentence deprives a person 
deemed mentally incapacitated of his or her civil rights, and determines the need for a 
guardian to protect the interdicted, administer their patrimonies and act in their name. In early 
modern Tuscany, interdiction procedures were managed by the Magistrato dei Pupilli et 
Adulti, the Tuscan Court of Wards in charge of guardianships and administering the 
patrimonies of orphans whose fathers had died intestate and of adults with physical or mental 
disabilities.  
This chapter investigates the legal and institutional context of the Magistrato dei 
Pupilli and the development of interdiction procedures in Tuscany, examining them against 
other European contexts, to present a European legal framework in which the Tuscan case can 
be inserted. It explores the general characteristics of interdiction procedures, their categories 
and functioning, to argue that they constituted a negotiated intervention of governmental 
authorities into the private life of families. Interdiction procedures, resorted to in order to 
resolve familial conflicts as much as to control the economic consequences of mental 
incapacity, shed light on the explosion of private family life into the public arena.  
 
1. 1. The Foundations of the Magistrato dei Pupilli and its Involvement with Mental 
Incapacity 
The foundation and development of the Magistrato dei Pupilli is deeply associated 
with the process of state building in Tuscany, from the configuration of the Florentine 
Republic and its transformation into a Grand Duchy, to the end of Medici rule, the 
incorporation of Tuscany into the Hapsburg Empire and the Lorraine reforms, until its 
dissolution in 1808 during the Napoleonic period. Throughout its remarkably long and stable 
existence, the Magistracy underwent two major reforms, the first in 1473 and the second in 
1565, both aiming at expanding its duties.61  
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The Magistrato dei Pupilli was founded in 1393 by the Florentine Signoria to provide 
governmental guardianship to families experiencing the devastating effects of the Black 
Death. It was not only a somewhat belated addition to the diverse communal provisions to 
respond to the effects of the demographic crisis, but it was also originally devised as a 
voluntary alternative to familial guardianship.62 The foundations of the Magistrato dei Pupilli 
circumscribed its area of involvement exclusively to underage wards, although scholars have 
claimed that already during this first stage the Magistracy timidly mingled with the 
curatorship of mentally or physically impaired adults, despite the fact that its regulations 
made no direct reference to this capacity. For instance, Magherini and Biotti suggested that 
the Magistrato dei Pupilli in practice extended its area of responsibility to include the 
curatorship of the insane from its early beginnings, an involvement for which Elizabeth 
Mellyn has, nonetheless, found evidence in only 4 cases.63  
Adult guardianship (curatela) during this period was also available through the court 
of the Podestà (the highest authority involved in civil justice during the Republic). In fact, the 
later provisions of the Magistrato dei Pupilli for mentally and physically incompetent adults, 
which were in force until the dismantling of the Magistrato dei Pupilli in 1808, were based on 
the 1415 statutes of the Comune di Firenze. These statutes stated, in rubric 118 of the second 
book, that adults could be interdicted “per via ordinaria” following the request of a close 
relative, which had to be supported by the testimonies of two trustworthy witnesses.64 
However, the statutes of the Florentine Comune made provisions for responding to the 
dangers posed by economic mismanagement without giving any explicit definition of the 
reasons for which a person could be interdicted, beyond economic mismanagement.65    
In 1473 a major reform of the statutes of the Pupilli established state guardianship as 
an obligatory task of the Florentine government, changing dramatically the purposes, 
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1728 and 1735. See, among many others, ASF, Magistrato dei Pupilli et Adulti (hereafter MPAP), Memoriali e 
Negozi di Cancelleria, F. 2300, no. 249, July 1728; no. 399, October 1732 and no. 457, November 1734. This 
provision was also recalled by Marco Antonio Savelli’s famous compendium of the Tuscan legal practice. 
Pratica Universale del Dottor Marc’Antonio Savelli Auditore della Rota Criminale di Firenze (Parma: Paolo 
Monti, 1717 [1º ed. 1665, seven editions until 1748]), p. 264.  




functioning and scope of the magistracy. The reform entrusted the Magistrato dei Pupilli with 
the mandatory guardianship of orphans from Florence and its entire territory whose fathers 
had died intestate or without having assigned a tutor, and with the administration of their 
patrimonies. As a result, the Pupilli officials were granted exclusive authority to administer 
and protect their wards’ patrimonies and to appoint them suitable tutors, and they were also 
empowered to intervene in crucial matters affecting the personal destinies of the wards (from 
education to marriage). As the historian Caroline M. Fisher has claimed, state guardianship 
“was the most direct and comprehensive way in which the Florentine government intervened 
in the affairs of its subjects.”66  
The 1473 reform also introduced for the first time a rubric with provisions for “the 
mad [mentecapti], dumb and deaf entrusted under the guardianship [cura] of the said Office”, 
which declared that “those men or women who have passed the age of 18 years old and who 
are out of their natural senses [fuori del naturale sentimento]” could be entrusted to the 
authority of the Pupilli, as was common practice with minors. The requisite measure was, 
though, that they were first declared by the officials of the Pupilli “to be mad [mentecapti] 
and out of their natural senses and that it has been agreed for them to be placed under the 
government of the said office.”67 The categories at this stage were highly exploratory. The 
word mentecapto literally meant to have one’s mind captured or injured, and served to make a 
loose reference to mental illness, while sentimento, referred also to the intellect, and meant in 
this context senses or wit, intellect, judgment. In particular, esser fuor del sentimento meant 
“lose one’s wit, go mad or be mad.”68 Therefore, without clearly setting the procedure nor the 
categories of adult incapacity accountable for guardianship, the statutes of 1473 opened the 
                                                
66 Ibid., p. 4. Fisher examined the foundations of government guardianship and the role of the Magistrato dei 
Pupilli. Guardianships during the early modern period have been examined by Giulia Calvi, Il contratto morale. 
Madri e figli nella Toscana moderna (Rome: Laterza, 1994).  
67 “R.ca 19. Mentecapti sordi et mutoli commessi alla cura di decto uficio, e signori e collegi dichiarino chi è 
mentecapto: Et più che quegli, o quelle persone che fussino passati l’età di XVIII anni et fussino fuori del 
naturale sentimento, possino essere commessi et per gli uficiali de’ pupilli presenti et che pe’ tempi saranno, si 
possino ricevere et pigliare in governo in quel modo et come s’usa et far si può pe’ pupilli con questo salvo, che 
tali persone siano prima dichiarati da signori et collegi, che pe’ tempi saranno et dalle dua parti di loro, essere 
mentecapti e fuori di naturale sentimento et che si convengha dargli al governo di tale uficio”. Statute Reform of 
the Magistrato dei Pupilli, 1473, in Morandini, “Statuti e ordinamenti dell’Ufficio dei Pupilli” 113 (1955), p. 
550.      
68 Vocabolario etimologico della lingua italiana [1907], s.v. “mentecatto” and s.v. “sentimento”, in 
http://www.etimo.it/?term=mentecatto&find=Cerca, accessed February 30, 2015. The Vocabolario degli 
accademici della Crusca, defined mentecatto as  “sentimento” was defined as “senso”, also “per intelletto, 
senno”; and when it was framed as “uscir del sentimento, ed esser fuor del sentimento”, it meant, “perdere il 
senno, impazzare, esser pazzo.” The definition of the word sentimento was not modified between the 1st ed. 
(1612) and the 4th ed. (1729-1738) of the Dictionary. See Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca, s.v. 




door for the state guardianship (cura) of adults with physical and mental disabilities, which 
would later be known as the interdiction procedure affecting prodigals and the demented that 
constitutes the core of this study.   
Further clues concerning the categories accountable for the interdiction and 
guardianship of the mentally disabled appeared in 1565, when a new reform specified the 
involvement of the Magistrato dei Pupilli with adult guardianship. This statute reform restated 
that not only minors were entitled to the guardianship and protection of the Magistrato dei 
Pupilli, but also adults when they were found to be incapable of managing their affairs. The 
reform stated that the Pupilli officials could accept under their guardianship [cura] the dumb 
and deaf “of any age at the request of any individual without any other formality to be 
observed.” They could also accept under their guardianship “the raving mad (furiosi), the 
fools (mentecatti) and demented (dementi), or prodigals (prodighi) and squanderers 
(dilapidatori) of their patrimony and belongings”, which it was “of public interest to 
preserve.”69   
This statute reform not only added more categories of adult incapacity accountable for 
state guardianship, but also specified the procedure to ascertain the veracity of the 
denunciation and thus establish the need of the interdiction. The provisions operated under the 
principle that in the case of prodigals and the mentally incompetent, abuses had to be 
prevented, for “out of malice or any other cause someone could be called or reputed to be as 
such without being it.” For this reason, the statutes established that in these cases adults could 
only be submitted to the “guardianship and government” of the officials of the Pupilli after 
their prodigality or insanity had been previously confirmed by the Magistrato Supremo, or 
following a direct commission from the Grand Duke.70 In contrast, guardianship of the dumb 
and deaf could be established without any further confirmation besides the relatives’ request. 
Finally, it was stated that all incapacitated adults had to be “interdicted” from the 
                                                
69 The Italian original said: “sotto tal cura ordinariamente possino venire, et possino esser’ accettati mutoli et 
sordi a natura di qualunche età si sieno et a requisitione di qualunche persona senz’ altra solenità da observarsi, 
et ancora li furiosi, mentecatti et dementi, o prodigi, et dilapidatori delle sustantie et facultà loro essendo 
interesse publico quelle conservarsi.” ASF, MPAAP, F. 248, “Statuti et ordini della Corte et Magistrato delli 
Offittiali de’ Pupilli et Adulti della Città di Fiorenza reformati et stabiliti per ordine di S.C.I. dal suo Mag. Cons. 
et Pratica Secreta sotto di 20 d’Agosto 1565”, Rubric 2, fols. 4-4v.  
70 “Providdono et ordinorno, che li prefati Uffitiali non possino accettar’ alcuno per furioso, mentecatto 
demente, o prodigo, et dilapidatore delle substanze et facultà sua, se non per comissione di S.E.I. o, se prima non 




administration of their patrimonies to preserve their properties and that the “interdiction” was 
to be publicised through bandi placed in public places.71  
In 1680, a new reform of the Pupilli statutes was issued to ensure the proper 
observance of the 1565 statutes. As the new law declared, “part of the things disposed in 
those Laws and reforms are neglected and not properly observed, and another part of them 
need new additions, statements and provisions.”72 Particularly regarding the provisions for the 
mentally incompetent, the new dispositions made evident the jurisdictional overlap between 
the Magistrato dei Pupilli and the Magistrato Supremo produced by the reform of 1565. These 
dispositions had stated that mental incapacity had to be confirmed by the Magistrato 
Supremo, which was a condition for the Pupilli to be able to assume the management of the 
guardianship. Moreover, the interdiction decree had to be issued by the Magistrato Supremo, 
and only after that could the Pupilli assign a suitable guardian to administrate the patrimony. 
The fact that the 1680 reforms needed to ratify that the Magistrato dei Pupilli was the 
institution with the prerogative over guardianship of adults, and thus over the administration 
of their patrimonies, suggests that the Magistrato Supremo had been trespassing into the 
Pupilli’s territory. To counterbalance this situation, the reform highlighted that the requisite 
that subjected the Pupilli’s power of intervention to the command of the Magistrato Supremo, 
had “neither removed nor diminished” the faculties of the Pupilli over matters affecting the 
mentally incompetent. To guarantee the observance of the rules, the reform commanded that 
after the officials of the Magistrato Supremo had confirmed a person’s incapacity, the 
guardianship was to be entrusted to the Magistrato dei Pupilli, “save, nonetheless, for the 
cases where, given the circumstances of involvement, it would seem more convenient that the 
Magistrato Supremo itself appointed those curators, attori, or relatives that were considered 
necessary and opportune…”73  
                                                
71 “…per preservatione de loro beni et substantie detti offitiali possino et debbino interdire loro 
l’amministratione, et mandar bandi ne luoghi publici et consueti della città et altrove, che detto tale e sotto la 
cura del loro Magistrato…” Ibid, fol. 4v-5. 
72 “...che parte delle cose disposte in dette Leggi, e riforme siano trascurate nella dovuta osservanza, e parte 
abbiano bisogno di nuove addizioni, dichiarazioni, e provvedimenti.” “Legge e Riforma Del Magistrato e Ufizio 
de Pupilli, ed Adulti della città di Firenze, ottenuta nel Supremo Magistrato del di 19 Luglio 1680 ab Inc”, in 
Lorenzo Cantini, Legislazione Toscana, Vol. 19 (Florence: Stamp. Albizziniana da S. Maria in Campo, 1806), p. 
156. 
73 “E perchè la Provvisione suddetta non ha levato, o diminuito la facultà ordinaria competente al Magistrato de’ 
Pupilli di soprintendere specialmente al governo di simili imperfetti, o per l’età, o per gli accidenti, ma 
solamente ha provvisto, che l’imperfezioni siano o comandate dagl’ordini di S.A. o riconosciute dal Magistrato 
Supremo: Perciò  il medesimo Magistrato Supremo, secondo la proposizione fattale dai medesimi Clarissimi 
Riformatori, dichiarò, e dichiara, che dopo fatta dal Magistrato loro la recognizione suddetta commetterà alla 




These special cases in which the administration could fall under the direct oversight of 
the Magistrato Supremo referred in practice to the Cavalieri of the Order of Santo Stefano, 
and other privileged men and women whose cases were thought to be better protected if 
concealed under the wing of the Magistrato Supremo. Certainly, less scandal was guaranteed 
to families if their relative’s incapacity was not publicised through bandi proclaiming the 
interdiction, as the Pupilli’s statutes commanded it do in similar cases. But, beyond the issue 
of privileged litigants, the debate over the jurisdiction of guardianships was largely centred on 
the distribution of the profits derived from the administration of the patrimonies. Since its 
foundation, the Pupilli had been burdened by financial constraints, which led the officials 
throughout the magistracy’s existence to devise mechanisms to ensure a sustainable income 
for the office. This was basically contingent upon the capacity of the ward’s patrimony to pay 
the designated fees in return for the magistrates’ services, and upon the ability of the 
magistrates to ensure that the fees were actually paid.74 State guardianship was designed as a 
government service that had to be profitable in order to continue to function, and after 1680 
the overlap between the Supremo and the Pupilli continued to be hotly debated.75   
The overlap of the spheres of action between the Magistrato dei Pupilli and the 
Magistrato Supremo is not a coincidence nor an isolated event, but a constitutional part of the 
“institutional pluralism” than characterized the Grand Duchy of Tuscany until the Lorraine 
reforms. In fact, scholars have engaged in a lengthy discussion regarding the institutional 
disorder that characterized the bureaucratic apparatus of the Grand Duchy, only radically 
reformed by Peter Leopold in the eighteenth century.76 Without intending to enter the debate 
                                                                                                                                                   
che concorressero paresse più conveniente, che il medesimo Magistrato Supremo provvedesse lui stesso di quei 
Curatori, Attori, o Congiunti che giudicasse necessari, o opportuni.” Ibid, pp. 160-161.  
74 A recurrent concern in interdiction procedures during the eighteenth century was that the defendant’s 
patrimony had to be large enough so as to support the required fees. Notwithstanding this concern, we observe 
recurrent campaigns commanded by the Pupilli officials in order to be paid outstanding fees. As the 1680 reform 
framed it, “Avendo il detto Tribunale poch’entrate, onde al presente sia più la spesa, che l’utile, e bisogni usare 
ogni cautela, che quelle che egli ha gli siano giustamente conservate”. “Legge e Riforma Del Magistrato e Ufizio 
de Pupilli... 19 Luglio 1680”, in Cantini Legislazione Toscana, Vol. 19, p. 159. On the financial constraints of 
the Pupilli and how this affected their involvement with guardianships, see Fisher, “The State as Surrogate 
Father”.  
75 For a sample of interdictions and curatorships entirely managed by the Magistrato Supremo after 1680, see the 
Suppliche of the Magistrato Supremo. For instance, see the interdictions of Venuto Pontelli, ASF, Magistrato 
Supremo (hereafter MS), Suppliche, F. 1181, March 1718/19, fol. 222; of Cavaliere Francesco Settimanni, Ibid., 
March 1721/21, fol. 833; of Cavaliere Giuseppe Greppi, ASF, MS, Suppliche, F. 1183, May 1728, fol. 435; of 
Angelo Galli, Ibid, January 1738/29, fol. 700; of Giovanni Cianfogni, ASF, MS, Suppliche, F. 1185, July 1735, 
fol. 970 or Antonio Chellini, ASF, MS, Suppliche, F. 1208, June 1761, fols. 354-356.    
76 For an overview of the discussion, see Franco Angiolini, Vieri Becagli, Marcello Verga (eds.) La Toscana 
nell’età di Cosimo III (Florence: Edifir-Edizioni Firenze, 1993) and Luca Mannori, “Effetto Domino. Il profilo 




over the decadency that allegedly characterized the last period of the Medici family, the fact 
remains that jurisdictional overlap and “juridical and institutional pluralism” were 
characteristic.77 
This is particularly clear as regards the Magistrato Supremo. Also known as the 
Tribunal of the Prince (Tribunale del Principe), the Supremo was presided over by the Grand 
Duke’s lieutenant (the Luogotenente) and his advisors (Consiglieri). Established as the 
highest civil court in Tuscany, its jurisdiction and competencies overlapped with many other 
magistracies, particularly the Ruota Civile and the Magistrato dei Pupilli.78 The recurrent 
arbitrary extension of the Supremo’s jurisdiction generated a lively discussion at the end of 
the seventeenth century, and led to a series of reforms, as the law of 1680 regarding the 
Pupilli statutes attests.79  
As a result, the virtual disappearance of guardianships by reason of mental 
incompetence observed by Mellyn in the records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli during the 
seventeenth century is likely to be the result of the Supremo’s involvement.80 Magherini and 
Biotti have attributed this decline in the Pupilli involvement to the 1680 reform of the 
statutes. They claim that changes brought by this law entailed a significant reversal to the 
Pupilli’s “prerogative” over the mentally incompetent, so long as it determined that in special 
circumstances the Magistrato Supremo officials could directly designate the curator and 
supervise the guardianship without the intervention of the Pupilli.81 However, in my view the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Alessandra Contini (eds.), La Toscana in età moderna (Secoli XVI-XVIII) Politica, istituzioni, società: studi 
recenti e prospettive di ricerca,  (Florence: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2005), pp. 59-90. 
77 Daniela Edigati, “Da una raccolta di leggi e bandi alla letteratura ‘d’apparat’ nella Toscana mediceo-
lorenese”, in Mario Montorzi (ed.), Tecniche di normazione e pratica giuridica in Toscana in età granducale, 
(Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2006), p. 95. See also Luca Mannori, Il Sovrano Tutore: Pluralismo istituzionale e 
accentramento amministrativo nel principato dei Medici (Secc. XVI-XVIII) (Milan: Giuffrè, 1994).  
78 Among its official prerogatives, the Supremo was involved in the administration of justice, had jurisdiction, 
among other fields, over civil family disputes (mostly testamentary, fideicomisi, etc), over suits related to gabelle 
and privileges, and over suits affecting the poor and incapacitated, in clear dispute with the Pupilli. See Giuseppe 
Pansini, “Il Magistrato Supremo e l’amministrazione della giustizia civile durante il Principato mediceo”, Studi 
senesi 85 (1973), pp. 283-315; Giuseppe Pansini, “La Ruota fiorentina nelle strutture giudiziarie del Granducato 
di Toscana sotto i Medici”, in La Formazione storica del diritto moderno in Europa, vol. II (Florence: Leo S. 
Olschki, 1977), pp. 533-579, and R. Burr Litchfield, Emergence of a bureaucracy: the Florentine patricians, 
1530-1790 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).  
79 The atmosphere of these debates and the aspirations of the reformers have been examined in Marcello Verga, 
“La ruota criminale fiorentina (1680-1699). Amministrazione della giustizia penale e istituzioni nella Toscana 
medicea tra Sei e Settecento”, in Mario Sbriccoli and Antonella Bettoni (eds.) Grandi tribunali e Rote 
provinciali nel tramonto degli Antichi Regimi (Milan: Giuffrè, 1993), pp. 179-226 and Mannori, “Effetto 
Domino”.    
80 Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families, p. 14.  
81 “...con la riforma del 19 luglio 1680 si attribuisce al Magistrato Supremo anche il potere di nomina diretta di 




decline of the Pupilli’s involvement in the affairs of the mentally incompetent has more to do 
with the general overlap that characterized the Tuscan administration rather than with a 
deliberate reduction of the Pupilli’s competences over mental incapacity. This is particularly 
the case if we take into account that many laws were not followed, even if they were 
continuously ratified and published. The fact that the Magistrato dei Pupilli’s competence 
over the guardianship of incapacitated adults had to be ratified through a series of reforms 
during its whole period of existence needs to be interpreted in the light of the institutional 
disorder and lack of clear boundaries between the different public offices that characterized 
the Grand Duchy. It highlights, furthermore, how the absence of a general compendium of the 
laws and provisions that regulated the Duchy seriously impacted upon its functioning.82    
Taking these issues into account, I suggest that the 1680 reform needs to be examined 
from a long-term perspective. On the one hand, it aimed to restrict the excessive involvement 
of the Supremo in the affairs of the mentally incompetent, not to augment it. We must take 
into account the fact that the Supremo had been intervening in interdictions and the 
management of adult guardianships since at least the 1565 reform, even though officially its 
involvement was supposed to be restricted to the ratification of mental incapacity. On the 
other hand, the evidence irrefutably shows that starting from the second decade of the 
eighteenth century, interdictions were predominantly managed by the Pupilli alone. 
Furthermore, if between 1387 and 1500 Mellyn has been able to find only four guardianships 
by reason of mental incapacity and 90 between 1500 and 1600 in the Pupilli records,83 the 
numbers for the eighteenth century suggest a dramatic increase, exceeding 600 hundred cases 
between 1700 and 1775. Plus, the evidence shows that during the eighteenth century, the 
officials of the Supremo reduced their involvement almost exclusively to the role of certifiers 
of mental incapacity. Now, this change was certainly not caused solely by the 1680 reform. 
The turning point for this issue was finally achieved through the new regulations introduced 
in 1718.   
The evidence suggests that the 1718 reform constituted a watershed for the activity of 
the Magistrato dei Pupilli. This new law stemmed from the government’s observation that the 
                                                                                                                                                   
della gestione patrimoniale, la revisione dei conti annuali e finali.” Magherini and Biotti, L’isola delle Stinche, p. 
75.  
82 For the contemporary discussion on the convenience of creating a compendium of the laws and regulations in 
force on the Grand Duchy, see Pansini, “Il Magistrato Supremo”, p. 297. Also Edigati, “Da una raccolta di leggi 
e bandi”, in Montorzi, Tecniche di normazione e pratica giuridica. 




dispositions made in 1565, and ratified in 1680, regarding the management of the interdiction 
and curatorship of adults manifesting mental or physical incompetence were not “accurately 
observed.”84 As a result, the new regulation ratified once more the Pupilli’s competence over 
the interdiction and guardianship of adults with mental or physical disabilities, only this time 
it clarified that this jurisdiction pertained exclusively to the Pupilli. The law declared that, 
henceforth, “the dumb and deaf, the raving mad (furiosi), the fools (mentecatti), the demented 
(dementi), prodigals (prodighi), squanderers (dilapidatori), or others to whom it may be 
convenient to interdict from the administration of their possessions and faculties” were 
“exclusively (privativamente)” under the jurisdiction of the Magistrato dei Pupilli.85 “No 
other tribunal or judge” could intervene in the affairs of the mentally or physically 
incompetent, and the involvement of the Magistrato Supremo was circumscribed to  “declare, 
either by commission of His Royal Highness, or by their own decree if anyone is furioso, 
mentecatto, demente, prodigo, dilapidatore, or any other whom it might be convenient to 
interdict.”86 But, beyond the assessment of mental incapacity, the new regulation specified 
that they could not intervene any further. Immediately after a person was declared to be 
suffering from mental incapacity, the case had to be transferred to the Pupilli so that its 
officials could appoint a curator, supervise the administration of the ward’s patrimony, and 
manage all the judicial activities involving them.    
A simple quantitative analysis attests to the fact that the 1718 reform represented a 
milestone for the functioning of the Pupilli. Following the reform, many cases that until then 
had been managed by the Magistrato Supremo now passed to “the protection and rule” of the 
Magistrato dei Pupilli, which explains the dramatic rise in the number of interdictions during 
the years immediately following the reform.87 As can be seen in Figure 1, before 1718 the 
number of interdiction decrees managed by the Magistrato dei Pupilli oscillated between 0 to 
                                                
84 “Bando. Circa l’Esecuzione de’Privilegi, e Statuti del Magistrato delli Signori Ufiziali de’Pupilli, ed Adulti 
della Città di Firenze, ottenuto nel Supremo Magistrato del di 28 Gennaio 1717”, ASF, MS, Suppliche, F. 1180, 
fol. 1311. The reform can also be consulted in ASF, Consulta poi Regia Consulta, Sezione I, Leggi, P. 14, Tomo 
XIV, fol.145; and in Lorenzo Cantini, Legislazione Toscana, Vol. 22, pp. 253-254. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid. 
87 See ASF, MPAP, Campione di Deliberazioni e Partiti, F. 112, year 1717, F. 113, year 1718 and F. 114, year 
1719 and following, and also ASF, MPAP, Memoriale e Informazioni, F. 2299, corresponding to the years 1688 
– 1722. As an example, see the case of Gio. Batta Arrighi, interdicted in 1700, passed to the authority of the 
Magistrato dei Pupilli in July 1718, because “doppo che in ordine al Motuproprio della medesima A.V. R. de 28 
Gennaio 1717, circa quelli a quali è interdetta l'amministrazione, abbiamo poste le mani nel maneggio delli 




3 every five years. In contrast, after the reform there was a marked increase in interdictions, 
rising from 17 interdictions between 1718 and 1720 to 44 over the next five years. 
 
Figure 1: Number of interdiction procedures recorded in the Magistrato dei Pupilli between 
1686 and 1725 every 5 years  
 
Source: Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Magistrato dei Pupilli et Adulti, Memoriali e Negozi di 
Cancelleria, F. 2299 – F. 2310; Campione di Deliberazioni, e Partiti, F. 112 – F. 170.  
 
Although since 1565 adults with physical or mental disabilities “could” be submitted 
to the authority of the Pupilli, in fact only a minority of curatorships for the mentally 
incompetent were managed by the Pupilli. This can partly be explained as the effect of the 
Pupilli’s involvement, but also as evidence that families simply resorted to the mechanism in 
a smaller proportion than during the eighteenth century. From the perspective of the Pupilli 
officials, the involvement of the Supremo hampered their ability to proceed with the 
necessary provisions in order to assume the management of the curatorships. The requirement 
that mental incapacity had to be asserted first by the Supremo so that the Pupilli could 
“intervene to assist and oversee the interests” of the mentally incapacitated made the 
procedure less efficient than was desired.88 But the real problem, according to the Pupilli 
officials, was the lack of clarity regarding the management of the curatorship after the 
                                                
88 ASF, MPAP, Memoriale e Informazioni, F. 2299, no. 117, 8 January 1693/94.  
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defendant’s incapacity had been confirmed by the Supremo, or after the Grand Duke had 
ordered his interdiction, which allowed for the officials of the Supremo to assign a guardian 
(curatore) without turning the matter over to the hands of the Pupilli officials. When this 
occurred, the administration of the interdicted person’s patrimony was often left 
unsupervised, and the lack of authority of some appointed curators allowed the interdicted to 
continue managing their affairs in spite of the interdiction. Similarly, the officials complained 
that the curators would do and undo to their own advantage because they “were not under the 
eyes” of the Magistrato dei Pupilli.89  
Nonetheless, the change in the procedure needed time in which to adjust, and it 
required numerous debates between the Pupilli and the Supremo officials regarding their 
conflicting competencies over the matter. The 1718 reform was recurrently cited by the 
Pupilli officials as proof of their exclusive jurisdiction over the mentally incompetent in 
interdiction procedures during the following years. This could happen when petitioners asked 
the Pupilli to only appoint a curator, requesting for the defendant not to be submitted to the 
authority of the Pupilli, or when they asked for the defendant to be submitted to the authority 
of the Magistrato Supremo, instead of to that of the Pupilli. Finally, it also occurred, for 
instance, when creditors tried to initiate litigation involving an interdicted person in the 
Tribunale di Mercanzia, despite the regulations which established that all judicial matters 
involving the interdicted were to be resolved by the Pupilli. In most cases the Pupilli 
succeeded in defending its complete jurisdiction over the affairs of the mentally afflicted.  
 
1. 2. The Interdiction Procedure during the Eighteenth Century 
Inquiries into mental capacity in Tuscany were generally instituted through a petition 
by the defendant’s next of kin to the Grand Duke.90 Every denunciation of mental incapacity 
had to be corroborated by the testimony of at least two witnesses “of good reputation,” which 
                                                
89 See the Pupilli report on the interdiction of Gio. Batta Arrighi, in ASF, MPAP, Memoriale e Informazioni, F. 
2299, no. 383, August 1718. 
90 Although petitions were addressed directly to the Grand Duke, they were actually centralized in the Consulta, 
from where they were redirected to the competent magistracies. The Consulta was created at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century as a high court of appeals. According to Nubola, petitions are to be inserted in the myth of 
sovereignty that sustained the Ancien Régime, which pictured the prince as “father, judge, legislator, and 
reference point of justice and of fairness, to whom subjects can turn...” Thus, petitions were addressed directly to 
the sovereign although supplicants knew their requests were actually evaluated by government officials and 
magistrates. Cecilia Nubola, “Supplications Between Politics and Justice: The Northern and Central Italian 




generally came from family members or neighbours, and only rarely involved medical 
opinion.91 Alternatively, relatives could come directly in front of the Magistrato Supremo to 
initiate a cause of interdiction. These cases, which were also supported by lay testimonies, 
were generally made through a procurator.92 Once the petition or the initiated cause reached 
the central administration, an enquiry was conducted to investigate and assess the veracity of 
the denunciation (from beginning to end, the process could take between two to three 
months). Depending on the results of the enquiry, those deemed mentally incapacitated were 
interdicted by the Magistrato Supremo, officialised through an “interdiction decree” that 
publicly announced that the person had been deprived of his or her rights to administer their 
patrimony, manage their affairs, and engage in any kind of legal contract. By means of the 
interdiction decree, the defendant was submitted to the “protection and rule” of the Magistrato 
dei Pupilli, which entitled its officials to appoint a guardian (curatore) or an agent (attore) to 
administer the ward’s property (called in Italian the sottoposti, to differentiate them from the 
pupilli), act in their the name and interests, and protect their person.  
The basic point of an interdiction was to protect a person and his or her patrimony 
when they were found to be incapable (inabile, incapace or impotente were the most used 
terms) of managing their own affairs.93 Thus, to declare a person incompetent, petitioners had 
to prove that he or she suffered from one of the kinds of incapacity defined by the Magistrato 
dei Pupilli as subject to an interdiction. The Pupilli statutes referred to the furiosi, mentecatti, 
dementi, prodighi, and dilapidatori as the categories of mental incapacity considered liable 
for interdiction and state guardianship. Of all these categories, interdiction procedures during 
the eighteenth century in practice employed only two: prodigality and dementia, as can be 
                                                
91 Savelli, Pratica Universale, p. 264.  
92 The “giustificazioni”, as the testimonies attesting petitions of interdiction were called, can be found 
accordingly in the series Atti e Scritture of the archive of the Magistrato Supremo. The interdiction decree, the 
appointment of the curator, and all the following actions derived from an interdiction sentence are found in the 
Magistrato dei Pupilli. This is why in some cases in order to find out under which category the interdiction had 
been decreed, we need to go to the Atti of the Supremo, which is a huge section containing between 4 to 13 
volumes per year. The other problem resulting from this is that the Atti of the Magistrato Supremo were severely 
damaged by the Arno flood of 1966, and many filze still have the status of “non consegnabile”. As a result, I 
have only looked for the giustificazioni of those cases that seemed interesting. This also explains why the 
category of “undefined incapacity” that can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 is higher than what it should be.   
93 This is when the person is thought to lack capacità di agire, which is fundamental for making use of the 
capacità giuridica that every person possesses since birth. According to the Italian civil code, the interdiction is 
meant to protect a person who despite having come of age, suffers a “permanent” illness that leaves him or her in 
a state of being unable to provide for his or her own interests. For the legal definition of the interdiction 
procedure, its uses and consequences according to the Italian civil code, see Francesco Scardulla, “Interdizione”, 




observed in Figures 2 and 3.94 Dementia was the generic legal term employed in reference to 
all types of mental disturbance, and encompassed the mentecatto and the furioso. Instead, 
prodigality – which in turn included prodighi (spendthrifts) and dilapidatori (dissipaters) – 
was a category that, at first glance, involved only inveterate reckless economic 
mismanagement, but that enclosed a clear association with unreason and madness.  
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that prodigality was the most common reason for 
interdicting a person in the eighteenth century. Interdictions by reason of insanity are 
outnumbered by interdictions by reason of prodigality, although they demonstrate a relatively 
constant increase over the years studied.95 While prodigality and dementia were the most used 
categories, in some cases interdictions were decreed by reason of an unspecified lack of 
ability to manage one’s financial and personal affairs. In these cases, the interdiction sentence 
declared that because the defendant had been found to be unable to manage his or her affairs, 
it had been necessary to interdict them. As can be observed in Figures 2 and 3, this third 
category was in use particularly during the first half of the century, while in the second half 
we can observe that the procedures tend to specify either prodigality or dementia. Towards 
1770, however, this process is somehow reverted, given that a new tendency for voluntary 
interdictions arises. In these voluntary requests, the defendants argued for the “convenience” 
of the interdiction to safeguard their patrimonies on account of their “lack of experience” or 







                                                
94 Interdiction procedures on account of deafness and muteness are not only rare to find but also left scant 
evidence during the eighteenth century. Given that they pertain to a different set of conflicts, I do not take the 
few that exist into account in this study.    
95 The drop in the numbers of interdiction sentences between 1760 and 1765 is hard to explain. We know that 
during those years the Magistracy was suffering a financial crisis due firstly to this drop in interdiction 
sentences, and secondly, because there was a deliberate campaign directed at securing the payment owed to the 
Magistracy on account of the past administration of many of the patrimonies that had been interdicted. On this, 
see especially ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2305, which covers petitions between 1759 and 1763.  
96 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2307, no. 85, December 1767; Ibid., F. 2308, no. 29, June 1770 and Ibid., F. 








Source: ASF, MPAP, Memoriali e Negozi di Cancelleria, F. 2299 – F. 2310 and Ibid., Campione 
di Deliberazioni, e Partiti, F. 112 – F. 170.  
 
Of a total of 599 interdictions decreed between 1718 and 1775, 48.6% were by reason 
of prodigality, while 32.9% were for dementia in any of its forms. The remaining 18.5% were 
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were in fact deeply conflated and were even often used interchangeably, being comprised of 
symptoms that were not completely distinct from one another. Both categories placed 
economic mismanagement as a starting point, both assumed a lack of control over mental 
faculties and actions and, above all, both entailed the same legal consequences.97 However, 
this had not always been the case.  
 
Roman Law Origins: Interdiction Only for Prodigals 
The foundations for guardianship provisions of adults with physical and mental 
disability practiced in early modern Tuscany date back to Roman law. The principles of the 
Roman guardianship of minors (tutela) and curatorship of adults (cura) mentally or physically 
disabled were introduced and adapted with the revival of Roman law and the work of the 
glossators of Justinian’s Digest in medieval Italy. Guardianship was originally designed as a 
judicial mechanism to administrate the ward’s property in the absence of the pater familias 
while his children attained full capacity to govern themselves, with the primary aim of 
protecting the interests of the family. Through the tutorship, the patria potestas was 
transferred to a tutor, who could be testamentary, statutory or appointed by the state (tutela 
testamentaria, legittima or dativa). The tutorship of minors lasted until puberty, while from 
that time until full majority they were placed under the care of a curator. In turn, curatorship 
of adults was based on “the idea that protection should be given to the interests of persons not 
themselves in a position to provide it, though not in a condition to require true guardianship 
(tutela).”98 
The curatorship of adults deemed mentally incompetent followed similar procedures 
to the tutorship of minors. A cura furiosi and a cura prodigi can be found already in the time 
of the Twelve Tables, destined to protect patrimonies and, only in the case of the furiosi, to 
protect also the person. The Twelve Tables established that curatorships were directly handled 
by the agnates (cura legittima), while under Justinian law it had to be previously approved by 
the state (cura dativa). As Susana Gazmuri has stated, “these dispositions were not destined 
                                                
97 These issues are examined in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.  
98 Carlo Calisse, A History of Italian Law [1º Ed. 1903] (New York: Kelley, 1969), p. 603. For a general review 
of the guardianship of minors see Ibid., and Enrico Besta, La famiglia nella storia del diritto Italiano (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 1962). Among the most important changes raised by the glossators was the possibility of introducing a 
new order of desirable guardians, giving precedence to the cognate line, particularly the mother. For the Tuscan 
adjustments of Roman law principles, the backgrounds of the Magistrato dei Pupilli and the development of the 




to protect the insane as individual, but to serve as a link in the long chain of the gens and 
familia, which was a matter of interest not only to the family, but also to the State.”99  
Curatorship was created to protect primarily the interests of the family, and thus, the property, 
and only secondarily to protect the interests of the allegedly insane or prodigal.  
Fur the purposes of this study, it is important to briefly define how the cura prodigo 
and the cura furiosus were conceived in Roman law, for this will allow us to understand to 
what extent they were transformed by medieval and early modern jurists, and how they came 
to be merged into one unique system of curatorship for adults. The curatorships for 
prodigality and for insanity were conceived differently in Roman law, and so they entailed 
different consequences. While in the case of insanity the curator was entrusted with the 
custody of both the person and his or her patrimony, in the case of prodigals, the curator only 
had authority over the patrimony.100 On the other hand, Roman law distinguished a difference 
regarding the origins of the loss of civil capacity in the case of insanity compared to that of 
prodigality. The fundamental difference, if we follow Marco Boari, was that in the case of 
prodigals their lack of civil capacity was determined by the law, while in the case of the 
insane, their civil incapacity was a natural consequence. In other words, prodigality was a 
category created by the law to catalogue a self-inflicted condition, while insanity was a 
category that pre-existed the law, a “natural incapacity” that worked as “an objective extra 
juridical reality” that only had to be judicially “recognized.”101  
The difference between natural and legal incapacity completely changed the terms of 
the curatorship and its conditions. Given that the insane were considered incapacitated from 
the moment their insanity had been triggered, economic transactions carried out by a mentally 
disturbed person “while” insane could be theoretically void. On the contrary, prodigals lost 
their capacity only after the law, by means of the interdiction, deprived them of their civil 
capacity. As a consequence, the interdiction made only future economic actions invalid, with 
no retroactive power. In both cases, nonetheless, the incapacity was understood as a 
temporary condition dependant upon the person’s subsequent behaviour, and it could be lifted 
when their mental disturbance abated or when they demonstrated that they had reformed their 
behaviour.  
                                                
99 Susana Gazmuri, “The mentally ill in Roman Society”, Argos 30 (2006), p. 96. See also Besta, La famiglia 
nella storia del diritto Italiano, p. 231; Il digesto Italiano. Enciclopedia metodica e alfabetica di Legislazione, 
Dottrina e Giurisprudenza, vol. XIII parte prima (Turin: Unione tipografico editrice, 1902-1906).  
100 Magherini and Biotti, L’isola delle Stinche, p. 63.  




The most important issue for us here is that in Roman law, interdictions were 
necessary only in the case of prodigality, for only a judge or a magistrate could deprive them 
of their civil rights. On the contrary, given that the mental incapacity of furiosi was thought to 
be natural, the legal interdiction was originally unnecessary. In both cases, their condition 
prevented them from alienating their property and making any future transactions. In other 
words, interdictions were created as a legal measure to legally deprive a person of their civil 
capacities, after which they and their patrimonies were entrusted to the custody of a curator.  
The Conflation Between the Categories of Dementia and Prodigality 
Elizabeth Mellyn has suggested that prodigality and mental incapacity were first 
“implicitly” associated during the Florentine Republic, and came to be “explicitly” 
assimilated during the first century of the Medici Principate. This conflation emanated from 
society’s “deep and abiding concern about the integrity of property and patrimony”, which 
equated financial mismanagement to madness. The conflation between insanity and 
prodigality, Mellyn asserts, served families so as “to regulate economic behaviour in their 
household and to invalidate contracts made by reckless relatives”, demonstrating a “pragmatic 
and instrumental use” of the legal mechanism of guardianship.102 The strategy was, she 
continues, to be able not only to avoid future potentially disadvantageous contracts, but also 
to be able to declare past contracts void. In order to be able to invalidate past contracts, 
prodigality had to be assimilated to insanity, for only in the latter case did the incapacity start 
with the change in behaviour. However, far from this initial motivation, during the eighteenth 
century interdiction could not be used to invalidate contracts. Quite the contrary, the Pupilli 
officials explicitly declared that interdiction procedures did not entail the possibility of 
declaring past contracts void, regardless of whether the defendant was interdicted as prodigal 
or as insane.  
Another important change regarding Roman law tradition is the eighteenth-century 
understanding of interdiction as the procedure used to legally declare mental incompetence so 
that a person could be assigned a curator. Adult guardianship was tied to interdiction already 
in the 1565 statutes of the Magistrato dei Pupilli.103 Furthermore, interdiction was applied for 
                                                
102 Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families, p. 96-97.  
103 “...detti offitiali possino et debbino interdire loro l’amministratione, et mandar bandi ne luoghi publici et 
consueti della città et altrove...” ASF, MPAAP, F. 248, “Statuti et ordini della Corte et Magistrato delli Offittiali 




both prodigality and insanity in its various forms (furioso, mentecatto, and demente), 
demonstrating that the legal framework made only one provision for all types of mental 
incapacity, irrespective of the type of alleged insanity (that is, regardless of whether it implied 
permanent damage or a temporary condition, if it was violent or harmless). This is interesting 
if we take into account that the term interdiction seems to have been uncommon in the 
proceedings of adult guardianship before the eighteenth century, according to the existing 
studies.104  
The sources during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries demonstrate that the most 
used concept was that of cura. The magistrates decided whether the defendants were in need 
of being “received under the cura and government” of the Pupilli, or “required a curator.”105 
By contrast, magistrates during the eighteenth century referred to their wards as the interdetti 
and the sottoposti (submitted) and, likewise, petitioners generally requested that their relatives 
be “interdicted”, and “submitted to the authority and guardianship” of the Pupilli. This 
terminological change was also visible in the decree issued by the Magistrato Supremo, where 
curator and curatela were replaced by the term interdiction, which survived with only a slight 
change the Napoleonic code.106 The interdiction decree of the Magistrato Supremo that 
ratified mental incapacity, as the statutes of the Pupilli required, was referred to in the sources 
as “the interdiction decree”, not as “the curatorship decree.”  
Based on the fact that the records of the previous centuries give no evidence for the 
use of the term interdiction, it can be ascertained that the 1718 reform was responsible for this 
change. So long as it differentiated the competences of the Magistrato Supremo and the 
Magistrato dei Pupilli regarding mental and physical incapacities, it created a new 
differentiation between interdiction and curatorship. The first, decreed by the Supremo, was 
the process by which a person was legally declared mentally incapacitated, creating thus the 
need for a curator to be assigned for his or her protection. The interdiction decree reached the 
offices of the Pupilli, commanding the magistrates to assign a person to supervise the 
administration of the ward’s patrimony, and oversee all matters relating the ward’s life (the 
attore).   
                                                
104 See Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families and Magherini and Biotti, L’isola delle Stinche. 
105 See, for instance, ASF, MPAP, Suppliche con Informazione, F. 2281, fol. 668, 1586: “...che le piaccia farle 
gratia che detto Jacopo sia ricevuto sotto la cura et governo del Magistrato...”, or , Ibid., F. 2279, fol. 506, 1579: 
“...che Girolamo... sia sotto posto come mentecatto alla cura et protectione del magistrato nostro...”, both quoted 
in Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families, pp. 39 and 41. 




Figure 4: Number of interdictions managed by the Magistrato dei Pupilli between 1686 and 
1775, five-year periods 
 
Source: ASF, MPAP, Memoriali e Negozi di Cancelleria, F. 2299 – F. 2310 and Ibid., Campione di 
Deliberazioni, e Partiti, F. 112 – F. 170.  
 
No further regulations were introduced in the practice of interdiction sentences until 
1767, when a new law was promulgated by the recently arrived Pietro Leopoldo, who among 
the many changes he promulgated in the administration of the Grand Duchy, decided to 
modify some aspects of interdiction procedures. Two of these changes are relevant here: 
firstly, it eliminated the Magistrato dei Pupilli’s capacity to act as “universal tutor and curator 
of all minors and adults of the Florentine dominium.”107 This meant that from thereafter the 
officials of the Pupilli had to name an external curator or tutor, for they were no longer able to 
assume it themselves. This is interesting, because although the magistrates had been granted 
this capacity since 1473, in the case of minors it applied only when the father had died 
intestate and no next of kin was willing to take the task, while in the case of adults, they were 
the de facto guardians.108 Although before the eighteenth century the mentally disabled were 
                                                
107 “Legge. Per il Regolamento del Tribunale de’ Pupilli del di 8 Giugno 1767”. In Cantini, Legislazione 
Toscana, Vol. 27, pp. 356-372. For the heated debate caused by these unwelcome resolutions, see ASF, MPAP, 
Memoriali, F. 2307, nos. 24-27.    
108 See Fisher, “The State as Surrogate Father”, p. 191-195.  









































assigned an external curator, the records of the eighteenth century demonstrate that the 
officials of the Pupilli almost invariably assumed the task, relegating the next of kin to the 
task of attori.  
The other important change regarding interdictions brought by the 1767 regulation 
was that it granted free access to the services of the Magistrate to the “miserable and poor”, 
provided their patrimonies did not exceed 500 scudi. As a result, for the first time those 
patrimonies that until then could not afford the costs of interdiction and guardianship could 
also have access to the service. The effects of this democratization are clearly evident in the 
explosion observed in the number of interdictions decreed after 1767 (see Figure 4). 
 
Characteristics of Interdiction Procedures and their Consequences in the Eighteenth 
Century 
As a consequence of the interdiction, the person remained submitted to the protection 
and rule of the Magistrato dei Pupilli (sottoposto a la cura e governo del Magistrato dei 
Pupilli).109 After the Magistrato Supremo issued the interdiction decree, the case passed to the 
offices of the Pupilli for the magistrates to manage all the details concerning the person’s 
guardianship. The Magistrato dei Pupilli acted in its capacity of “universal curator”, so 
technically the officials were the person’s curators, while an attore (both administrator and 
agent) was designated to take care of the ward and legally represent him or her. Additionally, 
the attore was also entrusted with the administration of the ward’s patrimony. After the 
official assignment, the attore had to officially accept the task, provide a guarantor for his or 
her administration (mallevadore), and was obliged to give an annual account of the 
administration to the Pupilli. After the 1767 reform, the Pupilli officials were divested of their 
role as universal curators, which entailed that the curatorship fell directly into the hands of the 
attore.110 
Special attention was paid in order to secure the administrator’s trustworthiness and 
impartiality towards the interests of the interdicted. For this reason, wives and mothers were 
usually considered the preferred guardians. Given that they had no inheritance right over a 
                                                
109 An interdiction decree usually commanded “…sottoporsi il medesimo al detto Magistrato de Pupilli a tenore 
del disposto della riforma delli statuti di detto Magistrato de 20 Agosto 1565 e del Motuproprio di S.A.R. del di 
5 febbraio 1717 nelle forme solite e consuete”. From an interdiction decree of 1740, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 
2301, no. 76.  




male’s property, it was believed that they had no personal interest in their husband’s or son’s 
patrimonies. Moreover, a proper administration was in the good interest of their children and 
themselves, securing their subsistence and future ability to rescue their dowry.111 Quite the 
reverse, agnates were usually regarded with suspicious eyes by the officials of the Pupilli, 
particularly when they were the direct inheritors of the ward’s patrimony. But, even maternal 
and matrimonial kinsmen who were not direct heirs were held to be too close and involved 
with the interdicted, thus increasing instead of mitigating the conflicts in the family. As a 
consequence, given that the Pupilli officials aimed to resolve existing family conflicts and 
avert the occurrence of any future ones, males from either side of the family lines were often 
vetoed on the grounds that choosing them could generate further “controversie d’interesse.” 
By contrast, the patrimony left in the hands of women was thought to create less disorder, 
even if it meant that temporarily the family structure was left upside down, and the woman 
ascribed a role equivalent to the pater familias.  
After the interdiction was decreed, the case often continued to require the Pupilli’s 
attention, whether due to administrative matters, because of the defendant’s petitions for the 
interdiction to be revoked, or due to any issue relating to the daily life of the interdicted and 
his or her family. Guardianships generated a difficult relationship between the interdicted and 
his or her attore. As the interdicted were adults who had been abruptly deprived of their 
power over themselves and their affairs, they hardly ever accepted the new state of affairs 
peacefully. The “disorder” their behaviour and personality created for the household was not 
easily contained and they often resisted the interdiction by recurring to a wide range of 
stratagems. For this reason, the records of interdiction procedures do not end with the issuing 
of the decree and the appointment of the guardian. This is not only because the Pupilli 
supervised the administration of the patrimony, but mostly because the families continued to 
use the Magistrate to resolve all kinds of conflicts and setbacks during the whole period in 
which the person was submitted to the Magistrate’s authority. Accordingly, interdiction 
procedures disclose what we could identify as particular periods of life crisis, cycles of 
disorder, and also permanent disruptions, as we will see in the next chapters. 
Once a person was interdicted, every decision regarding their patrimony had to first be 
approved by the Pupilli, from the monthly allowance destined for food and clothing of the 
                                                
111 The appointment of a guardian for mentally afflicted adults was not that different from the policies regarding 
guardianship of underage wards, which was also largely given to widows. See Calvi, Il contratto morale, and 




interdicted and their family, to the extraction of money placed in the Luoghi di Monte or 
under fideicommissary restriction. Some issues were even managed directly by the 
Magistracy, like the arrangements with creditors, or the selling of goods and property, if there 
were any (done through the pubblico incanto, that is by public auction).  
The Tuscan interdiction procedure did not automatically entail the suspension of the 
payment of debs, and much less the invalidation of contracts. If families wanted to institute 
litigation against some creditor on the grounds that the debt had been contracted while the 
individual was mentally incompetent, it had to be done after the interdiction, as a different 
legal procedure. This meant time and money being spent, and was not at all certain to secure a 
favourable result. Similarly, in terms of the economic situation of the patrimony, the 
interdiction meant that the Magistrato dei Pupilli acted as arbiter between the interests of the 
interdicted and the patrimony’s creditors, in what was called the giudizio universale di 
concorso dei creditori. New conditions were set in this procedure to meet the creditors’ 
interests within the possibilities for payment of the patrimony of the interdicted. But, for sure, 
debts had to be paid, so interdiction could not be used as a mechanism to skip payment, only, 
and when possible, to delay it.112 
Every one of these actions had to be paid to the Magistracy, according to the tariffs 
settled in the 1565 statutes. In addition to this, the interdicted had to pay an annual fee to the 
officials of the Pupilli for their involvement and management, to which had to be added the 
attore’s stipend, in the case that he was charging (close family members, of course, did not 
charge).113 For all these reasons, interdictions were an expensive matter entailing payments 
that created difficulties for families whose patrimonies were not large enough. Although some 
exceptions were made with small patrimonies in terms of granting them the possibility of not 
paying the annual fee to the Magistracy, in general the officials stated that the fee was 
mandatory. As a result, until 1767 interdiction was a mechanism available only for defendants 
whose patrimonies could afford the fees. In fact, government officials, before accepting an 
adult’s curatorship, had to investigate the patrimony to be certain that it was capable of paying 
the mandatory fees. However, this does not entail that only the high Tuscan aristocracy 
appears in the records of the Pupilli, for together with nobles and rich aristocrats in possession 
                                                
112 For an example of the potential economic problems following an interdiction and the difficulties of the 
families to meet the requirements of the creditors, see the case of Andrea Patriarchi, in ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, 
F. 2305, no. 211, 27 March 1762.   
113 As the interdicted several times had people from outside the family appointed as administrators, they usually 




of various estates outside Florence and more than one residence in the city, interdictions 
affected also people whose possessions were limited to the residence where they lived, or 
whose income was entirely dependant upon their “personal industry”, such as a pastry cook or 
an umbrella maker. After 1767, the procedure became available for every person in the 
Tuscan state, regardless of social position.      
The interdiction marked the suspension of the person’s legal capacity, which resulted 
not only in their being prohibited to administer their patrimony and engage in economic 
activities, but also meant that the person could not stand trial, serve as a witness or hold 
public office. As for the effects of the interdiction in other legal aspects of the interdicted’s 
life, early modern authorities were less consensual, however. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, it is possible to observe an unsolved debate over the capacity of an interdicted to 
choose his own lawyer or to make a legal will, for instance. Contrary to what one may 
assume, on some occasions the authorities validated a person’s capacity to testate, provided 
this respected the “good custom” (buon costume) and his or her final dispositions were not 
against the law. But in many other cases interdictions were requested precisely to prevent an 
unfavourable will.114 
Contrary to what might be expected by a modern observer, confinement was not 
connected to interdiction and was, at any rate, not its consequence. The fact is that 
confinement was hardly ever requested in interdiction petitions, even when the described 
individual was troublesome and evidently difficult to handle. There are basically two reasons 
for this. Firstly, incarceration and confinement in either of the existing Tuscan mental 
institutions  (the pazzeria of Santa Maria Nuova, and Santa Dorotea) was not the preferred 
nor the easiest solution. As I will examine later, most of the people interdicted in the 
eighteenth century were not confined in either of the two institutions. Secondly, and more 
importantly, confinement followed a different legal course than interdiction. While 
interdiction procedures were managed by the Magistrato dei Pupilli, confinement was 
regarded as a police matter, so it fell under the competence of the Auditore Fiscale. In legal 
                                                
114 The magistrates of the Supremo and the Pupilli engaged in several discussions regarding these topics, 
involving also the Consiglio di Reggenza. Overall the criterion was to decided case-by-case, so that the 
particular circumstances of each testator and his or her family could be taken into account, together with their 
particular mental condition. For example, see ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 115, July 1749 or ASF, 
Consiglio di Reggenza (hereafter CR), F. 756, no. 42, 1750. On the reasons to request an interdiction, see 




terms, interdiction procedures were managed by civil justice, while confinement was handled 
by criminal justice, with no necessary connection between the two.115 
Thus, a person could be confined without ever being interdicted and, certainly, 
interdiction was not even considered a relevant antecedent for confinement. It is true that we 
can find cases of people interdicted while confined at Santa Dorotea or at Santa Maria Nuova, 
but the majority of interdictions affected mentally disturbed people who were kept at home. 
Interdiction procedures largely affected people who had managed to marry, have children and 
perform normal duties for most of their lives. Furthermore, in those cases where interdiction 
lasted for a long time or where the person was interdicted early in their lives, it did not 
prevent them from forming a family of their own.  
By definition, interdiction was a temporary legal measure devised to last until it could 
be proved that the person had recovered his or her mental faculties. It could last from a couple 
of months to the whole life of the interdicted, and could be declared as many times as the 
person’s mental condition made it necessary. Interdictions could be partially or completely 
lifted, and this mainly depended, in addition to the development of the defendant’s mental 
incapacity, on the family’s support for the petition for removal. A partial lifting of the 
interdiction meant that the defendant was left under direct supervision of an official of the 
Pupilli or another government authority, who had to approve every financial decision for it to 
be legally valid. Given that they were considered more secure, partial lifting was a common 
transitional stage between interdiction and the complete restoration of one’s civil rights in 
Tuscany. If the interdiction was completely lifted, the person could resume complete powers 
of administration immediately.  
 Interdictions were used as a last resort by Tuscan families. They were a mechanism to 
turn to once every other measure to control, persuade or force the person to change their 
attitude had proved useless. Petitioners often said that relatives, neighbours or an influential 
person (the local priest, for example) had tried to prevent the radical measure of turning to the 
Pupilli by recourse to a series of unsuccessful arguments, such as illustrating the negative 
aspects the disorder provoked in their families, to their patrimonies, or for their honour.116 In 
this sense, resorting to interdiction as a mechanism to cope with family conflict and deviant 
                                                
115 The procedure for confinement and the involvement of the Auditore Fiscale are examined in Chapter 5.  
116 For example, “avendo l’oratore suddetto fatto intendere più volte al predetto suo fratello per mezzo de i 
parenti, e d’alcuni suoi confidenti, che voglia ritornarsene alla casa paterna, e desistere dal dissipare, non solo ha 
disprezzato la loro esortazioni ma più tosto gl’ha minacciati”, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 241, 




behaviour demonstrates what historians of the uses of justice have pointed out. As happens 
with matrimonial disputes, economic disagreements or the social responses to crime and 
assault, the judicial system came to the fore once every other measure to solve the conflict 
privately had failed, notwithstanding the countless efforts made by mediators (i.e. prestigious 
neighbours, priests, family friends).117  
But interdiction procedures served a twofold purpose: on the one hand, they were 
intended to provide care and protection for the mentally incompetent against themselves or 
against others who could potentially take advantage of their weakness. On the other hand, it 
was a procedure aimed at securing the subsistence of the family patrimony on behalf of the 
interdicted’s future heirs. Interdiction procedures served to negotiate who was responsible for 
the mentally disturbed. In other words, they shed light on the articulation of a combined 
welfare provision for the mentally disabled with shared responsibilities between the families 
and the state. Interdiction was not only the act of depriving mentally disturbed persons from 
their civil rights, but it also supposed the state’s involvement in their protection. In fact, the 
Pupilli officials supervised the caring and feeding of these people, and would generally 
defend their interests against ill-intentioned relatives. Therefore, interdictions provided the 
state’s intervention as requested by the families, but this at the same time implied shared 
responsibilities.   
Through the protection of the weak and incompetent members of society, the ducal 
administration was protecting the economic and moral welfare of the household. Preventing 
the economic collapse of a family meant preventing the need to procure different sources of 
maintenance for the affected family members. The economic subsistence of the family 
through the protection of the family patrimony secured social reproduction and the 
preservation of Tuscany. The preservation of private patrimonies was beneficial for the state, 
and was therefore at the core of the foundation of the Magistrato dei Pupilli.118  
The importance of patrimony in early modern Tuscan society has been the subject of 
numerous studies. In a society based on trust and credit where families had learned “the 
precarious nature of fortunes”, the difficulty in recovering from debts and the danger of 
mismanagement were written in stone.119 The institution of interdiction, thus, builds upon this 
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controllo sociale”; and Sbriccoli, “Giustizia negoziata, giustizia egemonica”.   
118 Fisher, “The State as Surrogate Father”. 
119 Thomas Kuehn, Heirs, Kin and Creditors in Renaissance Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 




fear of mismanagement – it had in fact been tied to this concern since its appearance in 
Roman law. The hereditary system, the ethos of the aristocratic families and, furthermore, the 
stability of Tuscan society as a whole were firmly based on the careful accumulation of 
familial wealth.120 But, by the eighteenth century, interdiction served a larger purpose than the 
conservation of family fortunes. Or, to put it in a better way, the subsistence of both middle-
class and aristocratic families by the eighteenth century was centred on a complex conflation 
between patrimony preservation and compliance with moral normativity. The behavioural 
deviance disclosed in interdiction procedures thus went beyond purely economic concerns, to 
place the accent on the disorder of the family, and on conflicting views regarding proper 
behaviour. In a time when the definition of aristocracy was being re-examined, interdictions 
served particularly well to tackle patrimonial mismanagement and its open defiance of what 
we could call the moral economy of the Tuscan aristocracy. As Bartolomé Yun Casalilla has 
suggested, this approach allows us to examine economic behaviour as a “moral choice.”121 
Recourse to interdiction could thus be interpreted as the action taken to defend those moral 
values that were considered crucial for the reproduction of the family.   
The practice of interdiction on the grounds that the person was risking the family 
inheritance (and, with that, the family name), coincides with the greater concerns of the time 
regarding social order and stability. This confluence between private and public interests must 
not be seen as an exemption or as a new phenomenon of the eighteenth century. As in the 
previous centuries, families petitioned for the state’s intervention with the argument that the 
family patrimony was at severe risk after the financial mismanagement of a mentally 
incompetent member. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the perception of mental incapacity 
surpassed purely economic concerns to progressively place the accent on the emotional realm.  
                                                                                                                                                   
interpretation and strategies, as Kuehn’s study on inheritance shows. He examined property starting from the 
repudiation of inheritance, to demonstrate the complex ways in which Florentine families interpreted legal 
structures so as to use them to achieve their aims. 
120 See, for instance, the line of argument developed by Jean Boutier, “Una nobiltà urbana in età moderna. 
Aspetti della morfologia sociale della nobiltà fiorentina”, Dimensioni e problemi della Ricerca storica 2 (1993), 
pp. 141-159, or “Les noblesses du grand-duché (XVe-XIXe siècle)” in Jean Boutier, Sandro Landi and Olivier 
Rouchon (eds.), Florence et la Toscane XIVe-XIXe siècles. Les dynamiques d’un Ètat italien (Rennes: Presses 
Universitaires de Rennes, 2004), pp. 265-285.  
121 “Una postura que nos aleja tanto de los tópicos que han visto la acción de la aristocracia a la luz de un 
supuesto y estático código normativo y de valores, como de interpretaciones en exceso economicistas sobre su 
racionalidad y criterios de comportamiento.” Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, “Economía moral y gestión aristocrática 
en tiempos del Quijote”, Revista de Historia Económica 23, Supplement 1 (2005), p. 50. The concept of moral 
economy was first proposed by E. P. Thompson in a seminal essay in 1971. Edward P. Thompson, “The Moral 




Patrimony itself was connected to affections and conveyed an emotional significance 
that seems very strange within the parameters of a modern consumer society. Family 
strategies and kin networks of support were entangled with the emotions ascribed to 
patrimony and expressed in situations related to patrimony.122 In this sense, interdiction suits 
had a particular emotional value and were therefore marked by the emotional, and not only 
the material world of the family. This process, which becomes particularly marked in the 
eighteenth century, allowed for a debate regarding the place of emotions in public and private 
life, entailing new discussions of proper and improper emotional displays. As will be argued 
in the last chapter of this thesis, emotional disturbances assumed an increasingly crucial role 
in definitions of mental affliction.   
The interdiction procedure functioned as a mechanism for neutralizing the disorder of 
the household produced by deviant individuals. As the Pupilli officials would say, interdiction 
and submission to the guardianship and authority of the Pupilli served to repair and impede 
ulterior disorders (per riparare or per ovviare ad ulteriori disordini). The echo of Farge’s 
Désordre des familles is evident here.123 Nonetheless, we have to take into account that 
interdictions are not really equivalent to the French lettres de cachet. Unlike the latter, 
interdictions were generally not the resort of executive power. Although it was in the power 
of the Grand Duke to command the interdiction directly and thus completely bypass the 
judicial enquiry, in practice this was hardly ever the case. The normal procedure worked as I 
have shown: inquiries into mental capacity in Tuscany were initiated by a relative’s request 
and the grand ducal decision was taken based on the observations made by the officials of the 
Supremo, the officials of the Pupilli and the information gathered at the local level. There is 
also another important difference. Lettres de cachet granted the king the power to arrest and 
imprison any of his subjects without trial, for any reason. On the contrary, interdictions in 
Tuscany not only had nothing to do with confinement but, furthermore, were exclusively 
concerned with mental incapacity defined (even if broadly) according to pre-established 
categories. Nonetheless, interdictions and lettres de cachet are equivalent in as much as they 
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Nootens, “ ‘What a Misfortune that Poor Child Should Have Married Such a Being as Joe’: Les fils prodigues de 
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both entailed that private matters were made public so that the government, through its police 
or judicial administration, could mediate, resolve or at least hinder family disorder.   
 
Abuses, Strategies and Uses of Interdiction Procedures  
In 1761, a petition for interdiction was sent by the underage son of a Rocco Giacchi, 
arguing that his father was “deprived of reason” (privo di senno) to the point of being unable 
to speak without stuttering, on account of the “fierce and frequent accidents of apoplexy and 
epilepsy” he suffered.124 The petition continued, saying that due to his father’s “impotence 
and inability,” he risked finding himself in “greater anguish”, having nowhere to stay and be 
cured, and having no other relatives to “supervise” his conduct. The interdiction, however, 
was not granted. The Pupilli officials claimed that the petition had been made only to avoid 
the payment of Giacchi’s debts. Furthermore, they discovered that the petition had been 
actually sent by the alleged demented himself and not by his son, who was absent from the 
Tuscan state at that time. The petition was thus considered to be a total fabrication by Giacchi, 
designed as a strategy to skip payment of a debt he had to his father-in-law.125  
Financial mismanagement was mandatory in order to institute an enquiry into 
someone’s mental capacity. This did not, however, imply that every case of economic 
mismanagement responded to a mental incapacity that was liable for interdiction. The sole 
fact of a patrimony being mismanaged or at risk of bankruptcy did not grant a sentence of 
interdiction. Entrenched in a judicial system that conceived the protection of the family 
patrimony as a public responsibility, interdictions gave power to the state to intervene 
precisely to prevent and control the financial mismanagement of a mentally incompetent 
person. Not any kind of financial mismanagement, but limited exclusively to mismanagement 
that was demonstrably the cause of incapacity. Requests for someone’s interdiction based 
solely on the argument that the patrimony was at risk of bankruptcy, or “anguished” by debts, 
as it was said, were considered an abuse, and were generally not granted. As the members of 
the Tuscan administration were well aware, “many times interdictions are decided when there 
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between the petition and the report, which also tells us about the rationales of the procedure. If cases seemed 




is no vice of prodigality, grounded [only] either in someone’s inexperience in the 
management of his patrimony, or because he spends his resources on ends that are not 
laudable.”126 
Mental incapacity was evidenced by the person’s economic performance, not by the 
state of the patrimony itself. In other words, the assessment of mental incapacity was not 
codified in the presence of debts or excessive spending alone, but much more in the behaviour 
of the current holder of the patrimony, and the reasons and circumstances surrounding the 
mismanagement. Why they had contracted debts, why their production had dropped, why they 
were selling household goods or liquidizing assets, how was their daily performance, how 
were their relationships with other household members, and which of their actions indicated 
some kind of mental affliction were the issues. The Tuscan government officials were 
particularly careful so as not to agree to petitions of interdiction that aimed at skipping or 
delaying payment of debts, or to expose the abuses and machinations of greedy relatives.    
We cannot exclude the probability that families made an instrumental use of 
interdiction petitions, whether to take advantage of a weaker family member, to avoid or 
resolve economic mismanagement, to accelerate an inheritance, to avoid an unfavourable will 
or to produce a change in the balance of power relations in the household. Abuses did exist, 
and the system was constantly aware of that possibility. For instance, Michel Arcangelo Fini 
from Greve was denounced by his paternal uncle as demente, and consequently unable to 
manage his affairs. The Pupilli requested information from Greve, where it was found out 
with the support of a medical practitioner, that Arcangelo Fini was naturally quiet and passive 
(of a naturale quieto e non vivace), but not mad. As a consequence, the officials of the Pupilli 
decided not to grant the interdiction because Fini’s alleged mental incapacity was not severe 
enough, but also (probably primarily) because he had an administrator who, according to the 
information that had arrived from Greve, was a perfectly good and honourable man and who 
was managing Fini’s affairs in a productive and disinterested way. Not only was the 
interdiction not thought necessary, but the uncle’s petition was suspected of being 
manipulative and with ulterior motives.127 The fact that he presented the petition with a very 
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laconic narrative and without the support of other testimonies certainly did not play in his 
favour. 
Petitions found to be abusive were not granted, but it anyhow happened sometimes 
that defendants made a petition shortly after the interdiction had been decreed or some times 
at the same time as their relatives turned to the Pupilli, claiming that the accusations were 
based on false grounds. If proven true, the interdiction was likely to be revoked and the 
defendant allowed to resume full civil rights. However, the possibility of ill-intentioned 
relatives requesting an interdiction only to accelerate the transfer of an inheritance or to take 
away the patrimony from the hands of a weak family member do not constitute, in my view, a 
relevant issue in the analysis of the perception and understanding of insanity. This is, firstly, 
because it was not the easiest or the fastest measure to take. A request for interdiction was 
expensive, presupposed hard and lengthy bureaucratic work, entailed constant payments, and 
sealed the intervention of the Pupilli in private family matters. For instance, the Pupilli 
officials did not necessarily side with petitioners to resolve residential conflicts, a situation 
frequently disclosed behind petitions for interdiction. Quite the contrary, the Pupilli officials 
largely privileged the unification of the household. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
the probability of ill-intentioned requests does not interfere with the study of social 
perceptions of madness. We can explore how and when madness comes into the fore and the 
circulation of languages and meaning of madness even when mental afflictions were 
instrumentally used to take advantage of a family member.  
Ill-intentioned, rapacious or abusive motives should be taken as fundamental elements 
in the articulation of interdiction narratives, but this, however, does not necessarily imply that 
the denunciation of mental incapacity had been completely manufactured. As Robert Allan 
Houston has claimed, even if becoming the subject of an inquiry into mental capacity “was 
partly, or perhaps mainly, a matter of contingencies and entitlements beyond the influence of 
the subject’s behaviour or words,” it was anyways necessary that the person had previously 
displayed “symptoms which could be taken to indicate madness.”128 Scholars working on 
legal records long ago warned us about the manufactured truth produced by judicial 
proceedings, disclosing “plausible stories” or “legal truths”.129 Narratives were manufactured 
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according to how much petitioners were willing to disclose. However, the fact that narratives 
had to be plausible should not lead us to assume they were entirely manufactured.  
 
1. 3. Interdiction Procedures as a Family Matter 
Although there are some exceptions regarding interdiction procedures initiated by the 
Magistrato Supremo itself or by creditors, the great majority of the suits were initiated 
through the petition of family members. The state was at the service of the families in 
Tuscany through the Magistrato dei Pupilli, and families that could afford the procedure 
increasingly turned to the Magistrato dei Pupilli when seeking arbitration in the private 
conflicts arising from the presence of deviant members in the family. The Pupilli was not only 
concerned with the economic subsistence of the Tuscan families, but could also act as 
mediator in the family conflicts unfolded by interdiction procedures.130 In their capacity as 
universal guardians of the mentally disabled, the Pupilli officials were often called to solve 
family tensions, to reconcile couples, siblings, or fathers and mothers with their sons and 
daughters. This placed the officials in the position, actively encouraged by the families 
themselves, whereby they could freely devise strategies to make household coexistence 
bearable, resorting to any possible means to pacify and normalize the chaotic environment 
that often accompanied the presence of the mentally disturbed in the household. This went 
from admonishments to coercive measures, such as temporary incarceration, to try to put an 
end to their extravagances and often violent outbursts, combined with an attempt to provide 
the care and protection that the mentally disturbed deserved. The officials of the Pupilli could 
dissolve inconvenient marriages, force a fugitive prodigal husband to return home, or 
persuade a wife to endure a mad husband. They could act as guarantors of the proper 
obedience to the commands set by hierarchical gender roles, and provide a negotiated 
response to the inconveniences caused by the mentally disturbed. 
Public intervention in family affairs was a negotiated process, a path settled from the 
beginning of the process of Florentine state formation. The logic behind the interference of 
                                                                                                                                                   
edition: Il filo e le tracce. Vero, falso, finto (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2006)]. On the plausibility of the narratives of 
mental incapacity in particular, see Houston, Madness and Society, pp. 42-45.  
130 The other Magistracy concerned with civil litigations was the Magistrato Supremo, which in fact often 
overlapped with the concerns of the Pupilli. A similar logic regarding private family conflicts being disclosed for 
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the Pupilli in family matters dates back to the construction of the Florentine Republic, and the 
organization of the state as what Isabelle Chabot called le gouvernement des pères (the 
father’s government).131 Founded in 1393, the Magistrato dei Pupilli et Adulti was embedded 
in the oligarchy’s concern for the consolidation of family order and moral standards. 
Similarly, Caroline Fisher has argued that the office of the Pupilli acted from its foundation as 
a meeting point for private and public interests, where the government’s intervention over 
family matters through the institution of state guardianship was a continually renegotiated 
process. Florentine families were active agents in the growing power of the Florentine 
Renaissance state, and state guardianship was defined in the community between government 
and subjects.132  
During the Medici period, the Magistrato dei Pupilli continued to act as a space to 
resolve family conflicts, developing what Giulia Calvi has called “contratto morale”. During 
the sixteenth century, the officials of the Pupilli positioned widows as privileged 
interlocutors, which demonstrates the Magistracy’s tendency to ascribe new value to the 
maternal line of the family structure. This, in other words, meant that women’s role in early 
modern Tuscany escaped from the image of segregation and exclusion previously assumed by 
scholars. Furthermore, precisely because women and their kin were excluded from the line of 
succession, they could play a predominant role as trustworthy guardians. In contrast, their 
juridical and social role was inversely proportional to their participation in the hereditary 
system, where “il prestigio del suo ruolo culturale e affettivo conseguiva direttamente dalla 
fragilità della sua collocazione successoria.”133    
The same model of negotiation and moral contract can be applied to the eighteenth-
century picture regarding the management of deviant adults, which also shows family 
structures and family strategies that escaped the supposedly rigid patriarchal model. The 
cognatic structure of the family was empowered by the negotiation of alternatives offered by 
the Pupilli. The capacity of women to negotiate in the legal arena, notwithstanding the legal 
constraints posed by the patriarchal system have been recognized in different areas of the 
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early modern Tuscan legal system, particularly regarding matrimonial disputes.134 The same 
assessment is applicable for Tuscan interdictions, with an important particularity, nonetheless. 
Women were not only the most common petitioners of interdiction procedures (of the 
petitions that revealed the identity of the petitioner, 206 out of 379 were made by women), 
but they were the most recurrent interlocutors of the Pupilli in the discussions to determine 
the existence of mental incapacity and the possible strategies to solve the problems it caused. 
The role of women as administrators and recurrent mediators between mentally incapacitated 
men and state officials is an issue that crosses most of the topics examined in this thesis. For 
now, suffice it to say that women were not only the mediators between the private domain and 
the public world but, furthermore, were invested with the role of rational agents in the upside-
down order created by mental disturbance. The study of interdiction procedures, thus, 
illuminates from an innovative perspective the shaping of the ideal of domesticity, suggesting 
that the moral role attributed to women was not constrained to the romantic paradigm of 
tenderness, resignation and submission.135  
Hence, although interdictions affected primarily men (only 26 women were interdicted 
between 1700 and 1775, compared to 581 men), this does not mean that the judicial space 
was dominated by men. On the contrary, women continued to be privileged interlocutors of 
the Pupilli during the eighteenth century, for we observe them as active agents in the 
negotiation of responses to control and handle their adult sons or their husbands. Women, 
supported by their kin, learned to use in their favour their position as impartial actors derived 
from their exclusion of the hereditary line. In fact, of a total of 379 interdictions decreed 
between 1688 and 1775 in which the petitioner was recorded, 222, that is around 59%, were 
initiated after a supplication sent by a mother, a wife, or one of her kin (see Table 1). And, 
usually when a mother or a wife made the petition, they were afterwards appointed 
administrators of the interdicted patrimony, as already stated.  
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Table 1. Distribution of interdiction petitioners according to family lines. 1688-1775  
Women and their kin  Male Agnates 
Mother 74 Son 51 
Wife 109 Brother 62 
Sister or daughter 15 Father  7 
Female marriage kin 8 Paternal uncle 22 
Maternal uncle 6 Nephew 11 
Marriage kinsmen136 10 Cousin 3 
  Grandson 1 
Total 222 Total 157 
 
 
It is of interest to point out that the number of women and their kinsmen may not be 
representative of women’s presence in the legal arena. Firstly, because the picture observed in 
Table 1 corresponds only to the initial interdiction petition, without taking into account the 
posterior legal suits carried out before the Pupilli following an interdiction decree, where 
women and their kinsmen also played a pivotal role. Particularly interesting here are the 
inquiries carried out following a petition for the interdiction to be lifted, usually sent by the 
interdicted himself. These inquiries took into particular consideration the opinion of women 
on the behavioural changes alleged by the interdicted. To secure the revocation of the 
interdiction, petitioners had to count on their mother’s or wife’s approval. Secondly, women 
hardly ever acted alone, and questions may be raised as to their actual agency behind these 
petitions.137  
It is true that there are cases where women appear after their husband’s or son’s 
interdiction had been decreed, confessing that they never knew about the content of the 
petition and had been forced to sign it. Nonetheless, the degree of active participation of 
women in this kind of procedures can also be assessed by means of the long-running 
perspective allowed by the records of the Pupilli. Precisely because we are not bound to a 
photographic image of the family conflicts surrounding the interdiction procedure, we can 
                                                
136 Father-in-law, Son’s father in law, Brother-in-law. 
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observe the pivotal role played by women in the identification of mental incapacity, in the 
evolution and eventual resolution of the conflict, and in how the deviant behaviour was 
handled. Furthermore, we find women who requested the interdiction of more than one family 
member at different times, or who requested the interdiction of the same individual more than 
once, due to their continual relapses into prodigality or insanity.138  
Finally, and to counterbalance this highly debateable matter, marriage kin played a 
more significant role than that suggested by the numbers of Table 1. Matrimonial kinsmen 
were usually part of the interdiction procedure at some point, to back up the denunciation 
made either by women or by men of the agnatic line. Other times, a brother- or father-in-law 
was preferred as administrator instead of a son or a brother, whose interests in the inheritance 
of the interdicted patrimony made him suspicious in the eyes of the Magistrato dei Pupilli 
officials. Matrimonial kinsmen were also part of the living arrangements made by the Pupilli 
officials in their efforts to settle the disorders produced by prodigals and the demented. Here 
we see the importance of the horizontal family manifested through the involvement of 
brothers, who can be seen as particularly active in the protection of their married sisters.139 
 
1. 4. Inquiries into Mental Capacity in Early Modern Europe 
Inquiries into mental capacity to determine a person’s legal status and establish the 
necessary precautions to protect those deemed mentally incompetent and their patrimonies do 
not constitute a Tuscan exception. Called “interdictions” in places that followed the Roman 
law tradition such as France, Spain and Italy, “commissions of lunacy” in England, or 
“brieves of idiotry and furiosity” in Scotland, these legal procedures shared common 
characteristics. They were devised to deprive people deemed mentally afflicted of their civil 
rights, leaving them under legal guardianship to protect them and their patrimonies. All of 
these procedures, moreover, functioned as a legal mechanism to be activated at the families’ 
request. This means that the understanding of mental incapacity that the historian may grasp 
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from these kinds of sources changes the focus from the medical profession and governmental 
power to society and the family. However, despite these promising features, inquiries into 
mental capacity have only recently elicited the attention of historians and the field still 
remains largely understudied. There are some exceptions, though, upon which this section 
draws, but none of them focus on the Italian peninsula.140 
Interdiction in France followed a similar pattern to that of Tuscany, both being 
profoundly entrenched in the Roman law tradition. However, although both territories shared 
their legal frameworks, the societies in which these provisions were inserted changed in 
practice the aims and application of the procedure, to the point that they followed different 
paths. Roman law left many fields open to interpretation, for the cases of life were always 
more complex and numerous than the cases covered by the law, as the Corpus Iuris Civilis 
itself declared.141 Accordingly, from the general and somehow rigid framework provided by 
Roman law, early modern judicial systems developed particular variants, according to the 
specific requirements of each space.  
As in Tuscany, interdiction in early modern France was employed as a legal procedure 
to deprive a person of his or her rights over their own self and their patrimony by reason 
either of prodigality or of insanity. Hence, although the procedure in France was also 
entrenched in the Roman law tradition, during the early modern period it had diverged from 
its original roots, being applied to both prodigality and insanity.142 As I explained above, 
according to Roman law only prodigals were interdicted, whilst the insane were considered 
incapacitated by nature, making an interdiction decree unnecessary. But, with the revival of 
Roman law in France, interdictions came to be applied both for prodigals and the insane, and 
the first documented interdiction of a mad person, according to Thierry Nootens, dates back 
to 1329.143 However, although in early modern France prodigality (prodigalité) and insanity 
(folie) were both subjected to the same procedure, French legal practice never fully blurred 
the difference made by Roman law regarding the origins of the incompetence and 
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consequently, its consequences. If we follow the study of Laurent Cartayrade, it seems that 
the conflation between prodigality and insanity was less complete than in Tuscany towards 
the eighteenth century. Preserving in this regard its Roman law roots, the incapacity of 
prodigals in France was understood to be only partial and dependant upon the decision of a 
judge while, in the case of insanity, the incapacity was understood to be always complete. In 
both cases, after the interdiction the person was left under a guardianship, although in the case 
of prodigals the curator protected only the person’s patrimony, whereas in the case of the 
insane the guardian protected both the person and the patrimony.   
Prodigality and insanity in France were conceived as two types of incapacity that 
produced the same consequence, but whose origins were not equivalent. According to 
Cartayrade, what prodigals and the insane had in common was their “irresponsibility, that is 
the inability or unwillingness to manage one’s possessions according to the socially 
sanctioned rules and goals...”144 However, while in the case of the insane their incapacity was 
considered natural or accidental, prodigals were to blame for their mental incompetence. 
Consequently, the insane were not held responsible for their condition, but prodigals were.  A 
clear distinction was made between “the morally corrupt and guilty, and the sick and 
innocent”, where prodigality was regarded as a voluntary “moral depravity.”145  
Therefore, although prodigality and insanity came under the same procedure in 
eighteenth-century France, they were kept as two distinct categories liable to interdiction, 
without evolving into the conflation that I have observed in the Tuscan legal practice. This 
difference underpins the divergence of the Tuscan procedure, which increasingly blurred the 
problem of the voluntariness of the prodigals’ incapacity. Through a process that had started 
already during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, by the eighteenth century prodigality 
was as pitied as insanity. As I will show later, the “vice” of prodigality was thought to give 
little choice to its victims. In this sense, vice was equated with illness or, furthermore, vice 
became the illness.  
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Interdiction was not the only way of dealing with the economic threat posed by 
madness in early modern France. The French legal framework also allowed the option of the 
conseil judiciaire, developed around the fifteenth century to provide a less invasive 
alternative than interdiction for the feeble-minded (faibles d’esprit). The judicial council 
functioned as a semi-interdiction process by which the individual was put under milder 
supervision to provide assistance in certain particular acts, which were determined on a case-
by-case basis.146 While interdictions were primarily requested by family members, councils 
were self-imposed and acquired increasing popularity during the eighteenth century. 
According to Cartayrade, the council experienced such success, firstly, because it provided 
more flexibility than interdictions in terms of the categories that were liable under it, which in 
fact were applied at the judges’ discretion. But, secondly, because it could be applied to 
particular circumstances, allowing for a personalized system to protect the patrimonies from 
economic mismanagement without the dishonourable mark that interdiction inevitably 
entailed.147  
As I explained above, in Tuscany towards 1770 voluntary interdictions also started to 
become common, though the connotations and consequences of the procedure were equal to 
those of interdictions decreed by reason of prodigality or insanity. However, as in France, 
voluntary interdictions in Tuscany enjoyed greater flexibility and were carried out in a more 
personalized way. Taking into account that in these cases the measure had been self-imposed, 
the authorities normally made compromises, giving some degree of autonomy to the 
interdicted. It could be argued that the categories of dementia and prodigality were already 
sufficiently flexible in Tuscany so as to allow for personalized variants. However, in terms of 
its consequences, all types of interdictions in Tuscany were subjected to the same rules, 
regardless of the category in which it was grounded. For this reason, to some extent the 
French council could be considered more akin to the Tuscan semi-revocation of the 
interdiction, the intermediate situation between interdiction and its complete revocation that 
was usually preferred to a total lifting of the interdiction in the Grand Duchy. This kinship 
works, despite the fact that in the latter case the measure was not self-imposed and was in fact 
quite resisted. This milder form of interdiction in Tuscany could last as long as the 
magistrates thought it necessary to secure the patrimony, and in practice signified that every 
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economic move made by the individual had to be pre-approved by an appointed government 
official in order to be valid. 
Two other important differences between the Tuscan and the French interdiction 
processes should be examined here. One concerns the duration of the interdiction and the 
other the number and distribution of the categories of mental incapacity. Although, 
theoretically, interdictions were conceived as a temporary measure, only a small proportion of 
interdictions were revoked in France during the eighteenth century, and generally one to ten 
years elapsed between the interdiction sentence and the first request for liberation (mains-
levées). On the contrary, interdiction revocations in Tuscany were not rare, suggesting that 
interdictions were much more flexible there than in France. In what appears to be an 
exclusively eighteenth-century feature, in Tuscany people could be interdicted up to five 
times in a lifetime, and the sentence could be revoked from just days to 20 years later, 
depending on the person and circumstances surrounding each case.148    
Regarding numbers, in France requests for interdiction tend to decrease after the 
second half of the eighteenth century, whilst requests for voluntary council experienced a 
growing popularity. This suggests, according to Cartayrade, that voluntary council was 
preferred to a full interdiction, evidencing a movement opposite to what I observe in Tuscany, 
where the numbers of interdictions tend to grow steadily throughout the century.149 To 
explain this we have to take into account the fact that the behaviour of interdiction procedures 
also responds to institutional changes (i.e. a change in the policies of the authorities in charge, 
or a change in the procedure making it either easier or more difficult), which occur in parallel 
to social changes that might have influenced the rise or decline of families’ decisions to 
initiate interdiction procedures. In this sense, Cartayrade takes the decline in interdiction 
procedures to be the effect of a change in the preferences of the families (and the allegedly 
incapable) towards the voluntary counsel, which was easier to obtain and entailed less 
troubles and dishonour. This accounts, he asserts, for an increasing reluctance of family 
members to resort to the authorities in favour of more private strategies to resolve their 
conflicts. It is interesting to note here that the increase in the use of interdiction procedures in 
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Tuscany can be taken to be the result of quite the opposite situation. It could in fact suggest 
that concern for the consequences of irresponsible behaviour increasingly called for a deeper 
public intervention in the private domain. This rise was further propelled by the effects of the 
1767 regulation that made interdiction available also to patrimonies that previously could not 
pay the fees charged by the Pupilli for its services.  
Another interesting difference between the two geographic frameworks is that 
interdiction for prodigality in France accounts for the minority of the cases, while in Tuscany, 
it is by far the most commonly recorded cause of interdiction. Furthermore, towards the 
eighteenth century in France interdiction came to be increasingly associated with madness and 
confinement. Petitioners often requested confinement along with the interdiction and, 
similarly, interdiction sentences increasingly pointed out that the interdicted was to be 
confined in a specified institution. However, Cartayrade warns us, interdiction did not mean 
automatic confinement. He argues that interdiction sentences explicitly stated that the 
guardian was entitled to confine his or her ward, which means that in the absence of such 
authorization, the guardian could not proceed with the internment. Thus, “confinement was an 
option offered with, rather than an intrinsic part of, interdiction judgements.”150 This means 
that the primary aim of interdiction in France was the protection of the patrimony and the 
person, and not the person’s confinement, for which a separate procedure existed as well 
(lettres de cachet).  
However, for our purposes, the fact remains that the causality of interdictions in 
eighteenth-century France was mostly attributed to insanity, and that petitioners tended to 
request confinement with petitions for interdiction. The Napoleonic civil code ultimately 
finalized the differentiation between insanity and prodigality by establishing that only insanity 
was liable to interdiction, while prodigals and faibles d’esprit (feeble-minded) were subjected 
to the judicial council.151 In contrast, in Tuscany interdiction and confinement of the mentally 
disturbed were kept as starkly different procedures, as I have explained, managed by 
completely different sections of the state bureaucracy, and only came to be associated with 
each other with the enactment of the Napoleonic code. Moreover, during the eighteenth 
century, prodigality was the most employed category both to request and pass an interdiction 
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sentence, suggesting that the moral condemnation suffered by prodigality in early modern 
France was not paralleled in Tuscany.  
Consequently, although France and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany shared the same 
legal tradition, their legal practices regarding interdiction evolved differently during the 
eighteenth century, with two key differences. Firstly, France did not produce the conflation 
between insanity and prodigality we observe in Tuscany and, secondly, in France the 
interdiction of insane individuals came to be associated with confinement. Now, if we move 
to the British context, we can see that the aims and general characteristics of the legal 
procedure to deprive someone of his or her civil rights followed similar principles, although 
framed under a different legal tradition. However, if in the comparison between the French 
and the Tuscan scenarios it becomes clear that local variants were at play, the examination of 
the British context similarly suggests that the interpretation and practice of these procedures 
responded and adapted to local concerns. In other words, although inquiries into mental 
capacity were widely conceived as a mechanism to neutralize the negative economic 
consequences of madness, how these consequences were identified and interpreted was highly 
dependent upon the cultural values of the given society. As was the case in Tuscany, British 
inquiries into mental capacity were also not connected to confinement. However, contrary to 
the French and Tuscan scenarios, neither the English nor the Scottish legal frameworks 
provided any measures for the consequences of prodigality. Although it was identified as a 
reprehensible vice, the category did not constitute legal reason to deprive someone of the right 
to administer his or her property.  
The whole system regulating mental incapacity in the English legislation was based on 
two categories, idiocy and lunacy. As defined by the influential English jurist Sir William 
Blackstone, “an idiot, or natural fool, is one that hath had no understanding from his nativity; 
and therefore is by law presumed never likely to attain any.”152 In turn, the lunatic, or “non 
compos mentis” was held to be “one who hath had understanding, but by disease, grief, or 
other accident hath lost the use of his reason.”153 English law considered that the protection 
and care of the mentally incapacitated and their estates was a royal prerogative. Therefore, 
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since the thirteenth century those deemed mentally afflicted were put under the guardianship 
of the Crown, first through the High Court of Chancery, and then through the Court of Wards. 
After the latter was abolished in 1660, guardianship of lunatics and idiots came to be under 
the competence of the Court of Chancery.154  
According to Michael MacDonald, the dissolution of the Court of Wards had 
markedly negative effects for the insane. The Court of Wards, he suggests, was not only 
concerned with administering the patrimony of landowners, as the Chancery was later 
reduced to doing for, although it was a much “hated institution”, it managed to protect the 
insane. On the contrary, the Court of Chancery “exploited the insane as the Court of Wards 
had never done. It was notoriously corrupt, inefficient, and expensive. And in the early 
eighteenth century it was rocked by one of the most serious scandals in the history of English 
law.”155 The notorious level of corruption within the management of commissions of lunacy 
and idiocy has apparently no parallel in other European frameworks. However, further 
investigation into the records of the surviving eighteenth-century English inquiries into 
mental capacity should shed greater light on the subject, as a systematic study still needs to be 
done. But the bottom line of the controversy was that the Chancery made the properties of the 
mentally incapacitated an open field for profit and corruption, bluntly disputed between 
judges, guardians and lawyers. Furthermore, with the rising costs charged by the Court of 
Chancery for the guardianship of lunatics and idiots, the procedure became affordable only 
for the richer members of English society. 
The legal procedure by which a petitioner could request the Lord Chancellor to inquire 
into the individual’s state of mind was called commission of lunacy or of idiocy (commission 
de idiota inquirendo or de lunatico inquirendo). The investigation was directed not only to 
assert the defendant’s state of mind, but also the date from which it could be established that 
he or she had become mentally incapacitated. This was fundamental, “because a commission 
was often used to retroactively annul a contract that had been made years before.”156 When 
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the enquiry established that the defendant was indeed a lunatic or idiot, this person and his or 
her property was commissioned to the care of a suitable guardian, generally someone who 
was next of kin, provided they were not the immediate heir. However, although incapacity by 
reason of lunacy and idiocy followed the same procedure, the legal consequences of the 
commission in each case were different. While the legal declaration of mental incapacity was 
irrevocable in the case of lunacy, the incapacity of lunatics was by definition understood to be 
temporary, and so they could regain their civil rights when their sanity returned. For this 
reason, according to Blackstone, very few individuals were declared to be natural idiots, for 
the deprivation of their rights would have been permanent.157  
The Scottish legal framework provided a similar provision for the mentally 
incapacitated, also based on the dichotomy between idiocy and lunacy (called, in this case, 
furiosity). In Scotland, those deprived of reason were also put under curatorship, once a 
“brieve [writ or brief] of idiotry” or a “brieve of furiosity” had been requested from the 
Chancery.158 As in the other cases examined here, brieves of idiocy and furiosity were 
requested by close relatives on the grounds that the person was incapable of administering his 
or her property, which represented a threat to their financial wellbeing and that of their 
families. In order for a person to be declared mentally incapacitated, an inquest was 
conducted by a judge to examine the capacities of the alleged insane, a procedure known as 
“cognition”. People held to suffer from mental incapacity were put under the curatorship of a 
relative, generally the same one that had requested the brieve, and the person was deprived of 
her or his civil rights.  
Cognitions not only established whether the defendant was mentally incapacitated, but 
they also indicated the exact time the incapacity had started. All deeds committed by the 
mentally afflicted since the onset of their condition could be nullified after the cognition. The 
fact that both in England and in Scotland the legal procedure that established someone’s 
mental incapacity had retroactive power meant that not only economic contracts, but also 
legal contracts such as marriage, could be nullified, a consequence that we do not observe in 
Tuscany, as we have seen. However, legal mental incapacity did not entail a fixed array of 
consequences, as Houston has argued. Given that the law recognized different gradations and 
types of mental incapacity, which could be temporary or permanent, and could affect the 
person in a myriad of ways, “cognosing a person did not automatically invalidate all their acts 
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while deranged, but it threw them into doubt, and allowed their ‘reduction’ [overturn] at 
law.”159 
Both in the Scottish and English legal frameworks, inquiries into mental capacity were 
a separate procedure from confinement. To institutionalize or to imprison an insane relative 
served a whole different set of aims than cognitions or commissions of lunacy. Thus they 
were regulated by a different set of rules, particularly because confinement was easier, less 
expensive, did not entail a court procedure, and was largely more discrete. As Houston puts it, 
inquiries into mental capacity were a much more difficult procedure than confinement 
(whether at home or in prison), so long as they were “a potentially difficult and necessarily 
public procedure.” Similarly, commissions of lunacy were expensive, long, and public.160   
Even with their dissimilarities, inquiries into mental capacity during the eighteenth 
century attest to a new visibility of madness all over Europe. Although historiography, 
following Foucault’s lead, long ago highlighted madness’s growing visibility during the 
eighteenth century, numbers were overestimated and to a large extent gathered only from 
asylum entrances. However, what later studies have come to suggest is that the growing 
visibility of madness during the eighteenth century can be observed not only in hospital 
records but, first and foremost, in poor law records (in the case of the British context) and 
inquiries into mental capacity, as the studies reviewed here attest.161 The visibility acquired by 
madness in the Tuscan scenario, thus, is an example of a bigger trend that involved Europe. 
What makes it particularly interesting, however, are the local characteristics of the process in 
Tuscany compared to other European frameworks. From a similar standpoint, inquiries into 
mental capacity departed from the general framework where notions of family roles and 
emotional patterns were concerned. In this context, the understanding of mental incapacity in 
Tuscany by the end of the early modern period seems to have been particularly embedded in 
an ongoing debate about conflicting age- and gender-specific family roles. This is still the 
case even if we enter the discussion through a source that is deeply tainted by the value 
ascribed to patrimony in Tuscan society.       
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As we have seen, the European legal framework provided measures to deal with the 
consequences of mental incapacity in a more-or-less similar fashion but with differences in 
the procedures. All the procedures that we have reviewed were aimed at protecting the 
patrimony and at the prevention or correction of economic mismanagement, and were, 
consequently, used primarily by the privileged. Moreover, in all the cases they primarily 
affected men. In all the legal frameworks examined here, civil law inquiries into mental 
capacity operated with categories that were open and deliberately vague. Rather than being 
concerned with the specific label used, the evaluation of authorities and judges privileged 
how the families exposed the behaviour, the reasons behind the denunciation, and the extent 
to which the behaviour was believed to imperil the family. Thus, inquiries into mental 
capacity were chiefly concerned with the public and domestic consequences of madness, 
instead of being preoccupied with defining its nature, and this explains why they were not 
really interested in determining clear diagnostic categories of madness. Their scope was to 
determine a person’s level of responsibility and to negotiate “the balance between private and 
public provision” accordingly.162 
As Houston has put it, the broadness of the legal definition of insanity coming out of 
these procedures is explained precisely because of their property orientation. “The difficulty 
is that sufferers were described cursorily, or classified in the broadest possible terms, by 
courts whose interest was to preserve property or ascertain culpability rather than to make a 
precise clinical diagnosis.”163 The aim of the procedure shaped the definition of madness we 
find in these sources. The problem derived from this is that we are bound to a socially limited 
conception of what insanity amounted to, given that the perceptions of the non-privileged are 
not considered in the sample under scrutiny. I have tried to correct this bias by extending the 
investigation to the Tuscan criminal records, where the poorer segments of society take the 
“leading” part.164 Nonetheless, the information they provide regarding the mentally afflicted 
has proved to be scant.  
The connection between madness and property is not a feature unique to Tuscany but, 
rather, is typical of the kinds of sources examined here. Inquiries into mental capacity 
involved a question of property rather than a question of liberty – even if in some spaces they 
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came to be conflated with confinement. Families debated first and foremost the right to 
manage a person’s financial affairs, placing control over property as the primary matter of 
concern. This only highlights the extent to which European elite families conceived of 
patrimony as a collective rather than as a personal concern. Individual ownership was 
regarded as a temporary right, a sort of transfer from the family that could be withdrawn the 
moment the person diverged from the expected path. Thus, individual disposal of one’s 
patrimony was thought to be subject to family approval, and the disagreement over this issue 
was to a great extent responsible for requests to deprive a family member of his or her rights 
of administration on the grounds of mental incapacity. Hence, although inquiries into mental 
capacity speak not only of patrimony, they do illuminate from a special point of view how 
patrimony was perceived, and how the disposal of patrimony was profoundly entrenched 
within the moral economy of the family.165 
Inquiries into mental capacity have been approached as extraordinary sources for the 
study of relations between families and state authorities within the development of different 
strategies to cope with deviance, placing madness in the broader context of the history of the 
family and the history of social disciplining. We can access these issues by taking into 
account aspects such as the marital status of the defendants, the identity of petitioners and the 
role assumed by household members in the events during and after the inquest was carried 
out. In my view, this is where the particularities of the Tuscan case are underscored.  
Taking into account the close connection between property and inquiries into mental 
capacity, it should hardly be striking to note that in all of the legal spaces where we have 
studies to base our conclusions upon, men from the upper ranks constitute the majority of the 
defendants, even if in Tuscany the downright scarcity of women is unrivalled. However, 
marital status seems to have exerted a different influence in Tuscany, compared to the other 
locations. Houston and Cartayrade have pointed out that being single was a decisive factor 
that moved families to resort to public assistance for the government and care of the mentally 
afflicted in early modern Scotland and France, respectively. In general terms, the appearance 
of madness in the public records has been attributed to the failure of the domestic sphere, as a 
clear result of the breakdown in the family structure and, particularly, as the effect of a 
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domestic space crippled by the absence of the feminine figure.166 Conversely, being married 
has been seen as a factor that allowed those deemed mentally incompetent to continue their 
lives under the vigilance and care of their spouses. However, as Suzuki has suggested, the 
appearance of mental affliction in the records responds above all to the failure of the domestic 
sphere, which to a broad extent exceeds the sole problem of bachelorhood or widowhood.167 
The Tuscan interdiction procedures support this assertion, for the appearance of single men in 
the records, whether mature widowers or young bachelors, seems not to be determined by 
their marital status, but rather by other factors disturbing the family order (i.e. squandering of 
the patrimony, changes in the family’s balance of power, economic constraints, illness).168  
In this scenario, the role assumed in Tuscany by the female members of the family as 
the privileged interlocutors of the authorities, on the one hand, and as primary performers of 
the role of curbing and caring for incapacitated adults, on the other, seems to be a peculiarity 
of the Tuscan context. I pointed out earlier how the systematic solution proposed by the 
Tuscan authorities to contain the disorder of the family tended to empower the female 
members of the household. Wives and mothers were not only the most common petitioners, 
but were also placed by the authorities as the interim rational heads of family while the 
weakened male recovered from his condition, which served both to protect the patrimony and 
ensure his recovery. Furthermore, when their relatives petitioned for the revocation of the 
interdiction, it was frequently the support of a mother’s or wife’s voice that moved the 
authorities in their favour. Only in the cases of elderly interdicted men does the role of the 
female members of the family seem to have been less decisive, for although wives and 
daughters frequently took the leading role, on many other occasions it was transferred to the 
first-born son.169  
That women were becoming active participants in the administration of justice in a 
wide range of jurisdictions between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is sufficiently 
known.170 However, studies on the early modern inquiries into mental capacity fail to provide 
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168 On this, see Chapter 3, section 5.  
169 For a study on how the age and marital status of male defendants conditioned the identity of the petitioners of 
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a gender analysis not only regarding the identity and performance of plaintiffs, but also 
regarding the role assumed by women once the judicial procedure was over, during the 
guardianship of the mentally incapable. This can be partly explained by their primary focus of 
attention, which is located in the procedures and not in the guardianship. The studies of 
Houston and Cartayrade are mostly concerned with how inquiries into mental capacity were 
carried out, the understandings and meanings of madness disclosed in the procedures, and the 
general patterns of insanity that can be drawn from them. But, both historians seem to lack the 
possibility offered by the Tuscan records of following the developments after the interdiction 
(or cognition) had been decreed. Thus, the fact that Tuscan interdiction records allow us to 
follow the cases from the initial petition until the revocation of the interdiction sentence 
(which, as I have said, could cover several days to the whole life of the defendant) becomes 
once more as an unrivalled advantage. This advantage not only allows us to grasp a more 
dynamic representation of madness, but it also sheds light on the role of the female members 
vis-à-vis the Pupilli magistrates and the evolution of the interdicted’s behaviour.   
A brief examination of the British, French and Tuscan civil procedures dealing with 
the consequences of mental incapacity largely demonstrates how the domestic environment 
shaped not only the ways in which the procedures were carried out, but also how madness 
was understood and the strategies that were devised to deal with it. In all the scenarios 
examined, mental incapacity was shaped primarily by the narratives of the families, with 
barely any intervention from the medical testimonies. Civil and criminal courts seem to have 
been dominated by lay opinion on mental states, for, as Houston has put it, “‘expert’ medical 
testimony was neither sufficient nor necessary” in most of eighteenth-century Europe.171 
Despite what some historians have pointed out, in Tuscany too the identification of mental 
incapacity, until the eighteenth century at least, was a highly social matter. The alleged mad 
person had to be known to be mad by the whole community, which had to be ratified by the 
political authority of the place.172 If the officials of the Pupilli still had any doubts, the 
defendant was inspected by the officials themselves.   
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171 Robert Allan Houston, “Courts, doctors, and insanity defences in eighteenth and early 19th century Scotland”, 
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Scholars have pointed out that inquiries into mental capacity should be examined as a 
space provided by the legal framework to resolve private conflicts, which functioned as a 
legal measure that families could use at their own will. In all the European scenarios 
examined here, including of course Tuscany, these procedures followed private initiatives, 
and cannot be taken to be the product of a top-down disciplining strategy.173 As Nootens has 
stressed, in interdiction procedures we find civil justice at the service of the families, to which 
family members could turn to in order to solve conflicts identified and defined by them.174 
How mental incapacity was defined and which measures were to be taken to respond to it 
were the result of careful negotiations between families, authorities and the defendants 
themselves. 
 
1. 5. Conclusion: Public Disorders of Family Life 
The identification of madness was undeniably a domestic event, but we only have 
access to it so long as it overran the boundaries of the private realm. In this sense, inquiries 
into mental capacity are by definition a private situation made public. They can be taken, 
then, as a manifestation of the publicizing of the private that characterized the eighteenth 
century on so many levels. If we bear in mind that it was the century that discussed the sex 
lives of royals and nobles, that witnessed the appearance of the marquis de Sade, Choderlos 
de Laclos and Carlo Goldoni, and in which there was a lively discussion of the mental and 
emotional instability of the rulers, it is hardly surprising that inquiries into mental capacity 
experienced an evident growth in Europe. At the eve of the Revolution, France witnessed the 
proliferation of pornographic pamphlets discussing noble sexual debauchery, and the 
proliferation of a new “philosophic” genre that spread from the young writers of the Parisian 
Grub Street to de Sade.175 The eighteenth century in Britain ended with King George’s 
madness, and the exuberant profligacy and reckless libertinage of the Prince of Wales with 
                                                
173 See Hernan Roodenburg, “Social Control Viewed from Below”, in Roodenburg and Spierenburg, Social 
Control; Gaune and Undurraga, Formas de control y disciplinamiento; Tomás Mantecón Movellán, “Formas de 
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the Queen Caroline affair.176 The Italian peninsula also witnessed the exposure of the secrets 
of marriage, with the peculiar figure of the cicisbeo, through which the aristocracy’s sexual 
behaviour was put under scrutiny.177   
In the case of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, it was the beginning of the century which 
marked the explosion of private life into the public arena, with the finale of the Medici family 
and the references to their sexual inefficiency, extravagances and emotional instability. The 
century closed, however, with a renewed negative view into the episodes that marked the life 
of the Grand Duke Cosimo III, his unhappy marriage with Margherite Louise and the 
disordered and decadent life of their descendants, manifested in the publication of Jacopo 
Riguccio Galluzzi’s Istoria del Granducato di Toscana sotto il governo della casa Medici in 
1781.178 The intertwining of the public and the public, so evident in the success of 
pornographic literature, and the discussion of the personal lives of the British kings that 
accompanied the end of the century are but the other side of a coin the one face of which had 
been seen in the Tuscan events at the beginning of the century.    
  When we examine the increasing success of interdiction procedures within this 
context, the family disorders disclosed by the records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli take on a 
new light, placing their otherwise private and even anecdotal features into a broader context 
of social and cultural change. The eighteenth century in Tuscany opened with the theatrical 
end of Medici rule. Involved in passionate scandals and licentious practices, the last members 
of the Medici family were unsuccessful in their efforts to provide an heir, and were 
consequently forced to witness helplessly the fall of Tuscany into foreign hands. The Regency 
entailed new government officials and new rules for the traditional Tuscan politics, not only 
in terms of government administration, but also by devising new constraints to the traditional 
social and political hegemony of the patricians.  
The eighteenth century appears thus as a discontinuous period, where images of the 
alleged decadence left by the last Medici were superseded by the reforms ordered by the 
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Lorraines. Between reform and continuity, an institution like the Magistrato dei Pupilli is but 
an open window onto the nuances of a pivotal period of Tuscan history, one that connects us 
with the particularities of local developments without losing the connections with the 
European scene, and one that has largely been left in the background of scholarly attention.179  
To the political changes brought about by the end of the Medici we have to add the 
effects produced by their disordered and scandalous behaviour. The pages Galluzzi dedicated 
to the last Medici are filled with negative commentaries on the behaviour of the Medici 
family. Most significantly for us here, he attached to Cosimo, Margherita Louisa, Gian 
Gastone and the rest of the family a series of adjectives that disclose both a profound rejection 
and pathetic compassion for their perturbed and tormented personalities. Inaugurating a trend 
that was to be followed later by first Gaetano Pieraccini and subsequently by Lord Acton, his 
descriptions of Cosimo portray him as “naturally melancholic”, subjected to passions and 
agitations originated by the lacerating uneasiness (inquietudine), anguish (he was permanently 
angustiato and in perpetua agitazione), and maddening jealousy (smanie della gelosia) the 
iniquities and publicized rejection of his wife cause him.180   
On her side, Margherita Louisa was portrayed as utterly voluble (volubile) and 
extravagant, with her passionate fits, her capricious behaviour and her complete disrespect 
and open disdain for her husband. Her scandalous abandonment of husband and children 
before the open eyes of the public was the extreme paroxysm of the disruption of her expected 
gender role as mother and wife. This is especially so if we consider how Galluzzi interprets 
her behaviour by the end of the century. Not only was she too extravagant and an endless 
source of her husband’s deep anguishes (angustie and inquietudini) but, above all, she 
exhibited a character that was too unstable to be placed on the side of rationality. Her 
relentless “extravagances” (stravaganze) and her frequent “agitations” (trasporti) were 
nothing but the inexorable consequence of her “disquiet spirit” (spirito inquieto), an 
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expression that by the eighteenth century had come to convey all the perils of having a 
disordered mind.181  
  Margherita’s distorted image of womanhood is paralleled by her sons’ lack of 
manliness, in their weakness, their inability to produce any offspring, their irresoluteness and 
passivity. While her elder son sought refuge in the arts and chose a musician as his confidant, 
Gian Gastone was as tormented as his parents by all sorts of emotional disturbances. His 
“spirit” was portrayed by Galluzzi as “agitated” and “oppressed by sadness”, and he sought 
refuge in debauchery and prodigality. His solitude during his years abroad left him with no 
one “with whom to vent his passion”, so he “grew cruel with himself” (non avendo con chi 
sfogare la sua passione incrudeliva contro se stesso).182 Just as his father, Gian Gastone was 
likewise the helpless victim of another unstable woman, who was as extravagant as her 
mother-in-law (Gian Gastone described her as manifesting a bisbetico naturale), and 
alternately subjected to periods of “introspection, tears and eternal angers” (musi, pianti, e 
rabbie eterne).183 
Through Pieraccini’s account, we can see the male members of the Grand Ducal 
family controlled by their appetites and gloom (suffering from Acedia), overcome by a lack of 
will, and consequently, a lack of control over themselves, and sunken in the waters of 
irresolution. It is precisely the lack of control that is at the core of the irrationality identified 
by family members when petitioning for a relative’s interdiction, a lack of control identified 
in their prodigal practices (drinking, gambling, women, etc), together with their unbalanced, 
and often violent characters. The end of the family is symbolized through the pathetic figure 
of the alcoholic Gian Gastone, confined to his bed for the last eight years of his life. What 
Galluzzi termed, using the common eighteenth-century parlance, “spirito inquieto”, Pieraccini 
transformed into hysteria. His description of the female members of the Medici family, 
contrasts the hysterical Margherita Louise with her rigorously religious, but still suffering 
daughter, Anna Maria Luisa.  Both are portrayed as a complete failure in terms of their 
femininity, the former with the abandonment of her offspring, to whom she showed no 
attachment, and Anna Maria Luisa with her inability to conceive a child.  
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According to Pieraccini’s degenerative theory,184 there was no member of the last 
branch of the Medici (including the unfortunate ones marrying a Medici) who escaped the 
pathological tendency of mental disturbance. But, even leaving this diagnosis behind, his 
reconstruction of the Medicis’ lives has strikingly historical grounds. The failure of the 
Medici family, their disturbed minds and tormented psychologies bear a close resemblance to 
how familial conflicts were codified in the records under examination in this thesis.   
Rather than trying to prove that the emotional disruptions disclosed by the actions of 
the last Medici are to be considered as the public signs of a rise in the prevalence of mental 
disturbances towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, I think they should be seen as 
the nurturing fountain of the languages and images used by the Tuscan petitioners. Cosimo 
III’s melancholy, Margherite-Louise’s capricious and unbalanced character (hysterical, 
according to Pieraccini), and the prodigal and vicious tendencies of Francesco Maria, 
Ferdinando and Gian Gastone, appear clearly echoed in the interdiction records of the Pupilli. 
The disorder of the Grand Ducal family mirrors the disorders of the private Tuscan families, 
in their publicity, in their explosion, in their dynamics, in the distorted individualities and 
tormented personalities.185  
In the accounts of the lives of the last Medici, from Galluzzi, to Pieraccini and Acton, 
and even in Anna Banti’s La camicia bruciata, fiction and reality meet.186 Similarly, the 
narratives that can be found in the records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli often have more to do 
with representations, exaggerations, and emotional reactions than with actual facts (if we take 
the latter as “reality”). But, following Anna Banti, there are occasions when the imagination 
can tell us more about the truth than history can.187  
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Chapter 2. Prodigality In Interdiction Procedures: The Masculinization Of 
Mental Incapacity 
 
The 1718 reform of the statutes of the Magistrato dei Pupilli listed five types of possible 
mental incapacities that could result in an interdiction sentence, of which the most common 
one was prodigality. In this chapter, I will focus only on interdiction procedures whose 
declared causality was squandering and prodigality. Despite being listed as two different 
categories in the Pupilli statutes (prodighi and dilapidatori), in practice they functioned as 
interchangeable categories, signifying the same thing. In fact, most of the cases were defined 
using both, that is, the individual was interdicted because he was a prodigal, and a squanderer 
(dilapidatore) of the patrimony.  
Prodigality was a condition that was not exclusively ascribed to youth. In fact, 
contrary to what the popular image of the prodigal son might lead us to think, prodigals were 
not only young sons who acted recklessly by contravening basic social norms and then 
repented. On the contrary, interdiction records reveal that men throughout their entire 
lifecycle, from youths to the elderly, could be defined as prodigals. Furthermore, the most 
basic characteristic when a prodigal was young was that he lacked a paternal figure, being the 
direct holder of the family patrimony. In this sense, the concept had more to do with the 
juridical notion of prodigality, as developed in ancient Roman law, than with the Christian 
parable.   
As explained in the first chapter, interdiction was originally designed for prodigality in 
Roman law, devised as a mechanism to control the economic mismanagement performed by 
reckless squanderers of family fortunes. While the incapacity of the insane was thought to be 
natural (and so they were assigned a curator), what established the prodigal’s legal incapacity 
was the interdiction decree, as we have seen.188 During the early modern period, the 
interdiction of prodigals also occurred in the French jurisdiction, but not in England or 
Scotland, for example, where the law only provided guardianship for the insane.   
According to Cartayrade, the transformation of the Roman tradition to respond to the 
early modern needs of France resulted in the equivalence between interdiction and legal 
incapacity, that is, prodigals and the insane were treated through the same juridical 
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procedure.189  Similarly, as I have shown, prodigality and insanity became conflated towards 
the eighteenth century in Tuscany also, to acquire a complete legal equivalence. Legally the 
instrument and its consequences may have been the same, nonetheless, qualitatively it was not 
the same to have a family member interdicted as insane as to have them interdicted as 
prodigal. This could explain, in my view, the higher rates of prodigality in interdiction 
procedures, as the table below shows.   
 
Table 2: Categories of mental incapacity used in interdiction procedures between 1718 and 
1775 
Prodigality 291 48.6 % 
Dementia  197 32.9 % 
Unspecified incapacity 111 18.5 % 
Total 599 100 % 
 
Note: Interdictions by reason of being deaf and mute are not considered in this study, given their 
rarity throughout the period.  
Source: ASF, MPAP, Memoriali e Negozi di Cancelleria, F. 2299 – F. 2310 and Ibid., Campione 
di Deliberazioni, e Partiti, F. 112 – F. 170.  
 
Prodigals were generally men of varying ages, but all were performing the role of 
heads of the family (even 18 year olds who had recently inherited), and in most cases were 
interdicted on the request of a close relative – a mother, a wife, an elder son or a brother. 
Prodigality was a distinctly male disorder, with different connotations according to age and 
social role. Its predominant features were excessive spending, extravagant actions, tendency 
to gambling, compulsive selling of household goods and frequent drunkenness, all marked by 
manifestations of unrestrained passions, recognized in their uncontrollable characters, 
uncertain temper, and frequent violent disruptions. All these indicators fitted under the 
umbrella of the “vice of prodigality”, a disorder considered severe enough to have the 
affected person declared mentally incapable of managing his affairs, to interdict and have him 
submitted to the authority of the Magistrato dei Pupilli. Bearing in mind that interdictions 
could be decreed by reason of prodigality, madness (demenza) or physical impairment, why 
were the majority of these persons accused of being prodigals instead of demente? How was 
                                                




the legal incapacity of prodigality framed? What were the meanings Tuscan culture ascribed 
to prodigality? 
In this chapter, I argue that prodigality was understood as a category of mental 
incapacity that, on the surface, related only to economic mismanagement, but which enclosed 
intricate assessments that point to a disordered mind and disturbed disposition, to the extent of 
blending with the categories of straightforward madness (demente, mentecatto, furioso). The 
study of prodigality sheds light on the configuration of mental incapacity broadening the 
picture of what was defined as madness. My argument is that in the process of petitioning for 
the interdiction of a prodigal, families reshaped legal and medical knowledge of madness into 
a socially meaningful language. Mental incapacity was defined through and by social 
experience, disclosing a new concern for the mental and emotional worlds that tended to 
explain disordered behaviours as a mental dysfunction.  
 
2. 1.  Adolescents and Young Prodigals: Indiscipline, Irreverence and Pleasures 
Legally speaking, the history of a prodigal started at the age of 18 in early modern 
Tuscany because, in order to be interdicted, the individual had to have gained the right to 
administer his patrimony (whether by receiving an inheritance, or, in the case of orphans, 
because they had come of age). Practically speaking, however, the career of the prodigal often 
started before they acquired the right to administer their patrimonies; I have therefore decided 
to include adolescents in this section, referring to males younger than 18. The study of young 
prodigals sheds light on the configuration of youth as a separate period of life, which could 
end between the ages of 28 and 30.190 What defined young prodigals was precisely their 
youth; their disorder was distinctly constructed in relation to their tender age and, 
consequently, their ages were generally recorded in the petitions.  
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The case of young prodigals is also marked by the fact that they were usually 
denounced by their mothers. In fact, they were usually firstborn orphans of a father who had 
been under the legal guardianship of their mothers (in most cases, if we follow Calvi191) or 
under the care of another close relative. In fact, young prodigals are to be examined against 
the legal possibilities given to women by the Tuscan patrilineal system, so long as their cases 
were, in many instances, managed by their mothers, who would usually be appointed 
administrators of the patrimony after the interdiction.192 This means that young prodigals 
were under their mother’s power, who would be able to intervene in their lives and youthful 
actions through the interdiction, as we will see.    
Before discussing the characteristics of prodigal behaviour, I would like to note here 
the significance of the fact that mothers were the recurring petitioners in the interdiction of 
young prodigals. Most had been appointed legal guardians (by their deceased husbands or by 
the Pupilli), which meant that petitioning for the interdiction of their son would not be the 
first time they came into contact with the Pupilli. They counted with an informed background 
that wives, for example, did not necessarily have. They knew the mechanisms of the 
institution, they were familiar with the language that had to be employed, and they knew, 
finally, how to manipulate the system to accomplish what they intended.  
Young men’s prodigality was characterized by their tendency to spend excessively to 
satisfy their pleasures and passions (from clothing, to alcohol, women and gambling), which 
led them to compulsively sell all kinds of items in order to cover their expenses. This was 
generally accompanied by being openly confrontational towards parental authority, an unruly 
character, un uncertain temper and the manifestations of abrupt changes of mood and an 
uneasy disposition (expressed in terms of furiosi trasporti, or capo irregolare).193    
Timing in the identification of young prodigality was crucial. When cases of young 
prodigals were disclosed to the authorities, the petition was commonly sustained with the 
claim that he had shown a “tendency” to dissipate from adolescence. Proof of this tendency 
was often provided by special clauses in the father’s will, who had stated that his elder son 
was not to obtain full administration of the patrimony until he was 22 (and sometimes older), 
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or even completely denying him the right to inherit. Elders saw young prodigals as a direct 
threat to the family (both economically and morally speaking), because of the early onset of a 
behavioural disorder that was widely known and feared.  
A young man defined as prodigal was not necessarily thought to be experiencing a 
crisis of youth, or having a temporary derangement. In this sense, prodigality was not only 
seen as the effect of a “wild” stage, or a difficult period. In other words, interdiction was a 
powerful weapon to control difficult young men, but the notion of difficulty must be extended 
so as to include deviances that went beyond the framework of deliberate recklessness.  
The very fact that they had developed the disorder in adolescence was used to 
maintain that they were unlikely to change, and that it was in their nature to be vicious, 
uncontrollable, passionate, and therefore disturbed. Or, as in the case of the 26-year-old 
nobleman Simeone Carlo Beroardi, his “vice of prodigality, and natural instinct to squander 
and dissipate” were so deeply entrenched, that it had not been possible “to remove it, or 
eradicate it from his spirit.”194 In other words, the young prodigal had a disorder the roots of 
which were to be found in adolescence, but which had exploded with the inheritance of his 
patrimony, whether because he had turned 18 (if he had been a fatherless orphan before he 
came of age) or because of his father’s death.  
The case of Alcino Contucci, from Montepulciano, interdicted just before he turned 
18, seems particularly illustrative. His disorder had started after the death of his father, when 
he was 14 years old, in the form of continually escaping from the different places he had been 
sent for his education (seminars and schools), open disrespect towards the authority of his 
mother and tutors, disregard for his rank, and a clear tendency to squander.195 When his 
mother and uncles succeeded in bringing him back home (in the end he had escaped to Naples 
to enrol as soldier), his rebellion went as far as to steal from his mother and announce that 
when he turned 18 he would abandon his mother for good, threatening to divide the paternal 
patrimony so as to dissipate the portion belonging to him (he was not the elder son). 
                                                
194 “Questo vizio di prodigalità, e naturale instinto a scialacquare, e dilapidare non è stato possibile di 
rimuovere, ne di svellere dall’animo del predetto Simeone Carlo Beroardi”, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, 
no. 189, June 1754.  
195 He had been first put under the care of a priest, and “di questo luogo, savio e prudente, da cui dopo pochi 
mesi senza motivo alcuno se ne prese da fuga; indi fù posto nel seminario vescovile di questa città di dove 
parimente scappò, e pervenuto nuovamente nelle mani della madre e tutori fù mandato a Roma in Collegio 
Bandinelli dove mal volentieri si trattenne anni 4, dopo il qual tempo venutosene a casa in occasione di vacanze, 
si sottrasse dalla medesima nascostamente, e andò ad ingaggiarsi per soldato a Napoli, di dove poi disertò, e si 
messe a fare il guardiano di armenti nelle campagne del regno suddetto...”, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 
65, December 1763. A similar case can be seen in the interdiction of Gimignano Durazzi, 20 years old. ASF, 




Threatening to squander their portion of the patrimony was recurrent feature of young 
prodigality, a threat that was taken seriously by families and government officials alike. 
Squandering away the family patrimony, or giving it away to someone outside of the family 
endangered the whole system of the Tuscan elite, and was precisely what the government 
repeatedly tried to prevent, as can be seen in the interventions in private life and economic 
management by the Auditore Fiscale (the chief of police and supervisor of criminal justice), 
on the direct command of the Consulta, the decisions of the Magistrato Supremo and those of 
the Pupilli.  
In such cases, interdiction acted as a preventive measure that had a twofold purpose: 
to avoid economic ruin and to control or restrain the individual. Given that youth was 
regarded as a particularly problematic period, or at least crucial for one’s future life,196 early 
detection of the tendency to the vice of prodigality was considered particularly important. The 
seed that was implanted in youth would be impossible to modify later on. If a young boy 
under 18 years of age was corrupt, this represented a strong clue as to how he would behave 
in the future.197 If the disorder had started early in life, it was seen as more or less irreversible 
damage, “his present life being a strong indication and argument of his future life.”198 
The incapacity of young men aged from around 18 to their early twenties was also 
presented by their relatives in terms of inexperience, as if they were immature, not yet 
prepared to act as heads of the family. Above all, they were presented as lacking the necessary 
prudence for proper economic behaviour, because of their youth, but also because of their 
lack of discipline, their characters, and their opprobrious tendencies. Youth was considered an 
extremely “fresh” age (età così fresca), which made young men prone to diversions and 
passions, weak and inexperienced in economic management.199 In this sense, their mothers or 
tutors denounced them as having useless distractions, or lacking the necessary character and 
talent to manage their affairs. But they were also thought to lack “world experience” (senza 
                                                
196 See, for example, Ben-Amos, Adolescence & Youth, Sharpe, “Disruption in the Well-Ordered Household”, or 
Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence. For intergenerational conflicts, especially associated with 
conflicting notions of masculinity, see Phillips, The Profligate Son.  
197 As the underage Matteo Sarti, who “attesa la pratica di alcuni pessimi compagni, che di continuo l’hanno 
sedotto, e seducono a modo loro, va continuamente dissipando nell’osterie, giochi, et altri vizi tutto quel poco di 
danaro, che gli viene in mano”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 77, February 1764.  
198 “essendo la vita presente forte indizio, e argomento della futura” Those were the terms used by the 
testimonies collected for Matteo’s case. Ibid.  




esperienza di mondo), which prevented them from being aware of the risks of living a life of 
pleasure and dissipation.200  
Youth in itself, therefore, could justify the interdiction, as can be seen in what was 
said in relation to the 20-year-old Vincenzio Fossi, who “because of his youth, and imprudent 
behaviour, we think it is convenient to interdict the administration.”201 But, on the whole, the 
records show that, at least for the period from 1720 to 1770, young men do not represent the 
majority of interdictions per year. In other words, it would seem that though youth was 
considered a period of crisis in life, young men were not interdicted at a higher proportion 
than middle-aged or old men. Prodigality was considered a seriously damaging disorder, 
which had the power of obscuring the rational faculties of individuals. Young men who 
presented the tendencies of prodigality, in the absence of a strong paternal figure, would be 
lost in the perils posed by uncontrolled passions if not controlled with the help of the Pupilli 
in due time. The career of the prodigal often proved that, notwithstanding the interdiction and 
the Pupilli’s intervention, although the officials of the Pupilli had the support of the police 
forces to make them yield to their mother’s authority, they would continue to have 
uncontrollable characters, committing all sorts of extravagancies and excesses.  
The young men denounced as prodigals to the Pupilli were also described by their 
families as frivolous pursuers of social prestige, devoted to superfluous diversions, and 
consumed by their desire to appear as independent gentlemen who treated themselves 
splendidly (trattarsi splendidamente).202 This was particularly visible in cases of 
impoverished noble families, as young men made desperate attempts to maintain their status. 
Such was the case of the 26-year-old Simeon Carlo Beroardi, whose natural tendency to 
squander was devoted precisely to his passion of living with grandeur (vivere alla grande).203 
Noble of birth, he became an orphan at 20 and, as the only one left in his direct family, he 
went to Florence to have the time of his life, and dissipate all his inheritance on carriages, 
servants, showy clothing, feasts and sociability (conversazioni geniali).204 He refused to leave 
                                                
200 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 53, August 1756.  
201 “per l’età sua giovanile, e poco prudente condotta, crediamo sia espediente, che gli sia interdetta 
l’amministrazione”, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 104, June 1753.  
202 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 26, March 1752.  
203 Also referred to in a different case as “passione che lo domina in volere passare per grande“. ASF, MPAP, 
Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 49, August 1752.  
204 His noble family was originally from Perugia. In the absence of close relatives, the interdiction was 
petitioned by his creditors. As for his splendid life, the original in Italian says: “cominciò a trattarsi 
splendidamente, e sciolto da ogni ritegno si portò a questa città, ove vivendo alla grande con carrozza, servitù, e 




Florence to confine himself in Castiglion Fiorentino, as the Magistracy fruitlessly ordered, 
controlled as he was by his vices. To complete the picture, he devoted himself to idleness, 
maintained a close friendship with a married woman and, due to his quarrelsome character, 
was more than once challenged to a fight (battersi).  
As in the case of Beroardi, petitioners recognized the disorder of prodigality in these 
men’s indiscipline and irreverence, and in their open disrespect towards legal rules and 
behavioural norms. Laden with debts as they often were, these young men would leave the 
city to avoid paying their creditors, or even to avoid the Magistracy’s commands. In a feature 
that we will also encounter with regard to middle-aged and old prodigals, their disorder spoke 
of conflicting expectations of life, of their gender roles, of their masculinity.205 If with the 
middle-aged prodigals, as I will show, the unfulfilled expectation was their disregard for their 
role of pater familias, with the young men it was their obstinate preference for idleness, 
grandeur and debauchery. They refused to work, or study (depending on the case and social 
rank), preferring instead to completely dedicate their time to the fulfilment of their passions 
and appetites, recklessly pursuing the excesses of the new enlightened sociability.206  
Perceptions of prodigal behaviour should be thus interpreted as entrenched in 
changing notions of masculinity, and marked by the eighteenth century clash between 
different conceptions of it among the generations, for “competing discourses of masculinity 
co-existed.”207. In this sense, conflicts generated with the young prodigal shed light on a 
debate about masculinity, normativity and expected moral and economic behaviour, exposing 
it from the perspective of a conflict between spending and saving, between following a career 
of drinking, duelling and leisurely pursuits, and a more rational, polite and self-controlled 
model of behaviour.   
                                                                                                                                                   
conversazioni geniali tutte le gioie, argenti, e contanti ritrovati nell’eredità del padre”. In ASF, MPAP, 
Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 189, June 1754. The case had previously appeared, also in F. 2303, no. 22 February 
1752, and no. 26, March 1752. This means that, two years later, he was still troublesome.  
205 The discussion on the conflicting expectations of gender roles in family disputes is vast. See Pollock, 
“Rethinking patriarchy”; Desan and Merrick, Family, Gender, and Law; Crawford, Blood, Bodies and Families; 
Alexander Cowan, Marriage, Manners and Mobility in Early Modern Venice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); and 
the studies based on the matrimonial disputes of the ecclesiastical tribunals edited by Seidel Menchi and 
Quaglioni, starting with Coniugi nemici. 
206 See for instance Bizzocchi, Cisicbei; Phillips, The Profligate Son, Lombardi, Matrimonio di antico regime. 
207 Nicola Phillips, “Parenting the Profligate Son: Masculinity, Gentility and Juvenile Delinquency in England, 
1791-1814”, Gender & History, 22, no. 1 (2010), p. 94. See also Henry French and Mark Rothery, “‘Upon your 
entry into the world’: masculine values and the threshold of adulthood among landed elites in England 1680-
1800”, Social History 33, no. 4 (2008), pp. 402-422, or Michèle Cohen, “‘Manners’ Make the Man: Politeness, 





Refusal to work, and persistent or obstinate idleness are a characteristic of the three 
stages of prodigality, but in the young men the difference is that it was presented as 
particularly troublesome because they had no direct paternal authority.208 In fact, the absence 
of a paternal figure was identified as one of the causes that could lead to the manifestation of 
a prodigal disorder. Tutors would often complain to the Magistracy about their pupil’s 
disobedience during adolescence, when they refused to go to school or obey any of their 
commands, constantly escaping, and taking refuge with their mothers (when the latter were 
not the legal guardians). Social status should be placed at the core of the conception of 
deviant behaviour, and was also present in the perception of madness. Mental incapacity was 
indicated by a person’s inability to respect basic norms and, in this sense, the prodigal 
disobedience of an uncle or a mother is echoed in the madman’s incapacity to understand 
authority. As we should recall, mothers, uncles, and brothers filled their petitions with their 
social perceptions of life, with how they understood the norms.  
Interdictions, as I have said, were used as a last resort, when all the possible resources 
to control the young man had been exhausted before turning to the Magistracy. Every 
available family strategy had been put to work before turning to the Pupilli, evidenced by the 
fact that interdiction petitions, although generally signed by a mother, a wife or male next-of-
kin, were generally supported by the extended family. Mothers were supported by their kin or 
by paternal relatives of the defendant, who had previously tried, unsuccessfully, to influence 
the behaviour of the individual. The two family lines could be united by the aim of controlling 
the squanderer although, of course, sometimes in contentious cases, alliances would be made 
to support one or the other side. 
Sending the petition meant that a state of urgency had been reached, when the prodigal 
had passed the accepted limits of tolerance, putting himself, and the patrimony, under eminent 
risk. This state of urgency was characterized by a life completely dedicated to vices and 
passions, gambling and squandering. As Giuseppe Maria Fede, an 18-year-old who “seduced 
by bad company, has abandoned his studies, and has devoted himself to pleasures and 
conversations, and has in such a way disregarded his subjection to the tutor, that he does not 
come back home if not after midnight, to rest few hours in his bed, and return the next 
                                                
208 As I stated before, the majority of the cases appearing in the Pupilli regarding young men correspond to 
individuals whose fathers had died, and who were under the care either of their mothers, or uncles. I have found 




morning to the usual career completely opposed to good custom, and to the education he 
received...”209  
Interdiction in such cases came as a valuable (and external) resource to restrain an 
otherwise uncontrollable, intractable young man, over whom the tutor had lost all possibility 
of re-establishing his (or her, where the tutor was the mother) authority. However, interdiction 
was not always completely useful regarding the governing of an individual, and sometimes it 
would not even achieve the purpose of reducing his spending. The family conflict would not 
necessarily be resolved with the interdiction, and problematic situations would follow, 
sometimes, during the whole life of the interdicted.  
The case of Count Giovacchino Ceuli from Pisa is particularly interesting here 
because, although his concrete age is not given in the sources, he appears repeatedly in the 
records of the Pupilli, giving us a long-term view of his character, the evolution of his 
disorder, and the reactions of the community, his relatives and the Magistracy. He was 
interdicted in August 1749, when his creditors petitioned the Magistracy, describing him as a 
prodigal lost by the passion of gambling (cards and lotto). He reappears again in 1752, but 
now married with a small child, having left Pisa, and still ruled by his passions. On this 
occasion he was depicted by his wife Anna Maria Lorenzani, as a violent man, capable of 
doing anything in order to obtain more money to satisfy his passions. She feared him, and 
denounced to the Magistracy his continuing insults and mistreatments. She had been 
unsuccessful in trying to straighten her husband out, and even petitioned not to live with him 
anymore, so that she and the child could be safe from his disruptive character.210 According to 
the community’s report, the mistreatments she suffered were driven by Ceuli’s constant need 
of money, and her refusal in giving it. His unruly and increasingly violent character led to his 
incarceration in 1757, this time petitioned by the officials of the Pupilli themselves.211 Eight 
years after the interdiction, he had become a man completely ruled by his passions, 
manifesting increasingly dangerous outbursts of rage, and performing “criminal acts” (mostly 
                                                
209 The original is as follows: “si è lasciato sedurre dai compagni cattivi, ha abbandonato gli studi, si è dato ai 
piaceri, e alle conversazioni, ed ha talmente scossa la soggezione del tutore, che non è tornato più casa, se non 
dopo la mezza notte, per riposare, poche ore nel suo letto, e ritornare la mattina susseguente alla solita carriera 
del tutto opposta al buon costume, e all’educazione ricevuta fino da suoi primi anni”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, 
F. 2304, no. 53, August 1756.  
210 “Et in oltre renderla libera da nuovi insulti, che sarebbe per ricevere ritornando esso suo marito, sperando che 
il medesimo possa rimettersi ogni qual volta provi il rigore di qualche gastigo, quando così piaccia alle SSrie LL. 
Illme”. Letter of Anna Maria Lorenzani, 16 May 1750, in ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 31.  




fraud and a willingness to fight with whoever opposed his intentions, be it a creditor or a 
public state official).212  
Ceuli was perceived as uncontrollable, unreasonable and unmanageable, and his 
disruptiveness did not seem to change with age. Articulated upon narratives that from diverse 
perspectives, through different voices and at various times coincided in their negative 
assessment, the case shows that the disorder behind the prodigal often went beyond a mere 
life crisis that would yield with adulthood. His behavioural disorder and disturbed disposition 
accompanied him and tortured his relatives for over 15 years. Although his interdiction was 
lifted in 1758 after a promise on his part to mend his ways, he still appears in the records until 
at least 1764.  
At the same time, this case shows that the conflicts and tensions surrounding a 
prodigal were not necessarily solved by the interdiction (and this goes for the three 
categories). All the signs of unruly character, and especially, the outbursts of fury, and the 
overwhelming passions that governed those individuals were now directed towards the person 
who had been appointed the new administrator of their patrimonies. In the case of young 
prodigals, this task was often given to the mother, which could revive the conflict, instead of 
reducing it. All their anger would be destined towards the person who denied them the use of 
their resources, with increasing irritation when it was not possible to demand from the 
“obstinate administrator [in this case the mother] who had never wanted to obey his 
command, neither through letters, nor through begging.”213  
In the power games between family members, mothers and wives could be sometimes 
in opposing positions, as the interdicted son would use his wife as means of diminishing the 
mother’s power. The issue of the administration of the patrimony was, again, at the core of 
the conflict. Ceuli chose between his mother and his wife as to which was to have control 
over him, deciding ultimately for the latter. In general, wives played an instrumental role in 
the attempts to govern the unruly prodigals. The wife was also used as a first resort of family 
strategies in their efforts to control the unruly prodigal. Wives appear as influential agents that 
could convince the husband to turn back home and reassume properly his duties as pater 
familias, as a last resort to make him regain his senses. When Giovacchino Ceuli fled Pisa for 
the city of Massa, where he continued his disorderly life “gambling and spending needlessly”, 
                                                
212 “Gl’atti delittuosi et arbitrari dal medesimo fatti”, Ibid. 
213 “...non ha mai potuto esigere ne detto Borghini ne altra persona incaricata dopo del supplicante ne pure un 
soldo dall’ostinatissima sua attrice la quale non la mai voluto obbedire, ne a lettere, ne a preghiere”. ASF, 




his wife Anna Maria Lorenzani also went there, “advised by relatives in order to induce the 
husband to return to Pisa, and turn to a prudent behaviour”214. The wife could be a resource, 
but success was not guaranteed, and deeper conflicts could arise from their intervention, as in 
this case. Ana Maria Lorenzani’s attempts to correct her husband ended violently and 
unsuccessfully, as she herself informed the Pupilli.215 But, seven years later, Ceuli would 
petition for his wife to be appointed as administrator instead of his mother, whom he said he 
could not trust, so that he could be “secured of everything, and quiet in soul and body.”216 The 
close relation between emotions and patrimony here is evident, as are the changing balances 
in the family disputes disclosed by interdiction procedures. 
To recapitulate, the young prodigal’s disorder was constructed in terms of a lack of 
control. His unrestrained behaviour was indicated by his dissolute ways of living (sregolato 
modo di vivere),217 his unruly character, or by the fact that he lived his life completely at the 
mercy of all kinds of pleasures and vices. All this would engender what was called an 
improper and/or extravagant behaviour, and these were all characteristics that could be 
resumed as the symptoms of a “irregular mind” (capo irregolare).218 These men were 
disqualified from administering their patrimony and managing their own affairs because of 
their irrational behaviour, being ruled instead by their passions and appetites. They were 
thought to be gentlemen lost in their passions (gentiluomo perduto),219 whether drinking, 
gambling, women, or crapule.220 Will and self-control were capacities totally absent in the 
prodigal. 
Their youth was also declared responsible of their frivolous desires, and particularly, 
their weakness, or their easily influenced nature. They were presented as having a temper that 
was too complaisant and easy, which made them prone to the influence of friends of bel 
                                                
214 “Dopo qualche tempo andò alla detta città anche l’Anna Maria Lorenzani sua moglie consigliata dai parenti 
affine d’indurre il marito a ritornare a Pisa, et a darsi ad una prudente condotta”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 
2303, no. 31, 29 August 1757.  
215 Testimony of Ana Maria Lorenzani, Ibid.  
216 “almeno il supplicante amministrando la di lui moglie sarà sicuro di tutto, e quieto d’anima, e di corpo”. 
ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 109, July 1764.  
217 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 21, March 1747/48.  
218 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 52, September 1752.  
219 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 128, 12 August 1749.  
220 The 4th edition (1729-1738) of the Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca, defined “crapula” as the vice 
of eating and drinking excessively, “Vizio, che consiste in troppo mangiare, e bere”. In 




tempo.221 The pernicious influence of these kinds of acquaintances was thought to act as a 
seductive force pushing them towards taverns, gambling and other vices. And those vices 
were precisely the sign needed to declare a man mentally unable to manage his affairs, so 
long as other forces, different from will and rationality, controlled him. 
Therefore, besides the component of youth, the young prodigal proved his incapacity 
to administer his patrimony particularly because of this lack of rationality. This was 
demonstrated in his dissipation, in his pursuit of pleasure, in his unwise conduct. But it was 
also proved in his emotional behaviour, his constant disruptions, his uncontained rage. 
Prodigality, thus, also presupposed emotional disturbances, making the man prone to furiosi 
trasporti,222 or in general to violent outbursts of anger.223   
Young prodigals were prisoners of vices that were thought to overshadow their 
capacity for discernment. It was on account of this that they acted unwisely and irrationally, 
as if their minds were not functioning properly. In fact, when a prodigal was declared “cured” 
from his vicious inclinations, it was because he had started to demonstrate better discernment 
and a wiser conduct.224 It was thought that a man who spent so much time in taverns, in the 
company of married women, caring only for vanities and pleasures, had lost his senses. But 
lets us move forwards to the middle-aged prodigals, and see if this problem may become 
clearer. 
 
2. 2.  The Adult Prodigal: Vicious and Passionate Heads of Family 
This section focuses primarily on middle-aged family heads, whose precise age was 
usually not recorded, but which was roughly from their thirties to their fifties. They were 
generally married, and still had young children, and accordingly their identity was defined 
through their gender role. They were presented, usually by their wives, as husbands and 
                                                
221 The prodigality of Paolo del Rosso, nearly 20 years old, was explained in terms of his young age, and his 
“complaisant and easy” temper, in Italian, “si per ragion della detta età, si per ragione della qualità dell’animo 
suo troppo condescendente”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 30, April 1752.  
222 As in the case of Giovacchino Ceuli, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 133, August 1757. In fact, the 4th 
edition (1729-1738) of the Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca, defined “trasporto” as “agitazione, o 
commozione d’animo”. In: http://www.lessicografia.it/Controller?lemma=TRASPORTO, accessed November 
20, 2010. 
223 The role attributed to manifestations of uncontrolled anger in the configuration of lay, legal and medical 
notions of mental incapacity are examined in Chapter 7.  
224 As Elena Poletti said in order to free her son from the interdiction: “per essere in esso cessate, quelle viziose 
inclinazioni, per le quali ricorse per interdirli l’amministrazione, e per essere egli dobuto [sic], di un miglior 




fathers who were in open abandonment of their duties. Wives would petition for the 
interdiction usually with the supporting signatures of their firstborn son, or another male 
figure. As in the cases of young prodigals, women generally petitioned with the support of 
kinsmen of either line of the family.   
In descriptions of the middle-aged prodigal disorder, we can find the same symptoms 
that we found in young prodigals: dissipation, a propensity to contract needless and capricious 
debts, irregular or illegal economic practices (usually scrocchi or illegitimate mallevadorie), 
dissoluteness and debauchery. And, finally, they were also described as extravagant and 
disturbed, of unruly and violent character, emotionally unstable and governed by their 
passions and vices.  
The notion of natural incapacity holds a particular mark in the case of middle-aged 
prodigals, as if it was natural for them to squander, just because they lacked the (mental) 
capacity to act differently. Their dissipation stemmed from lack of the capacity (mancanza di 
capacità) to administer their patrimony and regulate their affairs.225 It is precisely because this 
mancanza di capacita was implicated, that I am not entirely certain that prodigality was 
deemed as a voluntary disorder (while madness was considered an involuntary condition).226 
Evidently, there are cases when prodigal actions were deemed as the effect of deliberate 
recklessness, and where vices and passions were judged as tendencies that could have been 
controlled if the individual had wanted to. But there are many other cases where the disorder 
was presented in terms of his natural tendency, natural incapacity, innate instability; all of 
which occurred regardless of the intentions of the affected individual.  
The aggravating factor in the case of the middle-aged was their open disregard 
towards their role as pater familias and their responsibility towards their wife and children. 
Invariably in this category the nuclear family (wife and children) is always mentioned when 
petitioners tried to illustrate the negative effects of a prodigal. The desire of escaping, or the 
actual abandonment of wife and children seem common features of the middle-aged 
squanderer. Wives appear as accusing their husbands of creating all kinds of unnecessary 
debts, dissipating the patrimony in all sorts of vices and diversions, and then abandoning wife, 
children and debts. Consequently, the abandonment of their duties as active heads of the 
family comes as a first symptom of the middle-aged prodigal disorder, to both prove the 
                                                
225 Interdiction proceedings of Stefano Maria Giorgi, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2307, no. 13, April 1767.   





negative consequences of a prodigal career, and illustrate the gravity of the disorder in itself. 
This is important, because it could be proven that debts had been contracted for justified 
reasons, in which case, they were not interdicted. Although, in those cases they would not 
have escaped, and they would not have been described as vicious, and most of all, they would 
not have failed in their gender duties.  
Actually, the most obvious difference that we can find between the young and the 
adult prodigals could also be framed in terms of their having wife and children of their own to 
be responsible for. In this sense, the offense of the middle-aged prodigal was aggravated by 
the fact that, with his dissipation, he was denying his wife and children the necessary 
resources for living. The disorder of the prodigal pater familias was based primarily on the 
fact that he was neglecting (or that had “always” neglected) his role as head of the family, 
which in its topsy-turviness, supported in itself the diagnoses of a behavioural disorder whose 
roots, once more, were to be found in a mental faculty that did not work properly. For 
instance, the prodigal nature of Ranieri Fares, interdicted in June 1765, was defined in the 
testimonies in terms of a father of 10 children, who wasted all his income on useless things, 
and who had “never thought about giving a good education to his family, or about their 
necessary maintenance, having gambled all the money he had earned.”227  
In fact, the middle-aged prodigal disorder was often associated by petitioners with the 
breaching of the codes of behaviour expected from a head of the family. A male role that was 
complementarily defined by their behaviours in the private or domestic sphere as well as in 
the public world. The private behaviour could affect the reputation of a man and his family, 
particularly whether they performed their duties of father and husband with the adequate 
measure of rationality, self control and economic management. Quite at odds with this ideal,  
prodigals persisted in giving priority to the fulfilment of their passions and caprices over their 
duties as heads of the family, a pertinacity that forced their relatives to request interdiction.  
Their prodigal actions and behaviour put the family reputation at risk, but also the 
economic resources for its subsistence. The interdiction of a middle-aged prodigal, especially 
when he had a wife and small children, was marked by the intention of his next of kin to 
avoid the responsibility (which, in the absence of the father, would fall to them) of feeding 
and maintaining the abandoned family. If those men could, therefore, not be convinced by 
words to leave their pleasures and caprices, or to come back home and guarantee a proper life 
                                                




for their wife and children, they would have to be forced by the Magistracy.228 If their 
behaviour could not be changed by such a corrective measure, at least the patrimony would be 
secured for the future of their children. Similarly, idleness, and a refusal to work were also 
strongly contested, following the same principle.  
Lack of control over his actions, appetites and passions were at the core of the 
reprobation suffered by the squanderer. The descriptions of his behaviour often emphasized 
his sregolato modo di vivere, his voluttuose idee, his incapacity to manage his affairs. 
Economic behaviour encoded a more profound lack of control over his body, his mind, his 
actions, and a man enslaved by his passions and appetites was a distorted image of 
masculinity. The complete lack of control they showed was dishonourable and, thus, a 
disruption of their accepted male gender role. As argued by Elizabeth Foyster, “men were 
expected to demonstrate their greater share of reason by exercising self-control or ‘self-
mastery’ over the passions, emotions and temptations which were thought so easily to sway 
the ‘weaker’ vessel.”229 Foyster examined the energy and resources devoted by English 
husbands to preserve their male honour, even to the extent of paranoia.230 Conduct books, 
however, were reminders that male honour had to be preserved using male strength along 
with reason. But, above all, men were never to lose their temper in the grip of uncontrolled 
passions.  
To the dissipation of the patrimony, an immoderate way of living, the gambling and 
the excessive drinking, some petitions added the presence of a mistress, and the consequent 
disrespect and mistreatment of the wife. Prodigality was understood as a category of mental 
incapacity that encompassed a recklessness and lack of control that affected not only 
economic behaviour, but also morality. It was not only that they engaged in innumerable 
debts, countless non-profitable contracts and the compulsive selling of goods, but also that 
they were involved, repeatedly, with different women. This was not a one-time adulterous 
relationship, or a unique affection with the wrong woman, but a tendency that had become 
customary. 
                                                
228 As an example, we could mention Francesco Guastelli, denounced as a squanderer by his brothers because, 
besides his prodigal behaviour, he had abandoned his family, with great “disadvantage and disaster for his 
family”.  They tried to convince him to come back and reassume his duties, even promising that they would pay 
all his debts if he was to abandon his vices, but “his pertinacity in wanting to live only under his own caprice”, 
forced them to turn to the Magistracy, requesting the interdiction. In ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2307, no. 45, 
August 1767.  
229 Elizabeth Foyster, “Male Honour, Social Control and Wife Beating in late Stuart England”, Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society 6 (1996), p. 215.  




In many of these kinds of cases, the wife’s petition was far more dry, reducing her 
denunciation to the economic misbehaviour, compared to the extended and even spicy details 
presented in the testimonies collected by the Magistracy’s informers. The importance of 
witnesses in family litigations has recently been stressed by Julie Hardwick, who claims that 
they give the community’s expectations and judgment of the behaviour under discussion (she 
refers primarily to marriage litigations), and at the same time connect the private and the 
public worlds, partaking in the state’s regulation of the family life.231 Witnesses and 
testimonies also connect us to the context of the accused deviant behaviour, giving us a 
complement to the personal-private gaze.  
For instance, in June 1759 Agata Sammicheli, supported by her elder son, petitioned 
for her husband’s interdiction. Defined as prodigal, the description of her husband’s 
behaviour alluded strictly to his economic mismanagement, and it was only in the testimonies 
where dissipation was connected to dishonourable behaviour and violent actions against the 
wife. From Sammicheli’s place of origin, Lucolena, the Magistracy was informed that 
Giovanni Sammicheli regularly frequented “the house of a (female) neighbour, where he 
ordinarily spends most of the day eating, and drinking, and having a good time (bel tempo) 
causing public scandal, being this one of the main reasons why he mistreats in words and in 
actions, his wife.”232 The case is extremely interesting because in February 1760, Giovanni 
Sammicheli petitioned to be released from his submission to the Magistracy, claiming the 
falseness of the supplication made by his wife and elder son, and arguing that they had plotted 
against him.233 Strikingly, the official disavowal by his son and wife of their initial 
accusations supported Sammicheli’s petition.234  
The act of petitioning against an unruly and violent husband must have been a difficult 
thing to do for a woman in the eighteenth century. But it also shows them as active agents in 
                                                
231 Hardwick argues that, “witnesses, along with plaintiffs, royal prosecutors, and judges, formed litigation 
communities that explicitly addressed specific issues, in this instance about family in separation suits, and 
implicitly engaged the macrocosmic issues such actions raised about relationships of gender and property, 
household and state”. Julie Hardwick, “Between State and Street: Witnesses and the Family Politics of the 
Litigation in Early Modern France”, in Desan and Merrick (eds.), Family, Gender, and Law, p. 104. 
232 Visits “la casa di una sua contadina, in cui ordinariamente va passando la maggior parte dei giorni in 
mangiare, in bere e in darsi bel tempo con pubblico scandalo, essendo questi uno dei principalissimi motivi, per 
cui si in parole, che in fatti maltratta la propria moglie...”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2305, no. 14, September 
1759.  
233 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2305, no. 53.  
234 The retractions of wife and son are also interesting because of the procedure used by the magistrates to make 
sure they were not forced by the man to withdraw, and at the same time because they present a different 




this process of shaping the perception of legal incapacity, protected by their sons, or by their 
kinsmen. In the theatre of alliances and family strategies, it was common for the interdicted to 
denounce family plots against them, and certainly we have to concede that sometimes this 
may have been the case. Nonetheless, when the interdiction was petitioned out of ulterior 
motives other than the protection of the patrimony and the family, we usually have a 
liberation petition following shortly after the interdiction sentence.  
The wife’s involvement in the interdiction procedure could be both to denounce the 
husband as squanderer, and to plead in his favour, with the intention of proving her husband’s 
amendments, his “honourable” behaviour, sane state of mind, and economic abilities. In most 
of these latter cases, women adduced the perils suffered by the family during the head of the 
family’s submission to the Magistracy, the high expenses resulting from this situation, and the 
necessity of regaining the original structural order of the family. Provided that in many cases 
the patrimony’s administration was assigned to the wife, the distortion of the traditional 
family structure was further enlarged by placing women as active heads of family. In these 
cases, new conflicts followed the initial ones. The disempowerment of the head of the family 
imperilled the reputation and social position of the family, and could also affect its economic 
future. But, it also seriously affected family life, for the interdicted seldom reacted passively 
to their disempowerment. All these arguments point to the fact that petitioning for interdiction 
was not the easiest solution for controlling an unruly husband, or solving a matrimonial 
conflict. Women did not necessarily have their conflicts solved with the interdiction of their 
husbands.  
As in the case of young prodigals, violent behaviour was a recurring image in the 
description of the middle-age disorder, with the difference that in the cases of the former the 
anger would be directed against creditors, in street brawls, and occasionally against the 
mother. In the case of heads of family anger, on the contrary, would usually be directed 
against the wife. Rather than entering into issues of matrimonial violence, what interests me 
here is the recurring image of perturbed emotional states in the description of the prodigal’s 
disorder. Because they were known to be ungovernable, they were also feared, with their 
alienated temper, and unrestrained passions. Besides the evident similarity with declared 
cases of madness, the violent outbursts of the prodigals were often the reason for the 
Magistracy’s intervention. 
As already stated, petitioning for an interdiction was not the easiest, nor the fastest 




dishonourable to the family, as long as the reprehensible practices and licentious living of the 
man were made public by the Magistracy,235 and because it required paying the annual fee 
charged by the Pupilli, and the income of the administrator. Plus, every action that was made 
through the Pupilli had to be paid, and interdictions usually presupposed the inventory of the 
goods, selling part of them, or renting others. So, from neither the economic point of view nor 
from the social point of view, was it the easiest solution.  
Yet, despite the difficulties an interdiction would exert on family life, it was 
nonetheless used to control disordered members of the family. Furthermore, denunciations of 
prodigality were not only centred around the basic facts of the reckless economic 
mismanagement that was held liable to interdiction. The signs of mismanagement were in fact 
profoundly mingled with the identification of the signs that would lead to petitioning for the 
interdiction of an insane person. An uncontrolled body meant an uncontrolled mind, and an 
uncontrolled mind signified irrationality. Thus, their uncontrolled mental and emotional 
capacities were used by the families as arguments to justify the interdiction. Here the notion 
of vice, especially with regard to drinking and gambling, seems crucial.   
If drinking and gambling were sometimes part of the young prodigal’s disorder, in the 
case of the middle-aged they often appear as the defining factor of the disorder. We should 
bear in mind that the eighteenth century in Tuscany witnessed the proliferation of a series of 
measures to regulate gambling and public spaces of alcohol expenditure (bettolle, cantine), 
demonstrating the new public concern originated by these vices.236 Accordingly, the practice 
of gambling and the tendency to drunkenness functioned as a “winning” argument to sustain a 
petition for interdiction. This is particularly the case of the narratives of middle-aged 
prodigality, which attributed especial relevance to gambling and excessive alcohol 
consumption. These two vices were identified both as the paradigmatic symptoms of the 
prodigal disorder, and as its causal factors. Rather than being undisciplined and violently 
disobedient, disrespectful of social hierarchies, and pursuers of splendour and pleasures, as 
the young prodigals supposedly were, the middle-aged were primarily described by their 
relatives as consumed by alcohol and gambling, lost in the effects of such vices, and thus, 
irrational and unable to control themselves. 
                                                
235 After an interdiction, the authorities of his place of origin had to publish bandi which declared that the person 
had been interdicted, so that no business or economic contract could be made with him.  
236 See Cantini, Legislazione Toscana, vols. 20-27. On the legislation regarding gambling, see also Andrea 




Alcohol, and perhaps to a lesser degree gambling, were thought to seriously 
compromise the mental faculties of an individual, and proved his mental incapacity. In fact, 
we know that patterns of alcohol consumption changed in eighteenth-century Europe. 
Scholars have suggested that the eighteenth century witnessed a shift in the culture of alcohol. 
There was an increase in the amount consumed, which explains the “new” visibility gained by 
alcohol and the new conflicts associated with it.237 This went hand in hand with changes in 
the representations of drunkenness, particularly regarding the damaging effects it had on 
mental faculties.238 Throughout the century it became clear that excessive drinking could not 
only produce physical damage, but could also cause insanity, destroying reason and 
neutralizing will.239  
In eighteenth-century Tuscany, the very fact that the individual was continuously 
under the effect of alcohol, and seized by the power of gambling, was thought to demonstrate 
that there was no possibility of a future change in their behaviour. Drunkenness especially 
was seen as proof that it was not a temporary crisis, or a difficult “phase” in their lives, but a 
disorder, one that was shown in their behaviour, but that was thought to seriously compromise 
their minds. Excessive alcohol consumption seriously corrupted a person’s mind, to the extent 
of incapacity in the eyes of his relatives, and was seen, therefore, as the main causality of their 
squandering. Because individuals were supposedly weakened by drinking and gambling, they 
were seen as helpless objects before the seduction of ill-intentioned friends, who would 
deceive them and profit from their weakness and alleged stupidity.240  
As I suggested before, the most negative effect of excessive alcohol consumption was 
believed to be the effects it produced in the mental faculties of the drinker. Alcohol was 
thought to obscure rationality and will, making the person drunk and thus, “stupid in 
                                                
237 A. Lynn Martin, Alcohol, Violence, and Disorder in Traditional Europe (Kirksville, Missouri: Truman State 
University Press, 2009). For a more complete background on the cultures of alcohol before the eighteenth 
century, see Beat Kümin, Drinking Matters. Public Houses and Social Exchange in Early Modern Central 
Europe (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Beat Kümin and B. Ann Tlusty (eds.), The World 
of the Tavern. Public Houses in Early Modern Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); B. Ann Tlusty, Bacchus and 
Civic Order. The Culture of Drink in Early Modern Germany (Charlottesville and London: University Press of 
Virginia, 2001).  
238 Dana Rabin, “Drunkenness and Responsibility for Crime in the Eighteenth Century”, Journal of British 
Studies, 44 (2005), pp. 457-477.  
239 Porter, Mind-Forg’d Manacles, p. 201, and Tlusty, Bacchus and Civic Order, p. 58.  
240 For example, it could be said that “non mancano persone che profittino della debolezza di esso, e con 
spogliarlo del denaro col giuoco, e con fare dei contratti troppo vantaggiosi...”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 




mind.”241 In fact, the Italian term used was ebrio, which came from ebbrezza, and was defined 
by the Vocabulary of the Crusca as the obfuscation of the mind caused by excessive alcohol 
consumption.242 Similarly, to get drunk (imbriacare) was to ingest “so much wine, that the 
vapours and spirits ascend to the brain, obfuscating the intellect.”243 Attesting to the ubiquity 
of these understandings of the effects of alcohol, the expressions used in interdiction petitions 
are that the drunkard had “almost lost the use of reason.”244   
Petitioners therefore identified drunkenness as a causal factor of madness, because it 
could make the individual feeble-minded, and hence incapable of governing himself. 
Therefore, because their mental capacities were compromised, they could not be held 
responsible for managing their lives and affairs. Accordingly, this state of mental incapacity 
was what allowed petitioners to obtain an interdiction sentence for a prodigal relative. 
Interestingly enough, most of these lay diagnoses of mental disturbance did not need a 
medical certificate as support.  
In the reprobation of excessive drinking we can also find a strong disapproval of 
taverns themselves, as places of homosociability (the term in Italian was bettola or osteria). 
Rather than focused in the violence commonly associated with taverns, interdiction petitions 
centred their condemnation on the type of men that could be found drinking in them, usually 
considered as coming from a lower rank than the accused. Honour and respectability were at 
risk when frequenting these places, which had such a power over men that they could even 
become their homes (there are, in fact, frequent reports of drunk prodigals who actually lived 
in the taverns). They were also places associated with a licentious life, and the presence of 
libertine women of ill repute, where men could forget about honour and basic duties.  
Drinking also made the task of the administrator difficult, as the interdicted would 
demand financing for his “vice”, and the cases prove that often it was easier to have the 
prodigal at the tavern drinking, than at home suffering violent outbursts because alcohol was 
                                                
241 “che Ignazio lor fratello è molto debito al vino, perloche diviene spesse volte ebrio, e stupido di mente...” 
ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 26, May 1756.  
242 “Ebbro, Ebrio: Che ha la mente turbata, e lo intelletto alterato dall’ebbrezza”, and “Ebbrezza: Offuscamento 
dello intelletto, cagionato da soperchio ber vino, o da simile cagione”. Vocabolario degli accademici della 
Crusca, 4th ed, 1729-1738, s.v. “ebbro, ebrio” and s.v. “ebbrezza”, 
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http://www.lessicografia.it/Controller?lemma=EBBREZZA , accessed November 20, 2010. 
243 “Divenir briaco, che vale Bere tanto vino, che i fummi, e gli spiriti salgano al cervello, e offuschino lo 
‘ntelletto”. Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca, 4th ed, 1729-1738, s.v. “imbriacare”, 
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denied him. The administrators were in fact accused of wasting vital resources for the daily 
living of the family, with their “condescendence to the desires, and irregular behaviour of the 
submitted [the interdicted], giving him the indulgence of living in drunkenness, and of being 
constantly at the taverns.”245 
Finally, we should not forget the emotional component of the prodigal’s disorder. 
They were thought to be what we today would call emotionally unstable, which in the 
eighteenth century was expressed with references to an unruly character, uncontrolled temper, 
or more commonly, extravagant humour. The component of violence comes here again, a 
violence that was conditioned by their need to satisfy their vices. The vicious prodigal, 
especially one consumed by the “need” for alcohol and gambling, was greatly feared by his 
wife, who would often seek refuge against her husband’s outbursts of rage in the parental 
home.  
The evidence examined suggests that middle-aged prodigality was marked by this vice 
“dependence” in a lager extent than in the cases of its younger or elder counterparts. A 
significant part of the narratives describing middle-aged prodigality described their altered 
states of mind on account of drunkenness and the disturbing forces derived from the need to 
gamble. Rather than being undisciplined and violently disobedient, disrespectful of social 
hierarchies, and pursuers of splendour and pleasures, as the young prodigals supposedly were, 
the middle-aged were primarily consumed by alcohol and gambling, lost in the effects of such 
vices, unable to control themselves.  
 
2. 3.  Elderly Prodigals: The Liberties and Restrictions of Old Age 
The prodigal disorder affecting the elderly was primarily defined by their age. In fact, 
petitioners usually defined them as old, either by stating their precise age (from their sixties 
onwards) or by presenting their disorder as caused by their “advanced” or “decrepit” age. 
Their disorder was attributed either to the natural decline of age, or to the effect of some sort 
of seizure, or “accident” as the petitions generally called it. But in both cases, the physical and 
mental effects of aging played a crucial role. The interdiction procedures affecting elderly 
                                                
245 “[l’] Attore è oltremodo condiscendente ai voleri, e contegno irregolare del detto suo sottoposto dandogli il 
comodo di vivere in ubriachezze, e del continuo per le Bettole, quando potrebbe far valere il danaro, che in 
quelle spende, in riparo delle necessità comuni della casa...”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 12, case 




prodigals demonstrate that old age was perceived as problematic in eighteenth-century 
Tuscany, with an increasing awareness of its incapacitating effects, both physical and mental.  
As in the other two categories of prodigality, the disorder of old prodigals was 
identified primarily by their wrong economic decisions, excessive expenditure and growing 
debts. But here, with the difference that the physical and mental consequences of their 
“decrepit” age were held responsible for their squandering. Their incapacity could range from 
physical impediments to mental derangement, and was accountable for their capricious and 
extravagant actions, and their uncontrolled passions. As in the other two categories, the old 
prodigal was also associated with a vicious and licentious life. In any case, the degree of 
responsibility petitioners assigned to disturbed mental faculties varied, being presented as 
melded with other factors, such as the presence of the so-called natural tendency to squander.   
While young prodigals were usually denounced by their mothers or uncles, and 
middle-aged prodigals by their wives, elderly prodigals were usually interdicted after a 
petition sent by their eldest son. That means that in the case of the elderly, their interdiction 
has to do with how old age was perceived by the younger members of the family, by those 
closest kin that had to confront the social and family problems produced by old age. 
Historians have discussed the difficulty of assessing the onset of old age, generally 
determined between the sixties and seventies for men, and the fifties for women.246 In the case 
of eighteenth-century Tuscany, interdiction petitions evidence a growing awareness of the 
problems posed by old age. A significant number of petitions ascribed mental incapacity to 
the person’s “advanced age”, which was generally identified between the late sixties and early 
eighties. The fact that old age was identified as a distinct stage in the life course, and 
moreover, as a particularly problematic one is confirmed by the fact that the interdiction 
petitions specifically defined them as old, even as “decrepit”. The issue of their age was 
considered a relevant factor to be taken into account in order to understand their prodigal 
disorder, and affected also the possible solutions the Pupilli’s intervention could give.  
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have been the subject of numerous studies. See, for instance, Elizabeth Sears, The Ages of Man: Medieval 
Interpretations of the Life Cycle (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986) and The Long History of Old 




Consequently, interdictions open a window onto the social construction of the 
problem of the elderly, making them another entry point into what Angela Groppi has called 
the “welfare prima del welfare”. The care of the elderly, she claims, was considered a shared 
responsibility in early modern Europe, and the responses to old age resulted from a 
connection between private assistance and public intervention, both in the so called “nuclear” 
families of the north of Europe, and in the “extended” families of the south.247 
Focusing on eighteenth-century Rome, Groppi has suggested that the problem of the 
elderly was addressed through a carefully negotiated partnership between state policies and 
family strategies. The care of the elderly was considered a family responsibility, and the legal 
system promoted and certainly imposed the rigid observance of this social duty.248 Old 
people, she claims, were admitted into institutional facilities only when their decrepitude 
could be proven and when the family could pay for them, or in cases where their total 
abandonment by or lack of relatives was certain. At the core of Groppi’s analysis lies the 
assertion that the care of the elderly in eighteenth-century Rome was the effect of negotiated 
and constructed values of solidarity.249 
The situation of the elderly in eighteenth-century Tuscany seems to have posed similar 
problems to those suggested by Groppi. The cases where the officials of the Pupilli had to 
legally force a male son to pay for the maintenance an elder parent are indeed significant. In 
this regard, the interdiction of an old father was a complicated matter, because the pleading 
son had to respond to the care of the father, in the case that he could manage to prove that the 
latter had reached, indeed, a state of incapacity.   
It has to be said that in the case of old squanderers, the resemblance and even merger 
with cases of declared madness is apparent in most of the cases. But, in spite of the fact that in 
the majority of the cases involving old men they were declared more-or-less explicitly as 
being mentally disturbed, they were commonly categorized and interdicted as prodigals, and 
not as dementi. Also regarding the notion of age, the elderly prodigals posed a different 
problem than their younger counterparts, particularly when they were described as having a 
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natural tendency to squander, or had always been known to be extravagant and “odd”. In 
these latter cases, the extravagances, mistreatments, and dishonourable conduct had been a 
permanent presence in the lifecycle of the family, but for some reason the old man’s 
misbehaviour had become unbearable. This in part explains why squandering alone did not 
prompt families to request interdiction, nor did the decision rest solely on economic concerns. 
The moment for petitioning the interdiction of an old father had more to do with the 
exacerbation of his misbehaviour, his lack of respect for the family honour, the aggravation of 
his mental derangement, or a change in the power balance of the family group.  
Another difference that can be found in the perception of the squandering elderly, 
compared to that of young or middle-aged prodigals, has to do with the consequences of their 
squandering, which in the case of the older prodigals was judged differently. The main 
concern of their pleading kin was no longer the maintenance and education of a young family, 
but rather the inheritance, and the right of the eldest son to inherit an intact patrimony. But, 
again, it was not merely an economic concern. It is true that petitions contained a series of 
accusations that pointed to their lack of respect towards social norms, to their unreasonable 
economic behaviour, and, above all, to the future of the inheritance. Nonetheless, the records 
of the Magistrato dei Pupilli also reveal that denouncing an old father as a squanderer was 
often used as a mechanism to resolve the conflicts aroused by the coexistence with old 
parents, which could be even harder when adult sons and daughters had to cope with 
“powerful” fathers.   
It is well known that power relations and shifting balances marked the relationships of 
the early modern family. The accusation of the old squanderer often disclosed these kinds of 
conflicts, marked by a negative view, on the part of the plaintiffs, of what it meant to be old. 
Their advanced age made them useless, uncomfortable, extremely problematic in the eyes of 
their closest kin. On the other hand, because the interdiction of an old father was an act of 
disempowerment, they usually did not remain passive to their interdiction.  
 A number of testimonies submitted by the old prodigals themselves uncover the 
abuses they had to suffer. They expressed a distinct feeling of being humiliated by their 
relatives, treated as if they were foolish, childish, deprived of reason. Quite the contrary, they 
structured their supplications in a way that tried to highlight their determined will and clear 
awareness of the situation, expressing a distinct desire to be liberated from their sons or heir’s 
control, and often denouncing some sort of plot against them. Evidently, we only can assess 




them, or if the “awareness” was only regarding the son’s actions, not proving the actual 
condition of his mind.250 
The petitions submitted to the Pupilli suggest that old parents were a burden to their 
families, a constant inconvenience because they had to be taken care of, but also because their 
behaviour, often problematic and improper, compromised the family’s honour and the 
transmission of the patrimony. Of an age where most of them had married sons and daughters, 
they demonstrated an unrestrained desire for freedom, to be liberated from their social and 
economic responsibilities, their paternal role, and their duties as husband. But most of all, 
according to their relatives, their old age made them incapable of controlling themselves and 
behaving properly. The old squanderer had lost his capacity of discernment, had no reason, 
and was therefore unreasonable.  
According to his relatives, the disturbed state of mind affecting the old prodigal 
prevented him from making rational decisions, whether because out of his weakness he was 
seduced into dissipation and extravagant actions, or because his so-called “decrepit age” made 
him “impotent” in mind. Otherwise, it may be considered that alcohol had produced his 
disturbed state of mind. Drinking was, again, often accused of being instrumental in the old 
prodigal’s disorder. Firstly, it was considered a dishonour to have an old father known to be a 
drunker, and a habitué of taverns and other public places where alcohol was purchased. 
Secondly, the natural incapacity developed with aging was thought be aggravated by the 
“abuse he makes of wine, to the point of being always in such a continual drunkenness, that it 
provokes in him a complete alienation of mind.”251 This alienation of mind was held 
responsible for the complete dissipation of his patrimony, and could even be held accountable 
for his choosing a wife of a lower social rank, a decision completely contrary to good 
decorum and honour. In fact, remarriage (most times with a younger women of a lower social 
rank) was another cause that could force a son to petition for his old father’s interdiction. 
Late remarriage was identified by petitioners as an endless source of family conflicts, 
and it was even used as confirmation of the perturbed state of mind of the old man. Either 
they would spend all their income with the new wife (and children, if they had them), 
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neglecting the rights of their previous sons and daughters,252 or they would dissipate their 
patrimony pursuing the love of the young lady, not even marrying her.253 It was certainly 
regarded as extravagant (either an extravagant behaviour, or due to extravagant humour) to 
pretend to remarry at such an old age. The disorder and offence in these cases was to be living 
with people of an inferior social rank, feeding them, financing their distractions and 
diversions, and thus seriously disrupting the codes of honour and loyalty commanded by 
blood. Driven by their affinities, they would forget the blood ties that attached them to their 
sons and daughters and to their family name.254 A father who mistreated his sons and 
daughters, and who denied them “the necessary for their living” to instead spend it in the 
satisfaction of his pleasures, was a man of “extravagant humour.”255 
From this point of view, the old prodigal’s disorder was characterized by his lack of 
respect for the codes and norms appropriate to his gender and social rank. Old squanderers 
usually followed their inclinations freely, showing a total disrespect towards their relatives 
and family name. They were usually represented as disrespectful of the family hierarchies, 
disregarding the rights of the firstborn son, whether disinheriting him, or discrediting him in 
front of the rest of the household members.256 A petition to submit an old prodigal to the 
Magistracy’s arbitration was, therefore, an act of disempowerment of the head of the family, 
as part of the strategies that sons could use to undermine patriarchal authority.257     
To illustrate the moral reprobation that the old prodigal’s actions generated in his 
relatives, petitions often made reference to the character of the defendant, stressing 
                                                
252 See also the cases of Gerardo del Ponte, a vicious prodigal who wanted to remarry and spend his remaining 
patrimony only on his pleasures, denying a dowry and maintenance to his daughters and sons (aged between 17 
and 21), ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 57, September 1756; or the 77-year-old Girolamo Cocci, epileptic 
and married for the third time, who dissipated the patrimony of his first family in the new and constantly 
growing second one, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 59, October 1756; the marital conflicts between 
Ipolito Gaetano del Chiaro, avanzato in età, and his young wife, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 220, 
December 1765; or the case of Francesco Rigi, and the second wife of his diseased father, in ASF, MPAP, 
Memoriali, F. 2305, no. 79, May 1760.  
253 See, for example, the case of Giuseppe Caiozzi, who at the age of 77 fell in love with a younger and poorer 
woman, whom he managed to marry to another man to avoid any suspicious rumours of their own romance, 
afterwards inviting the married couple to live with him. The affair ended with the couple taking advantage of 
him and dissipating his patrimony, which forced his daughter to petition for his interdiction. According to the 
daughter, Caiozzi was completely enraptured by the woman, and this had caused a sort of alienation of mind, 
this time due to love. In ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2307, no. 46, August 1767.  
254 Patricia Crawford has examined the influence of blood and kinship in the experience of fatherhood. Blood, 
she states, is a key concept to understanding the construction and experience of the early modern family. 
Crawford, Blood, Bodies and Families. 
255 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 158, January 1758.  
256 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 249 and 274.  
257 The issue has been discussed by Linda Pollock starting from a family litigation in seventeenth-century 




particularly his uneasiness, from his irritability, his extravagant humour, to his low spirits 
(spirito abbattuto) or oppression of spirits. Thus, I would say that petitioners shaped their 
accounts of old age prodigality mostly based on the recognition of emotional disturbances, 
which have a predominant position in comparison to their younger counterparts.258 Moreover, 
it appears that the emotional disturbance recognized in the old prodigal was thought to be a 
sign of insanity to a higher degree than in the other two types of prodigality. The actions, 
gestures, manner of speaking and emotional state of the old prodigal fitted into the expected 
pattern of madness. But, as in the cases of the young and middle-aged, they were interdicted 
on the grounds of prodigality, not of madness, and medical testimonies appear only rarely 
(mostly to certify apoplexy).  
Descriptions of old-age prodigality were also mixed in with expressions such as “he 
has always been a man of diversions” (uomo di bel’tempo).259 The question here is, of course, 
why their families had tried to interdict them only at the end of their lives, if they had always 
been prodigals? The interdiction of Piero Bencivenni, of “advanced age”, may be illustrative 
for this issue.260 The supplication, made by his younger brother, melded strictly economic 
misbehaviour with moral flaws, emotional instability and mental dysfunction. The closing 
argument probably says more than the opening ones: the petitioner was 29 years old and, 
being Piero’s younger brother, had hopes of inheriting his patrimony soon, and he was 
“fairly” worried that by that time it would be reduced to nothing. Consequently, the question 
remains: was the argument of supposed insanity and emotional instability presented as a 
means to accelerate the inheritance, or was it included because the man “really” was 
unbearable to live with? The repetitive and inexpressive nature of the testimonies enclosed 
with this particular petition shed no light on the matter.  
 
2. 4.  Conclusion: Prodigality or Insanity? 
Here is where the problem of what determined the use of one category or the other 
(prodigality or dementia) comes to the forefront. For social and cultural reasons, and 
particularly because interdiction in itself was dishonourable to the family, families preferred 
to declare their deviant kin as being prodigal rather than mad, which would entail labelling 
                                                
258 See Chapter 7.  
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them under the category of demenza. On the other hand, the conception of madness and 
mental incapacity was clearly wider than what can be grasped from the contemporary medical 
literature. In fact, a considerable number of petitions simply described the deviant actions of 
the defendant without using any label. Plus, the records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli show 
that the label of prodigal was often interchangeable with the label of demente. A person could 
be interdicted for prodigality and afterwards, when lifting the interdiction, the officials of the 
Pupilli could say it had been originally issued by reason of demenza. Prodigality could change 
into demenza or vice versa with no particular pattern.   
I do not want to imply that prodigality was only a category that allowed petitioners to 
disguise insanity, but instead to suggest that prodigality was a category that comprised the 
notion of insanity. Prodigal behaviour in itself was, as I have argued, a kind of mental 
disturbance. Being a prodigal was thought to denote irrationality, and a prodigal’s 
reprehensible behaviour was said to stretch to madness.261 Whether because of their excessive 
drinking, their irregular characters, extravagant humour and unrestrained passions, they all 
were thought to have lost control over their mental faculties. The practical conflation in which 
prodigality and dementia found themselves was not so clear in traditional jurisprudence, as 
we saw in the first chapter. In general, the interdiction records show that there was no 
practical reason to differentiate prodigality from insanity. I have found only one record where 
a magistrate of the Supremo argued for the necessity to differentiate between the two. Mental 
incapacity supposed a “defect” that could only be assessed by expert medical opinion, and not 
by family members, this report from the Supremo said in 1734, while the “defect of 
prodigality” necessarily presupposed the presence of mental capacity, and consequently 
needed to be proven by facts provided by the plaintiffs.262  
By customary rule, as I have showed, interdiction procedures by reason of prodigality 
did not require medical knowledge but, nonetheless, the actions of the squanderer were 
attributed by petitioners to a perturbed and irrational state of mind. In so doing, the language 
used by petitioners to describe and explain prodigality speak of a lay knowledge about mental 
disturbances entrenched in the particularities of social life. People were at ease in explaining 
                                                
261 “pare che arrivi fino alla demenza la sua mala condotta”, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 72, February 
1753.  
262 Report of the Magistrato Supremo regarding the petition to interdict Diacinto Cicci, accused of prodigality 
and of mental incapacity and absentmindedness (smemoriato) due to advanced age and a series of “accidents”. 




their relative’s behaviour in terms of mental dysfunction and emotional imbalance, and in 




Chapter 3. Interdictions By Reason of Demenza 
 
The Tuscan legal framework provided five categories of mental incapacity liable to 
interdiction, if we follow what was listed in the statutes of the Magistrato dei Pupilli. These 
included the furiosi (furious or raving mad), the mentecatti (fools or idiots), the dementi 
(demented), the prodighi (prodigals) and dilapidatori (dissipaters).263 However, although the 
statutes listed five types of mental incapacity, interdiction proceedings in practice rested 
heavily on only two categories, prodigality and demenza, which encompassed the mentecatti 
and the furiosi. Following a trend that begun in 1530 with the introduction of the vernacular 
in judicial practice, categories of mental incapacity tended to conflate nuanced interpretations 
into simple categories.264   
Prodigality, it was established in the previous chapter, was the most recorded category 
in interdiction procedures. It indicated a behavioural disorder whose degree of mental 
impairment was frequently hidden, but that in any case supposed an open defiance of the 
accepted standards of rational behaviour. But who were the dementi and what did it mean to 
be demented? Why were people interdicted by reason of dementia? What determined the 
employment of prodigality over dementia to justify an interdiction petition? Furthermore, 
why were people sometimes interdicted without there being a category recorded?  
Focusing on interdiction procedures by reason of dementia, this chapter examines who 
was recorded as demented, how mental incapacity was described, and explores the implicit or 
explicit circumstances that compelled families to seek recourse to the interdiction. Drawing 
on R. A. Houston’s notion of the “contingencies” that determined the appearance of madness 
in the records,265 the chapter is built upon the contention that the election of one or other 
category of mental incapacity was not strictly bound to the actual characteristics perceived in 
the defendant’s mental disorder. The election of one over the other category responded 
                                                
263 ASF, MPAAP, F. 248, “Statuti et ordini della Corte et Magistrato delli Offittiali de’ Pupilli”, Rubric 2, fols. 
4-4v, and “Bando. Circa l’Esecuzione de’Privilegi, e Statuti del Magistrato delli Signori Ufiziali de’Pupilli”, 
ASF, MS, Suppliche, F. 1180, fols. 1307-1311 and fols. 1332-1333. 
264 On the effects of the introduction of vernacular in the language of mental incapacity in the previous 
centuries, see Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families.  
265 Houston, Madness and Society, p. 92. This idea is in turn inspired by the sociologist Ervin Goffman, who in 
his Asylums. Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates (1961) suggested that “in the 
degree that the ‘mentally ill’ outside hospitals numerically approach or surpass those inside hospitals, one could 





instead to careful calculation, which by no means signifies that interdiction narratives were 
complete constructs of manipulative and avaricious relatives.266 
The chapter aims to examine the different layers that composed the category of 
demente. By focusing on the family petitions to interdict an allegedly insane individual, the 
testimonies of neighbours, priests or other family members that backed up the denunciation, 
and the inquiries carried out by the officials of the Pupilli, the chapter studies how, when and 
why a determinate mental derangement appears in the records. The core argument of the 
chapter is that the definition of mental incapacity in eighteenth-century Tuscany has to be 
approached as a collective, or even consented category that allowed nuanced interpretations 
and responded to a wide range of private and public interests. The legal categories of mental 
incapacity made use of medical terminology only rarely, despite what has been claimed 
regarding the infiltration of medical terminology in the Tuscan civil and criminal courts by 
the sixteenth century.267 As Elizabeth Mellyn has recently suggested, despite what could be 
concluded from the appearance of juridical treatises that praised the expert authority of the 
medical profession to assert mental illness and judge physical evidence from the human body, 
the judicial assessment of mental incapacity continued largely to be based on lay narratives.268 
However, although the categories underwent little change over the century, the descriptions 
that filled those categories introduced increasingly complex connotations.  
The chapter starts with the story of the interdicted Lorenzo Baldinotti, which given its 
characteristics in terms of time-span, language, circumstances and actors involved, is 
symptomatic of the general picture of interdiction procedures by reason of dementia. It 
examines the connotations and legal consequences attached to the category of demente to then 
delve into the vocabulary and meanings of the category. The chapter then moves to an 
exploration of the recorded causalities of mental disturbance, and its most defining indicators. 
The chapter ends by examining the circumstances surrounding the recording of mental 
affliction in an attempt to understand the reasons for which families resorted to interdiction.   
Interdiction procedures affected predominantly adult men, from 18 years of age 
onwards. As a consequence, the picture they give contains an inherent gender imbalance. To 
counterbalance, explain and reflect on this silence in the sources, female mental incapacity 
                                                
266 For a similar approach to the subject, see Ibid., pp. 92-97.  
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Stinche.  




will specifically be discussed in the next chapter. However, many of the issues under 
examination here also apply to women.   
 
3. 1. Lorenzo Baldinotti 
On May 5, 1745, one Lorenzo Baldinotti petitioned the Grand Duke requesting to be 
freed from the interdiction that had submitted him to the authority of the Magistrato dei 
Pupilli two years previously, in 1743. In a moving narrative, he recounted the sufferings he 
had gone through since his interdiction, for which he held responsible a certain Marco 
Guerrini, his wife’s maternal uncle. In his petition, Baldinotti asked for the Grand Duke’s 
protection against the abuses and humiliations he suffered at the hands of his marriage kin, 
with whom he was forced to live by direct command of the Magistrato dei Pupilli.  
 
“Your Excellency should know [he said] that to this point the treatments that I receive 
from the Signore Marco Guerrini have become unbearable. Moreover, he sees fit to 
interfere in all my affairs, against my will, acting as if he was the master over my self 
and what is mine even to the great detriment of my interests. He is in agreement with 
his sister, the mother of my wife, who also treats me badly in actions and in words, 
pushed by her said relatives, and this they can do and do so continually because I find 
myself forced to cohabit with them, and be in their house.”269 
 
Interestingly enough, Baldinotti’s petition made no reference to the reasons for his 
interdiction, or to his present mental condition, but focused exclusively on the emotional 
distress his present situation caused him. He felt that his marriage kin (particularly Marco 
Guerrini) were only interested in his patrimony, and had deprived him of his natural rights 
just to take advantage of him. “Mi considerano come un [u]omo di paglia”, he said, that is, he 
was a man of straw who could be used to their convenience. His petition was intended to 
revoke the interdiction, or at the least partially regain his rights to administer his patrimony. 
He requested also to be allowed to live alone with his wife and children in a residence of his 
choice. 
                                                
269 “...sappia dunque V.S. Illma essersi ormai resi insoffribili li trattamenti, che ricevo in tutto dal Sig. Marco 
Guerrini, quali di più a suo capriccio vole [sic] entrare in tutti i fatti miei, senza la mia volontà, facendo il 
padrone sopra del mio, e della mia persona ancora con danno notabile de miei interessi essendo d’accordo seco 
la di lui sorella, madre di mia consorte, quale parimente malissimo mi tratta in fatti, in parole, messa sù dalli 
suddetti due suoi parenti, che lo possono fare, e lo fanno ad ogni momento per trovarmi e tenermi forzatamente a 
convivere con loro, et a stare nella loro casa”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 169(2º), Petition of Lorenzo 




However, the circumstances behind Lorenzo Baldinotti’s interdiction were far more 
intricate than what his narration suggests. He was interdicted for the first time in 1725, then 
once more in 1730, again in 1741, and a last time in 1743, dying in 1755. Although he was 
interdicted 4 times during his life, he was only openly categorized as insane (demente was the 
legal term used) during the last interdiction proceedings. The way in which Lorenzo 
Baldinotti’s insanity was disclosed through the 4 proceedings suggests that categories liable 
for interdiction were used instrumentally. It sheds light, at the same time, on the complicated 
interplay between the different notions, interests, concerns and requirements that converged in 
interdiction procedures. Moreover, it illuminates particularly well the backstage of 
interdiction procedures, disclosing the profound forces that moved families to seek recourse 
in the grand ducal administration for mediation, giving important clues as to when and why 
Tuscan families resorted to interdiction as a legal measure to cope with the mentally 
disturbed.  
Lorenzo Baldinotti was interdicted for the first time in January 1725, followed by a 
second interdiction in August 1730 and a third in February 1741.270 The reasons for and the 
circumstances of these first three interdictions are fairly vague. The first interdiction was 
decreed based on the succinct claim, made by his maternal uncle and his brother-in-law that, 
given Lorenzon’s financial mismanagement, he “needed” to be assigned a curator to 
administer his property and act in his name.271 The second petition, signed this time also by 
his elder brother, Stefano Baldinotti, claimed Lorenzo was “in a state of incapacity” that 
prevented him from managing his affairs.272 In other words, the first two interdictions had 
been decreed based on information that was not recorded, either because it had not been 
necessary to disclose more details, or because these details had been given to the authorities 
but still not recorded. As we will see later, the second option, which seems more likely to be 
the case here, was a frequent strategy to circumvent the employment of specific categories.   
The third interdiction followed roughly the same pattern. It was decreed in February 
1741 following a request of the same petitioners, claiming Lorenzo was (once more) 
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271 ASF, MS, Atti e Scritture, F. 1866, fol. 1529, 18 December 1724.  
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“incapable of being able to administer his estates.”273 Yet the interdiction decree introduced 
this time a revealing detail. It read that the need to interdict Lorenzo had been determined 
based on Stefano’s allegations that his brother “was not in a state of being able to administer 
his patrimony by himself due to his imperfections [imperfezioni].”274 Although again fairly 
vague, the proceedings on this occasion disclosed that these states of incapacity were 
produced by some unspecified “imperfections”.   
A major change occurred in the fourth interdiction brought against Lorenzo in August 
1743, providing the first sign that he had been perceived and identified as insane long before 
that. The proceedings were initiated this time with a note from the chief of police, the 
Auditore Fiscale, informing that the Council of Regency considered it expedient to once more 
interdict Lorenzo Baldinotti, so long as given “his known indispositions”, he was committed 
to Santa Dorotea, Florence’s mental hospital.275 Although the note referred to what were 
called Baldinotti’s “known indispositions”, we are told of them only now, owing to this 
reference to his committal to the mental hospital.  
The fact that no allusion to the nature of these so-called “indispositions” or 
“imperfections” was made in the previous proceedings is certainly puzzling. Furthermore, the 
interdiction of 1743 was similarly ineloquent on the subject, for it failed to elaborate further 
on the contents of the note written by the Fiscale, and neither text even employed the category 
demente. Many interesting lines of enquiry may be pursued here. Why was Baldinotti 
committed to Santa Dorotea? Why did the Auditore Fiscale not only intervene in this case, 
but act as expert authority to certify Baldinotti’s mental incapacity? Why is there no trace of 
Baldinotti’s mental condition prior to 1743 in the records of the Pupilli? Moreover, why were 
the interdiction proceedings of 1743 still elusive on the subject? Why had he been interdicted 
the previous three times? What was the connection between interdiction and confinement? 
What were the circumstances surrounding Baldinotti’s life and mental affliction?  
The involvement of the Auditore Fiscale with the management of madness will be 
examined in a later chapter, but let us establish for the moment that in Tuscany interdiction 
                                                
273 “...il medesimo è incapace di potere amministrare i suoi beni e perciò è degno, che li sia interdetta 
l’amministrazione...” ASF, MS, Atti, F. 2017, fol. 643, February 1740/41.  
274 “...non essere il Sig. Lorenzo Ferdinando Baldinotti di lui fratello in stato di potere da se medesimo 
amministrare il suo patrimonio mediante le sue imperfezioni...” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 110, 
February 1740/41.  
275 “Trovandosi per le sue note indisposizioni ristretto nello Spedale di S. Dorotea Il Sig. Lorenzo Baldinotti...” 
ASF, MS, Suppliche, F. 1188, fol. 871, August 1743. The records of Santa Dorotea Hospital reveal that 
Baldinotti was confined there between 18 July 1743 and 17 February 1744. See ASF, Santa Dorotea (hereafter, 




and confinement constituted separate procedures, completely disconnected from one another. 
While the former pertained to civil justice and fell under the jurisdiction of the Magistrato dei 
Pupilli and the Magistrato Supremo, confinement constituted a matter for the police and was 
therefore supervised by the Auditore Fiscale, who was the chief of police, and who supervised 
the administration of justice, was a member of the Consulta and had direct access to the 
Grand Duke and the Council of Regency.276 As a result, we see that on some occasions the 
Auditore Fiscale was consulted by the Pupilli regarding the behaviour of the defendants, or, 
as in this case, his word constituted the certification of madness of the kind that determined 
the need for interdiction. But his involvement was clearly not mandatory, especially given the 
fact that in the majority of the cases ending up in the records of the Pupilli the kind of mental 
disturbance under scrutiny did not constitute public danger nor disturbed the public peace – 
therefore it did not justify the need for the Auditore Fiscale to intervene. The procedure for 
committal worked in a parallel course to that of interdiction, was supervised by different 
authorities and aimed at completely different purposes. Someone could be confined without 
being interdicted, or be interdicted without ever being committed to a mental hospital.  
This clarifies why the 1743 interdiction was decreed based on the note of the Auditore 
Fiscale, but it does not explain why we find no clues regarding how his mental derangement 
was perceived until 1747. The petition to revoke the interdiction of 1743, which opened this 
section, failed likewise to disclose any details in this regard. It is only from 1747 on that we 
are given new insight into how Lorenzo Baldinotti’s family identified, made sense and dealt 
with his mental disturbance. Furthermore, this happened not because his mental condition in 
itself was under scrutiny, but rather because the family conflicts surrounding him, in large 
part due to his deviant behaviour, escalated. Mental incapacity was fully described not as a 
result of the judicial proceedings to define its legal status, but rather as a side effect of them, 
once the involved parties resorted to the mediation of the authorities to sort out some of the 
consequences madness entailed. In the case of Baldinotti, first it was the need to define a legal 
guardian for his underage son, and afterwards it was the issue of where was he to live and 
who was to be held responsible for his wellbeing.  
In February of 1747, Lorenzo’s five-year-old son was placed under legal guardianship, 
following a petition of Marco Guerrini, maternal uncle of Lorenzo’s wife. The petition argued 
that, given that Lorenzo had now been committed to the pazzeria (madhouse) of Santa Maria 
                                                




Nuova Hospital in Florence, the infant needed to be legally considered an orphan. In response 
to his request, the Pupilli officials informed the Grand Duke that Lorenzo had been interdicted 
as “demented”, which in combination with the fact that he had been confined, proved the 
appropriateness of Guerrini’s petition.277 Significantly, this is the first time that Lorenzo 
Baldinotti was openly referred to as demente in the records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli.  
After this, Guerrini petitioned several more times to request that the Pupilli intervene 
regarding Lorenzo’s whereabouts. In May 1747, he explained that Lorenzo, given his 
“insufficient understanding,” needed to be taken care of, and at the same time live separately 
from his wife.278 Here Guerrini provides new insight as to why his relatives had sought the 
Pupilli’s intervention so many times before, and why he had been admitted and discharged 
more than once from the two mental institutions existing in Florence – Santa Dorotea and the 
pazzeria in Santa Maria Nuova.  
Married twice and with four children (one of whom was from his first marriage), 
Baldinotti had turbulent relationships with all the members of his family, including his 
marriage kin. As a result, his residency was never a settled matter, and he wandered at 
random between his various family residences, prisons, fortresses, hospitals and even private 
accommodations. As mentioned above, in 1745 Baldinotti was forced to live with his 
marriage kin in a cohabitation that elicited great bitterness and insuperable differences. Marco 
Guerrini voiced the interests of Lorenzo’s wife, Maria Fine Ridolfi, representing his niece 
numerous times in court, and acting as mediator between her, Lorenzo and the government 
officials. On numerous occasions he tried to spare her from having to share a roof with her 
troublesome and occasionally violent husband.  
This is how we learn that in February 1747 Lorenzo Baldinotti had been sent to Santa 
Maria Nuova hospital because of his “unhealthy mind,” a “defect” that compelled him to 
insult his wife and children, and to perform other “imprudent and improper actions.”279 
However, only a few months later Lorenzo was released after one of his brothers, the priest 
Zanobi Baldinotti, petitioned to take care of him, promising to guard and feed him properly. 
But the arrangement ended abruptly after two months, when Lorenzo was violently expelled 
                                                
277 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 252, 16 February 1746/47. It is interesting to note here how the 
consequences of interdiction were not automatic, for even if Lorenzo Baldinotti had been interdicted in 1743, 
when his son was around two years of age, he had not been automatically deprived of his patria potestas. This 
only happened over three years later.  
278 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 265, 29 May 1747.   




from his brother’s residence. According to the Pupilli officials, Zanobi was unable to suffer 
Lorenzo’s recurrent “insolences and furious outbursts” any longer.280 As a consequence, 
Lorenzo ended up living under the roof of a “very poor man” without custody and lacking the 
necessities to feed himself, as Guerrini dramatically put it.281  
Subsequently the Magistracy advised in June 1747 that Baldinotti again be sent to 
Santa Maria Nuova until he made a complete recovery.282 Following the Pupilli’s suggestion, 
the case was placed once more into the hands of the Auditore Fiscale, who after a series of 
unsuccessful attempts to discipline Lorenzo, considered that the only solution was to imprison 
him. Although the Fiscale had “exhorted him to be wise, particularly with his wife” (who had 
recently given birth), Lorenzo had nevertheless turned up at her residence, where he 
performed “many mad actions” (fece molte pazzie).283 When more complaints arose regarding 
Lorenzo’s behaviour, this time coming from the Florentine prison, he was once more sent to 
Santa Maria Nuova. 
This second time Lorenzo Baldinotti remained in Santa Maria Nuova for around ten 
months, until his brother Zanobi intervened again to obtain his release.284 As before, the priest 
tried to share his residency with his brother, but the cohabitation proved once again to be 
impossible to bear after three years. After that, neither his agnates nor his marriage family 
were willing to take on the unpleasant responsibility of bringing him under their care. Finally, 
in July 1754, Marco Guerrini petitioned to once more liberate the Baldinotti patrimony from 
the authority of the Pupilli, and for Lorenzo’s wife to be appointed administrator. 
Additionally, he requested that Lorenzo Baldinotti remain under the government’s authority, 
whilst living in his brother Zanobi’s care. The latter, on his part, pathetically refused 
Guerrini’s request.285  
This new conflict gave space to more accurate descriptions of Lorenzo Baldinotti’s 
mental derangements, disclosing the variety of terms that characterized eighteenth-century 
interdiction procedures. Guerrini added to his petition a detailed account of the development 
of Baldinotti’s madness that highlighted the dangerous consequences it entailed to his family. 
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He declared that even before Baldinotti’s first marriage he had been incarcerated and confined 
several times on account of “his extremely extravagant brain [stravagantissimo cervello] and 
long series of follies [lunga serie di spropositi].”286 Baldinotti had become a widower in 
1743, after which he had married his present wife, Maria Fine Ridolfi. According to Guerrini, 
barely two months after the marriage Baldinotti had been imprisoned and afterwards confined 
to Santa Dorotea Hospital, where he was kept for ten months. He was then released after 
Guerrini’s request, who thought he recognized “some signs of correction in the mind of 
Baldinotti”, and consequently allowed him to live with his wife and marriage kin again.287  
For the next three years, Guerrini continues, the household had suffered Lorenzo’s 
“incredible extravagances and disorders” (let us not forget he was forced to live with his 
marriage kin), until in 1747 he was incarcerated again and afterwards sent to the pazzeria of 
Santa Maria Nuova. The rest of the story is already known to us, marked by the families’ 
intolerance over Lorenzo’s extravagances and his consequent itinerancy between mental 
institutions, prisons and private locations. Since 1751 he had been living alone at his villa in 
San Donato in Avane outside Florence, where he had been banished by order of the Auditore 
Fiscale. Almost blind, he had become a nightmare for the surrounding neighbours, displaying 
an exacerbated level of new extravagances, dissoluteness, scandals and disorders.288  
According to the enquiry conducted by the Pupilli officials to inform Guerrini’s 
petition, Baldinotti’s agnates had declared that it was “notorious that Lorenzo Baldinotti… is 
of an extravagant, furious and uneasy nature [naturale stravagante, furioso, ed inquieto], and 
sick in his mind.”289 The officials supported this by referring to Lorenzo’s mental distress 
with expressions such as he was “not perfect in his judgment” (non è di perfetto giudizio), had 
an “extravagant brain” (cervello stravagante), and performed numerous “nonsense, scandals 
and extravagances” (spropositi, scandali e stravaganze).290  
This is how we grasp some of the circumstances that surrounded the troubled life of 
Lorenzo Baldinotti, whose cyclical mental disturbance, although it had been part of his entire 
life, had still enabled him to live, at given periods, a normal life – he managed to marry twice 
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and produce offspring.291 Lorenzo Baldinotti was perceived as mentally afflicted early in his 
life, was subjected to four interdictions, was interned both in Santa Maria Nuova and in Santa 
Dorotea hospitals several times, and constituted a recurring problem for his relatives. 
Nonetheless, the language his family and the authorities employed to define his behaviour 
was strikingly imprecise and indisputably lay in nature.  
The reconstruction of the events and perceptions surrounding Lorenzo Baldinotti’s 
mental disturbance is particularly fruitful for understanding the language used to define 
mental incapacity, because it shows that the labels employed were embedded in social life, 
and were socially meaningful. Rather than trying to make their description fit into rigid 
medical or legal categories, Baldinotti’s relatives were able to describe him in their own 
words and, of course, according to their own interests.  
Clearly the terms employed were connected to the reasons behind the petition and the 
situation it was trying to highlight. For instance, Baldinotti was described as of lacking the 
necessary intelligence to manage his affairs properly in a petition relating to the 
administration of his patrimony, while he was defined as extravagant, disquiet and violent 
when his brother was pleading not to be forced to live with him. Similarly, further details on 
his mental derangement were only given after the fourth and last interdiction, and were given 
not to secure a positive response regarding the interdiction, because it had already been 
issued, but as a way of illustrating the anguish his perturbed behaviour exerted on his 
relatives.  
The fact that we do not have the wife’s perspective, which we usually do in other 
cases, is because her voice was assumed by her maternal uncle. Guerrini himself, when 
petitioning once again for Zanobi Baldinotti to assume Lorenzo’s care, depicted the mentally 
disturbed actions of Lorenzo by highlighting the suffering they inflicted on Maria Fini Ridolfi 
and the children, and the immeasurable care, they, the marriage family, had devoted to 
Lorenzo. Both pleas, that of Guerrini and that of Zanobi Baldinotti, are emotionally charged 
with details of their suffering when forced to live together with the mentally disturbed 
Lorenzo. For instance, in the eyes of Zanobi it was a matter of life and death not to be forced 
to live again with his brother: he had only one bed in his parish, which he would had have to 
                                                
291 Given that the Tuscan legal system conceived various gradations of mental incapacity, along with the 
characteristics of Catholic marriage, it is not rare to find men who married after they had been interdicted for 




share with Lorenzo, although, on account of his various illnesses (diverse indisposizione), this 
would shorten his life, he said.292   
Lorenzo Baldinotti’s example representative is on many levels. We could say that, in 
terms of the nuanced details left in the records, it constitutes an example of the “exceptional 
normal.”293 However, this may obscure the extent to which this case can be taken as example 
of a more general way of understanding, experiencing and dealing with madness. The 
situations illuminated by his story, the lexicon used to manufacture it, the complicated 
negotiation between the families, the mentally disturbed and the authorities regarding the 
meanings and consequences of madness, as well as the measures taken to deal with it are not 
exceptional. We find countless examples, mostly scattered in various records, which enable us 
to conclude that this was a standard response to mental deviance in the eighteenth century. In 
what follows, I will explore the language of mental incapacity and its meanings and the 
situations that moved the Tuscan families to resort to interdiction. The problem of the 
itineraries of madness, and the range of mechanisms for dealing with it provided by the Grand 
Ducal administration will be addressed in later chapters.    
 
3. 2. Vocabulary and uses of Demenza in interdiction procedures 
Demenza came from the Latin demens, which literally means de: “out of”, mens: 
“mind”, that is, out of one’s mind.294 In Italian early modern medical culture, demenza meant 
simply “perdita del senno o dell’uso corretto delle facoltà mentali,” and was used 
interchangeably with amenza and insania.295 The contemporary juridical culture ascribed a 
similar connotation to the category. For instance, in the famous medico-legal treatise of Paolo 
Zacchia, Quaestiones medico-legales (1621-1635), demenza was the “generic” term 
employed to make reference to “tutte quelle affezioni che colpiscono la facoltà razionale in 
                                                
292 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 210, Report sent by Zanobi Baldinotti, written for him by his nephew 
Domenico Baldinotti. 
293 For a discussion on this concept, introduced by Edoardo Grendi in 1977, see Carlo Ginzburg, “Microhistory: 
Two or Three Things That I Know about It”, in Threads and Traces: True, False, Fictive (Berkeley: University 
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modo da menomarne le operazioni.”296 Still during the eighteenth century, demente was a 
standard medico-legal category to designate all types of madness, under which all the other 
labels of mental disturbance or unsoundness of mind were grouped. Outside the realms of law 
and medicine, demenza meant plainly “madness”, if we follow the Tuscan vocabulary of the 
Accademia della Crusca, which defined demenza as “sciocchezza, pazzia.”297  
The meanings given to dementia in the early modern period were very different to the 
current medical notion of dementia, which was consolidated only at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Today dementia is understood as “an irreversible disorder of intellectual 
functions”, and it differs from mental retardation because the former is understood as an 
“acquired cognitive impairment” while the latter as congenital.298 But, until the early 
nineteenth century, dementia was “the umbrella term meeting the need for a word broadly 
defining intellectual, memory and personality impairment.”299 It encompassed different 
degrees of mental incapacity, from congenital feeble-mindedness and partial intellectual 
impairment, to mental affliction with lucid intervals and even straightforward insanity.  
In the context of the judicial practice of the Magistrato dei Pupilli, dementia was the 
legal term employed to interdict someone on account of an incapacity openly ascribed to 
mental disturbance, and was the second most used category. In the majority of cases, the term 
was first employed by petitioners and their supporting witnesses and afterwards repeated by 
the authorities. Only in a few interdiction procedures was the category introduced by the 
authorities, as the result of the inquiry conducted by the magistrates to assert the veracity of 
the accusation. In any case, rather than functioning as a diagnostic category, the term demente 
served to identify the interdicted, as evidenced by the books where the officials kept the 
accounts of all the relevant events and litigations related to their wards. Particularly during the 
first half of the century, when a new ward was recorded for the first time, the clerks usually 
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wrote either prodigo or demente by the side of the name, together with the town of origin.300 
Unfortunately for us, this practice cannot be taken to be the rule, and with time it fell into 
disuse.  
As the Baldinotti case so eloquently showed, one of the difficulties of examining 
interdiction procedures by reason of demenza is in differentiating them from interdictions by 
reason of prodigality, given that the proceedings many times do not attribute any particular 
category of incapacity to the defendant. Plain incapacity or constitutional financial 
mismanagement were many times preferred to the labels prodigo or demente (see Table 2). 
This to some extent explains why the clerks eventually ceased to record the category that 
motivated the interdiction; in terms of the administration of guardianships, it made no 
difference if the wards had been classified as demented or prodigals.  
 
Table 2: Categories of mental incapacity used in interdiction procedures between 1718 and 
1775 
Prodigality 291 48.6 % 
Dementia  197 32.9 % 
Unspecified incapacity 111 18.5 % 
Total 599 100 % 
 
Source: ASF, MPAP, Memoriali e Negozi di Cancelleria, F. 2299 – F. 2310 and Ibid., Campione 
di Deliberazioni, e Partiti, F. 112 – F. 170.  
 
The conflation between prodigality and dementia, examined in the previous chapter, is 
yet another issue that hampers the endeavour of examining only interdictions by reason of 
demenza (or the interdictions whose declared reason was dementia). Firstly, the two 
categories were employed interchangeably or as if they were complementary sorts of the same 
general kind of incapacity. As a result, interdictions by reason of dementia are many times 
hidden behind cases that initially appear to relate only to prodigality. Secondly, prodigality 
was a behavioural tendency that was present at the very core of every interdiction petition. 
The behaviours that indicated prodigality – that is, reckless spending, excessive and growing 
debts, compulsory selling of household goods, emotional instability and debauchery – were 
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the legitimate and basic reason that moved families to request an interdiction in the first place. 
To put it differently, so long as in order to be interdicted there had to be economic 
mismanagement of some kind, all the interdicted were represented as prodigals by their 
families. All but women, that is, who except in one or two cases, were not depicted as 
prodigal.301   
For all these reasons, the incidence of interdictions decreed by reason of insanity, or 
requested by families who perceived their relative’s behavioural disorder as the result of some 
level of mental impairment is difficult to assess. For the purpose of giving an approximate 
idea of the proportion by which the incapacity was thought to be the result either of demenza 
or of prodigality, I have created a table that groups under demenza all the interdiction 
proceedings that at some point employed either demente or any other concept by which the 
behaviour was openly attributed to mental disturbance or intellectual impairment (the range of 
terms will be examined in the next section of this chapter). In many of these cases the 
category of prodigality was also employed, but was coupled with a series of other terms 
specifying that the economic mismanagement was the result of a mental affliction. I also 
include under dementia those cases where the category of demente or the open reference to a 
kind of mental disturbance was introduced only in later proceedings (generally in relation to 
the interdicted’s maintenance and custody), or in the proceedings for the revocation of the 
interdiction, even if the initial proceedings that led to the interdiction had attributed the 
mental incapacity only to prodigality. The interdictions counted under prodigality relate to 
those proceedings that employed only the category of prodigo to classify the incapacity. 
Finally, the cases of “unspecified incapacity” correspond to proceedings that left no record of 
the reason that had motivated the interdiction, which for the most part relate to interdictions 
for which only the decrees have survived. For this reason, the number of people interdicted 
for dementia is not really indicative of how interdiction procedures dealt with mental 
disturbances. We could perfectly well assume that a larger number of families perceived the 
defendant as mentally afflicted than is reflected in this table, but they decided not to make it 
explicit or to record it.302  
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Taking into account the fact that the distinctions between prodigality and dementia 
were not always fully discernible, the question is why petitioners and government officials 
decided to classify the behavioural disorder of a defendant under one or the other category, 
and why in some cases we find that the category of mental incapacity was not even recorded. 
We have to take into account that all the evidence suggests that prodigality did not respond to 
a completely different set of characteristics and circumstances from dementia. The fact is that 
the reports and opinions of government officials in each proceeding usually repeated the same 
categories that had originally been employed by the petitioners, witnesses and local 
authorities. Furthermore, they hardly ever questioned the categories introduced in the 
petitions, unless they were found deliberately untruthful – which actually occurs in a minority 
of the cases.303 This means, on the one hand, that the authorities respected the language frame 
introduced by petitioners. But, at the same time, it suggests that the categories recorded were 
probably the result of a previous verbal agreement between the government officials, local 
and religious authorities, and the families. In many cases, however, the officials introduced 
new synonyms to the initial category(ies) employed by petitioners and witnesses.  
We could say that the proceedings employed the term demente to catalogue 
behaviours that were taken to be the result of mental illness. This seems evident, but what is 
less clear is if in all the cases of prodigality mental disturbance was thought to be absent. In 
this sense, we must bear in mind that we only have access to the written records of how 
mental incapacity was manufactured. In other words, we are bound to what they were willing 
to disclose, to how petitioners shaped the disorder of their deviant family member so that it 
corresponded to the purposes and requirements of interdiction.  
To have a relative declared mentally incapacitated presupposed that something that 
was better off left concealed would be made public. In this sense, the higher numbers of 
interdictions by reason of prodigality also speak of a society that favoured the label of 
prodigality over the label of dementia. Even if prodigality was not free of social stigma in 
early modern Tuscany, it was certainly less disgraceful than dementia, and above all, was 
easier to obliterate. The financial future of a family seemed to have been less affected if a 
member was interdicted for prodigality than for dementia. Evidently, this depends on the kind 
of prodigality manifested by the person but, in general, marriage proposals or prospective 
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financial endeavours seem to have been hardly affected. That prodigality was generally less 
stigmatized than dementia is proven by the rising number of voluntary interdictions observed 
towards 1770, which were precisely formulated around a constitutional tendency towards 
financial mismanagement. Furthermore, prodigality could be taken to be the result of the 
demands of eighteenth-century sociability rather than the outcome of mental impairment.304    
It was not only preferable, but above all, an accusation of prodigality was sufficient to 
interdict a family member, given how Tuscan society valued patrimony and how patrimony 
defined the elite. In fact, the foundation of the Magistrato dei Pupilli back in the Republican 
period had been bound to the social and political aspiration to preserve the patrimonies and 
wealth of families, which was considered a service of public utility.305 In this sense, 
denouncing (and proving) a state of risk for the family’s inheritance was argument enough to 
achieve an interdiction sentence. However, in spite of this moral economy, and moreover, 
because of it, over time the narratives get each time more complex, introducing new aspects 
to the argument of squandering, particularly in terms of the explanations given to deviant 
behaviours.     
Subsidiary Categories 
Interdiction narratives generally conceptualized madness as a sickness (infermità), or a 
defect (difetto), or, on other occasions, with the more precise expression of “sickness of the 
intellect.” Although all kinds of mental disturbance were categorized under the generic 
condition of demente, this does not mean that demente was the only label of straightforward 
mental incapacity employed. After demente, the categories most commonly used are melenso 
and mentecatto, and slightly less frequently, stupido and stolido. These terms worked as 
alternative descriptors of dementia, and were employed mostly in combination, as if by being 
grouped together they could exert a cumulative effect. According to contemporary definitions, 
a mentecatto was somebody “mentally ill, stupid [sciocco] and mad [pazzo].” Whilst the term 
mentecatto appeared to contain a broader range of mental afflictions, from stupidity to 
outright madness, the other three concepts appear exclusively related to a loss or alteration of 
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intellectual faculties. Melenso was “sciocco, imbecile [scimunito], foolish [balordo]” and 
sciocco was “someone who lacks wisdom and prudence.” In turn, stupid and stolido, as the 
other synonyms used to define melenso, all pointed to different variants of being intellectually 
diminished, a fool or insane.306 In general, people labelled with those terms were described as 
lacking capacity and intellect (privo di capacità e intelletto), as bereft of sense, reason or 
judgement (privo di senno, privo affatto di cognizione e favella), as weak of mind (debole di 
mente), as weak and stupid of wit (debole e stupido ingegno, or capo debole), as stupid of 
talent (scemo di talento) or as imbecile in mind or spirit (imbecille di mente or imbecille di 
spirito).    
Someone could simultaneously be defined as mentecatto, stolto, imbecille and poco 
sano di mente, without the need of delving into the precise characteristics of the person’s 
mental condition. But, furthermore, someone could even be classified as melenso and at the 
same time be said to manifest signs of frenesia or be subjected to a manic furore (furore 
maniaco). Categories of mental incapacity were not exclusive from one another and had no 
fixed meanings. On many occasions, terms that seem at first sight strikingly contradictory 
could easily coexist as descriptors for one and the same person. For instance, Orazio Penci 
was interdicted in August 1752 after a petition signed by his mother and three sisters declared 
that he dissipated “on account of his dementia” (stante la sua demenza). Their petition was 
supported by a testimony signed by a priest and “respectable” neighbours, which declared that 
for the past weeks Orazio Penci “is not healthy of mind, and it can be said he is demented” 
(non si ritrova sano di mente, e può dirsi demente), causing him to dissipate his patrimony 
and seriously endangering the maintenance of his mother and sisters. Among the signatories 
to the testimony was a physician who added that Orazio Penci suffered from frenzy (frenesia), 
which made him completely lose the use of reason. The authorities report concluded that 
Penci was currently melenso and debole di mente, but made no reference to the said frenzy.307 
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While Penci’s relatives and acquaintances described him in terms that highlighted his 
level of intellectual disability, medical opinion defined him with a term that pointed towards a 
more violent condition, introducing a qualifier that neither the petitioners and supporting 
testimonies, nor the authorities wanted to incorporate. Interestingly enough, the Pupilli’s 
conclusion repeated the lay language, not the medical one. For the purposes of interdiction 
procedures, Penci’s mental incapacity was exhibited by his irrational insistence in 
squandering and his neglect of his primary social role: providing for the economic subsistence 
of his mother and sisters. Through their centralizing concern with the consequences of 
madness, interdiction procedures tended to superpose the signs with the consequences of 
mental incapacity.  For this reason, not every petition had to be filled with forceful terms that 
were arbitrarily incorporated so as to indicate the absence or damage of reasoning faculties. 
Petitioners could also simply say that their relative needed to be interdicted because he or she 
was demente, without elaborating more on the nature of the alleged mental disorder.    
Almost any kind of madness could fit under this general lack of reasoning. 
Mentecatto, melenso, stupido and stolido evidently highlight the importance of declaring the 
defendant intellectually impaired, and thus incapable to manage his or her affairs. However, 
this is not to imply that people interdicted as dementi were necessarily perceived to be feeble-
minded, and even less to suggest that Tuscan families distinguished no gradations in the 
mental disturbance of their relatives. Post-interdiction narratives, particularly those related to 
the wide spectrum of conflicts generated by the troublesome nature of the interdicted, 
evidence that families definitively recognized different kinds of madness, particularly because 
each kind produced a different set of problems to the household. But a frenetic or someone 
perceived as prone to violent reactions could have been locked in a room or isolated in a villa 
while the interdiction was requested without it being recorded in the petition. The labels 
melenso, imbecille or demente simply highlighted better that the person was in a mental state 
that impeded his or her normal functioning. Petitioners intended these labels to appear as 
determinant and stable as possible, so as to imply that the defendant’s mental condition 
definitively obstructed his or her normal functioning. A frenetic could, say, suffer periodic fits 
of anger, but be able all the same to manage his or her affairs. Hence, references to mental 
impairment worked better to illustrate the extent to which the person was mentally 
incapacitated to manage his or her affairs.  
Another term comprised under demente was pazzo/a, which can be taken as a category 




literary representations. Pazzia meant plain madness, and could also assume all its forms. To 
be pazzo was to be “oppressed by madness”, encompassing from foolishness, to someone who 
is “bestial and furious [furibondo]”, “strange and extravagant”. Pazzia was “to be bereft of 
discourse, and of sense”, and was the antonym of wisdom.308 Although pazzo/a accompanied 
by furioso/a was the category accountable for committal in the Tuscan mental institutions, by 
itself pazzo was less specific, and did not constitute a legal category.  Given that it was not 
legally accurate, during the eighteenth century the term pazzo was generally avoided by the 
government officials directly involved with interdictions. When we find the term in the 
records of interdiction procedures, it usually corresponds to lay narratives, particularly those 
which are more descriptive, as an effort to qualify the denomination of demente previously 
given. It appears generally as a marginal commentary accompanying a person’s name 
supporting a testimony, saying that he indeed knew the person to be mad, or that the 
defendant was widely known to be mad (reputato per pazzo). Pazzo was used in a wide range 
of situations and, as can be drawn from the definitions just listed, it comprised madness in 
both its passive and violent forms, including people deemed foolish or feeble-minded 
(melensi), and the raving mad (pazzi furiosi). But it was also used to label those behaviours 
considered strange and extravagant, which points to a wider range of behaviours, and could be 
used also in a “lighter sense”, being present in many proverbs, as can be seen in the 
subsequent definitions given by the Vocabulary of the Crusca Academy.   
The categories that formed the legal language of madness examined here were largely 
not novel to the eighteenth century. Most of them were instead Italian translations of Latin 
terms, introduced when the official language of the Tuscan courts of law was changed into the 
vernacular at the beginning of the sixteenth century.309 Thus, in a context where continuity 
apparently seems to be the rule, it might be important to highlight the changes brought up by 
the eighteenth century. Firstly, it should be pointed out that some of the original Roman 
categories, such as fatuus or non compos mentis, although they had been incorporated in the 
early modern Consilia and in juridical treatises such as Zacchia’s Quaestiones medico-
legales, had fallen into disuse by the eighteenth century. But, most of all, the range of 
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categories used by the eighteenth century had mostly been reduced to prodigality and 
demenza, which provided the fundamental precondition for the possibility of shaping 
narratives that could respond to the changing social meanings. Given that these basic legal 
terms remained unchanged and circumscribed to simple definitions, they could encompass a 
wide spectrum of nuanced meaningful contents. So long as no specialized knowledge was 
required to denounce a relative of mental incapacity, narratives could instead focus on 
individual perceptions, particular events, actions or expressions that were meaningful for each 
witness or petitioner.   
The fact that prodigality and dementia, accompanied by its secondary descriptors, 
predominated in eighteenth-century interdiction narratives highlights two important 
observations, both of which constitute the subject of later chapters. On the one hand, it 
indicates by opposition that melancholy had come into disuse by the eighteenth century. And, 
on the other, it implies that medical language did not have a major impact outside the 
specialized circle of medical knowledge. Terms such as fissazioni, delirio or turbazioni di 
fantasia, which appear in medical testimonies of interdiction procedures towards the second 
half of the century, were not assimilated in the families’ or in the authorities’ narratives.310  
 
3. 3. Types and origins of mental incapacity  
Contrary to what can be observed in the case of prodigality, demenza was a category 
that was not defined by age. Save for the case of the elderly, interdictions by reason of 
demenza destined no particular attention to the age of the defendant. Rather, in these cases 
narratives centred around the indicators of mental perturbation found in the defendant’s 
behaviour, where age made no qualitative difference. Instead of focusing on the person’s 
family role according to age – which was crucial in the case of interdiction by reason of 
prodigality, descriptions of demenza focused directly on its indicative signs. To explain the 
extent to which a person was unable to manage her or his affairs, petitioners frequently made 
reference to the characteristics of their mental affliction, alluding to its origins, predominant 
signs, and most evident consequences. Thus, conditioned by its purposes, these narratives 
tended to shape types of mental incapacity that were not age-specific. In fact, most of the 
interdiction procedures by reason of dementia make no reference to the age of the defendant. 
                                                




As I will explain later in this section, the exception is constituted by the elderly, whose 
dementia was framed as stemming primarily from their advanced age, which placed the latter 
at the centre of the discussion.   
Early modern societies broadly conceived of madness as conforming to two general 
kinds, one violent and the other passive, as scholars have pointed out.311 Interestingly, this 
general differentiation is not so visible in the eighteenth-century interdiction records of 
Tuscany. Firstly, because all types of mental disturbances were piled under the category of 
dementia, and, secondly, because acute cases involving frenetic or manic conditions do not 
appear frequently enough in the interdiction records. If one looks at the records of Santa 
Dorotea hospital, it would seem that Tuscany acknowledged only violent madness as a public 
problem. Conversely, an examination of the archive of the Magistrato dei Pupilli gives at first 
sight quite the opposite situation.312   
This contradiction is partly explained because interdictions followed a completely 
different procedure from confinement. Although both were part of the Tuscan state’s response 
to the problem posed by madness, they pursued starkly different aims. Given that interdiction 
and confinement responded to different needs, the records of each provision configured 
madness in different ways. While the accent of a petition for interdiction had to be placed on 
the person’s incapacity to perform his or her normal duties, a petition for confinement was 
expected to emphasize the dangerousness of the person’s mad behaviour, as Roscioni has 
pointed out.313 In general, the mad behaviour described in interdiction narratives was less 
destructive and threatening than the one described in the petitions for the admission to Santa 
Dorotea. In fact, although the statutes of the Pupilli considered furioso, mentecatto, demente 
and prodigo as possible types of mental incapacity, the furioso scarcely appears in the 
interdiction records.  
 However, not all those categorized as demente suffered from passive types of mental 
disturbance. The dementi were also described as prone to suffering fits of fury, acting in the 
heat of anger and even brutally beating another household member. They could also both be 
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5 of this thesis examines the procedure of admission to the Tuscan mental hospitals, seeing them as one station 





suicidal and a threat to other peoples’ lives. In fact, many of them were also sent to Santa 
Maria Nuova or Santa Dorotea before, during or after they were interdicted, as the following 
chapters will show. However, these characteristics were not necessarily disclosed in 
interdiction petitions, especially because determining dangerousness was neither necessary 
nor decisive to assessing to what extent a person’s mental disturbance disrupted his or her 
normal functioning.  
Details regarding the characteristics of the disorder were only introduced if the 
information could produce an effect on the evaluation by the authorities. Contrary to what 
happened regarding violence or level of dangerousness, informing the authorities that the 
condition suffered by the defendant had hereditary precedents or that he or she had suffered in 
the past from similar episodes of madness could be decisive. The fact that mental affliction 
could be hereditary, and present itself episodically during the life of a person were valuable 
details that served to secure a favourable response on the part of the authorities. Most of all, 
they demonstrated that the denounced mental incapacity was not a malicious manufacture of 
rapacious relatives who only intended to seize hold of the defendant’s patrimony.  
Establishing that madness had been part of the family history argued in favour of the 
interdiction, for the notion that mental illness could be transmitted across generations 
provided a degree of certainty to the denunciation. For instance, if a defendant had a father 
who had been interdicted, this not only served to prove that the petition was probably not 
malicious but, furthermore, it was considered a demonstration that the defendant had little 
chances of not repeating his father’s fate. We observe this awareness in the words of the 
Supremo officers regarding the entourage of a defendant interdicted for demenza in 1767. His 
son, they said, “is entirely imbecile, so it seems that the vice is in the blood.”314 Petitioners 
understood how the argument of hereditary madness worked very well, for they usually 
pointed out that the defendant had a relative who had been recognized by the law as suffering 
from mental incapacity. It served, in this way, to prove the accusation of madness and its 
inevitable consequences.315  
                                                
314 “il suo figlio benche ammogliato, e di età, è affatto imbecille, onde pare che il vizio sia nel’ sangue”. The 
commentary appears when the interdicted, Gateano Migliorini, petitioned for his interdiction to be revoked. The 
Supremo officials argued against the lift and against the possibility of transferring the administration to his son, 
for he was held to be equally deranged. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali e Negozi di Cancelleria, F. 2307, no. 22, June 
1767. 
315 See for instance, the interdiction procedures for Anton Gaetano Diacceti or Antonio Baldinotti, respectively 




Cyclical madness played a similar role. Although the fact that a person was held to be 
prone to periodic episodes of mental derangement highlighted the temporary nature of the 
disorder, this only demonstrated more soundly the need for the interdiction. For one, it 
highlighted the fact that the disorder was not new to the family, and that they had not turned 
to the institution at the first hint of difficulty. As, for example, with a 90-year-old man, whose 
“decrepitude” was aggravated because he “frequently falls into frenzy, as he has fallen many 
other times in the past.”316 But it also worked as proof of madness, demonstrating that it had 
been requested in the best of interests of the sufferer, and serving as a precedent for 
subsequent interdiction. In fact, these people were generally interdicted more than once 
throughout their lives, as in the case of Lorenzo Baldinotti presented at the beginning of this 
chapter, in which case the interdictions were decreed on the basis of the evidence that had 
been presented the first time. Similarly, the notion of episodic madness served to ground 
petitions for each interdiction to be lifted, as it also served to petition for its reactivation if the 
person relapsed once more into his or her madness.  
Rather than establishing a difference regarding levels of dangerousness, interdiction 
procedures tend to centre most of their attention on the quotidian consequences of madness. 
As a result, the different kinds of madness appear minimized by means of descriptions that 
reinforce how the person’s behaviour causes a disruption in his or her life and that of their 
families. This is the case with those who were unbalanced, extravagant, suffered from 
uneasiness or were, in general, easily overcome by their passions, for these characteristics 
necessarily affected the way they conducted their business and managed their affairs. The 
closeness between dementia and prodigality is most evident in the case of unbalanced and 
unquiet types. As prodigals, dementi squandered their patrimonies, they could not control 
themselves, had unruly tempers, and often behaved improperly. These kind of dementi, also 
labelled melensi or deboli di mente, were characterized by their extravagancies and disrespect 
for social norms and social hierarchies. However, as later chapters will show, these 
characteristics were not necessarily brought to the fore when arguing in favour of the 
interdiction, and usually emerged once the interdiction was decreed.  
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Origins and Causations Ascribed to Mental Affliction  
Petitioners tended to identify the origins of mental disturbances in relation to 
particular events of the individual’s lifecycle. Depending on this, the condition could be held 
to be natural, accidental, temporary or permanent. In some cases the origin was thought to be 
natural, that is, inborn or caused by aging. In other cases the origin was situated outside of the 
natural order, understood as the effect of an infirmity, of an accident, of the experience of 
highly disturbing event or of the abuse of wine. Additionally, psychological factors played an 
increasingly determinant role in the increasingly personalized explanations for mental 
disturbance. In what follows, I examine how petitioners identified certain origins and causes 
of mental disturbance, introducing the opinion of authorities when there was a debate. 
Medical notions regarding the origins and causes of mental disturbance are examined in a 
later chapter.317 
Not only had melancholy almost disappeared from the language of madness in 
eighteenth-century Tuscany, but explanations of mental disturbances based on the principles 
of humoral theory were also vanishing. Not only we do not find descriptions relating to 
humoral imbalance, but there is also no allusion to the typical external factors that were 
thought to affect their balance.318 Despite what might be expected by taking into account the 
traditional association between fits of insanity and certain seasons of the year, there is little 
evidence of seasonal fluctuation in the interdiction narratives. We know that seasons and 
weather were still held responsible for the triggering of episodic mental afflictions in some 
medical circles in the eighteenth century.319 Although petitioners and witnesses frequently 
described episodic fits of madness that could assume the form of periods of low spirits or of 
exacerbated violent behaviour, the emphasis was placed on how these fits affected the 
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person’s mental faculties, and that the fits were regular and recurrent, rather than on what had 
caused them. Similarly, the relevant detail was thought to rest on the recurrence of these fits. 
When no causality was found, the disorder was likely to be considered as inborn, with 
the sayings of “has always been of unsound mind”, or “of little intelligence”. As a report from 
the authorities of Pisa stated regarding a case in 1756, there were people who had the bad 
fortune of having a weak head, of being so unintelligent that they almost were mentecatti.320 
In these cases, rather than constitute a defining characteristic, the reference to a mental 
incapacity, which had been manifested early in the life of the person or which had been 
present for as long as witnesses and relatives could remember highlighted the reliability of the 
denunciation.  
The other natural cause of madness is old age. Although the physical and mental decay 
caused by ageing was not necessarily equated to senility or to a state of dependency, ageing 
nonetheless posed particular challenges to those directly or indirectly experiencing it.321 It 
was widely acknowledged that old age could compromise mental faculties, affecting daily 
performance and ultimately lead to the loss of the ability to manage one’s own affairs. 
Interdiction procedures served precisely to tackle some of the most serious economic and 
relational consequences aroused by old-age mental incapacity. 
Old age has increasingly gained the attention of historians. Transcending initial studies 
that focused almost entirely on demography, the historiography of old age during the past 
three decades has challenged the model of the “golden age” of old age in pre-modern 
societies.322 To counterbalance the romantic approach to old age, recent studies have 
examined issues such as: meanings and experiences of old age according to gender and social 
background, status and social role of the aged; intergenerational relationships and co-
residence conflicts, perceptions about ageing and the conflicts posed by ageing to families 
and the state; and the provision of family or public systems of assistance, among others.323 
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However, old-age mental incapacity still constitutes an unexplored field. The visibility of old 
age in interdiction procedures, both as a characteristic of prodigality and as a defining factor 
of one type of dementia enriches our perspective of the intergenerational conflicts generated 
in relation to the transfer of property which, as historians have pointed out, marked the 
experience of old age in early modern Europe.324  
In fact, the elderly are the only age group that appears neatly defined in petitions by 
reason of dementia. Interdiction procedures portrayed aging as characterized by increasing 
mental damage, which seriously affected the person’s rational faculties to the point of turning 
him or her “impotente di mente.” The image frequently provided in these cases is that of a 
mind which has first turned childish (rimbambito), and then irrevocably declined into 
melensaggine and imbecillità di mente. As I said in the previous chapter, interdiction petitions 
denouncing the elderly generally started stating the “decrepit age” of the defendant, as if it 
was the decisive fact proving all the rest of arguments.325 However, whether the elderly man 
or woman had actually reached that stage was a matter for discussion, and so petitioners had 
to provide evidence beyond the sole reference to the defendant’s advanced age. As expressed 
by a Pupilli official in 1728, certification of someone’s advanced age by itself was not enough 
to determine that someone could be rimbambito, for he could perfectly be “of a sturdy nature 
and sound mind.”326   
For this reason, the interdiction procedures involving the elderly were often 
controversial regarding the assessment of their state of mind, disclosing a heated debate 
between the authorities, the elderly and their families. Indeed, the elderly constitute the age 
group that most eagerly contested interdictions, sending repeated petitions for their 
interdiction to be revoked. In fact it is not rare to find that they were interdicted for a 
decrepitude which was considered to produce an evident stupidity (melensaggine), but be 
later reinstated to their civil capacities because they had demonstrated a change of attitude.327 
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This suggests that evaluating the mental capacity of an 80 year old presupposed concerns that 
went beyond how their mind was working. As in every other interdiction procedure, 
regardless of the type of mental incapacity denounced, authorities, families and defendants 
negotiated the place, authority and role of the members of the household. In the case just 
cited, the 80-year-old man saw his interdiction revoked not because there had been an actual 
change in his state of mind, but because his household situation changed.   
Interdiction procedures shed light on conceptions of old age that portray it as a 
distinctly difficult stage of life, one that required the provision of new measures and which 
could constitute a Pandora’s box of family life. Tuscan families could resort to the Pupilli’s 
intervention to mediate between them and the elderly by means of the interdiction procedure. 
Thus, in interdictions by reason of dementia involving the elderly, families brought into the 
discussion not only the elderly relative’s economic mismanagement, but also their odd and 
stubborn behaviour, their increasing mental obfuscation, their need to be taken care of, fed 
and clothed. Interdiction procedures affecting the elderly, even if configured under the rubric 
of prodigality, are always entangled with the discussion about what it meant to grow old, how 
old age affected the family structure and balance of powers, and which were the defining 
signs of its mental decay. For this reason, these procedures illuminate the shaping of a 
pathologized conception of what old age was, presenting it as a negotiation between families, 
authorities and the elderly.328  
Mental incapacity by reason of old age was frequently combined with other external 
causes, such as a past illnesses, or, more commonly, an apoplectic stroke or epileptic seizure. 
In these cases the onset of the person’s mental decay was precisely identified at a certain 
point, which combined to the advanced age provided a degree of factuality to the 
denunciation. Apoplexy, which was particularly seen as a sign of decrepitude, served 
particularly well to argue that the person had reached a stage of mental and physical 
prostration, leaving them bereft of reason and partially or totally immobilized.  
But not only elderly mental incapacity was ascribed to external events. A person could 
be said to have become stupid in mind, or mentecatto after suffering an accident, such as a 
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serious fall, for example.329 Among the illnesses identified as responsible for triggering a state 
of mental incapacity, epileptic seizures and apoplexy definitively take a predominant place.330  
But, in many cases, the nature of the illness reported was not specified, and in many cases it is 
not clear that they circumscribe that “illness” (infermità) to a mental illness. Given how the 
body was connected to the mind in early modern culture, with a range of physical 
disarrangements that were thought to be able to affect mental health, it is perfectly possible 
that a physical ailment was being referred to.331 In other cases, petitioners simply state that the 
person had “fallen” (caduto) into dementia (or any other of its subsidiary categories), or “had 
fallen into many and diverse indispositions, [which] reduced him to unsound mind”, without 
disclosing the nature of such indispositions.332 More precise origins of the mental incapacity 
can be found in medical testimonies, but, as a later chapter will argue, medical practitioners 
tended in general to employ the same unspecified language employed by petitioners and lay 
witnesses when giving their specialized opinion.333  
When not relating to the elderly, accidental or external origins introduced the problem 
of duration into the assessment of mental incapacity, which explains why petitioners tended to 
avoid establishing a cause for the mental incapacity. For instance, a man was said to have 
turned “melenso and debole di mente because of a series of illnesses,” the nature of which was 
not revealed.334 In a slightly diverging explanation, a priest had testified for this case saying 
that he had “always thought of him as a man of little judgment and reprehensible conduct” (di 
poco giudizio e di poca condotta). Thus, indicating that an illness or an accident as the cause 
of a mental impairment could easily coexist with the argument of “has always been” or “I 
have always thought of him” to be mad, which transferred the discussion from causes (highly 
debatable) to consequences, which could be quantified and confirmed with facts.  
Drunkenness is the last cause of mental incapacity identified by petitioners that can be 
observed in the sources. The fact that in this case the origin had been self-inflicted made no 
difference for the argument of the interdiction. If anything, it proved even more the factual 
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existence of incapacity, and the behavioural disorder affecting its victim. The effects 
petitioners and witnesses attributed to excessive alcohol consumption (usually wine) were 
loss of control and damage in the intellectual faculties of the individual. Drunkards were 
frequently described to have become stolido, melenso, or frequently “out of himself” (fuori di 
se) by their immoderate consumption of wine.335 Family members tended to stress the 
damaging effects wine had on the human mind and thus, the financial effects on the 
household of having a pater familias who would be easily deceived or seduced into making 
unfavourable contracts.336  
Physical signs such as restlessness (inquietudine) or periods of exacerbated activity 
that prevented the defendant from sleeping at night also appear in the descriptions.337 These 
symptoms, which constituted a crucial sign characterizing uneasiness and extravagance as I 
will show in the last chapter, indicated the extent into which bodily signs could disclose the 
disruption in a person’s mind. Mad people lacked the rational will that allowed the individual 
to govern his or her actions, passions and appetites. Mad people could not govern their minds 
nor their spirits, that is, they could not take control over their thoughts and feelings. They 
would therefore be described by those who knew them as having extravagant and peculiar 
ideas, unable to chose one, or too fixed in another. The same would apply to their emotions, 
which were too inconstant and fluctuating to be ascribed to a rational being. Accordingly 
insanity was revealed, as it was said regarding a demente in 1760, in the “volubility of his 
feelings” and in “the extravagance of his behaviour, characterized by his way of speaking and 
by his fixation in his determinations, unreasonable to the extent of not being able to persuade 
him to do what is convenient.”338 Similarly, the individual’s recovery from a period of 
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insanity could be argued in terms of his having recovered his capacity to command his 
speaking and actions, and restrain his passed extravagancies.339 
It was not just physical factors that, according to lay knowledge, could contribute to 
the explosion of a mental derangement but psychological factors also played a role, 
particularly when we get to hear the voice of the mad. One defendant claimed that his mental 
breakdown had been cause by his animo angustiato, another explained that one of his 
episodes of mental affliction had been triggered after his wife had abandoned him, which 
produced in him a “fierce oppression of spirits that took him out of himself” (fiera 
soppressione di spiriti, che lo levò a fatto di se).340 However, these explanations usually come 
out in later proceedings, once the presence of madness and the extent of its consequences had 
been determined.   
Interdiction procedures are generally silent regarding the origins of mental incapacity, 
except for the reference to these marks in the life of a person that could signal the onset of the 
affliction. For the same reason, those who suffered a mental impairment from birth were not 
necessarily differentiated from those whose mental affliction had been triggered later, or 
whose madness was episodic. The onset of the disturbance only mattered if it demonstrated 
something regarding the consequences it exerted on the family. As a result, petitioners 
generally preferred to delve into the signs of madness rather than determine its origins and 
probable causes. First and foremost, interdiction petitions had to convince the authorities that 
the defendant was indeed incapable of managing his affairs, for which the argument of “has 
always been”, or “has always known to be” served the purpose straightforwardly.  
The temporal dimension of insanity played a different role in civil than in criminal 
procedures. The success of an insanity defence was dependant upon the possibility to 
determine the exact duration of the alleged insane episode, for this established if the crime 
had been committed with or without intent.341 On the contrary, to secure an interdiction 
sentence petitioners had to convince the authorities that the alleged mental disturbance 
exerted considerable damage on the economic resources of the family, regardless of whether 
the condition had been present since the defendant’s birth or only for the last couple of 
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months. While criminal procedures were concerned with past consequences of madness, civil 
procedures engaged with its present and future consequences.  
 
3. 4. Indicative Signs of Madness  
Despite the constant use of the word mente, it was widely recognized that the 
“essence” of madness was to be “visible and known by its appearance.”342 Gestures, 
behaviours, demeanour, external appearance, the way a person spoke, walked, related and 
reacted to others were its verifiable signs. In fact, the foundations of the legal assessment of 
madness had since antiquity relied on the principle that madness could be recognized through 
its outward signs. In other words, the mind was accessed through the external bodily signs of 
the person, which made madness very difficult to prove.  
The problem was that this assertion depended on highly debateable external indicators, 
which could not only be interpreted differently according to one’s point of view or intentions, 
but also be easily hidden or, even worse, simulated. The juridical treatises that circulated in 
Early Modern Europe usually warned about the difficulties of differentiating a real from a 
feigned madness, a danger faced by ecclesiastical and civil courts alike.343 Authors like Paolo 
Zacchia were well aware that the signs of madness were sufficiently known by lay people so 
as to perform convincing acts in order to obtain a mitigated sentence. For this reason early 
modern jurisprudence perpetually attempted to develop a system of proof to avoid fraudulent 
insanity pleas and detect cases of manipulation and abuse in civil law. The Tuscan legal 
system, after the revival of Roman law and following the lead of Zacchia’s Quaestiones 
medico-legales, had constructed a catalogue of insane actions and extravagant behaviours to 
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distinguish madness in criminal and civil procedures. Zacchia had presented many physical 
signs, such as cavernous eyes, or the marks of insomnia, which were determinant as long as 
they were impossible to feign.344  
However, judicial practice throughout Europe by the eighteenth century still largely 
relied on common sense and non-expert opinion to assess madness in criminal and civil courts 
of law. Furthermore, descriptors and signs were much more flexible in practice than what had 
been recommended by authors such as Zacchia. Contrary to the narrative that identified the 
eighteenth century as the onset of the medicalization of madness, British historiography has 
stressed the slow introduction of medical opinion in the judicial arena. As Houston has 
pointed out, in criminal and civil courts we can find the use or recalling of the existence of a 
“general or common standard of what constituted normal mental functioning.”345  
Following a long-standing tradition, recognition of its outward manifestations was 
critical in the assessment of mental incapacity. To be mad was to look mad and behave like a 
mad person. For instance, English law established that natural idiots could be identified 
because they could not count until twenty, could not name their parents, or could not tell their 
age. Similarly, a person could be held legally mad if a witness could declare “that they did see 
him to do such Things, or heard speak such Words, as a man having Wit, or Reason, would 
not have done, or spoken; namely, they did see him throw Stones against the Windows; or did 
see him usually to spit in Men’s Faces; or being asked a Question, they did see him hiss like a 
Goose, or bark like a Dog, or play such other Parts as Mad-folks use to do.”346 Following the 
same principle, Zacchia had stated that a melancholic could be recognized because they 
reacted strangely in front of other people, for they usually “become angry and are consumed 
by rage at the least provocation; they scream and shout; they threaten those present as well as 
those who are absent. With a savage countenance and violent motion of the body, they are 
terrifying.”347 
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The assessment of madness in the Tuscan courts was similarly based on physical and 
outward signs. Interdiction narratives frequently tried to prove a defendant’s insanity by 
declaring that they had “heard and seen him say and commit continual and diverse absurdities 
and acts of a real mad person.”348 The authorities’ assessment was built upon a combination 
of first-hand observation and what could be retrieved from the testimony of witnesses. 
Petitioners and witnesses generally concentrated on appearance and social behaviour, besides 
the squandering, when presenting their “proofs” of madness. Extravagancy, emotional 
instability, suicidal or violent tendencies were accompanied by certain bodily manifestations. 
The profound significance of extravagancy and emotional instability are examined in later 
chapters, but for now let me elaborate on how the body was held to give a conclusive sign. 
Perhaps responding to a judicial practice that privileged the recognition of bodily signs over 
demeanour and behaviour in the legal assessment of madness – the former were considered 
reliable and verifiable, while the latter could be easily simulated – interdiction narratives 
tended to include descriptions of external appearance and way of speaking when there was 
need to establish the veracity of a contested denunciation.   
Speech and physical impairment were amongst the most easily verifiable signs of 
mental incapacity and petitioners and authorities alike frequently resorted to them. For even if 
a defendant could “appear at the first sight that he speaks judiciously, when one continues to 
converse with him it becomes clear that his mind is not right.”349 Because speech was thought 
to be particularly revealing of a person’s state of mind, testimonies confirming the insane way 
of speaking of the person being denounced were particularly crucial. In fact, the Pupilli 
officials often contrasted the denouncements with their own visual assessment on the subject, 
summoning them to court if they were able to move by themselves, or sending an examiner. 
These visual assessments, although also based on clothing, demeanour and mobility, were 
especially based on speech.350  
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The inability to follow a coherent discourse and use the right words to express 
themselves is generally one of the signs signalling the effects that an apoplectic or epileptic 
“accident” had exerted on the mind.351 Difficulties of speech were in these cases accompanied 
by defective vision, difficulties of hearing and problems of mobility.352 Physical impairment, 
in fact, was conflated with insanity in uncanny ways. We have to bear in mind that being deaf 
and mute was listed among the causalities that could justify interdiction, according to the 
Pupilli statutes. But deafness or blindness were also included as physical symptoms 
accompanying the presence of madness, together with problems of speech or mobility. The 
legal conflation between physical and mental disability during the early modern period seems 
to be still understudied, despite the remarkable success experienced by disability studies in 
recent years. However, as Mellyn warns us, “The mad may have suffered from some find of 
physical impairment, but the physically impaired were not necessarily considered mad.”353   
In interdiction procedures, the fact that a defendant’s mental incapacity was 
accompanied by some level of physical impairment served to illustrate the extent to which the 
person’s normal functioning was obstructed. Not necessarily because physical, sensorial and 
mental impairment were equated, but mostly because they were seen as leading to the same 
consequences. Physical, sensorial and physical impairments hindered people’s normal 
functioning, constraining their capacity to manage their own affairs and conduct their own 
business, making them the potential victims of fraud and manipulation. This meant not only 
that they could be easily defrauded but also that they were not self-sufficient. Michele Frulli, 
around 60 years old, according to his brothers, “was and had always been demente, and 
incapable of managing his own affairs, and has always lived deprived of sight, and under the 
custody and care of the supplicants.”354  
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This is particularly clear in the case of the elderly. The fact that their minds were 
deteriorating was generally proved by their weakened bodies, an indelible sign of the passing 
of time. Aging left a perdurable mark on the individual’s body as well, and if the state of their 
mind could be the object of debate, their increasingly crippled bodies were incontrovertible. 
Physical impediments of sight, of movement and of speaking served, in this context, not only 
to support the assertion of mental decrepitude, but mostly to illustrate the need of the 
interdiction. The critical consequences of the elderly’s reprehensible financial conduct, with 
their wrong decisions, their indiscriminate selling of goods at a reduced value and their total 
opposition to any well-intended advice, assumed more convincing tones when combined with 
a “decrepit age”, “bodily indispositions” and problems of speech, demonstrating their being a 
“uomo stordito, e privo de ragione.”355 
Facial expressions and physical gestures are not easily found among the descriptions 
of mental incapacity in the eighteenth-century interdiction narratives. It is possible to find 
some comments regarding the defendant’s body language and appearance, generally included 
to suggest that the person has ceased to abide to the basic norms of civility and personal care. 
For instance, a defendant was “universally reputed by everyone” to be “wandering alone, 
roving with the beard of a capuchin.” These signs, combined with his past licentious and 
scandalous practices, and his distance from the Christian precepts demonstrated to the 
authorities that he was “not completely in his mind” (non pare che sia d’intera mente).356 
However, these remarks on the physical appearance are in fact marginal compared to the 
considerable significance attributed by interdiction narratives to descriptions that signalled the 
breaching of codes of behaviour, as the example just cited suggests. Furthermore, the 
authorities’ opinion on this case suggests that it was far more important for them to determine 
if the defendant was dissipating, and how and why, rather than establishing whether his 
personal appearance conformed to what was expected for a madman. 
A similar situation occurs with nudity. Among the outward signs of madness, the 
naked body of the madman or madwoman running amok through the streets is a well-known 
cultural stereotype of madness, which, however, is not as present in the interdiction records as 
might be expected. Nudity generally occupies a space in the studies of madness, and it has 
been singled out as a valuable key to grasp the meanings of early modern madness. For 
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instance, historians working with inquiries into mental incapacity have also included nudity 
under their examination of the outward signs of madness. In general terms, historians have 
argued, on the one hand, that external appearance was determinant in early modern societies 
for indicating social status, which placed nudity as symbol of poverty and as a source of 
shame and lack of decorum. On the other hand, historians have also read the disdain and 
rejection of the nudity and filthiness of the mad body by using the interpretative codes 
provided by the framework of the civilizing process and the growing importance of hygiene 
and manners.357 However, nudity and indecent appearance have a low profile in the 
eighteenth-century Tuscan interdiction narratives, following the same trend observed with 
regard to gestures and facial expressions.        
Tuscan interdiction narratives present alternative models to the stereotype of the 
raving mad running naked or unconventionally dressed, whose frantic and frenetic behaviour 
severely threatened the social order. The eighteenth-century interdicted evidently threatened 
the social order, but I have found only one case where petitioners recurred directly to the 
image of the naked, wandering mad.358 There is abundant reference to the defendant’s 
indecency, but it is mostly related to behaviour, not appearance. Furthermore, interdiction 
narratives do speak of clothing, but usually in reference to the excessive acquisition of them, 
not to their absence. If anything, the Tuscan interdicted were overdressed, in some cases 
clothed “above” their economic capabilities, and in others leaving the rest of the household 
deprived of decent outfits to wear, but they themselves were not naked.  
Rather than reading the Tuscan narratives as an exception against the more common 
early modern European cultural understandings of madness, I suggest that the difference 
responds, once more, to the special characteristics of Pupilli records under examination here. 
Particularly if we take into account that the disoriented or raving mad running naked or 
indecently clothed through the streets do appear in the records of Santa Dorotea. Thus, the 
stereotype does appear in other Tuscan records, only that interdiction narratives did not 
include it. This is, to my view, the relevance of taking into account a wider picture to grasp 
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more nuanced conceptions about madness in the early modern period. As I will try to show in 
later chapters, following the itineraries of madness allows us to understand the extent to 
which early modern petitioners and witnesses were extremely selective in their 
characterizations and their language. For the purpose of securing an interdiction sentence, 
instead of giving physical descriptions, it was more effective to delve into the financial and 
relational performance of the defendant.   
 
3. 5. Meanings and Perceptions of Madness 
The Purpose of Interdiction Shaped the Definitions of Madness 
According to Andrew Scull, during the eighteenth century the “long-standing cultural 
stereotypes of mad behaviour, encompassing extravagance, incoherence, incomprehensibility, 
menace, and ungovernable rage” persisted.359 The stereotype of the dangerous and frightening 
mad led the historian to assert that madness in “its most extreme manifestations – wild 
ravings, disturbances of the senses, deep depressions – were profoundly disturbing and 
disruptive events.”360 In like manner, studies focusing exclusively on asylum records have 
generally concentrated on the raving, dangerous mad, producing an image that tends to 
underestimate more nuanced representations of madness which can only be grasped by taking 
into consideration a wider range of records. This is what happens if one takes the image of the 
pazzo furioso produced by the records of Santa Dorotea, most of whom were dangerously 
violent and suicidal. The result is a stereotype much closer to the features of the dangerous, 
naked and wandering mad present in literary sources, than to the nuanced representations that 
can be found in records such as the inquiries into mental capacity under study here. This is 
not to deny that madness constituted a disturbing and disruptive experience, but rather to 
highlight that madness had many faces in the early modern period.361 
All these circumstances suggest that the perception of mental incapacity was wider 
than what we can grasp by clinging solely to the label of demente and to the purposes of 
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interdiction proceedings. This is particularly so because the evidence shows that the most 
interesting discussions regarding what it meant to be mentally impaired, and how families 
made sense of their relative’s mental afflictions come to light after the interdiction was 
decreed. That is, there was generally little contention about the category chosen to frame the 
interdiction. However, there was less agreement, and hence, more need to delve into the 
characteristics of the given mental incapacity, when the discussion entered the terrain of what 
was to be done with the defendant after the interdiction.  
If we were to limit our interpretation only to the vocabulary used, we would have the 
idea that people interdicted in early modern Tuscany as demente suffered almost exclusively 
from intellectual disability. Nonetheless, when the otherwise empty labels of demente, 
mentecatto, melenso were filled with the narratives of individual stories, a much more 
complex understanding of mental disturbance comes into the fore. The mentally disturbed 
denounced to the Pupilli were not only passive mentally impaired people, but also evidently 
problematic to deal with, and some of them certainly suffered violent outbursts. 
Although grouped under one overarching category, interdiction procedures by reason 
of dementia disclose nuanced conceptions of mental incapacity in accordance to different 
levels and gradations of mental disturbance. There was a general, and in my view, intentional 
imprecision in the legal application of the term demente. As such it could be open to the 
characterizations given by families and neighbours, granting enough space to definitions that 
were socially meaningful. The Pupilli was not looking for a medical diagnosis, but rather for a 
reliable description of the consequences of the alleged mental disturbance, regardless of how 
it was labelled. In this sense, reducing the picture of how mental incapacity was conceived to 
the two legal categories of the time (prodigality and dementia) may be misleading. On the 
contrary, the categories of mental incapacity were deliberately undetermined so as to 
encompass the manifold gradations comprised in mental incapacity, without resulting in the 
blurring of distinctions.  
A similar interpretation has been made regarding the ambiguity found in the meanings 
ascribed to lunacy and idiocy, the two basic categories provided by the legal framework in 
early modern England. Considered by Peter Rushton to be the product also of a “careful 
legalistic vagueness”, the dichotomy between lunacy and idiocy remained more or less 
untouched during the early modern period.362 Studies on the English provisions and legal 
                                                




treatment of the mentally disabled and mentally afflicted have suggested that the theoretically 
stark differentiation between the lunatic and the idiot was much less determinate in practice. 
However, Jonathan Andrews has drawn the attention of scholars to the problematic 
consequences of exaggerating the deliberate vagueness and flexibility of early modern 
categories of madness and mental disability. To avoid this he argues “for the meaningfulness 
and coherence in practice of early modern distinctions between types of mental disablement 
and mental illness.”363  
These studies also demonstrate that the employment of one over the other category is 
tightly connected to the nature and purpose of the institution where it was recorded. The 
English legal framework divided mental incapacity into two types, lunacy and idiocy, 
stipulating different consequences and providing a different range of provisions accordingly. 
Lunacy by definition supposed a temporary condition from which the individual could 
emerge, and included the possibility of lucid intervals. On the contrary, idiocy was conceived 
as a permanent condition, either born with or developed in early childhood. Lunacy supposed 
straightforward madness and was liable to confinement, while idiocy was applied to mental 
impairment, which was perceived to be generally milder, not dangerous and less disruptive of 
family and social life. As a consequence, idiots were generally cared for in domestic 
environments, which made them less visible. In fact, idiocy was recorded in parish records 
precisely by petitioners seeking parish provision under the Poor Law framework once “the 
private caring system disintegrated, through death or poverty.”364 As explained at the 
beginning of this thesis, lunacy and idiocy were thought to entail different legal 
consequences. While a legal declaration of mental incapacity by reason of idiocy was 
irrevocable, a person legally declared lunatic was deprived of his or her civil rights only 
temporarily, until the afflicted regained his or her faculties.365   
This differentiation between the lunatic and the idiot is applicable to a certain extent to 
the difference between the Italian pazzo and pazzo furioso, except that both of them were 
comprised under demenza in the framework of Tuscan civil court proceedings, and no real 
difference was made between those who had suffered their condition since birth and those 
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who had developed their mental affliction later in life. Here lies precisely the crucial point to 
this problem. For the purposes of interdiction procedures, it simply made no difference if the 
defendant was considered to be idiot (melenso would have been the most accurate equivalent) 
or lunatic (equivalent to the furioso or raving mad). Both received the exact same treatment in 
the civil courts and both entailed the same legal consequences. More importantly, interdiction 
under the Tuscan juridical framework was by definition conceived of as temporary. The 
system considered that people who had been feeble-minded “since always” could perfectly 
well resume their administrative rights provided they could prove they had regained their 
capacity to manage their affairs (or prove, alternatively, that the initial declaration of mental 
incapacity had been wrongful and ill-founded). Therefore, all types of mental affliction were 
placed under the comprehensive umbrella of demenza, regardless of whether it was 
considered dangerous or harmless, permanent or temporary, straightforward or mild. The 
difference was that the furioso could be also admitted to a mental hospital, provided his or her 
family petitioned for that purpose through the appropriate channels, which was not the case 
for the melenso. This opposition, devised with the purpose of determining whether it was 
necessary to provide a custodial solution, was not made in terms of symptoms and 
characteristics, but in terms of the person’s perceived levels of dangerousness.366  
 So diverse were “the types of illnesses comprised under the category of dementia,” 
that it was necessary to devise different regimes for the cure and management of each case, as 
the administrative board of Santa Dorotea explained to the officials of the Pupilli in 1759.367 
For instance, only a pazzo furioso needed confinement, while a person afflicted by 
“melancholic fixations,” as was the case of the patient that originated this report, would 
benefit more from a more cheerful environment where he could enjoy better air. However, 
both types of madness or, to put it better, all types of madness were liable to interdiction, for 
which they were generically categorized as dementi.  
The purpose of interdiction procedures made it useless to make this distinction. 
Interdictions were decreed provided it could be proven that the defendant was indeed 
mismanaging his or her property, and that it could be established that this mismanagement 
was caused by a constitutional incapacity. Whether it was a case of prodigality or dementia, 
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or if it was caused by a congenital intellectual impairment or some kind of mental illness 
developed later in life was, for this purpose, secondary.   
Culturally Meaningful Understandings of Madness 
Petitioners and witnesses had to load with meaning the conventional categories of 
mental incapacity if they wanted to convince the magistrates. It was in the descriptions of 
irrational and extravagant actions that petitions and testimonies dedicated most of their ink, 
filling with content the unspecific definitions of demente, mentecatto or melenso. For this 
reason interdiction narratives shed light on social conceptions and cultural stereotypes of 
madness. The negotiation of cultural standards of what constituted mad behaviour in the legal 
space offered by inquiries into mental capacity thus illuminates, from a different angle, an 
issue that has largely been approached through cultural manifestations like literary and visual 
arts.368  
Financial irresponsibility was evidently at the core of the cultural meanings ascribed to 
madness, so long as interdiction petitions were grounded in every family’s prerogative to 
protect their patrimonies.369 However, economic irresponsibility by itself was not a sign of 
mental derangement. As I suggested in the previous chapters, the conflation between 
prodigality and insanity occurred in certain characteristics of those who squandered, not in the 
squandering in itself. Indicators of a perturbed state of mind were found in the context of the 
squandering, in the defendants’ strange behaviours, their unbalanced characters, their pattern 
of unclassifiable reactions. One could tell that an allegedly demented person was indeed 
mentally disturbed not based solely on the fact that he or she dissipated, but on how and why 
they did it, and, moreover, if they understood that it was wrong to do it.  
At the core of the conception of mental incapacity we find the inability to situate 
oneself in a given context, shown in the person’s inability to perform normal activities, on the 
one hand, and to comply with basic social norms on the other. To engage in inconvenient 
contracts, not out of ambition or reckless spending, but out of pure incapacity was considered 
clear evidence, according to one contemporary Florentine, of the individual’s alteration of 
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mind.370 The allegedly altered state of mind of this defendant had prevented him from 
understanding that he was selling property at an undervalued price, for instance. In other 
cases, they were described as stubbornly contracting debts and engaging in illicit contracts 
that they would afterwards not acknowledge any responsibility for, behaving arbitrarily and 
demonstrating no concern over the consequences of their actions.   
Defendants were portrayed as completely unaware of the consequences of their 
actions, and particularly, oblivious to the material strain their mismanagement put on the 
family. Mad people were held incapable of differentiating good from wrong or beneficial 
from harmful. This was one of the basic notions used in insanity pleas, so they could not be 
held responsible for their actions. In terms of civil activities, it meant that they could be easily 
deceived into unfavourable financial actions, or even contradict the most basic rules regarding 
the transmission of the family patrimony in early modern Tuscany. For instance, Antonio 
Becciani acted deliberately against the norms imposed by the patriarchal hereditary system 
when he announced that he would donate his portion of the patrimony to an unknown third 
person. His purpose was deemed a clear sign of his perturbed state of mind in his mother’s 
eyes, and was instrumental for the interdiction sentence he finally received.371  
In their effort to demonstrate that the alleged mental disturbance justified the 
interdiction, petitioners provided a list of the defendant’s record of irrational acts, which, as a 
matter of fact, went beyond financial performance. Contextualized by ordinary circumstances, 
petitioners and witnesses described to what extent the defendant’s behaviour was in 
opposition to the standard or expected performance for an individual according to gender and 
social rank. An excellent example of how this operated in practice is the one discussed below. 
In August 1754, Antonio Corsi was interdicted because he had turned “frenetic and 
weak of mind”, giving “evident signs and demonstrations of his unhealthy mind”, as the 
officials of the Pupilli stated.372 The interdiction petition was signed by Corsi’s sister, who 
claimed he “had been giving clear signs not only of his incapacity to manage his affairs as any 
good head of family is expected do, but furthermore, of being of unsound mind” (mente poco 
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see ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 120, August 1764, for a further discussion of this case, see Chapter 7. 
It was common to denounce male and female defendants for the intention of making testamentary dispositions 
that distorted the patriarchal system of inheritance. The guardianship procedures examined by Mellyn also 
follow this same pattern. See Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families, for instance pp. 164-167.  
372 “[S]’è reso frenetico, e debole di mente” and “ha dato manifesti segni, e dimostrazioni di poca sanità di 
mente.” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 194, August 1758, Reports of the Magistrato dei Pupilli and the 




sana).373 The first sign of insanity she recorded was Antonio’s sudden refusal to fulfil his 
duties at the Merchant’s court (Corte di Mercanzia, the commercial court), where he was 
employed as assistant of the court records keeper. What made his refusal so odd, according to 
the woman’s narrative, was that he did not have any reasonable impediment preventing him 
from performing his usual tasks. The subsequent signs were that he had unexpectedly 
dismissed his own servants so that he could live in complete isolation. After that he had lived 
completely alone, manifesting no interest in the supervision of his affairs and showing 
complete indifference for the administration of his patrimony.  
The prevalent concern of Corsi’s sister was his refusal to participate in social life. 
Through a testimony she sent later on to the Pupilli, we know that Corsi not only longed for 
solitude, but insisted on confining himself at his residence with “bladed weapons and 
firearms” (arme bianche, e da fuoco), refusing to see anybody. He also carried his weapons 
wherever he went, which apart from being illegal, she presented as a source of particular risk 
to society on account of his well-known mental disturbance. Every new action he performed 
gave new signs of his insanity, said the sister, confirming the fact of his dementia.  
The testimonies she presented backed up her diagnosis of insanity with commentaries 
such as that from some moths before, whereby Antonio Corsi had begun to “give evident 
signs of not being right in mind” he had decided to live completely alone.374 There was also a 
testimony from the Cancelliere of the Tribunale della Mercanzia, who attested that Antonio 
had been absent from his post despite the efforts he had made to convince him to return. As 
he said, “I have many times advised him and beg him to come back to his working post,” but 
he had not been able to succeed, and Corsi prolonged his absence without giving any 
justification.375 He simply would not assume any responsibility for the abandonment of his 
post, even if some of his unattended tasks needed prompt attention. This, in the eyes of the 
plaintiff, witnesses and authorities demonstrated his detachment from the real world (and 
consequently, his insanity).376 
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Ibid, July 1758. Note how the government officials repeat the terms used by the petitioner and witnesses.   
374 “[H]a cominciato a dare manifesti segni di non essere di perfettissima mente, essendosi ridotto a star solo in 
sua casa”. Ibid. 
375 Ibid. 
376 He refused to give back the keys of the cupboards where money to be paid to third parties was kept, even 




Serving as a clear example of the conflation between the passive and violent type of 
madness, or of the proximity of terms like frenetico and debole di mente (weak of mind), his 
behaviour was also depicted as extravagant and violent. Not only had he shut himself off in 
his villa with weapons with which he might eventually harm himself, but when he left the 
place, he carried his weapons with him. To demonstrate the potential hazard his wanderings 
posed for public life, one witness claimed he saw Corsi passing every day in front of his 
bottega (shop) “making a thousand gestures to the people” which showed that he was mad 
(pazzo).377 He had even once seen him approach and threaten to attack with his sword a 
soldier who was speaking with a barber, with no recognisable motive. The soldier had been 
on the verge of responding to the provocation with his sword, but his companion prevented 
him by saying that Corsi was a pazzo and so could not actually defend himself. The soldier, 
according to the witness, had later said that there was indeed no point of killing a madman. In 
the eyes of the witness and his two victims, Corsi’s provocation was nothing but the mad 
actions of an insane person, given its utter absurdity and plain disregard for the rules of 
civility.  
The story of Antonio Corsi discloses particularly well the social notion of insanity, a 
culturally and historically grounded notion that made no use of medical or legal labels. He 
refused to work, insisted on isolating himself and engaging in street brawls, all actions that 
could not be rationally explained. The attitudes and behaviour described were considered as 
“manifest signs and demonstrations of his unsound state of mind”, in Italian, of his mente 
poco sana, the sister said. To the petition, the officials of the Pupilli concluded that Corsi had 
become “frenetico e debole di mente”. No medical testimony was added, and no further 
attempt was made to categorize Corsi’s insanity. Although his sister had petitioned for Corsi’s 
internment in a mental institution, this request was ignored by the Pupilli.378 
Corsi’s insanity was given away by the context that accompanied his actions, not by 
his bad temper or the act of threatening someone with his sword. The clue to his insanity 
rested on the fact that he did it with no apparent cause. Not because he was offended, nor even 
because he was drunk, but because he was passing by. Furthermore, although the magistrates 
later introduced the term frenetico, in the narratives of the witness we find no direct allusion 
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to Corsi’s emotional state when he was about to attack the soldier, almost as if the 
provocation had been accompanied by no classifiable emotion. What seems clear is that 
Corsi’s provocation could not be placed on the map of conventional behaviours nor on the list 
of acceptable emotional reactions. On the contrary, the story presents soundness of mind 
through the rational and compassionate reactions of those who encountered the madman, 
whose controlled reactions and well-governed passions served to demonstrate everything 
Corsi was not.379  
Relational and Social Dimensions of Madness 
Interdiction procedures illuminate the cultural dimension of madness, shedding light 
on how the understandings of madness were shaped in accordance with specific geographic 
and cultural contexts. Madness was a social experience, in the sense that its effects surpassed 
the boundaries of the family to involve the surrounding community.380 This context shaped 
the evaluation families and government officials made of each individual mental disturbance. 
Madness was obviously acknowledged as a condition suffered by an individual person, but it 
was understood as an individual sickness that had important social consequences, so its 
understanding was profoundly intertwined with how it affected others. The circumstances 
surrounding the defendants played a crucial role, such as, marital status, whether they had 
children or not, who they lived with or who took care of them. But, on top of that, behaviour 
was assessed always considering its context, not in the abstract.   
Whilst age was not a determinant in interdictions by reason of dementia, gender and 
the position occupied by the defendant in the household order were. Madness was portrayed 
by being inserted in specific contexts, for the way madness manifested and was codified 
changed according to the defendant’s position in the family. Given that the breach of 
behavioural norms was bound to each person’s expected roles, the three basic types we 
examined in relation to prodigals are also at the core of the descriptions here. And so we have 
the young bachelor, disobedient, defiant and riotous, the married man who resoundingly fails 
to fulfil his basic duties as head of family, and the old man who fails to acknowledge that the 
time has come to transfer his powers. The rule applies also to women, but probably to a 
greater extent. Most of the women interdicted were widows (a condition almost mandatory in 
order for them to be in a position to squander), and mostly of an advanced age. If they were 
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spinsters, they were old spinsters, never young. In the case they were in their forties, they 
were widows. The accusations, in these cases, were related to their inadequacy with regards to 
their financial management, as if their access to patrimony was the outcome of some 
unfortunate circumstances that should have never occurred.381 The breach of social norms that 
constituted the essence of the codification of madness varied in accordance to expectations 
that were age and gender specific. 
The petitioners’ identity is very much connected to the family position of the 
defendant, and the motives behind the petition. Most generally, petitions for interdiction on 
the grounds of straightforward madness (demenza) were sent by wives, mothers, brothers and 
sons. For instance, when they were married, the evidence suggests that the petition was made 
by the wife or the defendant’s brothers, depending on the relational circumstances that 
surrounded the family group. Interdictions were not only marked by the iniquities of a 
transmission system which privileged only the elder brother. It was most definitively an 
important part, but something else had to detonate the need of a wife or a brother to recur to 
public intervention. On some occasions we see that the male brothers conducted parallel 
litigation regarding the family inheritance in front of the court of the Magistrato Supremo, 
while contemporaneously or at a different time one of the brothers was interdicted by petition 
of a different family member.382 When the petitioners were women, they were supported by 
an uncle from either side of the family lines. In some cases the petition was made by a 
member of the marriage family, like a husband denouncing the disorders caused by his 
brother’s wife, or a concerned father whose daughter was married to a mentally disturbed 
man.383 An example of the effect the marriage family could have on the life of a mentally 
disturbed is shown in the case of Baldinotti examined at the beginning of this chapter, and 
also in the case examined below.  
Giovan Battista Becciani from Mugello, married and father of four children, was 
interdicted by a petition of his close relatives (their precise blood relation was not recorded, 
but they were clearly from the Becciani line). The petitioners declared that both Giovan 
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382 This is the case of Lorenzo Baldinotti, whose brothers were involved in a lengthy litigation over their 
inheritance. Many of the families of the interdicted pursued litigation regarding patrimony in front of the 
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383 See Table 1, “Distribution of interdiction petitioners according to family lines. 1688-1775”, in Chapter 1, 




Battista and his wife were incapable of administering the patrimony, the former because he 
was mentecatto, the latter because she lacked the necessary economy. Furthermore, they 
claimed the actual problem was the wife, who “makes her family suffer greatly.” She was 
prone to splendour and excessive spending, and because the couple lived separately, she 
consumed her husband’s resources in socializing with other people, without leaving anything 
for her husband. Testimonies signed by trustworthy witnesses added that Becciani was 
incapable because he was stolto and mentecatto, and that his wife squandered and raised her 
children with no education. The report from Mugello confirmed that Becciani was “so 
imbecilic and of unsound mind” (talmente imbecille, e poco sano di mente) that nobody 
believed him capable of managing his affairs, because he completely lacked the necessary 
economy and prudence.384  
The real argument of the petition was that Becciani needed to be assisted by a person 
who could really take care of his affairs. All the consulted parties agreed that it could not be 
his wife, for if she were to be designated administrator, she would most certainly squander the 
patrimony in direct detriment to her children. Therefore the interdiction petition aimed more 
to distance Becciani’s allegedly squandering wife from the patrimony than to deprive him of 
his rights of administration. The results of the argument are particularly interesting given that 
in a large majority of the cases interdictions were petitioned by women (although many times 
supported by their male kin), and they were generally the preferred administrators of their 
husband’s patrimonies.385 Not only was this not the case here but, furthermore, the squanderer 
was said to be the wife, not the defendant. She was not entitled the category of prodigality, 
but rather was considered as both the evidence of her husband’s mental impairment and the 
source for the sufferings of the whole family. As a result, rather than being an example of 
madness upside down, this case underpins the relational and social dimension of insanity.386 
Financial mismanagement was not the only concern behind the disclosure of madness. 
Squandering and/or the risk of bankruptcy were only the starting points for much more 
nuanced conceptions that were evaluated against the daily performance of the defendant. The 
failure to control one’s wife was a major indicator of mental incapacity, as were the failure to 
perform as pater familias and to oversee the education of one’s children. As appears evident 
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here, mental incapacity was measured against behavioural norms that were embedded in 
cultural and religious precepts that had been at the core of the formation of the Tuscan society 
and that were reinforced by the post-Tridentine church.387 Interdictions were thus a way to 
solve the disorders of the families that put the social order at risk. It is important to insist here 
that the wife’s disorder was not the fact that she was administrating her husband’s patrimony, 
but that she was making ill use of it, and probably, given the hints at her lavish social life, that 
she was being too lax and liberal with her relationships. It becomes clear, thus, how 
interdiction could be employed to put into order the disorder of the families, all commanded 
by the sacrosanct ideal of patrimonial preservation.   
 
3. 6. Familial Circumstances Behind Interdiction Petitions    
We have to take into account how families shaped the context of defendants’ mental 
incapacity to fully grasp why families resorted to interdiction at a given point. The familial 
circumstances surrounding each interdiction petition profoundly marked its disclosure. 
Something had to change or happen so that the family decided, first, to disclose mental 
affliction and, then, do it through an interdiction petition. This is even more clear if we bear in 
mind that a wider range of provisions to address the consequences of madness existed in the 
eighteenth century, which means that interdiction was not the only available option. While the 
other institutional or legal spaces where madness made an appearance are examined in the 
next chapter, we need to address here the problem of the circumstances that explain why 
families decided to resort to interdiction among the available measures. My suggestion is that 
interdiction procedures tackled two main issues: they addressed the problem of financial 
mismanagement at the same time they introduced a third party into the disturbing relational 
dramas generated by and because of madness. It is in the examination of this second aim 
where I see the most rewarding results. 
The records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli unequivocally demonstrate that family 
conflicts were not only of private importance, but were held to have a direct impact on social 
life, thus entering into the sphere of public concern. The involvement of patrimony in the 
private conflicts that were exposed to the ears of the Pupilli officials only heightened this 
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transposition of the private into the public arena. Although the declared reason for petitioning 
for an interdiction is always related to dissipation, risk of bankruptcy and a family on the 
verge of financial ruin, interdiction procedures always disclose profound family conflicts that, 
for one reason or another, had exploded, making the interdiction peremptory. By means of 
this reading, the timing of interdiction petitions appear much more connected to the rhythms 
of family life than to changes in the mental condition of the defendant, as studies in the field 
have suggested.388 The contextual contingencies that we see operating in the election of one 
or other category of mental incapacity or in the preference for culturally meaningful 
descriptors to define it, also shed light on the process that led a family to resort to interdiction.  
Among the declared reasons that moved families to request the interdiction, issues 
relating to patrimony administration assume a prominent role. This is almost self-evident 
given that protection of the family patrimony was the Magistrato dei Pupilli’s main purpose 
and was the primary reason behind interdiction procedures. Therefore, petitions commonly 
begun by declaring that the defendant, out of his or her madness, was dissipating the 
patrimony (stante la sua demenza, va dilapidando389). As prodigals, those codified as dementi 
were also defined by their financial mismanagement, and were consequently described as 
squanderers. We know that, generally speaking, both dementi and prodigals were deemed 
mentally incapacitated because they had been proven to be unable to manage their affairs, 
take care of their family and perform their role as head of the family. In the case of women, 
they were perceived as incapable to ascribe to and respect the limits of their position as 
temporary property holders. But this apparent simplicity cannot distract us from the main 
question that needs all the same to be posed, which is what moved families to send a petition 
for interdiction?  
There are two circumstances related to time surrounding interdiction procedures by 
reason of dementia that we need to take into account. One concerns the time frame between 
recognition and disclosure of the mental disturbance, the other concerns the rhythms of 
property transmission. Regarding the time frame, we do find mental afflictions of recent 
manifestation that were soon after exposed to the authorities. But, the majority of the 
interdictions (at least when considering those for which we have records of the petitions, 
supporting testimonies and authorities’ reports) relate to defendants who were said to have 
always been mentally disturbed, or in which the more-or-less defined origin of the 
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derangement is said to have occurred many years before the petition was made. A similar 
situation is observed regarding property holding. We have cases involving recent property 
holders, and cases relating to long-term property holders (not only the elderly), suggesting 
that coming into one’s inheritance was not the only factor, nor the most decisive one, to 
explain a recourse to interdiction.390 The records thus suggest that the timing of the 
interdiction petition does not necessarily coincide with either the first recognized 
manifestation of mental disturbance nor with transmission of property.   
Squandering by itself is an equally unsatisfactory factor for explaining why families 
resorted to interdiction procedures at a given point. Squandering is generally presented by 
interdiction narratives as a behavioural tendency that had long been a constituent part of the 
defendant’s personality. It is true that in many cases the dissipation is said to have reached a 
point of severe bankruptcy risk, and more than once it was said that someone had petitioned 
for an interdiction just to avoid paying his debts.391 There is no point in denying that 
interdictions were a real economic measure to manage overgrowing debts. However, I believe 
that we should take the squandering only as a window into more hidden factors, related to 
patrimony and financial behaviour, but not reduced to them. For, the family conflicts 
disclosed by interdiction petitions were precisely codified behind conflicting perspectives 
regarding economic behaviour.    
In some cases we can find clear triggers for the interdiction. Like a 65 year old whose 
foolishness and stubbornness had ultimately exploded, because he had been incarcerated, his 
assets impounded, and his patrimony at risk of total ruin.392 To the economic and social 
consequences of having this type of relative in the family, we have to add the age variable, 
because when they were old, their increasing insanity and their shattering bodies made it 
compulsory to intervene.  
Other reasons moving a family to petition for interdiction were related to changes in 
the family group which affected the distribution of power in the family. In fact, interdiction 
could be conditioned by a recent inheritance, whether because the defendant had come of age, 
or because the death of a relative had given him access to the family’s patrimony. But in these 
                                                
390 In the case of young prodigals, particularly those interdicted shortly after (or even just before) they came of 
age, inheritance evidently detonated the need to request the interdiction, although in these cases the behavioural 
disorder had been present long before the changeover of the property holders.   
391 See, for example, the interdiction of Gaetano Cantagalli. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 54, July 1739 
and no. 84, March 1740.  





cases, it was not rare for their fathers to have left a special clause in their wills to prevent their 
mentally afflicted sons from assuming the administration of the family assets. Additionally, 
they could have been under the care of a curator who had recently died. The interdiction could 
also be part of a testamentary disposition. For instance, a man who had always taken care of a 
feeble-minded brother left the testamentary provision for his wife to assume the guardianship 
of the demente.393 However, the actual reasons behind the decision of a family to petition for 
interdiction are generally masked. This is particularly the case when the allegedly mentally 
incapacitated is said to have always been mad. In interdiction procedures that were not 
contested, and that appear only once, we never get to know what had prompted the petition. 
But in many other cases we do get a glimpse into what could have happened.  
The most recurrent phrase indicating the motives behind interdiction petitions relates 
to the plead for the authorities to intervene as soon as possible in order to “oppose”, “impede” 
or “repair” the disorders caused by deviant behaviour (per ovviare, per riparare, per 
provvedere, per impedire ulteriori disordini). Mentally disturbed individuals were generally 
depicted as troublesome and ungovernable members of the family who refused to obey the 
commands stated by social norms. Economic mismanagement appeared thus as a pretext 
through which resolution to aggravated family conflicts could be channelled. At the backstage 
of interdiction petitions we are always confronted with changes in the balance of relationships 
within the family.  
Interdiction functioned as an alternative to resolving family conflicts and restoring 
family order. One individual refused to recognize the authority of his firstborn brother 
(pretende essere esso il padrone di tutto, e di comandare esso),394 acting as a furious man, 
and pretending to be the padrone. Another, out of his decrepitude and weakness of mind, was 
unable to properly govern his sons.395 Or we have the case of Giuliano Damiani, who 
petitioned because he had the misfortune, as he said, of having a brother who was not sui 
compos, defective in his hearing, speaking and brain (imperfetto nella lingua, nell’udito, e nel 
cervello). The actual problem was that his mentally disturbed brother recognized authority in 
no one but himself, and was so domineering that neither servant nor labourers were willing to 
work under his command. He would even threaten to kill the entire household, his 78-year-
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old mother and equally old uncle included, forcing the latter to flee from the house to save 
himself. His well-known “extravagances” made him worthy of the public label of pazzo, 
which seriously affected the economic prospects of the family because nobody would dare to 
make contracts with him. Nobody could control him, and with his improper and distorted 
ideas he turned his household upside-down, as the Pupilli was informed by the Podestà of 
Peccioli.396 As other cases show, Damiani’s family had resorted to all kinds of mechanisms to 
control him before turning to the Pupilli, and when they finally did, it was acknowledged to 
them that they could not continue suffering his frenzies (a word used by the Podestà of 
Peccioli, not by the petitioner).  
The interdiction petition was in these cases the way out of the explosion of a family 
conflict, one that was not anymore caused by the death of a household member, but because 
of a change in the alliances between the members. They can be read, in this sense, as part of 
the renewed familial conflicts that during the eighteenth century demonstrated that second-
born sons (cadetti) and women from the aristocracy were profoundly discontented with the 
traditional hierarchies of the patriarchal family.397 These conflicts, which according to 
Lombardi can be observed in litigations that placed the problem of unequal marriages at the 
centre of the conflict with increasing frequency, constitute but a different side of the same 
problem that we see reflected here. Intergenerational conflicts, and conflicts between siblings 
were also vented through interdiction procedures. Fathers who refused to hand over their 
position to their elder sons, brothers who disputed the management of the family patrimony, 
but who also disputed the possibilities of cadetti and women to decide on their marriages and 
life courses.    
 In fact, the interdicted usually argued in their defence that the petition had been 
originated as a plot against them, a product of new alliances among family members. This 
could explain why family members at some point in the life of a person deemed mentally 
afflicted “since always”, had decided to petition for an interdiction. To what extent 
interdiction procedures were employed as a mechanism to resolve family conflicts is best 
demonstrated in the reasons given by authorities to revoke interdictions, or not to grant them. 
The decision to turn to the authorities for their intervention did not, in fact, necessarily result 
as the petitioners intended. Interdiction procedures were an arena open for negotiation, and 
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authorities often assumed the voice of the weak members of the family. For instance, Michele 
Fabbroni, 86 years old, was considered by the authorities as still capable of managing his 
affairs. In fact, the magistrates sided with the defendant’s version, who had depicted a violent 
familial environment that had forced him to flee from the residence he shared with his sons, 
who had even dared beat him while he slept.398 
Contrary to what could be expected, interdictions were not only revoked once the 
defendants could prove they had regained their mental faculties or had emerged from 
derangement. In fact, most times this was very hard to prove, except for the cases in which the 
disorder had been framed as episodic. As interdiction procedures were much more about the 
relational dimension of mental incapacity than about the precise characteristics of the alleged 
mental disorder, petitions for the revocation of interdiction usually centred around the 
defendant’s change in attitude with regards to their financial behaviour and in relation to the 
way in which they related to the rest of their family members.   
The elderly, for instance, could see their administration rights restored even when they 
had been legally declared to have helplessly lost their mental faculties. Occasionally, in fact, 
they were able to revert the interdiction, managing to prove their soundness of mind, or their 
actually being “of a healthy body and awakened mind,”399 but usually this was combined with 
allusions to the existence of a family conflict that had originally moved the plaintiff, most 
commonly their elder son, to petition for the interdiction as a disempowerment weapon. If 
they could prove that the family disorder had been resolved, the Pupilli officials would 
generally not refuse their petition. 
Familiarity with the Procedure  
The more problematic a mental affliction was for a family the more colourful the 
narratives get, with descriptions that delve into the extravagant actions of the alleged mad, 
inserting them in the specific relational dimensions that characterize each family. It is 
probably in the accounts describing the troublesome and more disruptive behaviours where 
we can find more insights into the experience and perception of mental disturbance. Insanity 
was deemed as a complete disruption of the family, a force capable of making everything 
topsy-turvy. Furthermore, insanity many times constituted a recurrent presence in the family 
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history, which generally resulted in the family members being more aware of the depths of 
interdiction procedures, knowing precisely what to say and how to say it. Women appear here 
as the most active agents, empowered by the position the Pupilli had for centuries ascribed to 
them, and managing the strings of familial life. 
According to Elisabetta Montanti, her son Anton Gaetano Diacceti seriously 
threatened the family patrimony with his misbehaviour, “disquieting the entire household” 
with his unsound mind. Suggesting that she had sought help before, she explained in her 
petition that it was already known to the Pupilli that Diacceti was of weak mind and uneasy 
spirit (debolezza di mente ed inquieto spirito).400 Moreover, his father had also been 
interdicted as demented, as Anton Gaetano would be after his mother’s request. The petition 
was backed up by testimonies that described Diacceti’s irrational and extravagant behaviour, 
in his open defiance to social hierarchies and to the basic norms of conduct. His private 
behaviour affected the whole neighbourhood, meeting the common imaginary of the 
scandalous madman.   
We find in this case the usual flexibility of terms. His mother spoke of his uneasy 
spirit and his weakness of mind, while testimonies defined him as scemo di cervello, and 
without judgment (senza giudizio). Testimonies also said he unsettled and prevented his 
neighbours from sleeping, making annoying noises with his continual wanderings, his rattling 
of doors and other “impertinences.”401 Recognizing no authority but himself, he slept most of 
the day, and acted extravagantly at night. He had been banished from a neighbourhood for his 
annoying habits, and was in desperate need, according to the testimonies, to be placed under 
the authority of somebody who would control him. As we saw in the case of prodigality, 
irrationality was recognized in men who were not able to abide by the rules set by social 
hierarchies, which was aggravated in those cases, such as the present one, where there was no 
paternal authority to contain and direct them. Diacceti needed, the testimonies said, to have 
somebody who would make him feel intimidated, because only in that case he would stop 
harassing and mistreating his parents.  
From the Magistracy’s report we know that mother and son had been in conflicting 
positions since Anton Gaetano had come of age, when his desire to be appointed 
administrator of his father’s patrimony, which was under the guardianship of Elisabetta 
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Montanti, made him take all kinds of actions against her (initiating legal actions against her, 
accusing her of squandering the Diacceti patrimony, among others). The officials of the 
Pupilli stated the necessity to provide protection for the “anguished” mother against her son’s 
harassments so as to prevent any further vexation.402 
The case of Diacceti shows a woman, Elisabetta Montanti, who had learned to deal 
with madness years before, at least since her husband’s interdiction in 1718 (that is, 38 years 
earlier).403 The fact that she was appointed legal guardian of her husband, and administered 
the patrimony ever since means that she had long ago learned to move through the legal 
mechanisms offered by the Magistrato dei Pupilli. She managed to control her son because 
she knew how to legally argue the case. Although Diacceti tried to reverse the interdiction 
sentence, the officials of the Pupilli, with the consent of the Magistrato Supremo, sided with 
the mother, ruling in her favour.404 Never during the suit was it necessary for the Pupilli to 
rely on a medical opinion to assess Anton Gaetano’s mental disturbance.  
Repeated contact with the legal structure resulted in a clear sophistication of the 
arguments, strategies and vocabularies employed by petitioners. Not only do we find cases of 
people subjected to episodic madness alternating with lucid intervals that allowed them to 
periodically come out of curatorship, but we also encounter mental disorders transmitted from 
generation to generation. It is not rare to find cases of fathers interdicted after a petition of a 
son, or daughters who were, in their turn and many years later, also interdicted. The same 
occurs with husbands, wives and marriage kin, which not only suggests that interdiction was a 
legal measure known and conveniently used by the privileged groups in Tuscany, but also 
explains the circulation and evolution of the language of madness we find in interdiction 
procedures throughout the century.405 Cyclical disorder frequently derived also in various 
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periods spent in Santa Dorotea, or Santa Maria Nuova. As a result, these cases usually involve 
a family group well acquainted with what it meant to be mad, how it was argued in court or in 
medical environments, and what were the available provisions to cope with its consequences. 
This is why we need to follow the itineraries of madness to fully grasp the shaping of 
understandings of madness and the circulation of its languages.  
 
3. 7. Conclusion 
This chapter has showed that the language of mental incapacity developed in the 
eighteenth-century records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli was a cultural translation of the 
juridical language that had been used in civil trials for centuries. Legal knowledge had been 
appropriated, matured, and reformulated, incorporating the new concerns of the eighteenth 
century. Rather than proving the medicalization of madness, the interdiction procedures of 
eighteenth-century Tuscany thus speak of a socialization of madness. 
Overall, categories of mental incapacity did not change in relation to the previous 
centuries, except for a categorical preference for the term demente, which came to encompass 
all the other categories of mental incapacity except for prodigality. From the mid eighteenth 
century onwards, the differentiation between prodigality and dementia becomes increasingly 
clear. As the century advances, fewer cases of prodigality are conflated with dementia, and 
the narratives to define and exemplify the latter introduce a greater variety of descriptors.  
The openness and vagueness of legal categories enabled petitioners and witnesses to 
focus their descriptions on the behaviour of the defendant by recurring to their own 
terminology, giving space for a cultural negotiation over the indicators of insanity, and the 
possible mechanisms to minimize its private and social consequences. The increasing 
visibility madness acquired throughout the century appears thus correlated by the social 
appropriation of increasingly nuanced understandings of madness, nourishing from the 
circulating notions provided by the different languages (legal, medical, religious, political) 
that contributed to define the meanings of madness in the different institutional spaces where 
it could be disclosed, as later chapter will show.  
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The eighteenth-century notion of madness had broadened to contain daily, private 
perceptions of mental afflictions, encompassing personal experiences, social meanings and 
relational dimensions. The understandings of mental incapacity appear thus inseparable from 
the experience of the family, demonstrating the extent to which the perception and 
codification of madness was as much personal as it was contextual and relational.  For this 
reason, while interdiction procedures prove to be scarce in providing medical categories, they 
are, nevertheless, generous in the information they give about the family. Through them, and 
with the excuse of describing a mentally-disturbed relative, the narratives ultimately define 
the Tuscan families in all their complexity. Through the interdiction procedures we witness a 
family structure that escapes the rigid patriarchal model, presenting interconnected relations 
between maternal and paternal kin, shared and negotiated responsibilities, conflicting 
personalities with conflicting agencies; all placed on the legal arena of the Magistrato dei 
Pupilli seeking public arbitration. Furthermore, as later chapters will show, the way out of the 
disorder produced by mental incapacity, which was predominantly male in Tuscany, was the 
appointment of women as interim heads of family. The cure for the social consequences of 
madness was, thus, not only to secure the patrimony from the madman’s financial 











Chapter 4. Women in the Understandings of Madness	  
 
Female insanity constitutes a difficult field to study in eighteenth-century Tuscany, since in 
all the institutional spaces where madness made an appearance in the early modern world 
female insanity has a limited presence. Given the Tuscan patriarchal system of inheritance 
and property possession, interdiction procedures were, by default, a legal mechanism destined 
to control the consequences of male mental deviance. Similarly, as I will show in the next 
chapter, mental institutions and criminal records are equally unforthcoming on the perceptions 
and experiences of female mental disorders. Historians have in fact recently pointed to this 
absence, which strongly contradicts the traditional vision first developed by some scholars 
regarding the feminization of madness during the eighteenth century. The fact that women are 
under-represented in the eighteenth-century records of madness has led Houston to assert that 
female confinement constitutes a myth, particularly the idea that “men used asylums to get rid 
of unwanted wives.”406  
This chapter deals with female insanity, with the aim of elaborating what female 
madness meant to according to Tuscan families of the eighteenth century. The fact that female 
insanity is predominantly silenced in the records only makes the subject difficult to 
investigate, but it should not lead us to assume that this absence means that women’s madness 
was not identified, or that women were not thought to suffer from mental disturbances. 
Taking into account that the disclosure of madness was contingent upon factors often external 
to the manifestation of mental disturbance,407 it is clear that how many women were recorded 
as mad and how female madness was perceived are two different things. On the other hand, 
the fact that Tuscan society recorded male madness with such an overwhelming 
predominance when compared with its female counterpart is in itself a clear sign of the 
gendered categorization of madness in early modern culture. 
The ways in which madness made its appearance in eighteenth-century Tuscany 
suggest at least two things in this regard: firstly, that the concerns generated by madness were 
predominantly related to the consequences of male mental disturbance; and, secondly, that 
female insanity continued to be largely concealed in the domestic sphere or codified under a 
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different key (i.e. unruliness). So long as the codification of madness in Tuscan society was 
profoundly intermingled with property and financial behaviour, it constituted an affliction 
which predominantly attacked men. Furthermore, precisely because women were by nature 
and law shielded from its effects, they were positioned as the interim heads of family and 
entrusted with the responsibility of reintroducing the lost rationality to the household.       
  The virtual absence of female insanity in the records is partly amended when we turn 
to medical records. One of the most successful medical genres of the century, the Consulti 
Medici, recorded abundant cases of women suffering from the female mental affliction of the 
century, hysteria.408 Men also suffered in at least an equal proportion from other nervous or 
mental afflictions according to the contemporary medical language, but the frequency with 
which patients (or medical practitioners acting in their name) consulted on the mental 
afflictions of women is evidently at odds with their rare appearance at inquiries into mental 
capacity. Similarly, the examination of the admission records of Santa Dorotea, the Tuscan 
mental hospital, suggests that women were increasingly being confined during the eighteenth 
century. If between 1647 and 1749 women represented a minority of the patients admitted to 
the hospital, the numbers tended to even out during the second half of the century.409  
However, the aforementioned female visibility in Santa Dorotea Hospital from the 
second half of the eighteenth century is not necessarily representative, particularly when we 
take into account that only the raving mad (pazzi furiosi) were admitted to the institution. This 
means, as explained in the previous chapters, that only those men and women considered a 
serious danger either to themselves or to society were deemed liable for committal. Therefore, 
the type of insanity that emerges from the Santa Dorotea records is the violent type, which in 
women was portrayed particularly in terms of suicidal tendencies, furious fits against their 
relatives and offspring, or dishonesty and sexually-charged wandering through the streets.  
Nonetheless, raving madness (the pazzo furioso, or the maniaco) was not the only kind 
of insanity eighteenth-century families had to deal with, nor was it the only category that can 
be found in social language denoting mental disturbance. Given that only a minority of those 
regarded as insane were confined, the records of Santa Dorotea should be taken as the 
uncommon side of madness. For this reason, even if restricted to the wealthy classes and 
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unrepresentative in terms of gender, interdictions open the spectrum towards the more 
common side of insanity, the one that was largely at home. Interdiction procedures, and the 
legal space provided by the Magistrato dei Pupilli are a useful entry point into the social 
language of madness outside the walls of mental institutions, as we saw in the previous 
chapters, even if they focus predominantly on male mental incapacity. First and foremost 
because they do shed light on female insanity by their contrast, and because they position 
women in the role traditionally ascribed to men.  
 
4. 1. Madness and Gender 
Michael MacDonald’s Mystical Bedlam opened the analysis towards gender 
differences in the history of madness, for Napier’s casebook recorded more women than men 
as suffering from insanity, sadness or anxiety. Nonetheless, MacDonald was reticent in 
concluding that psychological disturbances were seen as a special characteristic of female 
suffering, preferring explanations such as that women had the habit of consulting physicians, 
or that psychological distress made women more vulnerable than men.410 MacDonald stressed 
that “both in its stereotypes of insanity and in the institutions that certified people as mad, 
Tudor and Stuart society was more concerned about men who fell insane than women.”411 
Although women were regarded as mental weaklings and as the passionate sex, a particular 
connection between women and madness was not made, MacDonald emphasized. “Despite 
the general conviction that women were especially prone to turbulent emotions, most medical 
writers paid surprisingly little attention to their mental maladies.”412 However, he did 
recognize that gender stereotypes influenced the identification of the symptoms of mental 
diseases. Symptoms of mental disturbances were built upon “culturally” expected behaviours 
that tended to see men as active, angry and violent, while women were seen as passive, sad 
and vulnerable.  
In contrast, Elaine Showalter, in an influential study published in 1987, claimed that 
madness towards the end of the eighteenth century had come to be seen as “one of the wrongs 
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of woman,” holding an “essential feminine nature unveiling itself before scientific male 
rationality.” Drawing, for instance, on MacDonald’s study of the records of Richard Napier, 
Showalter considered it to be an indisputable fact that woman outnumbered men among the 
mentally ill before the Victorian era, although she established that the process by which 
madness became a “female malady” was only completed during the nineteenth century.413 
Since the appearance of Showalter’s study, feminist researchers have been searching for the 
origins of the construction of madness as a feminine disturbance. The most important issue 
under examination is if the feminization identified by Showalter at the end of the eighteenth 
century can be transferred to the previous centuries. This quest has produced studies on the 
gendered meanings of lovesickness, the political uses of female melancholy and the feminine 
origins of depression.414     
Interdiction procedures to some extent call into question the assessment made by some 
historians regarding the process of the “feminization” of madness between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.415 Ingram and Faubert, for instance, have claimed that madness was 
regarded as a condition that enhanced feminine characteristics.416 Madmen, from this point of 
view, were thought to have lost their masculine attributes, falling into a feminization of their 
character, being sensibilized by emotions, and weakened by their passions. In eighteenth-
century Tuscany, interdiction procedures were indeed used by the families to control the 
damage caused by men who were acting against the basic paradigms of their masculinity. 
They failed to act with rationality, economy and propriety, manifesting their total incapacity 
to control themselves.  
However, I would advocate caution when ascribing this to a process of the 
feminization of insanity. On the one hand, the evidence suggests that passions and 
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recklessness were not considered by Tuscan families as exclusively feminine characteristics, 
and men falling into mental incapacity were not labelled as effeminate. To be overwhelmed 
by one’s passions was identified as a symptom of both male and female mental disturbance, 
as later chapters will show, and this was not thought to affect their masculinity or femininity. 
The overwhelming number of men interdicted during the eighteenth century who were 
described as manifesting a wide range of emotional disturbances suggests that emotional 
suffering was not considered an exclusive prerogative of women.417  
Furthermore, madness was certainly not limited only to passionate behaviour, and 
female insanity was not necessarily thought to be an exacerbation of feminine characteristics. 
Emotional disturbances, and mental afflictions in general were believed to seriously hamper a 
person’s daily performance and, in this sense, they prevented them from fulfilling their 
gendered duties. Both men and women, when deemed insane, were thought to be a distorted 
image of their genders, but in my view they were not considered to have lost their gendered 
qualities in the process. Likewise, neither did it imply an interchange of gender qualities 
either, nor the exacerbation of only one of them. 
The particular context illuminated by the Magistrato dei Pupilli serves to challenge the 
conception of insanity as naturally female. It is telling, for example, that women were placed 
in a “masculine” position when appointed administrators of their “irrational” husband’s or 
son’s patrimonies. If women were indeed deemed as naturally insane or tending naturally to 
madness, why put them in this evidently “rational” position? Based on these arguments, I 
suggest that insane women are absent from the records not because their insanity was deemed 
natural and constitutional in such a way that it simply did not require that any external 
measures be taken to deal with it. Rather, their mental afflictions were less recorded because 
it was easier to control and hide them through different methods (monasteries, for one), and, 
especially, because their madness did not disturb family life as male madness did. For this 
reason, I believe that we must take into account how, and when, female madness appears in 
the records. 
 
                                                




4. 2. Women and Interdictions 
Despite the Tuscan patriarchal inheritance system, women were also interdicted and 
submitted to the Magistrato dei Pupilli. Nonetheless, as one might suppose, female cases were 
rare. Between 1700 and 1775, I found only 28 female interdictions, which, when compared to 
the 599 male interdictions issued in the period, is certainly a reduced number. However, even 
if they are rare, they are of value in exploring some of the meanings ascribed to female mental 
incapacity.  
We know that the primary purpose of interdictions was to respond to the dangers of 
economic mismanagement caused by mental incapacity, regardless of the defendant’s gender. 
Consequently, we can assert that women were interdicted because they were deemed to be 
mismanaging their patrimony. Nonetheless, behind this primary reason we find different 
typologies codified behind the notion of economic mismanagement, connected to the reasons 
that motivated the petitioners to request the interdiction. As was the case with men, women 
appear in the records when, for some reason, the family order and stability had been 
disturbed. This imbalance could be produced by shifts in the distribution of family powers, 
like the death of a member, the marriage of another, or a change in the alliance between 
another two. This could produce shifts in the ownership of the patrimony, or change the living 
situation of the household. But, we must keep in mind that the model examined regarding 
men also applies here: the decision to interdict a family member was not directly conditioned 
by the shifts in property ownership. In other words, women were not interdicted only because 
they had recently inherited.  
Madness is known to us because something had changed, a change that does not 
necessarily coincide with the first manifestation of the mental disturbance recorded. As we 
have seen, people could be interdicted, or confined, after having been mad for years. Families 
turned to the authorities for help when the behaviour of the alleged insane had reached a 
turning point, whether because of this change in the balance of the family, or because the 
derangement in itself had become aggravated, placing the family at risk. In the particular case 
of women, their mental derangement appears when some external factor had placed them 
outside the range of masculine authority: the death of their father, the refusal to marry, the 
abandonment of their husband, widowhood.  
Consequently, female mental incapacity also appears as tightly connected to the 
female lifecycle. Scholars have pointed out the extent to which cultural values shaped the 




menopause. Furthermore, the cultural concerns over specific stages of a woman’s life were 
strongly connected to their role and position in the family: daughter, wife, mother, widow.418 
For the same reason, the stages of a woman’s life were usually represented according to men, 
contingent upon their relation to these men. Accordingly, descriptions of women interdicted 
and submitted to the authority of the Pupilli changed according to their position within the 
family and their age. They were never young, although in some cases we know they must 
have been under the age of fifty (given that they are said to have small children).419 But, in 
most cases they are defined as of an advanced age and, furthermore, as widows or spinsters of 
an advanced age. Closely related to the women’s position in the family and their ages, 
petitions were made by their sons, their marriage kin, or whoever had inheritance rights over 
the patrimony they were thought to be mismanaging.  
 
Female Dementia: the Consequences of Old Age 
The first important characteristic of the female interdiction procedure is that 
prodigality is an almost absent category, and that most cases were decreed either on the 
grounds of dementia, or without recording the category. We find cases when the interdicted 
woman was openly defined as “deprived of capacity and intellect,”420 “mentecatta” 
(foolish),421 suffering a “defect of memory”,422 incapacitated by her “imbecility of mind and 
little cognition”423 or directly said to be demented, with no further information.424 Within the 
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category of dementia, we also have women who were said to have suffered from apoplectic or 
epileptic fits that rendered them of unsound mind. But, what did demenza amount to with 
regard to women? Did gender make a difference?  
Margherita Bellini was interdicted on account of her dementia after a petition sent by 
her sister in August 1757.425 Although we know she had been committed to Santa Dorotea 
Hospital on her brother’s request in 1751, no reference was made to her committal. A 
comparison between both petitions sheds light on the extent to which the woman’s situation 
in the family, and the aims motivating the petitioners to resort to a public intervention marked 
the vocabulary employed. In the confinement petition, Margherita’s brother explained that she 
was an unmarried woman of 62 years of age who for 16 years had been “severely injured in 
the mind with frequent maniacal insults, and her illness has turned increasingly worse, with 
furious fits, which are of [the kind of] strangling herself, throwing herself into the well or out 
of a window, escaping or similar things.”426 By then she was living with her brother, and his 
petition in fact resulted from his unwillingness or inability to continue taking care of the 
perturbed Margherita. In contrast, the interdiction petition sent six years later by her sister 
made no allusion either to her situation at Santa Dorotea, nor to her maniacal insults and 
furious fits. The vocabulary used was so plain that it was strictly limited to the most 
elementary requirements. It declared that Margherita was “demented” and, as such, 
“incapable of managing and administrating her things.”427 The interdiction petition made by 
the sister was prompted by her particular concern over the patrimony they both shared.  
In a similar manner, the 55-year-old Maria Maddalena Scardigli was interdicted after a 
petition sent by her cognate nephews, who declared that their spinster aunt possessed a small 
house (casetta) from which “out of her dementia and madness [she] had dissipated all the 
furniture it had” because she could not manage her affairs.428 She could not earn her living, 
they added, and had reduced herself to poverty. The testimonies provided to support the 
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nephews’ petition confirmed the woman’s lack of reasoning faculties and madness, stressing 
the fact that she was alone, and as such, was in desperate need of protection and help.  
This last issue connects us with the usually hidden destinies of women suffering from 
mental disorders in the early modern period. It can be said that we know of her madness 
precisely because she lacked family networks to take care of her, as in the situation of 
Margherita Bellini examined above. Only that in this case the petitioners sought to prevent 
Maria Maddalena Scardigli from completely dissipating what was left of her resources, so 
that they could continue to provide for her living. In other words, the nephews sought to avoid 
the case of being legally forced to maintain her, as would probably happen in the eventuality 
that she “succeeded” in ruining herself.  
Both these women had reached old age, a change in the life cycle entailing new social 
consequences. Furthermore, contrary to what can be observed in the case of old men, women 
denounced for mental incapacity were generally singled out as defenceless and in need of 
protection. In fact, the records of the Pupilli show many cases of women alone, whether 
spinsters or widows with no resources to maintain themselves, requesting protection from the 
Magistracy.429 The standard procedure was to legally force their kinsmen (marriage kinsmen 
in case they had been married and had produced offspring) to provide for their needs.  
Thus we are confronted with the issue of how and when cases of female insanity were 
made known, which in turn shaped the way the mental disorder was portrayed. In fact, old age 
accounts for the majority of interdicted women, combined with the death of a relative, the 
need to provide care for them or familial controversies over their inheritance. And so the fact 
that they were old, usually alone or with grown-up children, marked profoundly the narratives 
of female mental incapacity.  
Old age, as we saw in the previous chapters, was thought to compromise a person’s 
mental faculties, producing a progressive mental decay that ultimately rendered them 
“completely incapable of being able to discern between useful things and harmful things.”430 
The consequences ascribed to female old age present an important difference. While in the 
case of elderly men the inheritance line was predetermined, in the case of women it could go 
where she decided. Consequently, in interdiction requests involving old women we can 
observe a recurring concern for the future of their inheritance. Maria Cassandra Langieri, for 
                                                
429 Groppi, Il welfare prima del welfare. 
430 “età assai avanzata, e di mente non sana, e di tutto incapace a potere discernere le cose utili dalle dannose.” 
Interdiction of Anna Maria Farsi widow of Frangioni, of “advanced age”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 




example was interdicted in July 1748 when she was in her 80s, because, according to “some 
relatives”, in her advanced age she had given signs that she was not able to manage her affairs 
and, furthermore, that she could be the victim of insidious comments regarding how she 
would dispose of her patrimony. In other words, the ultimate reason of the petitioners was to 
prevent her from making any undesirable transfers of property or making a testament contrary 
to their interests.431 
Interdiction petitions were elicited by specific circumstances, which sometimes went 
beyond the disordered behaviour that they denounced. In this sense, when the denounced 
woman was said to be old, plaintiffs would refer not only to her incapacity to manage her 
affairs, but also to the need to prevent the woman from making her last will. As in the male 
cases, the issue of the last will, or the possibility of selling or giving away assets, was raised 
when the family conflicts led the relatives to believe that the individual could distort the rules 
of inheritance. When they were women, and particularly when they were spinsters, the line of 
inheritance was not as clear as in the case of men, and to that the plaintiffs added the 
circumstance of her being of unsound mind.   
Such was the case of Maria Maddalena Panfi, interdicted in 1743 because she had 
suffered some “corporal indispositions” and had lately had more “accidents” (we know they 
were epileptic attacks) which had rendered her “mentally obfuscated, and absent of 
memory.”432 The petition was requested, nonetheless, due to her sons’ fear that she would 
make a testament contrary to their interests, because some “little differences” had lately 
emerged between mother and sons. Beyond the interdiction, the petitioners wanted to prevent 
her from making her testament at all costs, so that she “could not proceed to any act, whether 
upon the living, or by causa mortis without the consent and approval of a legal person.”433 
Not only were male petitioners concerned for the inheritance of old women, but this 
was in fact a great preoccupation of their daughters too. In these cases the loneliness of 
widowhood in old age is combined with the growing emotional instability that was usually 
thought to accompany one’s last days.434 As with any other interdiction procedure, the attempt 
to interdict an old mother or an old aunt was the last resort taken to solve a growing relational 
                                                
431 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 48, July 1748. 
432 “…quale per le sue indisposizioni corporali, et in specie per avere il di 28 Agosto 1743 prossimo passato 
sofferto più accidenti, si ritrova con qualche offuscazione di mente, e priva di memoria.” ASF, MPAP, 
Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 201, September 1743.  
433 “…non possa procedere ad atto alcuno, o sia inter vivos, o sia causa mortis senza il consenso, et 
approvazione di qualche persona legale…”. Idem.  




conflict. This can be observed in the interdiction of the 78-year-old Maria Eleonora Faraoni, a 
widow denounced in 1750 by her three daughters, because at her “decrepit age” she lacked 
the necessary “clarity of cognition and capacity to dispose of her affairs.”435 The petition 
stemmed from the daughters’ apprehension that their mother would make an unconventional 
will, so they specifically requested for Maria Eleonora to be forbidden to make any final 
disposition regarding her patrimony without the approval of an officer of the Pupilli. The 
Consulta argued that so long as Maria Eleonora Faraoni did not suffer from “imbecility of 
mind”, nor had the “reprehensible vice of prodigality”, there were no grounds for prohibiting 
her the free disposition of her possessions.   
Maria Eleanora’s daughters petitioned again in 1753, arguing this time that their old 
mother was “consuming what remained of her life and her limited resources” in long-lasting 
suits against them, influenced, they suspected, by ill-intentioned domestic servants, who 
“joined to her passions”, and exacerbated her enmity towards her daughters.436 By doing so, 
according to the daughters, the domestic servants hoped to take advantage of Maria Eleonora 
and profit from her weakness. The response of the Pupilli was to try to reach a friendly 
solution between the two sides, respecting on the one hand Maria Eleonora’s request to rescue 
her dowry, and on the other, the daughters’ petition to protect Maria Eleonora from the abuses 
of her servants. After they mutually agreed to resolve their differences through a neutral 
arbiter appointed by the Pupilli, the case ceases to appear in the records, most likely due to the 
probable death of the 80-year-old Maria Eleonora.  
Interdiction procedures do not shed light on the unproblematic experience of old age, 
which we cannot assume did not exist, but they are revealing about those cases where the 
lives of the elderly had become problematic for those surrounding them. We should therefore 
bear in mind that not all of the elderly deemed mentally incapacitated were condemned to 
having an interdict against them. What I wish to highlight here is that their mental 
derangement was made public because of a circumstantial reason. This applies to any 
institutional or judicial space in which madness was recorded, regardless of the age of the 
sufferer. As, for example, with the insane mother of two underage daughters who, after her 
husband’s death, abandoned them. We only know of her existence because the girls needed 
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capacità di disporre delle cose sue.” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 209, September 1750. 
436 “va consumando il resto della vita e le poche sostanze in detti litigi, che dubitano venghino fomentati da 
persone domestiche, che uniformandosi alle passioni della medesima, procurano per tale strada farsi merito per 




somewhere to live.437 Or, the old woman over whose inheritance her nephew and niece were 
fighting. Whoever was to be held the legal inheritor, was to be in charge of the old lady, 
mentally incapacitated in her advanced age (she was said to be barbogia).438 Or, to give a last 
example, the daughter who petitioned for her half-brother to provide economically for the 
care of their old and foolish (melensa) mother.439    
When referring to women interdicted on the grounds of their advanced age, we should 
not imagine only a defenceless old woman being taken advantage of, and consequently in 
need of protection. They were also depicted as rebellious, as were the interdicted old men. In 
fact, rebelliousness was a reason for petitioning for a relative’s interdiction. Here, as with the 
other categories, the level of recognized mental derangement or the open identification of 
mental disturbance to explain the odd behaviour observed in these women also deserves 
discussion.  
In April 1734 the widow Ottavia Margherita Almeni was interdicted after a request 
sent by her only son, the Cavaliere Lorenzo Poltri. In the petition, Poltri declared her 
incapable of managing her affairs “due to her age and the prejudices she occasioned.”440 One 
year later, Ottavia petitioned for her release claiming that she had been unfairly declared 
incompetent by her son and other “malevolent” relatives. The petition had been written, she 
argued, only to prevent her from compensating some creditors and, above all, for marrying for 
a third time.441 Contrary to what her son had denounced, Ottavia assured the Pupilli that the 
wisdom (saviezza) and economy by which she managed her own affairs were well known, 
and the interdiction therefore was only acting against her interests, causing more financial 
damage than what it was supposed to prevent.442  
                                                
437 ASF, Fanciulle Abbandonate di Santa Maria e di San Niccolò dette “Del Ceppo”, F. 4, no. 62, June 1610. 
They were consequently sent to the Monastery of the Fanciulle del Ceppo. In her insane state, the woman had 
left the matrimonial home to live with her brothers, abandoning her daughters. Although the episode dates back 
to a century before the period under concern here, I think it can be perfectly applied to the eighteenth century. 
The Conservatory of Santa Maria e San Niccolò del Ceppo was founded in response to the danger of prostitution 
for abandoned women. On its foundations and organization, and on other charity institutions for abandoned 
women in Florence, see Philip Gavitt, Gender, Honor, and Charity in Late Renaissance Florence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 171-177 and passim, and Lombardi, Povertà Maschile, povertà 
Femminile.  
438 ASF, Fanciulle Abbandonate di Santa Maria…, F. 2, N. 34, 1659. While the legal procedure was unsolved, 
she was sent to the Fanciulle del Ceppo.   
439 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 71, November 1748. 
440 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 440, April 1734.  
441 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 482, April 1735. 
442 She referred here to the different payments that had to be paid both to the Pupilli and to the administrator 




From the inquest carried out by the Pupilli to investigate her petition we know that she 
was a 64-year-old widow who had been married twice, and who wanted to stop being a 
widow by marrying, for a third time, a young cadet. According to her son Poltri, who sent a 
written testimony to contradict Ottavia’s version, it was because of her lack of economy and 
the “love that entered her head”,443 that she had dissipated half of her patrimony, following 
her lover throughout the Italian peninsula and spending enormous amounts on the cadet’s 
encouragement. Poltri even added that the young cadet was inducing Ottavia to sell all her 
assets and leave Tuscany so as to marry him in Naples.  
To prevent the marriage, prevent her ruin and prevent the eventuality “of being forced, 
driven by honour and justice, to feed and maintain her after she had dissipated everything”, 
Poltri, with the support of other relatives, had petitioned for the interdiction one year 
before.444 By doing so he had intended to guarantee for his mother that she be able to live 
with due decorum, his testimony asserted. In fact, he explicitly said that with the interdiction 
he had not sought to deprive Ottavia of her right over her patrimony, which was indeed also 
his right-to-be, but only to protect her, and avoid her ruin.445 If he had wanted to take away 
her patrimony, Poltri explained, he would have “rightfully” done it already, but that would 
have left her without the possibility of living with due decorum and honour.  
Because the Pupilli backed the son, and considered Ottavia Almeni to be a woman of 
reprehensible conduct and unstable character (inquieta), the interdiction was not lifted until 
10 months later, when a decree released her from the interdiction, but left her nonetheless 
subject to the supervision of the Auditore Giacomo Conti, from the Magistrato Supremo.446 
Why the state came to this solution we do not know, but what seems clear is that she did not 
marry the object of her affections, and probably chose to continue managing her affairs 
herself rather than follow her passion. Suggesting what made her disordered in the eyes of the 
authorities, the Pupilli officers noted her strong character, and described her as a woman 
difficult to calm and hard to convince.447   
                                                
443 “dependuto [sic] della sua poca economia, e da gl’amori, che gli sono entrati in testa di volersi rimaritare a 
un giovine cadetto in età di sopra 64 anni e da questi amori è dependuto, che ella ha dissipato la metà del suo 
patrimonio”, Ibid, testimony sent by the Cavaliere Lorenzo Poltri (Ottavia’s son from her first marriage) to the 
Pupilli.  
444 “...per non mi avere a trovare ad essere obbligato a titolo d’onore, e di giustizia a darli gl’alimenti, e 
mantenerla dopo averà [sic] dissipato in tutto”, Idem.  
445 In so saying, Lorenzo Poltri wanted to ensure the Pupilli that his petition was not driven by a personal 
interest, claiming that he would content himself with inheriting whatever would be left after Ottavia’s death.  
446 The liberation decree is in ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 499, February 1735/36. 




Her traces appear on two further occasions after the said release from interdiction, 
relating in both instances to her economic affairs and pointing to her willingness to participate 
and take full action in matters that concerned her, despite the efforts made by her son to take 
control.448 Finally, we have a last notice of her existence in 1749, when Lorenzo Poltri 
petitioned to secure some jewellery, silver and furniture because his mother had recently 
suffered what was called an “apoplectic accident.” At 79 years of age, “the accident had 
rendered her”, in the son’s words, “deprived of mind, and speaking.”449  
If we follow the same logic as shown in the better documented male interdiction 
procedures, we can infer that, although the word demente was never used to characterize 
Ottavia Almeni except at the very end of her life, she was nevertheless deemed mentally 
disturbed and indeed irrational by her relatives. Her head was thought to have been taken, 
perturbed by her passions, which drove her to distort the social order and gendered 
hierarchies.  
It is also telling that it was assumed by the men involved in the case (her son and 
agnates, her administrator, the officers of the Pupilli) that due to the age difference and the 
lower social origin of Ottavia’s lover, he just wanted to take advantage of her. A young man 
would only be perceived as taking advantage of an older woman in situations like this, 
especially because of the difference in rank. To this we have to add that it was said that her 
head had been captured by this amorous affection, as if love had obscured her rational 
faculties, rendering her, in fact, insane. It is true that the actual image of love being the 
symptom and the cause of her insanity was not used in the narratives that portrayed Ottavia’s 
disorder, but it is also true that the story is reminiscent of the conceptualization of 
“lovesickness” as represented in eighteenth-century medical and lay literature, which was to 
become a psychiatric category in the nineteenth century.  
For instance, in 1772 a certain Antonia Perini who was committed to Santa Dorotea 
was said to suffer from amorous madness (pazzia amorosa), that is, it was understood that her 
insanity stemmed from her love fixation.450 A tendency for exacerbated passions was in fact 
at the core of the medical conceptualization of hysteria, where passionate affections to the 
point of fixation was one among the various emotional disturbances that could overwhelm the 
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449 “…sua madre alle settimane passate fù sorpresa da un Accidente apopletico, per ragione di cui rimase priva 
di mente, e di favella”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 116, July 1749. 




mind and irritate the nervous system to produce a mental breakdown. Ottavia Almeni had not 
been described using any of these terms and yet the reference to her unconventional amorous 
affection for a younger and lower-born man points in that direction. 
Love could obscure women’s rational faculties, leading them to act not only 
improperly with regards to their virtue, but also to wrongly spend part of their patrimony to 
satisfy their lover. A “disordered passion” (sregolata passione) could dazzle (leaving her 
acciecata) a woman, particularly when she was a lonely widow, making her spend substantial 
amounts on gifts of goods and money.451 However, the pernicious effect of passions such as 
love, and particularly unrequited love, could equally affect both sexes. Following recent 
studies that have questioned the allegedly gendered origins of lovesickness, interdiction 
procedures in this sense once again call into question this traditional approach.452  
Interdicted men of all ages, but particularly those of young or advanced age, are 
frequently portrayed as the helpless victims of disordered amorous affections. The interesting 
thing is the different key assumed by the objections to the passionate affections of the elderly. 
Falling in love late in life, and being openly driven by amorous affections could also be 
singled out as evidence of both male and female mental incapacity. Deeply entrenched in the 
expectations about proper behavior according to the stages of life, “lecherous old men and 
women were the butt of jokes and attacks in many literary sources.”453 Old age passions were 
considered as being against the laws of nature, and lustful tendencies in old men and women 
were seen as a form of madness, following a tradition that can be traced back to antiquity.454 
Accordingly, love affairs and late remarriage (mostly of men in this case) were used as 
arguments for the interdiction of an elderly parent.  
Lovesickness was certainly not constrained to the elderly, but when it affected them 
the explanations and meanings given were tied to age. Their advanced age was seen as a 
weakening force that rendered them helpless to the effects of these improper feelings. The 
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453 Ottaway, The Decline of Life, p. 31.  
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frailty generated by age made their minds fertile ground for the development of a mental 
derangement caused, in this case, by an intense passion. Similarly, precisely because this 
amorous affection manifested in old age, it was used as further proof of its oddness, making it 
at the same time utterly improper.   
 
The Difficult Personalities Concealed Behind Dissipation 
Although women were also interdicted because they were thought to be dissipating 
their patrimony, their squandering is hardly ever framed in terms of “prodigality” – the 
exception being the case just examined. For instance, Francesca Celli was denounced by her 
brother-in-law for dissipating her dead husband’s patrimony with the help of her sister. The 
accusation was that she dissipated because she spent it to her own advantage so that she could 
remarry “with all commodities.”455 The interesting thing is that women were thought to be 
perfectly capable of squandering, and even to be the cause of their husband’s prodigality, only 
that in their case the label was generally not applied.456 The new characteristics of eighteenth-
century sociability, with its increasing expenses, also resulted in women spending above their 
means, even when they were not the direct holders of the assets. In aristocratic circles in 
particular, within the context of the new relationships that have been studied by Roberto 
Bizzocchi, women were often at the centre of criticism for their excessive expenditures and 
loose morality. For instance, in 1747 a woman was sent to a conservatory for disordered 
women (the Conservatorio dei Mendicanti), because her excessive attachment for her cicisbei 
pushed her into improper public manifestations of affection and spending on exceedingly 
expensive gifts, demonstrating her “bad employment of money” (pessimo uso del danaro).457   
However, dissipation in the case of women also served as a target for criticism 
regarding certain characteristics in these women’s personalities, which suggests how their 
mental faculties were conceived. Dissipation concealed other “bad practices” that were not 
only related to an excess of liberty and loose morality in the public world, but foremost 
denoted a disturbed disposition. The characteristics and perception of the levels of mental 
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disorder manifested in the denounced behaviour are to be found in scattered details, in 
expressions and descriptions that, without really intending to, reveal cultural notions of what 
female unsoundness of mind constituted.  
Caterina del Pugliese was interdicted together with her husband Lorenzo Buonaccorsi 
Perini in October 1764.458 Their interdiction resulted from creditors’ pressure over both their 
patrimonies, which were said to have been reduced to a miserable state. In this case, the 
interdiction was issued both to protect the family and to respond to the creditor’s demands, 
and consequently no category other than “dissipater” was needed to issue the sentence. 
Nonetheless, we know that Lorenzo Buonaccorsi suffered from “nervous affections”, while, 
as Caterina herself said years later when petitioning for her release, she felt she had been 
treated as if she was “a person without reason or prudence.”459 Her sentiment was aggravated 
by the fact that she had not only been deprived of her administration rights, but her children 
were also taken away from her so that they could receive a better education.  
Although in Caterina’s interdiction procedure no allusion was made to her mental 
faculties, nor to her behaviour besides the mismanagement of her patrimony, the development 
of her case exposes a far more complicated picture. She strongly resisted the interdiction 
decree, issuing a series of infructuous petitions to be released from what she called her 
“ignominious submission.”460 Her rebellion and need to control her affairs was so strong that 
she repeatedly confronted her administrator and the Pupilli’s authority. She continued to 
manage her affairs, making contracts and monetary transactions forbidden for those under 
interdiction, “considering herself a free proprietor [libera padrona].”461 She went so far as to 
hide the key of one of her villas to prevent the Pupilli from selling the furniture. Violating a 
direct command from the Pupilli, she even went to rescue some furniture and household 
effects with one of her sons at another of her villas, which were confiscated by the Pupilli to 
be sold at the public auction to pay the family debts.462 Her troublesome personality and her 
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459 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 140, December 1764 and F. 2307, no. 20, May 1767, for Caterina del 
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461 Report signed by her administrator, where he declares himself incompetent to put Caterina under control. 
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462 “passando sopra ogni rispetto dovuto agli ordini sovrani, si portò verso la fine di settembre insieme col 
figliolo maggiore Niccolò Buonaccorsi alla Villa di Giogoli, dove erano custoditi sotto sigillo una buona 




inability to follow the norms imposed by state officers resemble the situation seen in 
prodigals and demented men, showing that economic mismanagement by itself did not suffice 
for an interdiction sentence. Caterina Pugliese’s deviance had in fact started early. We know 
that in her youth, while still secluded in a Convent for her education, she was involved in a 
curious matrimonial affair, when the news reached the Consulta that she had promised herself 
in matrimony to two men at the same time. One of them was a promise secretly signed 
without her parents’ consent, while the other had been arranged by her relatives, engaging her 
to marry the man who was to become her future husband, Lorenzo Buonaccorsi Perini.463  
Contrary to the case just examined, those women interdicted and submitted to the 
Magistrato dei Pupilli were generally under no direct masculine authority and, consequently, 
they were thought to be defenceless against deception. This defenceless state was deemed 
particularly harmful because they were in a position to squander, being direct holders of the 
family patrimony. They were under no scrutiny or supervision, something the interdiction was 
designed to provide.464 
The interdicted women were portrayed as the opposite of the numerous women who 
were appointed administrators to their sons’ or husbands’ patrimonies. In this sense, there is a 
clear opposition between the rational and independent role played by women as guardians of 
their children and husbands and their being held as the core of the normative and disciplining 
efforts focused in interdiction procedures. Although the image presented by female 
interdiction procedures cannot be taken to be the rule, given their small number, they do 
speak of the danger women alone posed to society. For, even when women were nominated 
guardians of their underage children or administrators of their husbands or children’s 
patrimonies, they were usually not alone. Although they were the preferred interlocutors of 
the Pupilli, and they were ascribed a leading role in the restoration of the familial disorder 
produced by male mental incapacity, they could usually count upon the support (and 
supervision) of their kin.465 
                                                
463 The affair was entrusted to the hands of the Auditore Fiscale Filippo Luci. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 754, no. 6, 
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464 For example, Isabella Franceschi, widow of Rucellai Ricasoli, was said to need the close scrutiny and control 
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Women denounced for mental incapacity were thought to need the assistance of a man 
to behave properly and manage their economic affairs. In general they are said to have been 
under the direction or supervision of a man (if they were widows or spinsters who had long 
been the direct holders of a patrimony, this could be a brother or a son), whose recent death 
had left them defenceless and totally vulnerable to the possibility of people taking advantage 
of them. This was the case of Lisabetta Miralda Gaci, interdicted in November 1730 because 
of her “little conduct, judgment and stability.”466 Until then, she had been under the 
supervision of Giuseppe, her priest brother, but because he had recently passed away, 
Lisabetta was unsupervised. According to the plaintiffs, who happened to be her future 
inheritors, since she completely lacked the capacity to manage her affairs, she could be the 
victim of fraud by the people surrounding her. But, it was not only her weakness that rendered 
her liable to an interdiction. She was considered to be defenceless because she was thought to 
lack the necessary judgment (in the sense of diminished intellect), but also because of her 
supposedly improper behaviour, details of which were not given. But, most of all, she was 
said to be unstable, to lack stability. In 1730, and in the context of a female interdiction, it 
was not necessary to go into further details on the nature of such instability (mental, 
emotional, behavioural, we do not know). Nonetheless, from the rest of the cases appearing in 
the Magistrato dei Pupilli, instability, or recklessness, was a typology very much present in 
interdiction procedures, which pointed to the incapacity to control one’s mind and emotions.  
 
Flexible Definitions 
Categories of mental incapacity were also flexible when applied to describe women. 
To examine this it may be useful to investigate the case of Maria Francesca Paoli del Feo, 
interdicted twice on account of a mental disorder that was never precisely nor definitively 
defined. She was first interdicted in 1751 and then once again in 1755, both times at the 
request of her brother. Maria Francesca Paoli was the mother of 6 children, whom we first 
meet with an absent husband and then as a widow. In her first interdiction she was alternately 
described as in a “state of dementia,” with “imbecility of mind,” and “stupid and foolish 
[stupida e melensa].” In 1754 her interdiction was revoked because her “soundness” had 
                                                                                                                                                   
the powerful and, most of all, rational one. See Fisher, “The State as Surrogate Father” and Calvi, Il contratto 
morale. 
466 “...poca condotta, giudizio, e stabilità di detta donna…” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 329, 




“returned”, but she was interdicted again in 1755 because she had “relapsed into her 
prodigality.”467 In simpler words, first she was considered demented, then of sound mind, and 
finally prodigal, her case being one of the very few where this last category was applied to a 
woman.  
Maria Francesca Paoli is a perfect example of the extraordinary situation women had 
to be in in order to be interdicted (and thus become known to us). In her case it was not 
because she was a widow or a spinster, as we have seen in previous cases, but a married, yet 
abandoned middle-aged woman (for later developments, we know she was interdicted at the 
age of 35), who was “forced” into a position where she had to play a role that did not suit her. 
Her economic incapacity worsened when she became a widow, forcing a definitive 
intervention of the Pupilli. Moreover, because her brother was a friar of the Servite Order, he 
could neither supervise nor take care of her, making her “emancipated” position even more 
dangerous. Her marriage kin did not participate in the process, and were in fact never 
considered as possible administrators of her patrimony.  
The way her disorder was described by the men acting as supporting witnesses in the 
different stages of her procedure is symptomatic of the “extraordinary” situation she found 
herself in. The first petition for interdiction sent by her brother was supported by two written 
testimonies, each signed by priests who endorsed her interdiction. One stated that Francesca 
Paoli was “frequently and almost always” in a “state of dementia” because of the 
“misfortunes” and “infirmities” she had suffered.468 The other framed it in terms of the “long 
and severe adversities, and great troubles” she had suffered, accompanied by an undefined 
illness.469 As her administrator recalled in 1755, with her husband’s disappearance she had 
been left “without the guidance of any relative that could supervise the administration of her 
resources”, which she had dissipated to the point of reducing her “to wandering the streets, 
almost naked.”470 
According to the clergymen’s testimony, her disorder originated in the experience of 
being abandoned by her husband and left with six children to feed by herself. It is true that 
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because she was left unsupervised she could dissipate her patrimony and thus end up 
interdicted in the first place. But that explains why she ended up in the Pupilli records, not 
how those around her conceived of the nature of her disorder or how they explained its 
causalities. This is where the testimonies given by the two clergymen and the narrative given 
by her appointed administrator become relevant. In the three cases, the emotional element of 
her suffering comes to the fore. As we saw, she was thought to be in a state of dementia 
caused by the severe adversities she had had to endure, of which her husband’s absence was 
crucial. It is revealing that the expression used was that she was “frequently and almost 
always” in a “state of dementia”. That is, she was not deemed at first as irrevocably 
demented, but in a temporal state of dementia induced by her sufferings.     
When described as wandering naked through the streets, Francesca Paoli’s disorder 
meets the common image used to describe madness in the early modern period, as we saw in 
the last chapter. The mad women that were sent to Santa Dorotea in fact frequently fulfilled 
this stereotype. Maria Umiltà Baldi, for example, was committed to Santa Dorotea in January 
1756, because she had “tried to throw out of the window her own children many times, and 
when she could escape from the custody of her husband, and of other household members, 
she began to wander as a vagrant through the streets, half naked, and in that manner she 
entered once into the Church of the fathers of S. Francesco di Paola, while there were many 
people, causing great scandal to everyone.”471 Strikingly, nonetheless, at the same time 
Francesca Paoli was described adopting the same elements that were used to argue for a 
confinement petition, her disorder was framed under prodigality, not dementia. However, if 
we follow her administrator’s narrative, we can confirm that although in the second 
interdiction procedure she was not defined as demente, she was definitely perceived as 
mentally disturbed.   
Although she was not deemed a pazza furiosa, she was described as progressively 
violent. According to her appointed administrator, after the first interdiction in 1751, 
Francesca Paoli had been sent to live with him, so that he could take care of and control her. 
Usually this responsibility was given to the next of kin but, in this case, as her brother was a 
friar in a convent he could not perform this duty and so it was given instead to this “outsider”. 
She went to live there with one of her daughters, while the other one was sent to the 
Conservatorio dei Mendicanti. Two years after the interdiction, Francesca started to 
                                                




demonstrate signs of better behaviour. As he considered she was acting more wisely, her 
administrator entertained the possibility of the interdiction being revoked.472 In fact, her 
liberation was granted after a petition signed by her brother who, following the 
administrator’s advice, claimed that Francesca was completely sound of mind, as to be “able 
to give any kind of advice.”473 Her soundness of mind would not last for long, however. 
After her interdiction was revoked, the administrator remained as her supervisor and 
procurator, to assist Francesca in the management of her affairs. But according to the 
administrator, once she “felt free from the submission to the Magistrato [dei Pupilli]”, she 
“started to interfere with his appointed duty with mistreatments and insufferable insults.”474 
Her aggressive behaviour made him and his wife leave the house they all still shared, forcing 
him even to turn to the Auditore Fiscale for a warrant to expel her. Francesca’s rebelliousness, 
violence and uneasiness made her intolerable to everyone surrounding her. Neither her 
mother, nor her friar brother were willing to receive her and take care of her, until she finally 
moved to a countryside villa that she owned, where she continued to disturb those 
surrounding her. She was later said to be seen wandering around wearing indecent clothes, 
and a few years later she was involved in an obscure marriage proposal. Still subjected to her 
disordered mind, on that occasion, the authorities explained her involvement as coming out of 
her instability (leggerezza), for she did not seem “of a mind completely healthy” (non mi è 
parsa di mente del tutto sana).475 We finally meet her in 1765, when her daughter petitioned 
the Auditore Fiscale to be spared from the ignominy that her mother, dressed indecently and 
permanently drunk, caused her.476 
Francesca Paoli del Feo’s story is interesting on many levels. For one, it depicts the 
evolution of a mental disorder over a large timespan, picturing her at different points of her 
life over almost 15 years. It also demonstrates how labels of mental incapacity were also 
flexible when applied to women, so that they could adapt to the changing circumstances. 
Finally, it illuminates on some level what had to happen in order for a woman to appear in the 
records. Francesca was more-or-less alone, as her brother’s monastic life left her without 
social networks. She had offspring, but we are told that they were also unwilling to assume 
her care. In this sense, her final appearances in the records are very similar to the story of 
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Lorenzo Baldinotti, and indeed, to the stories of most of the interdicted who repeatedly appear 
in the different legal spaces provided by the Tuscan administration to solve the problem posed 
by the insane. In many cases, the eighteenth-century interdiction procedures and the 
contemporary institutional records show families at a breaking point but then being able to 
recompose through the intervention of the authorities, and thus the cases cease to appear. But, 
in certain other cases we see the same names reappearing at different times and in different 
legal spaces. This leads me to suggest, as I will argue in the next chapter, both that families 
moved from one provision to the next, sometimes simultaneously, in their efforts to resolve 
the problems posed by madness, and that any available mechanism was by definition 
temporary, producing what I have called the itineraries of madness.   
 
4. 3. Female Madness beyond Interdiction: the Spaces of Women 
If interdiction procedures predominantly affected men, where can we find the women 
who suffered, or were deemed to suffer, from mental disturbances? How can we bypass this 
institutional and constitutional silence? And, why do madwomen appear less than madmen in 
the eighteenth-century records? What explains this silence over the existence and 
characteristics of female insanity? It is certainly not a matter of prevalence (i.e. that men were 
biologically more prone to insanity than women), but has instead to do with the social role of 
women, on the one hand, and with the problems posed by insanity, on the other. The most 
obvious answer is that, as interdiction procedures were bound to the existence of a property 
over which the individual had ownership rights, there was simply no need to interdict most 
women in Tuscany. So long as women were excluded from the inheritance system (beyond 
their dowry), irrational and irresponsible actions committed by women did not have the 
damaging economic effects of those perpetrated by men. In fact, for the most part, women had 
no patrimony of their own to squander. But there is more.  
We know that men deemed mentally incapacitated to manage their own affairs ended 
up interdicted and submitted to the Pupilli. For this itinerary to commence, family members 
had to perceive that something was wrong with their relative, that the individual had deviated 
from the path of normality. However, the “appearance” of mad people in the records is not 
necessarily conditioned or governed by the development of the mental disorder in itself, as I 
have argued. In other words, something had to occur for the family to turn to state 




dynamics, and dependant upon the fluctuations of relational conflicts. Against this 
background, we could hypothesize that female insanity did not provoke the same disorder in 
family life that mad men did. Mad women could be taken care of, controlled, neutralized, and 
therefore silenced more easily than mad men, and certainly their economic damage was less 
severe. But, furthermore, female mental disturbances had a different effect on the household 
dynamics than male ones did.  
Consequently, female mental disturbances seem bound to the realm of private life in 
eighteenth-century Tuscany, coming to the surface only in extraordinary cases: widows with 
administrative power over their family patrimony (either by marriage or by inheritance), 
usually at the end of their lives; or suicidal and scandalous women of different ages whose 
families could not control them, or whose families were absent, who ended up in Santa 
Dorotea. Any other encounter with madwomen in the eighteenth century records is more the 
result of a random and accidental discovery by the historian. I will explore some of these 
“accidental” recordings in what follows.  
Defiance of the patriarchal order is a characteristic that we meet in many of the insane 
women described above. Following MacDonald, “although parental authority and 
patriarchalism were neither absolute nor unchallenged, reverence for the hierarchical bonds 
between parents and children and husbands and wives was so strong that it shaped popular 
conceptions of insanity.”477 Nonetheless, were all women who defied parental dispositions, 
such as over who to marry or where to live, or who did not recognize the authority of those 
above them considered mentally disturbed? If we acknowledge that madness was recognized 
as open defiance to social hierarchies, then these women should be included in the category of 
madness, although they were not openly defined as such. For example, young men 
challenging paternal authority were labelled as prodigals and others openly as demented, as I 
showed in the previous chapters. Nonetheless, the line between moral deviance and mental 
disturbance here is difficult to draw. Because it is one thing to say that madness was 
recognized in acts of rebellion against patriarchalism, and a different thing to assert that 
rebellion was always seen as a kind of madness.  
This is not to say that female insanity was exclusively seen as an act of rebellion. As 
happens in the case of men, defiance and rebellion can be singled out only as the detonating 
factors of the disclosure of madness, as the contingencies that marked its appearance, 
                                                




although this does not mean that women were thought to be insane only when they were 
rebellious. We know that one of the characteristics of family disorders in the eighteenth 
century was the perceived increase in the rebelliousness of young men and women.478 We saw 
that in the case of young men this would result in a petition of interdiction on the grounds of 
prodigality. Prodigality was seen as a distortion of the ideal of the pater familias, due to their 
inability to provide for the economic and moral needs of the family. Squandering, open 
defiance of social hierarchies, from the paternal to the family hierarchy they were supposed to 
lead, were seen as a serious alteration of the masculine prototype. And this alteration, as we 
saw, was conflated with madness in the most intricate ways. Women, in contrast, were hardly 
ever defined as prodigals, because prodigality was, as I showed, an intrinsically masculine 
category. How can we find, then, the equivalent of prodigality in women, if there is any? In 
other words, which category, or for which reasons could families ask for the state’s 
involvement to manage female relatives deemed mentally disturbed, without recourse to the 
legal category of dementia? 
A clue to solving this problem can be found in denunciations of unruly women, whose 
rebelliousness is usually portrayed as a rebellion against marriage or monastic life, the most 
common destinies their gender roles imposed. If we follow the same logic used in previous 
chapters regarding the conflation between prodigality and dementia, we could say that the 
disclosure young, middle-aged and elderly female unruliness was used as a mechanism to 
neutralize and handle the disorders produced by what was increasingly ascribed to the effects 
of a perturbed mind, and altered emotional states. The risk, nonetheless, of asserting that 
madness was identified in an act of rebellion, according to Houston, is that “this argument 
also leans towards the notion that mad acts were voluntary – a protest against social 
conventions – whereas one of the cornerstones of definition for eighteenth-century people 
was that insane behaviour was outwith the control of the sufferer.”479   
Hence, we must be cautious not to assume that acts of rebellion in women were 
necessarily thought to trigger mental derangement, or that every rebellious woman was 
labelled as mad. Nonetheless, the boundaries between unruliness (or deviance in general) and 
madness are in many cases porous. And this precisely because madness was recognized in 
behaviours that were perceived as being at odds with the expected norms. Rebellion, 
consequently, was listed as one of the signs of insanity, whether female or male. The family 
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narratives recorded in the archives of the records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli bear witnesses 
to this.  
Female Life Courses 
The second characteristic of the appearance of madness applies this time more to 
women than to men, and is circumscribed to the spaces where women were destined to be. As 
Gabriella Zarri has pointed out, the monastery and the family were the spaces of confinement 
of female life in medieval and early modern times.480 If female insanity is inevitably tied to 
early modern female spaces, then it is in a direct relationship with the course of a woman’s 
life: marriage, conventual life, spinsterhood; being tied to the economic and social situation of 
their families. Consequently, if we are to elucidate what female madness meant in eighteenth-
century Tuscany, we must enter, first, the realm of the family and, second, that of the convent.   
The course of a woman’s life was a major cause of familial disputes in the eighteenth 
century, with the added novelty of an increasing number of cases where women tried to 
intervene with an active voice over the matters that affected their lives. The possibilities and 
strategies available to women to evade the consequences of patriarchal authority in the 
context of the familial disputes handled by the Magistrato dei Pupilli are a useful starting 
point for examining women’s rebellion through the scope of this study.  
Giulia Calvi has explored the strategies used by women to negotiate the destinies of 
their own lives, particularly their recourse to intermediaries such as the officers of the 
Pupilli.481 Calvi follows women’s capacity for negotiation through the Tuscan seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries, in a development that shows female voices were becoming 
increasingly louder and more self-confident, until they eventually had a say in what had 
previously been their pre-set path in life.482 While the choices of women through their life 
cycle were still confined to the quandaries of patriarchal society (and thus, determined by the 
dowry they could get), we hear voices of women rebelling and negotiating their destinies 
using different strategies.  
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Cases of women who would plead not to be forced into an unwanted marriage, or to 
forced monachization, become increasingly common during the eighteenth century. Voices 
such as that of Caterina Guiducci, who in 1742 defended before the officers of the Pupilli her 
right to choose not to marry and not to take vows, in spite of the pressures exerted by her 
brother-in-law.483 A voice that could hardly be heard in the seventeenth century had become a 
possibility in the eighteenth, when women who refused passively to follow the path designed 
for them by their next of kin are no longer so rare. Some of these features we have already 
seen in the interdicted women examined above.    
Women in the eighteenth century tried, albeit often unsuccessfully, to intervene in 
their matrimonial prospects, and would exert increasing pressure to be allowed to take a 
leading role in the shaping of their lives. Petitions were issued to the Pupilli to control the 
effects of these excessively libertarian intromissions in paternal authority, be it because they 
intended to marry against their parent’s approval (a problem that took on alarming 
proportions during the century), or because they refused to choose a monastery for an 
allegedly temporary forced reclusion.484  
For instance, Ginevera Bruschini had “arbitrarily” left her paternal uncle’s home, and 
intended to arrange her marriage by herself. The Pupilli commanded, according to the 
statutes, that she immediately stop her pretentions of freedom, inform the Pupilli of her 
preferred candidate and leave the matter for the officers to decide.485 The same happened with 
Maria Antonia Pagnini, for whom we have more information regarding the characteristics in 
her personality that made it so dangerous for her to decide by herself. She had been released 
from the Convent where she was schooled and put into the custody of an honourable family, 
when it reached the ears of the Pupilli officers that she intended to arrange her marriage by 
herself. Driven by what the officers of the Pupilli called her “imprudence” and “little 
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judgement” (poca avvedutezza), she had contracted a promise of marriage “forbidden by our 
laws.”486  
But women’s desires were often respected by the authorities, provided they 
demonstrated the necessary judgement that women were expected to have. The once 
inflexible parental decisions came to be discussed by daughters who were no longer willing to 
be passive witnesses while others decided upon their lives. Thus, as we have seen in other 
spaces of the judicial system, women appear as active agents in the uses of justice, employing 
the legal structure to make their once annulled voices heard. However, rather than examining 
the possibilities exerted by women so as to intervene in their destinies, we need to focus here 
on the way these women’s personalities were depicted by their opponents and how they 
described themselves, to see if we can get closer to the conception of female insanity. 
Because these cases served as an arena in which to discuss the boundaries of sane behaviour, 
it is worth reflecting on women’s intellectual capacities and on the occasions when their 
behaviour denoted something more than a mere desire for liberty.  
Petitions by young women denouncing their elders for constraining their life choices, 
or for failing to abide by their maternal or paternal roles are also interesting in as much as 
they demonstrate that women were not considered to be “naturally” irrational, nor that they 
had diminished rational capacities.487 Quite the contrary, the evidence shows them not only 
exerting their strong agency, but also being empowered by the judicial structure.488 In 1736, 
Maria Rosa Masi denounced her father for abandoning her and failing to fulfil his duties as 
head of the family, explaining that because of this she had been forced to leave the paternal 
household to live with her married sister.489 The purpose of her petition was to force her 
father to pay the dowry he had been legally sentenced to pay a year before in a suit initiated 
by Maria Rosa herself. It was now possible for her to marry, she explained, but she could lose 
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her suitor given that the matrimonial promise would be dissolved unless her father paid as 
soon as possible. Even though her father had been forced by a decree of the Pupilli to pay the 
dowry, he obstinately refused to pay. The father, on his part, claimed that the alleged 
abandonment had been a subterfuge by his daughter that aimed at taking advantage of him. 
Indeed, Maria Rosa had gone to live with her sister “to enjoy full liberty”, and because she 
did not want to cohabit with her progenitor.490 In other words, the father intended to accuse 
Maria Rosa of rebelling against paternal authority, to delegitimize her petition. Nonetheless, 
the Pupilli judged in favour of the daughter, and the father was forced to pay the dowry.  
Women’s petitions against men holding the authority given by patria potestas 
(whether natural or transferred, as in the case of guardians) could only be successful if they 
were exactly in accordance with the patriarchal hierarchy. We can find plenty of requests in 
the Magistrato dei Pupilli sent by abandoned women, who repeatedly strove to be maintained 
by their responsible male relatives. These kinds of requests were generally conceded, and 
fathers, brothers, uncles, and marriage kinsmen, were repeatedly sentenced to pay and assume 
responsibility. But women could not always get their way in these kinds of requests, 
particularly when their behaviour was on the edge of abnormality. Their personalities and 
their state of mind were closely scrutinised, and their male counterparts in the litigation 
usually resorted to arguments that undermined their position by putting their mental sanity 
into question.  
The story of the widow Maria Maddalena Cardini was also initiated by her defiance to 
impose hierarchies, when, having disagreed with her daughter’s guardians, she took the girl 
and fled from the marriage household, seeking refuge in Florence from the “persecutions” and 
physical abuses they exerted on her. She claimed to the Pupilli in 1744 that she had been 
unfairly accused of mismanaging her daughter’s patrimony, and of neglecting her 
education.491 But the strategy worked against her, for her daughter was abruptly taken away 
from her, to be sent to a convent. Through the Pupilli’s report on the matter, we learn that the 
disagreement had started because Maria Maddalena Cardini, who shared the guardianship and 
administration of her daughter’s patrimony with two other individuals, had intended to marry 
the girl without taking into consideration the opinions of the other two guardians, who were in 
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fact opposed to the alliance. Under these circumstances, the Pupilli officers decided to send 
the girl to a convent.492  
But Maria Maddalena Cardini, as with the other women we have seen, would not 
yield, and fervently attempted to visit her daughter, trying to convince her to declare that she 
was in the convent against her will.493 Maria Maddalena even tried to get her daughter out of 
there with the argument that she was suffering, and was even sick due to the ill effects that the 
monasteries exerted on her. But her claim was contradicted by the mother superior and the 
daughter herself, and her strategy proved unsuccessful.  
In descriptions of Maria Maddalena Cardini we encounter various of the 
characteristics associated with the mentally disturbed. She was seen as too insistent, too 
obstinate, too irrational in her tenacious opposition to the authorities’ rule. But she also 
contravened the most sacred duty of a woman. Her behaviour as a mother was reprehensible 
and distorted the expected norm. In fact, women’s disordered dispositions were frequently 
pictured in relation to how they behaved as mothers. Guardianship litigations are particularly 
illuminating on this type of scrutiny into the mind of the widow, where references to her 
irrationality, instability and passionate demeanour served an instrumental purpose.  
Anna Felice Venturi, widow of Pagnini, had between 1745 and 1757 been involved in 
a lengthy suit against her marriage kin regarding the guardianship of her only daughter. She 
was accused of having abandoned her new-born child because, when her husband was still 
alive, she had “capriciously and without any motives” left the matrimonial residence, and in 
so doing she had demonstrated, in the eyes of her marriage kin, “lack of tenderness and love 
towards the daughter.”494 This lack of tenderness evolved into alienazioni di animo 
(alienations of mind or disposition) when the child’s paternal grandmother petitioned for legal 
custody over the child. Claiming that she deserved be appointed guardian instead of Anna 
Felice, she argued that the latter was still too young, had remarried, and demonstrated 
“alienazione di animo” and “little tenderness” towards the child.495 She blamed Anna Felice 
for the legal resolution of sending the child to a monastery at the “tender” age of four, where 
she was so disturbed that she “could not stop crying and lamenting, so that to secure quietness 
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for the nuns and the health of the girl the tutors were forced to let her out and take her back” 
to the grandmother for her education.496 
The interesting issue for us here is that the argument of Anna Venturi’s abandonment, 
her lack of maternal qualities and capriciousness, later transformed into alienazioni di animo, 
was used when the marriage kin were trying to revoke the Pupilli’s sentence which granted 
the child’s guardianship to the mother until she was six years old. Initially the Pupilli had 
ruled in Anna Venturi’s favour, considering she had left her husband for good reasons. But 
the girl was sent to another convent in 1749, while her mother, now remarried, kept on 
petitioning to be allowed to live with her.497 Her daughter was asked on several occasions if 
she wanted to live with her mother and stepfather, but she “frankly and with a vivid spirit” 
(francamente, e con vivo spirito) refused. Begging the Pupilli not to send her to her mother, 
the girl claimed to have “many reasons”, the most pressing being that “given her previous 
denials,” and the fact that she had been ill-treated by them, she “legitimately feared receiving 
bad treatment from them, particularly from her stepfather.”498 The officers of the Pupilli, 
along with the girl’s relatives, presumed that after her second marriage Anna Felice “had lost 
her affection for her daughter”, as was generally said in similar cases.  
Gender roles defined the proper behaviour of men and women in the early modern 
period, wherein both roles and behaviour were thought to be a natural consequence of their 
constitution. Mothers were supposed to develop maternal affections towards their children, 
and the action of abandoning a new-born daughter was seen as against nature, which explains 
Anna Felice’s mother-in-law’s recourse to the image of alienation. Anna Felice’s behaviour 
was depicted as estranged from nature, constituting her disorder, attesting to her deviance, and 
denoting a distortion in her mental faculties. It is true that her alienation was not put in terms 
of an illness, but the word in itself had a medical connotation that is difficult to dismiss. 
Deviant motherhood, or distorted maternal affections were identified by petitioners as 
a sign of disorder, as a proof that these women were manifesting something that was not right, 
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that was not natural, that was not as it was supposed to be.499 Accepted behaviour and social 
codes relating to motherhood are, once more, tied to patrimony, as was in the case of men. 
The features of a distorted motherhood can be found when the mother was taken to be 
dissipating her children’s patrimony, or when she was thought to exert a bad influence over 
her offspring with regard to economic management. This was the case with Maria Livia 
Vernacci and her 18-year-old son Segno Maria Baldesi, interdicted for prodigality on his 
paternal uncle’s request.500    
Segno Maria’s father had stated in his testament that his son was not to be allowed to 
live with his mother if she was to remarry, as she had done.501 But the problem lay not only in 
the woman’s remarriage, but in her “change of attitude” after having done so, particularly her 
alleged intentions of taking advantage of her position and influence over her son to dissipate 
his patrimony. In fact, the uncle claimed that “during the short time she had her son under her 
guardianship, she had dissipated and even partly destroyed his patrimony.”502 And afterwards 
she was accused of inducing Segno Maria to request the lifting of the interdiction sentence 
only to take advantage of his patrimony.503 An accusation that portrayed a mother as having 
economic interests over her son’s patrimony was a strong accusation at a time when a 
mother’s affection was supposed to be pure and secure precisely because this meant that she 
did not (and could not have) any economic interests in her children’s inheritance.504 
Showing an interest in her son’s patrimony was considered by her opponents and the 
Pupilli as demonstrating a lack of real maternal affection towards her son; as serious as the 
alienazione di animo displayed by Anna Felice towards her daughter. In other words, these 
women were disqualified by their legal adversaries through recourse to attitudes that revealed 
                                                
499 Values associated with motherhood play, of course, a major role. See Calvi, Il contratto morale, pp. 107-161. 
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500 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 408, April 1733.  
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administrators of their children’s patrimony, see Calvi, Il contratto morale, p. 19-29 and passim.  
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Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 408, April 1733.  
503 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 426, October 1733.   
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that their feminine nature was not functioning properly. And the feature chosen in both cases 
was the distortion of maternal affection.  
In a society where social position and identity had to be exposed to external 
recognition, being accused of distorted motherhood entailed the same as when a man was 
denounced for failure as a pater familias. Even more so when we take into account the 
increasing importance of maternal values such as tenderness, self-control, resignation and 
propriety during the eighteenth century. Domesticity and ideal motherhood required a 
virtuous (in the sense of self-controlled) personality, which was deemed fundamental so long 
as it was thought they would be passed on to their children. “The virtues that one wished to 
pass on to one’s children had to be qualities demonstrated by the mother as well.”505 It is 
important to recall here that mad women committed to Santa Dorotea were commonly 
portrayed as defying codes of motherhood too, with their neglect and even open violence 
towards their offspring. Lack of affection towards a woman’s offspring was considered a sign 
of insanity in lay narratives of the Tuscan eighteenth century. The examination of a third, and 
final, case, will clarify further the extent to which the features of distorted motherhood 
mingled with rebellion and emotional instability.  
Eleonora Cecchi was involved in a legal dispute with her stepson in 1751, over her 
late husband’s testamentary disposition which forced her into living conditions she was not 
willing to accept. Eleonora’s husband had stated that she was to be appointed guardian of 
their mutual children, a boy and a girl, as long as she was to live together with her husband’s 
elder son, which she was not willing to do at first. As a consequence, according to the 
stepson’s narrative, the girl had been sent to the Ceppo monastery in Pistoia, but the boy had 
been allowed to live with his mother. Some time after, however, she had changed her mind 
and yielded, expressing her willingness to at least live in the same city as her stepson, 
although not in the same house. Her new “cooperative mood” did not last, however, and from 
then on she never stopped disturbing both her stepson and the Pupilli officers with her 
constantly changing petitions. She was portrayed as moved and commanded by her 
“extremely uneasy spirit” (spirito inquietissimo), and subject to constant shifts of mood and 
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fickleness, as when “having changed her mind, she went back to Florence carrying her child 
[the boy] in the most strange time of bitter winter, [and then] leaving him abandoned.”506  
Maternal behaviour gave valuable keys to interpret a woman’s state of mind. In this 
case, Eleonora’s uneasy spirit had led her to commit the unforgivable sin of abandoning her 
child, and later her uneasy spirit (spirito inquietissimo) pushed her to petition the Pupilli to 
remove her daughter from the convent. When this was denied, she asked instead for her 
daughter to be left there, based on the suspicion that her stepson might take the girl away to 
another convent, far from her, and she could not trust him. While the destiny of the girl was 
under discussion and the suit open, she went to the convent in Pistoia, and “arbitrarily, and 
almost by force took her daughter away from her aunt without the knowledge of the 
Magistracy and her guardians, transferring her to the Convent of S. Pier Martire.”507   
Eleonora Cecchi’s own narrative, however, was slightly different. She stated that she 
had been forced to abandon the imposed cohabitation because the stepson and other appointed 
guardians had sold every piece of furniture, and had “arbitrarily” and “capriciously” sent the 
girl to the convent and the boy to live with a priest. As a consequence the widow had been 
forced to go to live in Florence, given that she had been separated from her children, and was 
constantly mistreated by her stepson.  
The Pupilli and the Consulta ruled in favour of the widow, that is they took into 
consideration her accusations against her stepson and other appointed guardians of 
mismanaging the patrimony, their refusal to pay the proper dowry to the daughter, and their 
disregard for the children’s education. We know that between 1751 and 1753 the girl was 
allowed to live with her mother, but in 1753 the guardians petitioned again to send the girl to 
a Convent, obtaining this time a favourable response. On this occasion, the Consulta ordered 
the Pupilli to control Eleonora, who given her “fervido umore” might oppose the disposition 
to send the girl to a new convent.508  
Eleonora’s spirito inquietissimo had evolved into a fervido umore in the narratives of 
the officials of the Pupilli, complicating the picture of her turbulent disposition, and bringing 
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passaggio di detta fanciulla nel monastero, segua con quella quiete, proprietà, e convenienza, che si conviene...”. 




her even closer to the features of insanity. Fervido came from fervente, meaning bollente 
(boiling) and intenso, veemente (intense, vehement).509 In other words, she had been 
characterized as a person of boiling temper, an image traditionally associated with the 
irrational effects of anger, combined with her passionate character. Her boiling, intense and 
unstable temper put her in urgent need of being controlled. Her boiling temper made her 
dangerous because her reactions could not be anticipated, and her past record of unexpected 
reactions made it necessary to prevent a new episode from happening.  
The case reveals, for sure, the instrumental use of women’s emotional instability to 
secure determinate legal outcomes. As later chapters will argue, emotional instability was 
increasingly seen as a feature of mental incapacity, which allows me to safely presume that 
mentioning emotional instability was a way of discrediting a woman in terms of her mental 
capacities. The term inquietudine here is pivotal, as we will see. But let me first go to a 
slightly different realm where emotional instability and women’s uneasiness were also 
portrayed.  
Being of a “spirito inquietissimo” or a “naturale inquieto” served not only to discredit 
a woman’s maternal qualities, but it is also commonly found in the descriptions given by 
husbands to argue their wife’s confinement in an institution such as the Conservatorio dei 
Mendicanti or the Malmaritate.510 In both cases, the resemblance with the common features of 
mental affliction, with its tones of extravagance, unruliness and instability comes to the fore. 
These conservatories of female virtue were useful depositaries of cases where sexual 
misconduct and mental derangement met, concealed between prostitution, adultery and donne 
pericolanti. When we direct especial attention to the vocabulary employed to describe these 
women’s disorder, we observe that the male evaluation of feminine normativity and their 
rejection to women’s defiance of decency and masculine authority were melded with 
appreciations of their state of mind.    
The entry key to understanding this superposition can be found in the use of the word 
inquietudine, which we see appearing increasingly in descriptions of male mental incapacity. 
In the case of women it served as a basis for a petition to send them to the Mendicanti or the 
Malmaritate. As in the example of Anna Geltrude Modeni, a 74-year-old widow who 
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denounced her sons for expelling her from the paternal home and trying to send her to the 
Mendicanti, “as if she was a disturbed woman” (come pretesa donna inquieta).511 She was 
confined there for a while, but her sons were forced to take her out after the institution’s 
request, on account of her bad behaviour.512 As I will argue in the last chapter, inquietudine 
served to indicate a disordered disposition, characterized by the unrestrained rule of affliction 
and passions caused by mental affliction. In fact, according to the Pupilli officers, Anna 
Geltrude was an inquietissima donna, “poorly capable of adapting to any plan.”513  
Inquietudine indicated instability, and this in turn was held to be a sign of mental 
disturbance. Women of “uneasy spirits” would change their minds for no reason, as we 
already saw with Eleonora Cecchi who, according to her stepson, had first decided to abandon 
her offspring, and then unexpectedly decided that she could not live without them.514 Anna 
Geltrude shared this same characteristic according to her sons, because she had been the one 
requesting to live separately from them, and had then made a petition arguing the opposite, 
that she had in fact been kicked out by them. As we will see in the last chapter, agitation of 
spirit, anguish, uneasiness, and in general, emotional disturbances were considered by 
medical knowledge as serious triggers of mental affliction. Strong, uncontrolled and 
overwhelming passions affected the nervous system, triggering nervous conditions such as 
hysteria and hypochondria, and causing mental illness. 
 
4. 4. Monasteries, a Place for Psychological Disturbance? 
The monastery was still a common destination for many women in the eighteenth 
century, although the female conventual population was lower than in the previous century, 
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512 The sons said that the Auditore Fiscale made the disposition of “riservarla nei Mendicanti per la sua gran 
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and had dropped substantially towards the second half of the century.515 In the search of a 
female space where we can find traces of the lives of early modern women, the monastery is 
revealed as a space for a series of uncategorized emotional sufferings, most of them 
associated with monastic life. The psychological dangers of conventual life were not an 
unknown or new issue in the eighteenth century.  
Female monasteries had been at the centre of discussions regarding the deviant 
mystical experiences that characterized baroque culture, eliciting careful theological 
differentiations between what could be asserted as a real mystical experience, what needed to 
be ascribed to the devil’s doing and what to mental or physical illnesses.516 The eighteenth 
century witnessed the decline in cases of diabolical possession, and the rigid campaigns 
commanded from the Holy Office tended to reduce and circumscribe sanctity and spirituality 
to features that progressively distanced mystical phenomena from the passionate and 
theatrical features that had characterized them before. According to Elena Brambilla, the 
religious campaigns against the excesses of baroque mysticism and the changes in theological 
and medical knowledge from the end of the seventeenth century were conflated so as to 
produce a change that was materialized in the reinterpretation of possession into uterine 
hysteria, and from there to mental illness. Very much adhering to the thesis of the 
medicalization of mystical phenomena, which was primarily tied to hysteria, Brambilla has 
suggested that there was “a mutazione che decretò, non solo nella scienza ma anche nella 
teologia, non solo nei medici ma anche nei sacerdoti, un progressivo rifiuto 
dell’interpretazione teologica della possessione e la sua sostituzione con una spiegazione 
medica…”517 This does not mean that a new univocal interpretation was produced but, rather, 
that theories ascribing as much of a role to the devil as to nerves to explain mystical reactions 
tied to hysteria, coexisted through the eighteenth century.518  
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By the beginning of the eighteenth century we can find various traces that the Italian 
culture made a connection between hysteria and monastic life, or between psychological 
afflictions, as we might prefer for the moment to catalogue them, and conventual enclosure. I 
do not aim here to enter the discussion on the negative or positive effects that monastic life 
had on women.519 But, it has to be acknowledged that, particularly during the eighteenth 
century, it is common to hear voices that ascribe a pernicious psychological effect to the 
enclosure of women.     
Forced monachization was still a reality in the eighteenth century despite the efforts of 
the Church to reduce it,520 and rebellious women would often end up confined within the 
walls of a monastery. According to Paola Vismara, forced monachization constituted a 
significant proportion of the conventual population, and in the eighteenth century they could 
still constitute the majority of the nuns in a monastery.521 Unfortunately, records of women 
forced into convents do not abound, as Francesca Medioli points out; quite the contrary, “very 
few reluctant nuns left records of their unhappy experiences.”522 Recently Anne Jacobson 
Schutte has called into question the traditional assumption that forced monachization affected 
predominantly women. Her study has elaborated on the familial dynamics behind  the 
phenomenon, suggesting that the dynamics of forced monachization during the century were 
eminently determined by economic motives and the shifts of inheritance. Forced enclosure, 
she argues, was the outcome of a lengthy “battle of wills between those exerting force and 
fear and those subjected to it.”523    
                                                                                                                                                   
eighteenth century. While the defenders of the Convulsionaries claim that convulsions had been miraculously 
produced, physicians looked for natural causes such as seeing them as a symptom of hysterical affections. 
“Naturalization did not, however, entail the suspension of individual responsibility for having entertained the 
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It is well known but poorly documented that monasteries were the most common 
depository for mentally afflicted women whose wealthy families were willing to keep them 
from the indiscreet gaze of neighbours and elite society. It is true that most mad persons were 
kept at home in the early modern period, but many times diverse family situations meant that 
they had to be sent away. It is almost inevitable here that reference be made to Arcangela 
Tarabotti’s Paternal Tyranny. With her well-known eloquence, she denounced in 1654 the 
practice whereby fathers usually filled convents with their undesirable, disabled and feeble-
minded daughters. “They do not offer as brides of Jesus their most beautiful and virtuous 
daughters, but the most repulsive and deformed: lame, hunchbacked, crippled, or simple-
minded. They are blamed for whatever natural defect they are born with and condemned to 
lifelong prison.”524 
In fact, the rigours of monastic life and their effects on the delicate bodies and the 
easily influenced spirits of women were well known, and an acknowledged factor in the 
appearance of physical and mental disturbances. The Italian physician Bernardino Ramazzini 
identified “passions of the spirit” (passioni di spirito) as a typical disorder of nuns in his De 
morbis artificum diatriba (1700).525 According to Ramazzini, while writers and philosophers 
were thought to suffer typically from melancholy, nuns suffered typically from passions of 
the spirit that needed to be controlled if they wanted to maintain themselves sound in body 
and soul.  
Nuns were thought to be subject to particular illnesses that were believed to be 
specific to the conditions of enclosure. As Ramazzini outlined, monasteries were usually 
places with an insane air, usually constructed at the margins of the cities, where all the city’s 
refuses was destined. The Italian physician also recalled the pernicious effects of drinking 
young wine (vino nuovo) instead of old wine, which was safer for the stomach, had better 
digestive properties, and lasted longer without decomposing. A major peril for the nun’s 
mental and physical soundness were the dietary restrictions imposed by monastic life, which 
would be maximized by periods of fasting. A balanced diet would keep the nuns “as healthy 
as possible”, so that “with joy of spirit” they would serve God.526 But nothing could damage 
the nun’s health more, continued Ramazzini, than their interrupted and insufficient sleep 
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regime. The problem, according to the physician, was that although they were assigned a 
“determined time to sleep”, they could never manage to sleep those hours through. They slept 
all together “in a big and long space, called by them a dormitory, each one on her bed,” where 
their sleep would irremediably be disturbed by the noises each one made. During the night 
“some cough, others sigh, others doze off loudly (strepitosamente), others dream and talk in 
their sleep.”527 To make things worse, nuns were not only unable to sleep during the 
necessary hours, but they were also bound to a sedentary life, which did not provide the body 
with the necessary movement to keep it healthy.     
Ramazzini’s list of the perils besieging nuns’ health ended with the passions of spirit 
(passioni dell’animo), which produced “acute internal commotions especially in the female 
sex.”528 The passions of spirit needed to be at peace (in quiete) to keep nuns healthy, the 
physician pointed out. Although Ramazzini did not frame it explicitly like that, his line of 
argument leads us to the conclusion that the characteristics of monastic life enhanced 
women’s natural tendency to be overwhelmed by their passions. In other words, nuns not only 
had an interrupted sleep pattern, but they also showed the signs of a disturbed interior that 
was unable to sleep properly: they would sigh, they would talk in their sleep. And sleep 
disorders were already being seen by physicians as symptoms of perturbed states of mind.  
Ramazzini’s diagnosis of the damaging effects that conventual life could exert on the 
bodies and spirits of women was not unique, and in fact the severe effects exerted on the 
nerves by monastic life were a recurring topic of medical discussion. The numerous consulti 
medici devoted to the sufferings of hysterical nuns published by diverse Italian physicians 
tend to support this point.529 
For instance, among the many tasks that the renowned Florentine naturalist and 
physician Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti performed for the Tuscan state (he was the medico 
fiscale in charge of medico-legal consultations for the Otto di Guardia e Balìa and Santa 
Dorotea, and was also the physician of the Florentine prison, the Stinche, to name a few), was 
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his role as appointed doctor of the Monastero della Crocetta, from where he was consulted for 
different ailments, as was usual at a time when physicians had no specialization in a particular 
area of medicine. But a note found in the section of his Consulti medici devoted to hysteria is 
particularly telling on the nature of the ailments that commonly afflicted nuns or, at least, on 
the kind of sufferings nuns thought it necessary to seek medical consultation for. A man 
asking for Targioni Tozzetti’s opinion on the hysterical sufferings of a certain nun said he had 
postponed his request moved by the concern that Targioni Tozzetti was already swamped 
with the numerous requests from the nuns of the Crocetta and from the entire Florence “who 
abundantly suffer from the same ailment.”530  
Hence, joy of spirit was not necessarily the common factor in female conventual life in 
the Italian eighteenth century, and various voices testified that the monasteries were full of 
unhappy nuns. The perturbations of spirit identified by contemporary physicians as a common 
peril nuns had to face were seen from outside the walls of the convent as closely connected to 
the phenomenon of enforced enclosure. In the words of Angela Tarabotti, convents were “a 
living hell for those without vocation… the place where these unfortunate women dwell… 
can be likened to an inferno… Only Hell itself bears a likeness to the suffering of these 
enforced slaves of Christ.”531 
Even from the religious world we hear voices that recognize the negative effects 
enclosure could exert on nuns, particularly when they were young and unsure of their 
vocation. The Jesuit Giuseppe Agnelli in 1703 wrote Il verisimile finto nel vero, in which he 
sought to give advice to the discontented nuns that “unfortunately” filled the monasteries of 
the time.532 The major source of nuns’ misfortunes was identified by Agnelli in the fact that 
most of them entered the convents without being clear about their vocations, some were even 
forced to do so by their relatives or by their familial situation. Nuns were usually unhappy, he 
said, because they were in the monastery against their will or at least reluctantly (contro il 
loro volere; o di malavoglia).533 The profound unhappiness that would overwhelm them once 
                                                
530 “Ho finto sempre di dimenticarmene, per non accrescere ad un’ amico le seccature, che gli vengono di questa 
sorte dalle monache della Crocetta, ed altre, che in abbondanza in cotesta città soffrono gli stessi mali.” BNCF, 
Manoscritti, Le carte di Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti (from now on, GTT), N. 234, “Consultationes medicae”, 
cart.2, fasc. X, Consulti per affezioni ipocondriache ed isteriche, Tommaso Manfredi (from Milano) to Targioni 
Tozzetti, 21 March 1764, fol. 151. 
531 Tarabotti, Paternal Tyranny, p. 65.  
532 Giuseppe Agnelli, Il verisimile finto nel vero. Pensieri suggeriti dal Direttore ad una Religiosa Novizia 
scontenta, Per disporla alla Solenne Professione. Raccolti per uso opportuno di Meditazioni nel Triduo, o altro 
maggior tempo precedente alla Sagra Operazione, In Roma, 1703.  




inside, would easily convert into a melancholy that would alter their judgement, affecting 
their performance of their monastic duties. Notwithstanding the “caring” help of the female 
relatives that usually accompanied in the cloister, they would be weighed down by the “tears 
that fall abundantly from their eyes.”534 From there, their immoderate passions (passione 
sregolate) would only increase the anguish (angoscie di animo) that corroded them, 
“increasing to such a point their apprehensions and fantasies of strange melancholies, that 
sometimes they lose their senses, or at least are consumed little by little, until they die, 
desperate.”535 
This same awareness of the psychological effects that monastic life could have on 
women can be observed in debates regarding girls schooled in convents. To the distress 
produced by being separated from their mothers at a young age we must add the strict rules of 
monastic life, which were thought to produce a negative effect on their temper and 
complexion.536 Monasteries would make the girls feel lonely, disturbed and anguished, while 
the rigours of monastic life forced them to repress those feelings and the “tristezze d’animo” 
(low spirits) that affected them. As was said in a medical consultation addressed to Giovanni 
Targioni Tozzetti in the second half of the eighteenth century, agitations, changes of mood 
and perturbations (trasporti, mozioni  or commozioni d’animo), if not taken into account in 
time, could easily lead to the appearance of an hysterical affection later on.537  
Widows pleading to regain custody of their underage girls would, in fact, frequently 
make use of this argument, as in the case of Anna Felice Venturi, who petitioned to take her 
daughter out of the monastery she had been sent for her education, with the argument that “in 
the Convent she did not enjoy perfect health.”538 We even find cases where mothers had taken 
their daughters away from a convent without the authorities’ permission, as we saw in the 
case of Eleonora Cecchi. She later justified her action by explaining that she had received 
“pressing letters” (lettere pressantissime) from her daughter, where she said that she “wanted 
                                                
534 Ibid., p. 9.  
535 “…accresce a tal segno alle Novizie le apprensioni, e le fantasie di strane malinconie, che talvolta perdono il 
Senno; o almeno consumandosi a poco a poco, muoino disperate”, Ibid., p. 29.  
536 For example, the maternal kin of Maria Anna Paffetti petitioned to revert the decision to send her to the 
Monastery of S. Elisabetta in Pontadera, which they thought could affect her “gracile complessione.” ASF, 
MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2307, no. 124, April 1768. The petition was not granted.  
537 BNCF, Manoscritti, GTT, N. 234, cart. 2, fasc. X, Consulti per affezioni ipocondriache ed isteriche, fol. 210, 
no date and not signed. 
538 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 135, August 1757. Antonia Pagnini, around 12 years old, daughter of 




to escape at any cost” from the convent.539 Eleonora Cecchi believed that there was no point 
in having “the said girl anguished against her will, as her guardians had done until now” and 
confined in the convent.540  
Other examples are abundant. The 11-year-old Agata Landucci suffered from 
homesickness in the Convent where she was sent after her mother Maria Maddalena Mauri 
had remarried. According to her mother (deprived of her daughter’s guardianship when the 
latter was aged eight), Agata started to suffer “an extreme affliction” because she had been 
separated from her mother and sent to the convent. Because she was languishing there, 
“assaulted by apoplectic accidents”, she decided to take her back home.541 In fact, mothers 
deprived of the guardianship of underage daughters would usually use the argument of the 
adverse psychological effects conventual life could exert on them to try to prevent them from 
being separated from them. As this same mother said regarding another of her daughters, in 
the convent they were deprived of the assistance and company of their loving mothers and 
their next of kin. Agata, according to her, had developed apoplectic accidents precisely 
because she suffered there. And particularly because they were girls, they were thought to be 
more psychologically influenced by the change.  
Nonetheless, we have much more material regarding underage girls psychologically 
afflicted inside the convent than testimonies about adult women. Lay testimonies regarding 
the experience of adult women in monasteries are difficult to find, and when we have records 
of the disquieting psychological situation with which nuns could be confronted, it is through 
mediated discourses like the consulti medici. Unfortunately in the case of the latter, what was 
usually conserved and published was the medical response to the consultation, and in most 
cases we do not have the woman’s voice.  Consequently, although we know many women 
developed different kinds of what were recognized as mental afflictions, we only know this 
through medical literature, the other narratives already discussed here, or accidentally, 
thorough, for example, the records of the affairs handled by the Auditore Fiscale.542 
 
                                                
539 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 275, July 1751, Eleonora Cecchi to the Pupilli regarding her 16-year-
old daughter, Maria Francesca Giovacchini. 
540 “non pareva, che meritasse la pena di dover’ tenere la detta fanciulla angustiata contro la di lei volontà, come 
fin’ ora anno fatto i tutori, nello Spedale di Pistoia”. Idem. 
541 “ma postasi in un estrema afflizione d’aver lasciata la cara madre, sempre languente in detto Monastero, 
assalita da accidenti apoplettici, ricondottola alla propria casa”. Petition of Maria Maddalena Mauri to regain the 
guardianship of her younger daughter, after Agata had died. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 49, April 
1739.   




4. 5. Conclusion  
This chapter has explored female madness mostly through the silence left by female 
insanity in the eighteenth-century Tuscan records. Starting from female interdiction 
procedures, we examined the features of female incapacity, pointing out that, notwithstanding 
their limited number compared to male interdictions in the period, these procedures are 
nonetheless invaluable for reconstructing what female insanity meant according to the family 
gaze. Strongly marked by the female life cycle, female mental incapacity was constructed 
upon the breaching of traditional feminine roles, such as obedience, motherhood or virtue. 
But, notions of female mental incapacity also encompassed new cultural concerns regarding 
femininity, such as the apprehensions generated by the new sociability, which ascribed to 
women not only a new visibility, but also a new place and looser behaviour in relations 
between the sexes. Combined with this, we see the appearance of a debate regarding the 
values ascribed to motherhood under the ideal of domesticity, where manifestations of a 
fervido umore, or a alienazione d’animo against their children came to be of major concern. 
In an effort to overcome the lack of records on female madness in the eighteenth century, this 
chapter has drawn on borderline cases of disordered women whose features, although not 
openly labelled as mad, recall those of the women interdicted or committed on account of 
their insanity.     
However, the most interesting feature of the eighteenth-century records is not so much 
this connection between distorted femininity and the breaching of behavioural codes but, 
rather, the position held by women in relation to mentally incapacitated men. Contradicting 
the vision of the feminization of madness, and the perpetuation of the traditional view that 
considered women as naturally irrational and unstable (as the infirmitas sexus),543 the Tuscan 
records placed women in a position of power and control. Both their male kin and the 
authorities considered them the most appropriate palliative to the disorder caused by male 
insanity. Furthermore, the possibility that men could re-emerge from their disordered state 
was very much based on their “feminine” capacities. Women recurrently appear as playing a 
pivotal role as disciplining agents in the family. Their petitions to interdict their husbands or 
sons, for instance, frequently recalled their previous efforts to emend and correct their 
                                                
543 Lindsay Wilson highlighted, based on a serious of medical case histories and causes célèbres of the French 
eighteenth century featuring maladies des femmes, “the influence that traditional values, largely prejudicial to 
women, continued to exert in early modern society”, demonstrating “that the ghost of the medieval synthesis of 
medicine, ethics, law, and theology… was not entirely laid to rest by the end of the eighteenth century”. Wilson, 




husbands, all fruitless, forcing them to petition for the interdiction.544 We can thus consider 
that petitioning for an interdiction was a mechanism for women to be empowered to complete 
a task they had already been executing before the authorities’ intervention. I have said that 
interdiction often resulted in women being appointed administrators of their husbands’ or 
sons’ patrimonies. What is interesting to note here is that their intervention was not 
necessarily received negatively by the affected men. We have, for instance, the case of Marco 
Barni, who petitioned for his interdiction to be revoked arguing that “given that now he has a 
spouse and children, he is now released [spogliato] from all those passions that before moved 
him to spend unnecessarily.”545    
  
                                                
544 Isabella Corbini, wife of the interdicted Cammillo Moresi. ASF, MS, Suppliche, F. 1208, fol. 337, April 1761 
545 “...stante che in oggi per aver moglie e figli si è spogliato di tutte quelli passioni, che prima lo portavano a 















PART II.  ITINERARIES OF MADNESS AND THE 








Chapter 5: Spaces and Itineraries of Madness  
 
During the eighteenth century, Tuscan families could turn to various mechanisms to deal with 
the difficulties posed by madness. In their battle to govern, curb, contain and cure their 
mentally suffering relatives, families could resort to the course of action that most suited their 
aims and needs, sometimes experimenting with various of them, other times holding only to 
one. Although scholars have convincingly argued that the mechanisms employed to control or 
deal with madness in early modern Europe were eminently temporary and flexible, 
specialized historiography has failed to delve into the connections between them. Studies on 
the history of madness generally centre their attention around one of the many scenarios in 
which madness left its record in the early modern world, whether the household, the hospital 
or prison, criminal and civil proceedings, or the more evocative realms of literature and 
culture. However, less attention has been paid to the connections between one arrangement or 
space of appearance and another. The mapping of madness onto the landscape of the 
mechanisms provided by the Ancien Régime still needs to be done.546  
This chapter is intended as an attempt to expand the focus from the interdiction 
procedures to other spaces and mechanisms where madness makes an appearance in the 
eighteenth-century Tuscan records. It first examines criminal justice and insanity pleas, then 
gives a summary analysis on the admission procedure to Santa Dorotea, to finally examine the 
special and executive matters handled by the Auditore Fiscale (the chief of Police), and ends 
by elaborating on the itineraries of madness. The primary concern is to examine the 
multiplicity of available arrangements through which families, communities and authorities 
could respond to the problems exerted by madness. This approach allows me to demonstrate 
that the increasing concern for madness and its dramatic visibility was not confined to legal 
inquiries into mental capacity, but was present in many different fronts of social life. Madness 
                                                
546 Scholars such as Roscioni, MacDonald or Porter, for instance, have centred their attention on the medical 
dimension of madness, even if from a socio-cultural approach. Conversely, scholars working on criminal 
insanity, such as Rabin or Eigen, have generally not connected their analysis with the medical or extra-criminal 
dimension. Likewise, the series of British studies that initiated the trend of a history of madness “outside the 
walls” of mental institutions, such as those followed by Rushton, Suzuki or Wright, has focused on the family as 
the primary “locus of care”, but has devoted less attention to following the itineraries of madness. Finally, 
studies on the cultural representations of madness tend to circumscribe their scope only to the realms of 
literature. The most salient works are: Roscioni, Il governo della follia; MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam; Porter, 
Mind-Forg’d Manacles; Rabin, Identity, Crime and Legal Responsibility; Eigen, Witnessing Insanity; Calabritto, 
“A Case of Melancholic Humors”; Rushton, “Lunatics and Idiots”; Suzuki, “The Household and the Care of 





could also appear in criminal proceedings or hospital records, as the object of official 
reprimands or of executive measures like imprisonment or forced embarkation. Furthermore, 
these measures are to be interpreted as a combined effort to control the public and private 
effects of madness in which authorities and families worked hand in hand.  
Mapping the itineraries of madness discloses a complicated net of possible destinies 
and available courses of action to deal with the problem of madness. Although each measure 
had a separate procedure with no standardized connections, we do have the possibility of 
following some individuals who make an appearance in more than one scenario. Following 
the alleged mad across different settings allows us to enrich significantly our view on the 
problem of how madness was perceived, understood, conceptualized and handled. Our 
settings and locus of madness here are no longer bound to the domestic environment and 
professional life, but are open to the city and the countryside, including hospitals, 
monasteries, prisons and vessels. Madness could assume the form of mental incapacity, 
justifying interdiction, or assume the form of raving mania that justified confinement. It could 
be used to argue impunity in a criminal procedure, or be used as an argument in an 
intergenerational or matrimonial dispute that is disclosed to the authorities in special petitions 
submitted to the Grand Duke. Madness could thus assume manifold forms, and even the same 
person could be depicted differently according to the context to which his or her mental 
disorder was disclosed.  
This chapter is built upon the contention that understandings of madness were of a 
contextual and contingent nature. Madness in the early modern period was measured against 
patterns of normality that were conditioned by variables such as age, gender, social role and 
status. This evaluation was further shaped by the requirements of each of the spaces in which 
madness occurred and where madness was disclosed, conditioning its forms and meanings. 
As I have been suggesting, the identification and evaluation of deviant behaviours that were 
singled out as evidence of mental derangement was deeply entrenched in the context in which 
the said behaviour developed.   
Rather than being generically shaped, the general features of deviant behaviour whose 
cause was connected to mental derangement were adapted and modelled according to the 
context of its appearance. Consequently, why the behaviour was denounced or why it 
received public attention and where, profoundly change the arguments that revealed its 
presence. Civil law, we saw in the previous chapters, conditioned the characteristics of mental 




criminal law, admission records of mental hospitals or special requests made directly to the 
central government or through the Auditore Fiscale.  
 
5. 1. Criminal Insanity 
Criminal prosecution in Grand Ducal Tuscany, centralized in the tribunal of the Otto 
di Guardia e Balìa, aimed at establishing liability, which was contingent upon providing 
evidence of criminal intent and motivation for committing the crime.547 However, as Roman 
law had established, the very nature of madness supposed that the mentally afflicted lacked 
criminal intent and motivation, for they were taken to be devoid of judgement, intention and 
will. Following this classical principle, the Tuscan legal framework placed the criminally 
insane under the category of “exception of innocence” which released them from 
punishment.548 Madness was, after all, punishment enough.549  
Diminished responsibility by reason of madness could be established through two 
courses in early modern Tuscany: during trial, or alternatively through a supplica submitted 
after conviction and once the sentence had been pronounced. According to the famous 
summary of Tuscan legal practice compiled by Marc’Antonio Savelli, the criminally insane 
could adduce insanity through a procurator or a relative even if they were contumacious. As 
                                                
547 The central criminal court of the Grand Ducal Tuscany was the Otto di Guardia e Balìa, which supervised all 
the other criminal courts of the territory. Criminal procedures could be initiated in three ways: through the 
denunciation of the civic authorities; through private accusation; or on the initiative of the judges (ex officio). 
The case started with the informatory process, during which the criminal courts had to gather as much evidence 
as possible and interrogate witnesses to determine if the accusation or suspicion of crime was grounded. When 
there were enough grounds to proceed, the accused was publicly notified to appear before the court, and was 
given a report of the informatory process that was to be used to build a defence with the help of a procuratore 
de’ poveri (procurator of the poor). Once summoned to court, the accused could decide to remain contumacious, 
fail to attend and disappear, respond to the summons and confess or plea his/her innocence, or appear later with a 
prepared line of defence, once they had managed to obtain peace with the offended party. Depending on the 
seriousness of the crime, the accused could be held in prison during the informatory process. The Tuscan 
criminal procedure in all its stages, possibilities and consequences can be seen in Savelli’s famous handbook of 
criminal practice. See Savelli, Pratica Universale, pp. 5-22, first published in 1665, with seven editions until 
1748. See also John K. Brackett, Criminal Justice and Crime in Late Renaissance Florence, 1537-1609 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Trevor Dean, Crime and Justice in Late Medieval Italy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
548 Savelli, Pratica Universale, p. 108. 
549 “References to the insane in Justinian’s sixth-century Digest, the part of the corpus Juris Civilis intended for 
judges and magistrates and which included selections from classical jurists, noted that uncontrollable lunatics 
and murderers who were insane at the time of the crime, and not merely feigning, should be imprisoned or 
confined in their homes, but not punished; insanity was itself punishment enough.” Watson, Forensic Medicine 
in Western Society, p. 72. See also Robinson, Wild Beasts & Idle Humours. The Insanity Defence From Antiquity 




Savelli warns his readers, this could turn in their favour, because if they were not found to be 
mad after all, they could continue without being punished.550   
Insanity pleas entered during trial are difficult to find in the eighteenth-century records 
of the Otto di Guardia, which is particularly striking compared to the high rate of interdiction 
decrees issued during the same period. Their scarcity is explained in part because, by 
definition, the insanity defence required that the accused plead that they were guilty but not 
responsible by reason of mental incapacity, which was hazardous and entailed the mastering 
of basic legal principles or, alternatively, the possibility of receiving legal advice. In this 
sense, it was safer either to attend trial alleging innocence, in the expectation that the evidence 
would exculpate them or be inconclusive, or remain contumacious to the Otto’s instruction to 
appear before court. The other explanation as to the scarcity of insanity pleas is connected to 
the characteristics of the archive of the Otto di Guardia itself. In particular, its massive size, 
combined with its frequent lacunae make it difficult to conduct a thorough search.551 Finally, 
it is possible that exemption from legal liability by reason of insanity was determined through 
informal pre-trial resolutions that left no trace.552  
Insanity pleas to a certain extent could be better argued after trial, once the accused 
had been convicted and the sentence pronounced, using the instrument of the supplica. 
Supplications to obtain a grazia from the Grand Duke in the form of a mitigated sentence or a 
full pardon were the only available mechanism to appeal a sentence. Supplications constituted 
a legal course of action in which personal and more emotional experiences, so necessary to 
sustain an insanity plea, could be received with more sympathy, contributing to a more 
favourable response. Accordingly, many insanity pleas in the eighteenth-century records 
come to light in the form of petitions sent after conviction. 
                                                
550 Savelli, Pratica Universale, p. 108. He recommended that such cases be avoided, and instead advocated for 
insanity defences in which the accused could be directly examined by the judges with the support of medical 
experts, and, although not necessarily imprisoned, he recommended that they be kept under proper custody. 
Normally, failure to appear before the court after being notified that criminal charges had been brought against 
them resulted in an “automatic sentence of guilt” accountable for full statutory penalty.  
551 My survey of the Otto di Guardia aimed at grasping the criminal language of madness rather than at building 
a complete map of criminal insanity. Both the dimensions of the archive and the scope of this thesis made it 
impossible and at the same time unnecessary to perform an exhaustive search. This section is therefore based on 
an in-depth scrutiny made for roughly every three to five years between 1720 and 1770 of the different sections 
of the archive of the Otto di Guardia (namely Negozi, Negozi dei Rettori, Suppliche, Straordinarie). Depending 
on the size of the volumes (Filze) and the characteristics of the findings, my sounding out covered more than one 
consecutive year. For this reason, the results are not intended to be numerically representative, but qualitatively 
meaningful in terms of the understanding of madness in criminal justice.  
552 The tendency to resolve insanity pleas through informal pre-trial resolutions was common in eighteenth-




Categories of Criminal Insanity and the Assessment of Diminished Liability 
 In terms of legal practice, the conviction and sentencing of criminals found mentally 
afflicted rested entirely on the judges’ power of arbitrio, which gave them liberty to decide 
without following the statutory law.553 Exemption from statutory penalty was not understood 
as automatically liberating the criminally insane from all kinds of punishment, but only as the 
possibility of diminishing the penalty at the judge’s discretion. Recourse to arbitrary penalties 
gave the Tuscan legal system the necessary flexibility to deal with criminal insanity, adjusting 
each penalty according to the varying levels of responsibility that could be found in the 
different forms of madness.   
Exemption from punishment by reason of madness generated a complicated dilemma 
for the practice of law, particularly regarding the identification of the different kinds and 
degrees of madness, the assessment of how each kind affected the person’s legal 
responsibility, and the decision of what, in accordance, to do with the criminally insane. As 
we can see in Savelli’s Pratica Universale, legal theory was still largely based on the 
principles stated in the famous work of Paolo Zacchia, who had established different levels of 
legal responsibility according to the various categories of madness. Referencing Zacchia’s 
work, Savelli recalled that there were different kinds of “pazzia, furore o demenzia”, which 
were differentiated according to origins and degrees of mental alteration.554 Whereas Savelli 
used the categories of pazzia, furore and demenzia as equivalent, Zacchia in his Quaestiones 
medico legales had proposed the use of dementia as a generic term comprising all kinds of 
mental afflictions.555 Focusing on the various signs and manifestations of madness, he 
classified them according to the degree in which the rational faculties were compromised: 
fatuitas (with diminished mental faculties), delirium (altered mental faculties) and mania 
(where mental faculties were completely lost). After classifying the kinds of dementia, 
Zacchia thoroughly examined the different signs of madness (codified in specific behaviours 
                                                
553 Arbitrio meant that the penalty was decided at the discretion of the judges, and was generally used to give a 
lenient sentence to a crime that, according to the statues, deserved a harsher one. The Otto di Guardia e Balìa 
were given arbitrary power in 1478, which granted them independence to judge without reference to the statutes. 
Giovanni Antonelli, “La magistratura degli Otto di Guardia a Firenze”, Archivio storico Italiano XCII (1954), 
pp. 3-40 and Brackett, Criminal Justice and Crime, p. 4. 
554 Savelli, Pratica Universale, p. 107.  
555 The comprehensive classification of the different variations of madness appearing in Zacchia’s Quaestiones 
medico legales  (1621-1635) proved to have long-lasting effects in the legal practice of the Italian peninsula. 
Calling into question the actual novelty of Zacchia’s work, scholars during the past decade have challenged the 
once indisputable position of Paolo Zacchia as the founder of forensic medicine, placing his work in a larger 
development that stretches at least two centuries back. See Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families, 




but also in physical signs) so that judges could carefully assess the level of mental impairment 
they were faced with, and establish a penalty in accordance with the level of responsibility it 
entailed.556  
As shown in the previous chapters, legal inquiries into mental capacity that eventually 
led to interdiction were largely built upon the category of dementia as the generic term for 
legal mental incapacity. Criminal records, on the contrary, appear less definitive in this 
matter. In fact, it is difficult to find a pattern in the use of categories of criminal insanity in 
criminal procedures. While the types of insanity covered appear to be somehow broader than 
in civil procedures, the scope of the descriptions giving meaning to them is much more 
limited. The categories are generally bound to a basic legal language, such as the generic 
demente and mentecatta/o, or terms denoting intellectual impairment, such as stolidezza, 
melenssagine or fatuità. The employment of these categories demonstrates that the Roman 
legacy was still entrenched, having incorporated minor Italian variations after the vernacular 
was introduced as the official court language in the early sixteenth century.  Although there is 
some evidence of the use of specific medico-legal terms, such as lucid intervals, melancholy 
or frenzy, what prevails is the recurrent use of the less specialized pazzia (both legally and 
medically speaking). The evidence examined suggests that insanity pleas employed mostly 
simple, non-specialized categories of insanity. Different variants of stupidity, foolishness or 
even undefined unsoundness of mind are common to find. The legal category of demente, so 
vital for assessing mental incapacity in interdiction procedures is here even further diluted 
into a plain denomination of pazzo or matto.557  
The recurrent use of simple categories of madness and the cursory descriptions of the 
behaviours that accompanied them are contrasted profoundly with the complex nuances 
exposed in Zachia’s Quaestiones medico-legales or in early modern Italian Consilia.558 Even 
if the influential work of Zachia had organized and categorized a series of possible variants 
for criminal madness, with its corresponding legal implications, the criminal proceedings of 
the eighteenth century had diluted its employment to routine quotes to the author with no 
                                                
556 Colombero, “Un contributo alla formazione della nozione di malattia mentale” in De Bernardi, Follia, 
psichiatria e società. 
557 This finding contradicts previous studies that suggest that the term pazzo progressively fell into disuse 
towards the seventeenth century. See Ibid, p. 127.  
558 See, for instance, Monica Calabritto, “Medicina practica, consilia and the illnesses of the head in Girolamo 
Mercuriale and Giulio Cesare Claudini. Similarities and differences of the Sexes”, Medicina e storia 11 (2006), 
pp. 63-83; Calabritto, “A Case of Melancholic Humors”; Mellyn, Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families, 




further disquisition. But, in general, the characteristics of the records made it unnecessary to 
provide specific categories of criminal insanity. Interestingly, records of pre-trial or executive 
resolutions regarding criminal insanity utilise a vocabulary decisively more attuned to 
jurisprudential language, such as references to “lucid intervals” (lucidi intervalli), “furore of 
madness” (furore di pazzia) and “melancholy” (malinconia).559 Institutional eighteenth-
century records consistently demonstrate that the use of specialized language was highly 
dependant on the requirements of each procedural space in which madness makes its public 
appearance. This landscape, combined with the particularities of the Tuscan way of keeping 
criminal records explains the absence of more straightforward categories of criminal insanity. 
Interdiction procedures show that the category employed was not what mattered for 
assessing mental incapacity, but rather the events and circumstances surrounding the alleged 
insanity. It was the context, much more than the category, which gave government officials 
the clue to determine if the person (and the patrimony) needed the interdiction. Likewise, 
criminal insanity was also assessed in close examination with the events surrounding the 
crime, with particular attention to the biography of the accused and his or her behaviour after 
the crime was perpetrated. Nonetheless, whereas interdiction procedures scrutinized current 
and subsequent consequences of insanity, criminal procedures were concerned with its past.  
Criminal proceedings for suspected suicide are particularly useful for examining the 
principles used to assert soundness of mind and liability, so long as in these cases defensive 
efforts were directed to rebut the suspicion of madness. Absence of wrongful intent was not 
paired here with a lack of discernment, but with fortuity and accident. This demonstrated that 
although the suspects had dangerously injured themselves, it had been accidental or out of 
mere bad fortune, instead of “out of desperation.” The context surrounding the events was the 
key elements used to complete the puzzle, together with expert medical opinion on the self-
inflicted wounds. It could happen that testimonies identified a motive to commit suicide, 
declaring that the injury had been committed “out of desperation because he was litigating 
with his brother Carlo by cause of their paternal inheritance,” or that after a serious fall 
suffered some months before, the accused had given signs “that he was of imperfect mental 
sanity.”560 Nonetheless, even in these cases if the physical evidence was inconclusive, 
                                                
559 See ASF, Consiglio di Reggenza (hereafter CR), Fiscale, F. 756, no. 7, 1760-61 and F. 758, no. 61, 1754. 
560 “...il Lorenzi si ferì nella gola dalla disperazione, perchè litigava con Carlo suo fratello per causa dell’eredità 
paterna...” and “...affermando la madre, la sorella ed una compigionale, che costui fin dallo scorso dicembre 
doppo che cadde da un barbero mostrava di essere di non perfetta sanità di mente...” Respectively, ASF, OGB, 




conviction would not be reached. In the two cases cited here, charges were dropped with the 
argument that the injuries had not been lethal, and that the evidence was not enough to sustain 
that the injury had been self-inflicted.  
Two elements were carefully assessed by the judges: the physical evidence and the 
mental state of the injured prior to the alleged attempted suicide. The first consideration was 
in the charge of medical experts, while the second was largely based on hearsay testimonies. 
Although in the cases cited above the self-offenders were at the end acquitted, the testimonies 
gathered regarding their state of mind are all the same interesting. A clear connection was 
made between desperation or unmanageable emotional turmoil and suicide, on the one hand, 
and between mental impairment and suicide, on the other. In other words, suicide was clearly 
considered as a sign of insanity, placing Tuscany in the wider European scenario of the 
secularization of suicide.561 
Another case of attempted suicide, this time with fatal consequences, gives further 
insight into the logic employed to assess the state of mind in which the man found himself 
before and as he committed his desperate action. The case is disclosed in an extrajudicial 
inquiry developed by the Auditore Fiscale to ascertain if murder could be ruled out in a 
reported case of suicide. The information was that a fratello converso serving in the Jesuit 
college of San Giovannino had jumped off a terrace, “oppressed by a furore of madness” 
(soppresso da furore di pazzia) and was in mortal danger.562 The inquiry revealed that the 
fratello had a known tendency to suffer similar episodes of madness, and in fact had been 
“oppressed by a similar fury” in the past, on account of which he had been sent to Rome 
where he had managed to heal and had been consequently sent to serve in the college in 
Florence. The Auditore Fiscale was informed:  
“that he had not given other signs of mental confusion [sconcerto di mente], but that a 
few days before the accident occurred he had demonstrated [some] melancholy 
[dimostrata della malinconia], and that the same morning, while he was doing his 
service in the cell of father Niccolai, all of a sudden threw himself at his feet, asking 
                                                
561 For instance, before the eighteenth century English judges could still consider suicide as the outcome of 
rational behaviour. The problem of how to explain and punish suicide was a matter particularly intertwined with 
the religious sanction of the suicidal act. The issue at stake was that suicide could have been rationally planned, 
contradicting the principle of criminal intent and liability that necessarily needed to be ruled out in order to 
declare a criminal non compos mentis. See MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam, p. 137.  
562 Domenico Brichieri Colombi to the Council of Regency, ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 758, no. 61, December 1754. 




for forgiveness for all his faults, and that this [behaviour] had confirmed the suspicion 
of some new perturbation.”563  
 
The members of the congregation were so aware of the possible consequences of this 
new melancholy and perturbation that, just before the fatal accident occurred, they had 
arranged for his transfer to a place where he could be held under custody. Consequently, 
according to the Auditore Fiscale there was no need for a further inquiry into the “unfortunate 
accident”, given that it was evident that “he had exposed himself to the danger in which he 
died oppressed by a fit of frenzy [assalto di frenesia].”564 
That he acted motivated by the mental confusion caused by melancholy was therefore 
proven by his biography and previous behaviour. It was clear to the legally trained Auditore 
Fiscale that responsibility for the crime could only be assigned to the poor converso, and that 
his perturbed state of mind had led him to the fatal end. Moreover, the situation was so clear 
to the authorities that it was decided not to follow regular criminal proceedings, revealing yet 
another possible hint as to why it is so difficult to find insanity pleas in the Tuscan criminal 
records. Although we cannot identify any expression that indicates that the suicidal act was 
morally condemned or that it was regarded as a sin, it was clearly better left concealed than 
publicised through the proceedings of a regular trial.  
Which actions denoted awareness of one’s doings, which were the product of a 
deranged mind, was highly dependent not only on the context and events surrounding the 
crimes, but also on the behaviour of the defendant during trial. It was vital to assess if they 
understood the consequences of their actions, if they remembered them, if they felt any 
remorse, or how they explained what had happened. Here the supervision exerted by the Otto 
di Guardia over local criminal courts could result in a harsher sentence for someone whose 
insanity defence had been considered plausible in the first place.565 This was the case for 
Santa Venturini, tried for infanticide in 1730, who pleaded innocent claiming that she had not 
                                                
563 “Che non aveva dato altro segno di sconcerto di mente; ma che pochi giorni prima del seguito accidente 
aveva dimostrata della malinconia, e che in quella stessa mattina, facendo il suo servizio nella stanza del padre 
Niccolai, a un tratto se gli era gettato a piedi, chiedendoli perdono de suoi mancamenti, e che questa cosa aveva 
confermato il sospetto di qualche sua nuova turbazione”, Ibid.   
564 “A me non sembra che sia luogo a far di vantaggio in questo disgraziato accidente, vedendosi 
manifestamente che sorpreso da un’assalto di frenesia il povero religioso si espose al pericolo, in cui perì”, Ibid.  
565 The Otto di Guardia was at the centre of the criminal system, and supervised local courts. The Otto’s 
decisions were in turn supervised by the Auditore Fiscale, in the name of the Grand Duke. For an overview, see 
Antonelli, “La magistratura degli Otto di Guardia”; Brackett, Criminal Justice and Crime and Floriana Colao, 
“La giustizia criminale come momento di identità dello stato toscano”, in Ascheri and Contini La Toscana in età 




been aware of her pregnancy and that she had suffered a natural abortion.566 To uphold her 
innocence, she argued that her actions were the result of her “simplicity and foolishness” 
(semplicità e stolidezza), which made her behave “like a mad person without a brain” (come 
una pazzerella, e senza cervello).567 She had let herself be deflowered only due to her 
simplicity and naivety (dabbenaggine), she explained to the authorities. Nonetheless, her 
simplicity and foolishness could not be proven according to the Otto officials and, quite the 
contrary, her depositions demonstrated that she possessed sufficient intelligence to have 
realized she was pregnant and understood the consequence of her actions. Particularly since 
she had confessed her crime several times during the proceedings, although had afterwards 
retracted. Thus, her actions were held “to come from malice and not from simplicity”, causing 
her to be sentenced to seven years at the Stinche (the Florentine prison) instead of the two 
years of internal exile (confino) originally proposed by the regional court.568 She had avoided 
death penalty, however.    
The crucial point in an insanity defence was to demonstrate that the accused was 
indeed devoid of will and intention. According to the legal principles, absence of will and 
intention implied lack of malice and premeditation, which were the fundamental elements to 
determine liability. For this reason, criminals resorting to the insanity defence strived to 
convince the judges that they lacked malice, and that the crime, particularly if murder, had 
been the result of an accident or the effect of their diminished comprehension of reality.569 At 
the base of insanity defences, therefore, was the argument that there was no motive for the 
crime. Nothing could have predicted it and nothing in the previous behaviour of the accused, 
except from the fact that they were deemed mad, anticipated the crime.  
The case of Natale Righini from Firenzuola, tried in 1730 for attempted parricide, 
illustrates how insanity defences were considered by Tuscan criminal justice. Although 
testimonies argued on his behalf, including from Righini’s father and brother, stated that he 
was matto, the judges questioned the level of mental disturbance he suffered from and, 
                                                
566 “Che la medesima è tenuta innocente di detto fatto, e creduto, che l’aborto si a seguito naturalmente, e che 
non si sia accorta della gravidanza per essersi supposta idropica...”. ASF, OGB, Negozi dei Rettori, F. 2134, 
Negozio 7275, no. 1, June 1730. A similar line of defence was used by Maria Angiola Comanducci, in ASF, 
OGB, Suppliche, F. 2499, no. 74, November 1720. Pleading innocent to the charges of infanticide was a 
recurrent strategy by women in early modern Italy as a last, and many times useless effort to conceal the shame 
of the illegitimate child. See Adriano Prosperi, Dare l’anima. Storia di un infanticidio (Turin: Einaudi, 2005).  
567 ASF, OGB, Negozi dei Rettori, F. 2134, Negozio 7275, no. 1, June 1730.  
568 “...precedente operato procedesse da malizia, e non da semplicità...”, Idem. 
569 On the classification of evidence to prove insanity in early modern Italian legal procedures, see Boari, Qui 




particularly, the legal consequences derived from it. The facts surrounding the crime were that 
Righini was a young man who refused to work and insisted on wandering about in complete 
idleness, as did many other disorderly young men of the time. He had shot his father when the 
latter was reproving him for his refusal to stay at home and work as he was supposed to. 
Although the officials of the Otto di Guardia in Florence conceded that a motive for the crime 
could not be identified, given the father had been only “lovingly” reprimanding his son when 
the so-called matto had pulled the trigger, Righini’s alleged dementia (se sia o non sia 
veramente demente) needed further proof. Four new witnesses were examined to assert his 
mental condition, of whom we are given no information regarding their identities. The inquiry 
revealed, according to the Florentine officials, that he:  
“is not mad [pazzo] but only slightly diminished of the brain [scemo di cervello], 
which is not in a degree that deprives him the cognition of what he does, since both 
before and after the crime under inquiry, he could manage his affairs [fare i fatti suoi] 
as any man. Although sometimes he went wandering here and there without working, 
he received his sacraments, attended mass and stayed at Church composed as the other 
men...”570  
The magistrates, therefore, considered him to be an ordinary man who neither gave motive to 
be laughed at nor to be admired. They conceded, nonetheless, that “maybe” he occasionally 
manifested some “inconsistences in his speech”, and sometimes walked decidedly towards a 
certain destination only to suddenly change his course for no reason, “which gave motive to 
those watching him to call him pazzo.”571 However, the fact that after the crime he fled from 
the paternal residence stood against him, for it was taken to reveal his awareness of the 
significance of his actions. Consequently, on account of the evidence gathered, the 
magistrates considered that “such a foolishness” (melensaggine), which only partially 
estranged him from reason, could “excuse him” only to a certain extent, but not completely.572 
As a consequence, although he was spared the death sentence, he was sentenced to the 
arbitrary penalty (pena arbitraria) of 10 years in the galleys plus a pecuniary penalty for 
illegal possession of weapons.   
                                                
570 “...si ricava che l’Inquisito non sia pazzo, ma solamente alquanto scemo di cervello, il che per altro sia in 
maniera che non gli tolga la cognizione di ciò, che opera, essendo che tanto avanti il delitto del quale si tratta, 
quanto dopo faceva i fatti suoi come gl’altri uomini, benche tal’ ora, andasse vagando in qua, e in la, senza 
lavorare, che si sacramentava, andava alla messa e stava nelle Chiese composto, come gl’altri uomini...”, ASF, 
OGB, Negozi dei Rettori, F. 2134, Negozio 7254, no. 1, April 1730. 
571 “...che non dava materia di riso, ne d’ammirazione, ma solo che tal’ ora s’incaminava alla rassegna, e giunto 
a mezza strada, senza alcun motivo tornava indietro, il che dava motivo, a chi lo vedeva di tacciarlo di pazzo, 
ricavandosi di più che forse tal ora potesse avere qualche incostanza nel discorso...” Idem.  




The degree into which the legal foundations of insanity pleas permeated through 
Tuscan society is hard to assess. When mental incapacity was argued during the trial, the 
records give only shallow glimpses into the characteristics and meanings of the alleged 
mental incapacity, and we often have no way of knowing how the defence was conducted or 
by whom. It has to be taken into account that eighteenth-century records of the crimes judged 
by the Otto di Guardia present mostly the summary of proceedings. Although it is possible to 
find records of the complete proceedings, it is difficult to come across an insanity defence in 
the hundreds of crimes recorded in no order. For this reason, the language of madness that we 
can access here is even more mediated than the one examined in interdiction procedures. We 
barely have occasion to glimpse the judges’ reasoning, and even less can we access the 
language of the accused and their relatives. Against this scenario, supplications provide a 
valuable counterpart, as their records tend to incorporate a wider variety of voices, although 
authorship is anyways a controversial matter.573   
If we follow the scholars who have examined Tuscan civil and criminal justice in the 
previous centuries, we can assume that legal arguments were fairly entrenched in society. 
Studies on criminal justice in medieval and early modern Italy have disclosed the population’s 
capacity to appropriate legal knowledge and judicial machinery, enabling them to make use of 
defensive strategies, and manage an instrumental use of justice.574 Centuries of appropriation 
and maturation of legal principles and judicial mechanisms provide the context of interdiction 
procedures in the eighteenth century. We know that the higher up on the social scale people 
were, the deeper and more influential was their relationship with public institutions. Here, 
again, language comes as a helpful tool to elucidate in part the problem. The evidence 
gathered suggests that there was a widespread social awareness regarding the implications of 
madness in legal responsibility. Petitioners repeatedly alleged that they were or that the 
accused was mentecatto, pazzo, unable to understand what they were doing, unable to act with 
premeditation, as we saw in the case of Righini and Venturini. The basic principle 
commanded was that their intellectual impairment and altered mental state prevented them 
from both commanding their actions and understanding their surroundings. However, I am 
                                                
573 Some of these petitions were signed by the avvocato dei poveri, others were directly written by relatives or 
by the convicted felons themselves. Who wrote the petition, and the ability to argue exculpatory circumstances 
was directly related to the social origin of the petitioners. Poorer prisoners made use of the public lawyers, richer 
ones could write directly themselves, and could even afford the costs of private legal advice.    
574 The extent of the instrumentalization, and the space of manoeuvre given by Italian legal frameworks is a 
matter of debate. For an overview of the discussion, see Dean, Crime and Justice, 17-28. See also Bellabarba, 




more cautions regarding the social permeation of more specialized medico-legal concepts, 
such as lack of malice or impunity or notions about the different gradations of criminal intent 
and diminished accountability derived from madness. The appearance of these specialized 
legal notions can be interpreted, we can safely assume, as the sign of the involvement of legal 
advice. At a social, non-specialized level, there was a well-established awareness of the 
effects of pleading insane, but the arguments and resources of knowledge to do it varied 
greatly according to wealth and education.  
In 1743, Lorenzo Buonriposi was convicted of sodomy, and sentenced arbitrarily to 10 
years in the galleys. Shortly after the sentence had been issued, his parents petitioned the 
Grand Duke to obtain the grazia of a full pardon or, at least, a reduction of the sentence, 
declaring that it was invalid and needed revision. The criminal proceedings reported that 
Buonriposi had confessed voluntarily not only that he had sodomized the other suspect, but 
also to have been sodomized by him and others several times, and to have masturbated 
“almost every day” for the last “seven or eight years.” Using terms which suggest they had 
received legal advice, the plaintiffs claimed that the criminal prosecution had been 
“irregularly fabricated”, inasmuch as there was no record of the insanity plea that had been 
entered in Lorenzo’s defence and, furthermore, there was no evidence against him. Above all, 
his “fatuity and foolishness” (fatuità, e stolidezza) rendered him “incapable of malice”, 
making him “non punishable” (sarebbe impunibile).575  
The reasoning behind this petition in many aspects escapes the norms of similar 
requests to mitigate sentences on the grounds of insanity. Direct reference to eminently legal 
arguments such as that the legal proceedings were to be declared null, or that the accused was 
incapable of malice and deserved impunity, were not the norm. Even less frequent was the use 
of the Latin terms that appeared in this petition (nullo iuris ordine servato) to refer to the 
breach of legal norms denounced in the proceedings. Even the lay testimonies supporting the 
petition suggest direct legal counselling, for they were crafted in close compliance with the 
                                                
575 “...rappresentano essere stato detto Lorenzo nel Tribunale del Potestà di Detto luogo ingiustamente 
processato per supposta sodomia, e successivamente essere stato per resoluzione del Magistrato degl’Otto 
ordinato doversi condannare arbitrariamente nella pena vituperosa della galera per anni dieci, ma perche detta 
resoluzione è destituta d’ogni fondamento di ragione per le manifeste nullità del processo sopra di ciò fabbricato 
irregolarmente, et nullo iuris ordine servato contro detto Lorenzo che attesa la sua fatuità, e stolidezza, come 
incapace di malizia, sarebbe impunibile, sebbene nulla costi in processo, anzi escluso resti il preteso delitto, per 
cui non ostante senza riguardo alcuno alle ragioni addotte, e militanti a sua difesa, è stato così precipitosamente 
risoluto in gravissimo pregiudizio del proprio interesse, e della salute, non meno che della buona fama della 
famiglia, e del parentado tutto, che resta aggravato da pena così infame...” ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2523, no. 




basic legal signs used to define a lack of discernment by reason of mental impairment: 
behaviour and cognition similar to that of a child and imperfections in his speaking.576  
Finally, the petitioners presented the text of his legal defence (which, although it was 
not signed, was clearly written in the vocabulary of the legal profession), where it was argued 
that his confession needed to be interpreted as the product of insanity and stupidity 
(confessione insensata, e da stolto), and that it had been extorted through illegal means. 
Lorenzo had invented the facts of his confession and, furthermore, the medical exams had 
determined him as being in “the perfect state of his virginal innocence.” Thus, not only was 
there no physical proof of his sodomitical practices, but he also lacked the “virile and robust 
complexion” of those who were prone to masturbation. He finally stressed Lorenzo’s 
impunity on account of his fatuity and dementia. 
According to the Otto officials, and taking into account the facts reported by the 
defence, Buonriposi’s confession in fact not only seemed implausible, but was contradicted 
by the medical exam. As a result, the initial sentence was cancelled, and he was temporarily 
“imprisoned” in his own house, from where he had fled.  At the end, clearly favouring the 
hypothesis of his impunity, his sentence was commuted to prison (we are not told the number 
of years) provided the family would pay his maintenance.  
 
Attenuating Circumstances 
The assessment of liability, motivation and criminal intent considered not only mental 
impairment and madness as exculpatory, but also other circumstances such as drunkenness, 
and justified angry reactions. Crimes committed while heavily inebriated or seriously 
influenced by a strong and justified rage were considered as attenuating circumstances 
deserving a lenient sentence, provided the accused had appeared before court. If 
contumacious, on the contrary, any attenuating circumstance was insufficient argument 
against the presumption of guilt derived from being a fugitive.   
Drunkenness appears to be particularly connected to crimes of violence and assault, 
although it surpasses violent crimes to become a sort of immanent presence of criminal 
behaviour in general. Crimes committed while “altered by wine” (alterato dal vino), or while 
                                                
576 “Lorenzo di Giuseppe Buonriposi, d’età di soli anni 19 in 20, oltre l’avere una loquela balbuziente, e mal 
intelligibile, è insieme d’un naturale così semplice, e privo di quella cognizione, e malizia, che anno gl’altri della 
sua, e molto minore età, che, come stolido, e melenso, è giudicato incapace di commettere maliziosamente 




“not being in a perfect cognition” (non era in perfetta cognizione) by reason of drunkenness 
could also be taken to deserve mitigated sentences, provided that drunkenness could be 
corroborated and had been so evident as to give recognizable signs, such as staggering.577 
Additionally, it helped the cause if the accused could prove that the crime had been 
unpremeditated and fortuitous, so that motive and wrongful intent could be discarded.   
Alleging drunkenness at the moment of the crime served both to demonstrate that the 
crime had been unintentional and to diminish liability. The effects of alcohol and the 
instrumental use of the plea of drunkenness appear to have been known throughout all 
segments of society. The frequency by which drunkenness was used to explain why a crime 
had been committed suggests that the notion of intoxication as a factor that diminished 
culpability was widely accepted. The effects of inebriation on the mind were discussed in 
civil and criminal procedures, and drunkenness constituted a recurrent line of defence in 
criminal prosecution or in petitions for a reduction of sentence. Many crimes, particularly 
street brawls and different levels of assault took place in the environs of taverns and were 
attributed to heavy drinking, explained as a state of being “overheated with wine” (riscaldati 
dal vino), “almost drunk” (quasi imbriacato) or even so “drunk” that he “staggered due to the 
wine he had drunk.”578 The many crimes committed in a state of inebriation that were 
reported in the seventeenth-century Casi Tragici attest to the wide acknowledgement of the ill 
effects of alcohol and its capacity to create a temporary lack of full discernment.579  
Drunkenness appears almost invariably associated with male criminality. Although it 
is possible to find inebriated women involved in criminal acts, it is mostly tied to prostitution 
and to raving madness. Bearing a more straightforward moral condemnation in the case of 
women, alcohol’s power to obscure the human mind is generally portrayed as equally 
damaging for both sexes.580 Male drunkenness generated a more ambivalent response, 
eliciting both moral condemnation and pity. As a man who had been insulted while severely 
inebriated framed it, he had been abused at a time when “he was not in a rational state”, and 
                                                
577 ASF, OGB, Negozi dei Rettori, F. 2134, Negozio 7229, no. 1, February 1729 and ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 
2540, no. 195, November 1765, respectively.  
578 Respectively, ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2537, no. 173, August 1761, Ibid., F. 2499, no. 28, December 1720 
and Ibid., F. 2531, no. 54, September 1751. 
579 ASF, Manoscritti, N. 165, “Casi Tragici”. 
580 Regarding two prostitutes, for example, it was said that when they were drunk, “they have less respect than 
when they are in their brain, although they are always dissolute [scorrette] and impertinent.” OGB, 
Straordinarie, F. 2661, no. 49, c. July 1720. For a case that exemplifies the association between female madness 
and recurrent inebriation, see my discussion regarding the case of Maria Francesca Paoli del Feo whose mental 




“merited to be shown compassion, not insulted.”581 In fact, according to the testimonies, on 
the night of the offence he “was drunk and out of himself, and did not know what he did or 
said, to the point that he fell into the Arno, and had rendered himself ridiculous to the whole 
town of Brozzi for the strambottoli [love songs] he uttered.”582 The fact that drunkenness 
diminished liability did not imply that severe drunkenness was not generally condemned, 
particularly if the inebriated man demonstrated that he was unable to hold his liquor.  
Pleas of drunkenness evidently did not always result in a lenient sentence. Precisely 
because of its popularity and association with male criminality, judges were particularly 
cautious in examining the level of inebriation, a delicate matter to prove. Additionally, 
diminished responsibility by reason of inebriation produced a moral dilemma for the 
authorities, only magnified by its permeation throughout all social levels. In this sense, the 
need to pass exemplary and deterrent sentences was a particular concern regarding 
drunkenness, for it was too easy to allege total intoxication at the moment the crime had been 
committed and thus escape punishment. For this reason, pleas of drunkenness in Tuscany 
resulted in mitigated sentences which in the case of homicide or theft served to commute from 
the death penalty or a lifetime sentence in the galleys to relegation (confino) for life. For less 
serious crimes, such as brawls with no injuries, arbitrary penalties were less severe and could 
even result in no penalty provided the accused could present a peace settlement with the 
injured parties.  
Drunkenness fell under the category of exculpatory circumstances because the 
temporary mental obfuscation derived from inebriation was held to produce a total loss of 
control. If a drunkard had no control over himself when committing the crime, he could not 
be held responsible for it; he could not have avoided it, had not planned it and was not 
conscious when committing it. Provided the person had not planned the crime before getting 
drunk, once inebriated it was not anymore in their hand to avoid it and, furthermore, they had 
not been in a state of consciousness while committing it. The same argument applied to other 
temporal derangements, such as strong passions, similarly believed to have the power of 
obfuscating the person’s mental faculties. However, as Savelli warned his readers, to escape 
                                                
581 “...come da gran tempo astemio per cagione di povertà, essendogli stato dato dagli amici il conforto di un 
poco di vino, restò inebriato; e tornandosene a casa senza dar fastidio a nessuno, che ne pure era capace di darlo, 
fù insultato per ischerzo...allorche fù ingiuriato non era in istato ragionevole... supplica voler degnarsi di 
renderlo esente dalla spesa dell’offese, perche trattegli da quello, che lo ha ingiuriato in un tempo, che meritava 
di essere compassionato, e non insultato...”. ASF, OGB, Straordinarie, F. 2679, no. 265, september 1757.  
582 “...era umbriaco [sic], e fori di sè, e che non sapia quello che si faceva e diceva, a segno tale che cade in 




from ordinary penalty the crime must have been committed under “just rage, anger, or pain 
caused by offences, provocation or other just causes.”583 To be given a lighter punishment, the 
offender needed to prove both that his or her rage had been justified, and that it had been such 
as to temporarily obfuscate his or her judgement. This was the case for a man charged with 
the attempted murder of his brother, who was spared the death sentence on account of a 
temporal mental perturbation caused by anger. Although the accused had been caught 
violently beating his wife, which had prompted his brother to intervene, the judges argued on 
his behalf that it had to be acknowledged that his reaction “revealed a disturbed mind derived 
from his wife’s provocation”, because she had insulted him as “bestiaccia” when he 
remonstrated her over some household duties.584 His mental disturbance had been further 
aggravated, in the eyes of the judges, when his brother sided with his disobedient wife. On 
account of this he was “only” given 10 years in the galleys. To mitigate his penalty, the 
judges had also taken into account that the bullet had not been found, so it was uncertain 
whether he had loaded the weapon with mortal ammunition.  
 
Possible Destinies for the Criminally Insane 
When judges considered that there was enough evidence to establish that the accused 
was not liable for his or her actions by reason of madness, the legal proceedings were likely to 
be abbreviated and end with a lighter penalty than what was usually imposed for the given 
crime. It could even happen that the “mania” suffered by the accused prevented the criminal 
court from initiating normal criminal proceedings, forcing the central government to come up 
with an alternative solution to deal with the case.585 In any case, criminal insanity posed not 
                                                
583 “Delitti commessi per iracondia, ira, o giusto dolore causato da ingiurie, provocazioni, o altre giuste cause 
non si puniscono di pena ordinaria, ma d’altra arbitraria più mite secondo la qualità dell’eccesso, e persone, 
mentre che il delinquente non perseverasse nella mala volontà ratificando anco doppo il delitto, ò che la causa 
dell’ira, ò provocazione fusse ingiusta, come se egli fusse stato il primo a provocare, ò in altra maniera facendo 
cosa illecita, e proibita, o che l’ira e causa di essa fusse stata molto leggiera, e non si provasse, perchè in questi 
casi potrebbe essere lungo anco alla pena ordinaria...” Savelli, Pratica Universale, “Delitti”, p. 111.  
584 “...non può negarsi, che nell’Inquisito si scorga turbata la ragione della provocazione della moglie, qual 
turbazione è altresì certa, che sarà a misura cresciuta dato che l’accapigliasse col fratello...”. ASF, OGB, Negozi, 
F. 2134, Negozio 7249, March 1730.  
585 In January 1760 Giovanni del Panaio from Lucignano was received in Santa Dorotea as pazzo furioso. He 
had been periodically subject to episodes of frenzy, which came to be associated with the fits of epilepsy he had 
suffered since early youth. During one of these episodes he managed to loosen the bonds which secured him to 
his bed, and ultimately managed to beat his wife to death. According to the Auditore Fiscale, Brichieri Colombi, 
Giovanni’s delirium made it impossible to cross-examine him, and so the criminal proceedings were interrupted 
and he was asked to intervene. Given that the local prison could not hold the “maniac” safely, the only available 




only the problem of how to identify madness and determine liability but, furthermore, it 
created the dilemma of what to do with the criminally insane. The pressing matters were 
where to send them and who could be held responsible for their subsequent behaviour.  
According to Mellyn, until the seventeenth century the issue of criminal insanity 
amounted to a problem of guardianship. Before the foundation of Santa Dorotea in 1643 there 
was no official place for the custody of the insane, while prisons were designed to be only a 
temporary measure. Therefore, a sentence of life imprisonment generated a problem of 
resources that was difficult to overcome, since the prisoners’ maintenance had to be covered 
by the families. Nonetheless, if the solution was not confinement, the criminally insane had to 
be taken care of by their families, which in turn was a difficulty not always easily resolved. 
As a consequence, the problem of what to do with the criminally insane was addressed 
through collaborative efforts between families, communities and courts. Until the seventeenth 
century, Mellyn stresses, the tendency was to send the criminally insane home, which made 
the family the primary custodial institution.586     
In my view, Mellyn and other scholars with similar positions overestimate the impact 
of the foundation of Santa Dorotea in the fate of the criminally insane. I will explain the 
admission procedure to Santa Dorotea in the next section, but for now let me say that since its 
foundation until the mid-eighteenth century, the hospital only accepted patients who could 
pay for their maintenance. Although since 1750 charity maintenance was assured for every 
mad person who was in need of admission to Santa Dorotea, this change did not produce a 
considerable impact on the situation of the criminally insane. When criminals were found to 
suffer a kind of madness that justified their committal to Santa Dorotea, their transfer would 
be ordered, but this would only last while the disorder proved to be of a dangerous kind. In 
some of these cases, the episode of madness was triggered while they were in prison and after 
they had been sentenced; in others, they were found to be mad during the trial, and thus 
transferred immediately to the hospital. Given that Santa Dorotea was generally overcrowded, 
                                                                                                                                                   
dealing with these cases of serious and evidently dangerous madness, explaining to some extent the relative 
scarcity of these kind of cases in the records of the Otto di Guardia. ASF, Nove Conservatori del Dominio, 
Memoriali Spediti, F. 1295, no. 160, January-February 1760.      
586 Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families, chapter 2. Mellyn builds her argument by challenging previous 
studies claiming that criminal reforms made by the duchy had disastrous results for the insane. See Magherini 




its administrative board took especial care to ensure that patients were not kept there longer 
than was strictly necessary.587  
Clearly, then, the problem of how to decide the destiny of the criminally insane was 
only temporarily solved with Santa Dorotea, for once the patient was released the decision 
had to be taken again. Their fate was determined by taking into consideration factors such as 
economic resources, if the person had family networks who could assume their custody, their 
physical and mental health and that of their families, among other factors. When the kind of 
madness ceased to be dangerous or if it had never been of a dangerous kind, then they could 
be sent to prison for a period of time. After this, provided they had relatives who could 
assume their custody, then they could be sent home. Otherwise, they could be sent into exile 
if they had no family networks and had the physical health to provide for their own 
maintenance. For instance, Antonio Razzuoli, convicted of theft and sentenced to five years of 
relegation (confino) to Grosseto, was caught breaching his sentence. But, because he was 
found to be demented, he was sent to Santa Dorotea and his sentence suspended. Nine months 
later he was dismissed because his madness ceased to be dangerous. Given that he also 
suffered some physical indispositions, it was not considered suitable for him to return to his 
relegation at Grosseto so the Auditore Fiscale Domenico Brichieri Colombi instead suggested 
that he be entrusted to the care of his father, who would be in charge of his custody and 
responsible for any actions he might commit.588  
Criminal responsibility was a highly delicate matter, not only because it depended on 
the contextual nature of insanity but also because it posed the problem of coming up with a 
sentence that was both fair and exemplary. As Rabin has put it, “The history of the insanity 
plea documents a tension between a belief in the just exculpation of crimes committed by the 
                                                
587 For instance, in 1753 Benedetto Sezzatini was charged for assault in a brawl, but during the legal enquiries 
carried out in the informatory process the judges came to the conclusion that he was pazzo furioso, and so he was 
transferred to Santa Dorotea. ASF, SD, Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 1, no. 27, September 1753. For other 
examples of mad criminals transferred from prison to Santa Dorotea see ASF, SD, Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 2, 
no. 25, August 1756; Ibid, F. 3, no.3, December 1757 and no. 9, April 1758; Ibid., F. 8, no. 17, April 1770; ASF, 
OGB, Suppliche, F. 2542, no. 34, October 1767. Given the unconnected nature of the registers of the Otto di 
Guardia with those of Santa Dorotea, the records of the latter are not necessarily informative about the nature of 
the crime or the sentence given to the transferred criminals. However, it seems clear that only people convicted 
of minor crimes were released from S. Dorotea and sent back home, and in cases of a more severe mental 
impairment their release depended on their familial situation. On this see also the next section.  
588 ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2542, no. 27, September 1767. Permuting prison for exile solved the problem of 
financing through the felon’s own capacity to work. For example, a certain Domenico Sorcini, convicted of 
pimping, petitioned to change his sentence from the galleys to internal exile (confino) by reason of his being 
mentecatto. He was granted the grazia, but on the condition that he had the capacity to maintain himself there. 




insane and the fear of unpunished dissemblers and dangerous lunatics.”589 When dealing with 
insanity pleas, Tuscan judges tended to favour the strategy of giving mitigated sentences that 
could be further remitted through a supplication rather than resorting to open acquittal.590 
Evidence suggests that the preferred path for dealing with criminal insanity was remission 
through grace, which left intact the deterrent effect without contradicting the principle of 
impunity by reason of madness.     
The criminally insane were usually spared the death sentence and the galleys, but not 
necessarily prison. Criminal insanity, although not deserving punishment, needed 
confinement both for security reasons and for exemplary purposes. However, the tendency 
that can be observed is that imprisonment generally was not for life, given the financial 
constraints it inevitably carried. Even when criminals were sentenced to prison for life, they 
were likely to be able to supplicate for their release years later, or be accountable for a ducal 
pardon. As the Auditore Fiscale explained to the Regency in 1747, it was advisable for the 
Grand Duke to demonstrate his mercy every once in a while by giving general pardons to 
criminals who had been imprisoned in the Stinche for a long time and whose crime, 
preferably of a minor nature, had been expiated through the “vexations of imprisonment” 
[gravità della prigionia].591 At the same time it demonstrated the duke’s compassion and pity, 
it served to offload the fiscal burden of maintaining those prisoners whose families could not 
finance their imprisonment. Some restrictions applied to the potential beneficiaries of the 
pardon, among them mad prisoners who lacked family networks that could assume their care. 
Thus, liberation or confinement of the criminally mad was tied to their family or social 
situation. If they had nobody to take care of them, they could not be left alone to wander the 
streets.  
As the cases of Righini, Venturini and Buonriposi disclose, the solution to criminal 
insanity, and to madness in general, was highly dependent on the social and economic 
                                                
589 Rabin, Identity, Crime and Legal Responsibility, p. 42.  
590 A certain Francesco Giani, tried for illegal possession of weapons, was given a mitigated, pecuniary sentence 
with a term of one month to supplicate for a full pardon because he was 85 years old, and “suffered in the brain” 
[avesse patito nel cervello]. Accordingly, he was given the grazie of his penalty after he petitioned as he had 
been told. ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2505, no. 73, August 1725. Although it was a minor crime, it is nonetheless 
telling regarding the strategy of avoiding a full acquittal from the beginning. On the laws against the possession 
of arms, see Brackett, Criminal Justice and Crime, p. 103.   
591 Giovanni Brichieri Colombi, ASF, Consiglio di Reggenza (hereafter CR), Fiscale, F. 755, no. 27, July 1747. 
On the practice of official pardons given to prisoners on important holy days or special occasions in previous 
centuries, see Brackett, Criminal Justice and Crime, p. 54. “Those not eligible for pardon were private debtors 
(8.42), the insane (3.42), those held for disobedience to their parents (0.71), those transferred into the prison 




situation of the accused. Families who could afford the necessary maintenance of their 
relatives in prison or in Santa Dorotea were more likely to obtain from the government the 
response they expected. The higher the families’ financial resources were, the more 
mechanisms they could count on to address the problem of their mad relatives, from space 
and personnel to keep them at home, to legal advice and access to the necessary knowledge to 
manoeuvre between the different offices and the judicial structure of the ducal government. In 
contrast, the situation of poorer people, like Righini and Venturini, left less space for 
negotiation. The collaborative model proposed by Mellyn appears, thus, to be still in force in 
the eighteenth century.  
Imprisonment was sometimes specifically requested by relatives, both as a security 
measure, and as a way to conceal the crimes committed by the deranged from the view of the 
rest of society. It was in fact routinely employed as a disciplining measure to reform unruly 
relatives throughout Europe.592 However, it should be taken into account here that the 
disciplining of the unruly members of society was seen as the shared responsibility of families 
and governments during the Ancien Régime. The destiny of mad people was the result of a 
series of negotiations between the authorities and their families, which took into consideration 
issues such as the family’s resources, the person’s current and chronicled behaviour, their 
level of dangerousness and capacity to disturb, and the need to defend the family honour, 
among other concerns. The next case illustrates particularly well the private and public 
concerns that had to be combined when determining a suitable solution for the problem of 
madness. 
In July 1760 the officials of the Council of Regency had to deal with a case of an 
allegedly demented man, Domenico Chelli, who had been involved in the serious crime of the 
abduction of a nun eleven years before. The crime, committed in Pisa, had created a scandal 
that was still remembered by the population of Pisa and Livorno, where Chelli was from. 
Chelli had fled from Tuscany, having only recently returned “completely demented”, and 
recklessly exposing himself to arrest. While he was in a prison of Livorno, his brothers 
requested his transfer to a place where he could be under the proper care and custody that his 
                                                
592 Houston, Madness and Society, p. 65. See also Farge and Foucault, Le Désordre des familles; Spierenburg, 
“Imprisonment and the Family”; Catharina Lis and Hugo Soly, Disordered Lives: Eighteenth-Century Families 




present condition demanded. Although there was no sentence for his crime, the brothers 
argued, they did not intend to keep him at liberty after his “scandalous behaviour”.593  
The problem for the authorities was twofold. On the one hand, the man, if indeed 
found to be insane, was unaccountable for his actions. But the crime was too serious not to be 
clearly and publicly condemned and punished. On the other hand, the crime could no longer 
be prosecuted given that more than 10 years had elapsed since it had been committed. As the 
Otto di Guardia could no longer prosecute him using the ordinary proceedings the matter was 
taken directly to the Council of Regency.     
According to the governor of Livorno, after the crime Chelli had demonstrated a 
behaviour “full of irregularity and extravagances [pieno d’irregolarità, e stravaganza]”, so 
even if more than ten years had elapsed since he committed the abduction, and the legal 
period for its prosecution had been exceeded, the crime had been too notorious and too 
serious not to be punished. “It would seem monstrous, particularly to this ignorant people [of 
Livorno] to see at liberty a man of such character.”594 Therefore, despite deeming Chelli to be 
mad, the governor considered it better if he were to be taken away from the city so as to give 
a clear sign to the population that his crime was extremely reprehensible. The concern for 
setting a clear public example in the management of Chelli’s crime was shared by the officials 
of the Consulta. Accordingly, they specifically requested that a medical specialist (perito 
fiscale) be heard on the matter of Chelli’s madness, with the scope of determining if his 
madness were “true, continual and complete [vera, continua, e totale].” If this were the case, 
then “the confinement of Chelli in a place for mad people [pazzi] would suffice, [for] in that 
case to the eyes of everyone he would be sufficiently punished by his infelicitous state.”595 On 
the contrary, if his madness was found to be feigned, or not complete and continual, 
confinement in a place for the custody of the mad was not enough to punish him.596  
                                                
593 Petition signed by Liborio and Luigi Chelli, ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 756, no. 7, July 1760. 
594 “...dopo un fatto si notorio parebbe mostruoso particolarmente a questa ignorante popolazione il vedersi in 
libertà un uomo di tal carattere”. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 756, no. 7, Letter from the Governatore di Livorno to the 
Consiglio di Reggenza, November 1760.  
595 “...il chiudere il Chelli in un luogo da pazzi poteva bastare a qualunque effetto, rimanendo egli agl’occhi di 
tutti in tal caso punito abbastanza dall’infelicità del suo stato.” Report given by the Consulta about the Chelli 
case, ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 756, no. 7, January 1761. The Consulta (High Court of Appeals) was integrated by 
three Auditori, Girolamo Finetti, Marco Filippo Bonfini and Domenico Brichieri Colombi (Auditore Fiscale).  
596 That it was relatively simple to argue an insanity defence had been the incubus of criminal jurisprudence 
since ancient Rome. The dangers of feigned insanity both in ecclesiastical and criminal procedures had also 
come to the attention of Paolo Zacchia in his Quaestiones medico legales. See my comments on this in Chapter 




The consulted physician indicated that Chelli suffered from “lucid intervals and 
fixations”,597 in a testimony the dullness and brevity of which contrasts with the generous 
information given by the Governor of Livorno.  
“I do not believe, [the latter said], that the Dottore [Lawyer] Domenico Eusebio Chelli 
has ever given up the old maxims of his frenetic vanity that have directed him into 
such fatal accidents, and I think that if he were to be left master of his own liberty his 
sort of madness would lead him to other situations of foul consequence.”598   
 
Chelli’s past behaviour was a clear proof both of his derangement and of the extent of 
its consequences, the governor considered. In 1759, for example, he had been in London, 
where on account of some violent reactions and some serious offences against the Princess of 
Wales he had been committed to a madhouse. But he would not stop there. His altered 
imagination made him delusional to the point of pretending to be a noble who had supposedly 
been betrothed to the Princess, using a different name and fake noble title, and not 
recognizing his family. Although at first glance he seemed perfectly normal, the type of 
“frenetic ailment” (male frenetico) and “inconstancy” (levità) that affected him pervaded his 
“spirit” and each of his actions and ideas.599  To make matters worse, he gave no sign of 
repentance or of understanding the gravity of the crime he had committed in Pisa so many 
years ago. Based on this information, the Consulta agreed he was “mad, and irrevocably mad 
[pazzo, e pazzo irremediabile]”, suffering a “special frenzy” that “floods his whole spirit, 
influences his ideas and commands his actions,” despite at first glance seeming perfectly 
normal, and a “devotee of literature, sober, modest and without other vices.”600  
The decision of what to do with him was not simple, given the considerations involved 
when the future of a criminally insane was decided. Authorities and relatives debated not only 
                                                
597 “...avendoli fatte varie interrogazioni per vedere se era di mente sana, dico che a molte di dette interrogazioni 
rispose a dovere, ma in qualche sua risposta si conosceva esservi del lucido intervallo, e della fissazione”, 
Testimony of Giuseppe Socci, “Medico del Pubblico della città di Livorno”, ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 756, no. 7, 
November 1760. 
598 “Non credo, che il Dottore Domenico Eusebio Chelli abbia mai lasciato le massime invecchiate della sua 
frenetica vanità, che l’anno condotto a si funesti accidenti, e credo che se nuovamente si rendesse padrone della 
libertà sua sarebbe portato dal suo genere di pazzia ad’altri casi di brutta conseguenza.” Report of the Governor 
of Livorno. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 756, no. 7, December 1760. 
599 “...nella specie del suo male frenetico, e della sua levità che inonda tutto il di lui spirito, e colla quale anima e 
regola tutte le sue idee, i suoi movimenti, e le sue azioni; si palesa il detto Chelli per vero demente, e tutto il 
detto Chelli reputa lecito alla sua pazza grandezza, e potenza, e credo sarebbe pronto a ricadere negl’eccessi 
possibili se diventasse libero signore de suoi arbitri.” Ibid.  
600 Said to be a “...vero pazzo senza rimedio nella specie di quella frenesia, che in esso inonda tutto lo spirito, 
muove le idee, e regola le operazioni, ancorché nel resto egli apparisca amante della letteratura, sobrio, modesto, 





about criminal responsibility, but also negotiated the deterrent effect of the sentence. 
Sentences had to consider safety issues and at the same time allow for the humanitarian 
response madness was unanimously considered to deserve. Chelli was initially sent to the 
hospital of Santa Dorotea, but a note sent a few days later from the Regency declared that 
Chelli’s crime was too serious for him to be sent to Santa Dorotea, advocating instead for his 
confinement at home. Given that his relatives and the authorities of Livorno had requested the 
possibility of having him secluded at the Fortezza of Portoferraio, he was finally confined 
there. The three alternative destinies were conceived starting from the evidence that Chelli’s 
brothers were able to finance his maintenance in either of the places. In fact, imprisonment “at 
request” was not possible if this condition was not met.  
The detailed information provided by the government authorities had been 
complemented by specialized medical opinion to give further certainty of the “reality” of 
Chelli’s mental derangement. Theoretically, the Tuscan legal system established that criminal 
madness always had to be asserted through medical opinion.601 Nonetheless, evidence 
suggests that madness was generally asserted from lay testimonies corroborated by the direct 
observation of the judges. None of the criminal proceedings examined until now, save the 
Chelli case, suggest that medical practitioners were involved to assess the mental state of the 
accused. In the case of Chelli, in contrast, we have access to the complete medical testimony, 
only to discover that the medico-legal category of “lucid intervals and fixations” is largely 
inexpressive until we combine it with the much more meaningful report given by the local 
authority.  
The scarcity of medical testimonies in criminal procedures, also characteristic of the 
previous centuries in Tuscany, and of other early modern European scenarios, is not 
necessarily an expression of how medical knowledge on madness was valued in the 
eighteenth century.602 In legal practice, it was simply not necessary to medically certify 
madness to assess liability. Medical opinion was becoming increasingly important in Tuscany 
in order to determine proper punishment, which had to combine the need to convey that 
crimes were not treated with impunity with other considerations such as health and resources. 
These complementary considerations were generally faced after conviction, when not only 
                                                
601 “Delinquenti, e simili se siano furiosi, dementi, o pazzi ad effetto di scusarli dalle pene, o cose simili si deve 
stare al giudizio de’ Medici.” Savelli, Pratica Universale, p. 107. 
602 For an in-depth examination on the role and characteristics of medical expert opinion in the criminal and 




economic constrains but also the convicted’s medical situation moved the authorities to 
mitigate a sentence or grant a pardon.   
Not only physical ailments, but also mental afflictions were adduced by medical 
practitioners on behalf of convicted felons. This happened, for instance, with criminals said to 
suffer from epileptic fits or apoplectic “accidents”, in which cases the physicians argued that 
imprisonment or time in the galleys was detrimental to their health. Medical testimonies 
served in these cases to obtain a reduction or a permutation of sentence, which could be from 
forced labour to internal exile or prison, from the galleys to prison, from prison to exile, 
depending on the health condition of the convicted felon.603 The outcome of a petition was 
not dependant, however, upon the presentation or not of a medical testimony, as the next 
chapter will show.  
 
5. 2. Confinement in Mental Hospitals: Santa Dorotea and the Pazzeria of Santa Maria 
Nuova 
Since the ground-breaking work of Michel Foucault, madhouses or mental institutions 
have been considered the prototypical spaces of madness. Even if later studies, particularly in 
the last two decades, have demonstrated that madness was largely kept at home, mental 
institutions continue to be the cultural locus of madness.604 The Italian peninsula, and 
Tuscany in particular constitute no exceptions, with studies that have been primarily focused 
on the institutional dimension of madness. However, to my view we should approach the 
segregation of the mentally ill in Early Modern societies from a wider perspective, one that 
not only illuminates the relationship between families and institutionalization, as recent 
studies have done, but also has in mind the larger landscape in which madness made its 
appearance. When we examine confinement as only one of the many existing spaces where 
madness made an appearance in public life, the development of mental institutions acquires 
new meanings. Confinement was neither an isolated measure nor a definitive one, and the 
boundaries between society, authorities and institutions of confinement (both medical and 
purely custodial) were more fluid than what was originally thought.605 The model of the 
                                                
603 See, for instance, ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2530, no. 132, July 1750; Ibid., F 2532, no. 15, August 1752 or 
Ibid., F. 2537, no. 14, July 1762. .  
604 For the respective works, see the beginning of this chapter and the Introduction.  
605 Here the studies of Suzuki have proved invaluable. See, for instance “The Household and the Care of 




itineraries of madness provides the possibility of following the shapes adopted by madness 
through its different spaces of appearance, enriching its meanings and enlarging the scope of 
analysis. 
Calling for a more complex and flexible approach to the medicalization of madness, 
Lisa Roscioni has argued that Italian seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries mental institutions 
were at the same time spaces of confinement and exclusion, and spaces for the cure and 
treatment of the insane.606 In the case of early modern Tuscany, the birth of custodial and 
“increasingly” medicalized institutions especially destined for the mentally ill dates back to 
the mid-seventeenth century, when the Pia Casa di Santa Dorotea dei Pazzerelli was 
founded.607 Active since 1647, admissions were managed by the administration of the 
institution, composed of a group of “distinguished” lay Florentines, and was contingent upon 
the ability of the patient’s family to pay the maintenance fee. For this reason, and particularly 
in response to the problem of the insane kept at the Stinche prison, a special ward for the 
insane (the pazzeria) was opened in the general Tuscan hospital of Santa Maria Nuova in 
1688.608 The space destined for the mentally ill of Santa Maria Nuova was thus created to 
receive the poor patients who could not pay the fees of Santa Dorotea, although there is 
evidence that wealthier patients were also among its inmates from time to time.609 Until 1750, 
therefore, less wealthy families had to acquiesce in order for their mad relatives to be 
admitted to the pazzeria of Santa Maria Nuova at the discretion of the spedalingo (the 
hospital prefect).  
The criteria of admission until 1750 were fairly vague. Medical certification of the 
alleged madness was not required, and little clarification was made regarding the notion of 
pazzo/a that defined the category of confinement.610 Closer to jurisprudential than to medical 
notions of madness, patients were admitted because they were mentecatti, matterelli, matti, 
pazzi or furiosi, terms that were used “in complete synonymity.”611 Even if admission was 
                                                
606 Lisa Roscioni, “Soin et/ou enfermement? Hôpitaux et folie sous l’Ancien Régime”, Genèses 82 (2011), p. 
32.  
607 See Roscioni, Il governo della follia, pp. 57-153; Magherini and Biotti, L’isola delle Stinche, pp. 147-181; 
and of the same authors,“Un luogo della città per custodia de’pazzi”.  
608 On the Stinche as a place of reclusion for the insane following special requests, see Magherini and Biotti, 
L’isola delle Stinche, pp. 25-59.  
609 In fact, the records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli attest that Santa Maria Nuova was as common a destiny as 
Santa Dorotea for the mentally incompetent whose patrimonies were interdicted and their relative put under 
curatorship until 1750. See Chapter 6.  
610 ASF, SD, Memorie, Documenti, F. 23, no. 11, particularly “Del modo di ricevere i Mentecatti”.  




decided by the administrative structure of Santa Dorotea, the institution provided medical 
treatment for those who “could be brought back to a sound intellect.”612 In this sense, 
although admission was a bureaucratic procedure, based on lay definitions of insanity and 
dependant upon the families’ ability to pay, scholars have nonetheless approached the period 
as marking the initial steps towards the medicalization of insanity. To give an idea about the 
limited extent of the institutionalization of madness during this first period, between 1682 and 
1714 Santa Dorotea held an average of twelve patients per year, and fifteen between 1715 and 
1750. Although the first decades of the eighteenth century witnessed an increasing number of 
requests for committal, confinement still was an extreme solution. As Roscioni pointed out, 
madness continued to be largely a family matter during the century.613  
The mid-eighteenth century proved to be a turning point for the history of the 
institutionalization of the insane in Tuscany. In 1750, the pazzeria of Santa Maria Nuova was 
closed, and the Pia Casa di Santa Dorotea was transformed into a new, bigger institution, 
acquiring the status of Grand Ducal hospital “for the cure of all the diseases comprised in 
mania and the custody of those that are incurable.”614 The aim of the reform, as stated by the 
Motuproprio that enacted it, was “to provide for the many inconveniences innocently caused 
to the Public by the furious mad, abandoned and wandering through the public streets.”615 The 
ordinance stated that from there on patients could be received at public expense to be paid by 
Santa Maria Nuova and other charitable institutions if the person was from Florence, or by the 
community of origin if they were from the rest of the grand ducal territory. As a consequence, 
between 1751 and 1788 around half of the patients were admitted at public expense, and only 
a quarter of the total patients were Florentine. If between 1647 and 1750 there were 429 
admissions to Santa Dorotea, the number between 1751 and 1788 rose to 2411.616 
                                                
612 Only months after Santa Dorotea received its first “mentecatto”, the administrative congregation determined 
that a physician, Niccolò Buonaiuti, was to provide a medical cure to those patients who could benefit from it. 
“Determinorno, che il dottore Niccolò Buonaiuti ogni volta intraprenda la cura di quei matterelli, che da esso 
saranno giudicati potersi per mezzo de mendicanti ridursi a sanità d’intelletto, e parimenti ancora di quelli che 
stesse in ambiguo della reduzione del medesimo stato, tralasciando solo di curare quei tali, che stimerà 
onninamente vano il potere loro restituire il discorso razionale”.  ASF, SD, F. 42, Istrumenti e ricordi 1642 al 
1740, September 1747, in Magherini and Biotti,“Un luogo della città per custodia de’pazzi”, p. 79.  
613 Roscioni, Il governo della follia, p. 124.  The data is taken from ibid., pp. 116-120.  
614 “...che la Casa di Santa Dorotea di questa città di Firenze si eriga in Spedale con l’intero titolo, sotto 
l’immediata sua Regia Protezione; idoneo generalmente per curarvi tutte le malattie comprese nella mania; e per 
custodirvi quelli, che sono incurabili”. “Copia di Motuproprio di S.M.I. per l’erezione del nuovo Conservatorio 
di S. Dorotea de 16 novembre 1750”, ASF, SD, Memorie, Documenti, F. 23, no. 5. 
615 Idem.  




The procedure of admission was a matter of intense discussion between 1740 and 
1760. Of particular concern were the mechanisms to certify madness, but also the strategies 
for resolving the problem of financing the entry of those patients who could not pay. The 
1750 reform established that only people whose madness was certified by medical opinion 
would be admitted, preferably, by a physician and, in his absence, by a surgeon. Additionally, 
requests of committal were to be corroborated by the testimony “of the parish priest and 
[other] representatives attesting the inconveniences caused” by the alleged insane.617   
The new provisions to a large extent aimed to provide a solution for the problem of the 
vagrant and poor mad who could not afford the fees of Santa Dorotea, but who nonetheless 
generated a severe problem for the life of the cities. Dangerousness and “disturbance” of 
“public quietness and honesty” were major criteria for committal, particularly when caused by 
the “wandering” and “abandoned” mad. The dispositions adopted in the motuproprio of 1750 
were the corollary of a long discussion between government officials regarding responsibility 
for the problem of the mentally ill. Particularly during the first three decades of the eighteenth 
century, Santa Dorotea and the Pazzeria of Santa Maria Nuova captured the attention of the 
governmental administration. The key issue under discussion was under whose competence 
the custody and cure of the mentally disturbed came, especially of those who could not pay 
Santa Dorotea. It was a financial problem but also a discussion that concerned ideological 
standpoints on public involvement in the provision of assistance, and the balance between 
charity, social and family responsibility.618  
The problem concerned not only the management and financing of the two institutions 
that received mad patients, but also involved police measures to address the problem of the 
vagrant and abandoned insane who were disturbing the city’s social life. For instance, in April 
1722, the Auditore Fiscale, in his capacity as chief of police, ordered the banishment from 
Florence of a certain Maria Laura Maioli, known to be “half mad [mezza pazzarella] with a 
very mordacious tongue, impertinent and temerarious.”619 A native of Pisa, Maria Laura had 
been caught wandering through the streets of Florence and imprisoned, while an order was 
sent to her only relative, a paternal uncle, which gave him a term of 8 days to send for his 
                                                
617 “Copia di Motuproprio di S.M.I. per l’erezione del nuovo Conservatorio”. 
618 The discussion about welfare provisions for the insane in the first half of the eighteenth century in Tuscany 
resembles the negotiations between state policies and family strategies to provide assistance for the elderly in 
eighteenth-century Rome studied by Groppi in Il welfare prima del welfare.  
619 “...Maria Laura è tenuta in concetto di mezza pazzarella con lingua assai mordace, impertinentezza, e 




niece and undertake or provide for her custody. The uncle, “a poor and miserable painter”, 
was finally exempted from his “duty” as the closest family member to assume her custody, 
given his “extreme poverty” and his “fair motives for not desiring her proximity.”620 
Situations in which family members were either non-existent or unable to assume 
responsibility for a mad relative put the administrative structure of the duchy under 
considerable strain, as we have seen. Close evaluation had to be made of the economic and 
familial circumstances that surrounded the patient to come up with the most suitable solution, 
carefully combining private and public interests. Actually, prefiguring later official 
dispositions, Maria Laura was not sent to the pazzeria of Santa Maria Nuova nor left at the 
Stinche because she did not qualify for the category of pazzia furiosa to justify confinement at 
the expense of the state. The problem, as historians working in the previous periods of the 
history of Tuscany have revealed, was not new.621 The novelty provided by the eighteenth 
century is to be identified in the new interpretations of the problem and in the new measures 
adopted to respond to it, as exemplified in the reform introduced by the Motuproprio of 1750.  
The organs in charge of the enquiries to assess the petitions for confinement after 1750 
were the Auditore Fiscale for the Florentine inhabitants and the Magistrato dei Nove for the 
inhabitants of the rest of the dominium.622 The investigation conducted by the Auditore 
Fiscale and the Magistrato dei Nove comprised the collection of at least one medical 
testimony asserting the mental condition of the patient, and the testimony of priests and 
neighbours confirming his or her level of dangerousness. Upon confirmation of madness they 
had to rigorously investigate the economic situation of the afflicted, to determine if they 
deserved to be admitted at public expense (pubbliche spese). Finally, every admission had to 
be ratified by royal command (real rescritto).623 In this sense, although the admission 
procedure continued to be designed as an administrative one, categorized as a police matter 
                                                
620 Idem. For a similar case regarding a pazza furiosa who despite being “molesta e molestissima”, could not be 
received in Santa Dorotea because she was unable to pay the fee, and could not be admitted to the pazzeria of 
Santa Maria Nuova either, allegedly because there was no space, see ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 755, no. 37, 
September 1747.  
621 See Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families and Magherini and Biotti, L’isola delle Stinche.  
622 The Nove conservatori del dominio was the magistracy in charge of the governmental management of most 
of the dominions of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and coordinated the relations between the capital and the 
provinces. On the Magistrato dei Nove in the eighteenth century, and relations between the centre and the 
provinces, see Mannori, Il Sovrano Tutore. 
623 Roscioni, Il governo della follia, p. 134-135. The regular procedure of internment followed three stages: 
supplication (supplica or istanza di internamento), a public inquiry carried out either by the Magistrato dei Nove 




and under the direct control of the state, the novelty provided by the reforms of 1750 was the 
requirement of medical certification.624   
The admission procedures generated particular concerns regarding the kind and degree 
of madness accountable for committal given the high costs of interment at public expense. 
The motuproprio had stated the government’s intention to provide for abandoned furiosi who 
caused serious trouble to public life. But the first decade after the motuproprio was issued 
demonstrated that the degrees of mental affliction had to be further specified in order to avoid 
“abuses”. Particularly in the case of patients admitted at public expense, dangerousness was to 
be the primary criterion. The degrees of madness were officially measured in terms of the 
seriousness of the threat insanity posed to society. The admission procedure progressively 
came to equate madness [pazzia] with furious madness [pazzia furiosa], excluding its 
harmless forms – the melensi and mentecatti that were so common in the other juridical 
spaces we have examined. And, thus, a criterion for determining discharge from Santa 
Dorotea was that the patients were only melensi, who “have not given any manifest sign of 
madness [pazzia]” during their time at the hospital, and the administrators considered them 
unable “to disturb either the public quietness or the public honesty.”625   
Discussion regarding why the melensi or mentecatti were not considered in need of 
being committed, while the pazzi furiosi were, not only centred on the level of dangerousness 
shown by the alleged mad. Moreover, the matter generated sometimes divergent views, as we 
will see. The administration of Santa Dorotea approached the problem merely from a practical 
perspective, considering that admission of the passive and harmless mad used up the available 
beds and public funds, when their fee was not privately paid. The target was focused, 
therefore, on guaranteeing a place for the really dangerous mad, as can be seen in the regular 
discharges of non-paying patients as soon as they would stop showing signs of 
dangerousness.  
The politico-practical differentiation between melenso and pazzo furioso, nonetheless, 
concealed a larger problem affecting not only private life, but also social life which had not 
been tackled by the motuproprio. The perception of some government officials and family 
                                                
624 On the development of notions of state responsibility over welfare provisions during the Regency, with the 
consolidation of “the social character of assistance that substitutes private charity”, see Sandro Boccadoro and 
Anna Zandri, “L’opera riformatrice di Pietro Leopoldo nell’ordinamento giuridico dell’ospedale S. Maria Nuova 
di Firenze”, in Zeffiro Ciuffoletti and Leonardo Rombai (coord.), La Toscana dei Lorena: riforme, territorio, 
società (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 1989), p. 279.  
625 The administrative board of Santa Dorotea to the Auditore Fiscale. ASF, SD, Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 2, 




members was that sometimes non-violent types of madness required special measures, 
ranging from custody, personal care or medical cure. Measures that families were not always 
able or, sometimes, willing to take. Not only the raving mad were left alone to their destinies, 
abandoned to wander the streets, as the 1750 declaration had stated. Madness was, after all, 
“the most solitary of afflictions.”626 
Home-care was at times unfeasible and economically impossible. Pauperisation, 
household composition and even an absence of available relatives conspired to make public 
the life of the mentally afflicted.627 The wealthier mentally afflicted did not necessarily have 
an easier situation. Their families had certainly more resources to cope with them, but wealthy 
and poorer families alike recurrently turned to the authorities seeking reinforcement to tame 
their unruly relatives or convince them of behaving properly. All types of families turned to 
the Grand Duke, requesting to obtain the “grazia” of having a person interned in the hospital 
even if they did not fit the pattern of the pazzo furioso.  
This situation is vividly illustrated in the case of Lorenzo Baldinotti, which opened 
Chapter Three of this thesis. He had been deranged for most of his life – his first appearance 
in the records was in 1725 –, was interned both in Santa Maria Nuova and in Santa Dorotea 
hospitals several times and constituted a recurring problem for his relatives. Over the years he 
was portrayed as a mad person whose mental derangement made him unruly, scandalous, 
dissolute and utterly extravagant.628 And yet, when his relatives requested his committal once 
more in 1755, the petition was not granted, regardless of the fact that it was to be an interment 
that was privately affordable. The physician of Santa Dorotea determined that Baldinotti was 
not “in a state of furious dementia”, arguing that “notwithstanding his prattling [garrulo], 
vehement and disordered discourse, he is not capable of falling into furious acts.” As such, he 
was “far from the need of being enclosed in the Hospital of S. Dorotea.”629 Strikingly, only a 
                                                
626 The quote refers to the famous beginning of MacDonald’s Mystical Bedlam, “Madness is the most solitary of 
afflictions to the people who experience it; but it is the most social of maladies to those who observe its effects.” 
MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam, p. 1. 
627 Attesting for the long-lasting problem stemming from the practical division between pazzia furiosa and the 
non-violent types of madness, we find the case of an abandoned 14-year-old melensa from the community of 
Greve who was sent to Santa Dorotea in 1769 after being caught wandering in the streets. Although the medical 
and civil authorities were well aware that her type of madness did not fit the parameters of pazzia furiosa, she 
was left in the hospital for about a year while the authorities endeavoured to find a long-term solution to her 
situation. See ASF, SD, Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 8, no. 64, September-October 1770. 
628 See Chapter 3, section 3.1, “Lorenzo Baldinotti”.  
629 “...attesto come il di la detto Lorenzo Baldinotti non è in stato di demenza furiosa, anzi per piu visite fatte al 




year before his brother had described him as “of an extravagant, furious and uneasy nature, 
and sick in his mind.”630   
The problem of how to determine if petitions for committal corresponded to pazzia 
furiosa was first tackled by the appointment of Antonio Lulli as the official physician of Santa 
Dorotea in 1756.631 Together with the cure of Santa Dorotea’s patients, he was entrusted with 
the special commission of assessing whether prospective or current patients qualified to be 
kept in the hospital. Attesting to the growing conflict aroused by the typification of the kind 
of madness accountable for committal, in 1757 the hospital administrators requested that the 
Consulta appoint two physicians to certify that the requests of admission indeed referred to 
people who were either maniacs or raving mad (pazzo furioso, or maniaco), to avoid what 
were called “abuses” by the families. The physicians elected were Giovanni Targioni 
Tozzetti632 and Lodovico Scutellari,633 chosen due to their experience as medici fiscali. The 
scope of this new addition to the admission procedure was to ensure that those who were 
allegedly pazzi furiosi were visited by more than one physician to verify the truth behind the 
requests for committal. Scutellari and Targioni Tozzetti were commissioned to this task after 
Antonio Lulli had repeatedly protested his overwhelming workload. He had to divide his time 
between the care of the hospital patients and the many visits he had to pay to those persons 
whose families had requested their committal. These visits had to be repeated, as the 
                                                                                                                                                   
ad atti furiosi; onde lo reputo lontano dal bisogno di rinchiudersi nello Spedale di S. Dorotea.” Report of 
Antonio Lulli. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 759, no. 11, June 1755.  
630 “…c’hanno rappresentato esser notorio, che Lorenzo Baldinotti… è d’un naturale stravagante, furioso, ed 
inquieto, ed infermo di mente”. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 210, August 1754, Report of the officers 
of the Magistrato dei Pupilli.  
631 Before 1756, Antonio Lulli had been performing occasional visits to the patients of Santa Dorotea, and 
usually gave his medical testimony to assess pazzia furiosa. He was the medico ordinario of Santa Dorotea until 
1788. Roscioni, Il governo della follia, p. 268.   
632 Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti (1712-1783), renowned Florentine physician and naturalist, had been 
sporadically involved with madness due to his assistance to the Otto di Guardia as medico fiscale and his 
position as official physician of the Stinche prison. Through his involvement with Santa Dorotea Targioni 
Tozzetti developed a special concern for mental afflictions which can be observed both in his reports (perizie) as 
medico fiscale and in the reports he periodically had to make regarding patients in Santa Dorotea or the mentally 
afflicted under the care of the Pupilli. This special concern leaves a final mark in his Consulti Medici, which 
included a section exclusively devoted to hypochondriac and hysterical affections, to epilepsy, and to delirium, 
among others. Aside from the commentaries of Roscioni, Stumpo and Brambilla, the work of Targioni Tozzetti 
on madness remains largely unexplored. His role as an “authority” on madness in the second half of the 
eighteenth century is examined in Chapter 6. BNCF, Manoscritti, Le carte di Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti 
(henceforth, GTT), N. 234, “Consultationes medicae”, cart.2, and N. 235, Relazioni forensi. See Roscioni, Il 
governo della follia, passim,  Enrico Stumpo, “Un uomo per tutte le stagioni: Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti e la 
polizia sanitaria nella Firenze dei Lorena”, in Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti, Relazioni forensi. Ambiente, igiene e 
sanità nella Firenze dei Lorena (coord. S. Pelle) (Florence: Le Lettere, 1998), pp.7-24, Brambilla, Corpi invasi, 
pp. 238-241.        




provveditore Niccolò Martelli informed, “in order to assert, if they really are in a state [that 
requires for them] to be guarded [custoditi] and cured in the hospital destined for the maniac, 
and not attacked by some accidental delirium, or by other illness.”634 Although the 
appointments of Targioni Tozzetti and Scutellari to support the admission procedures 
officially established that a medical certification of madness was compulsory, in 1759 a 
biglietto from the Council of Regency still warned about the “easiness” by which relatives 
could request and obtain the admission of a relative.635 
A medical certification of madness did not secure admission to Santa Dorotea, 
particularly for the miserable and abandoned mad. The case of a poor prisoner whose 
madness became an “intolerable annoyance” to her fellow inmates at the Stinche, is 
illustrative of the problem of interning madness at public expense. It was in March 1759 when 
a petition from some female prisoners at the Stinche requested the transfer of a certain 
Lucrezia Gambassi to Santa Dorotea because she was “in a demented state”, of the kind that 
“disturbs night and day with howls the [other] prisoners.”636 A medical note had been 
included, signed by Antonio Lulli and Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti, establishing that the 
woman was indeed demented and, as such, was found “worthy of being confined [riserrata] 
and cured in the Conservatory of Santa Dorotea.”637 Even the Auditore Fiscale Domenico 
Brichieri Colombi expressed his agreement for the suggested decision of transferring her, 
adducing that the Stinche was not “a proper place for the custody of the mad [pazzarelli].” To 
this administrative reason he added a moral one, revealing that “the disease of the said woman 
has turned out to be burdensome to the petitioning prisoners, which to a certain extent 
increases their punishment given the annoyance that the said woman generates.”638  
                                                
634 “...affine di assicurarsi, se veramente sieno in stato da esser custoditi, e curati nello spedale destinato per i 
maniaci, o piuttosto attaccati da qualche accidentale delirio, o da altra infermità”. The problem was, as the 
provveditore Niccolò Martelli informed the Auditore Fiscale, that families sometimes petitioned for the 
committal of patients who were only foolish (melensi) instead of insane (pazzi), or who had become stupid from 
a stroke. Letter from Niccolò Martelli to the Consulta. ASF, Santa Dorotea, Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 2, no. 56, 
29 March, 1757 and ASF, CR, F. 426, no. 3, 24 march 1757.  
635 Biglietto of Roberto Pandolfini to the administrative board of Santa Dorotea. ASF, SD, Motupropri, 
Rescritti…, F. 3, no. 58, 28 June 1759. The Council of Regency proposed then that after patients were admitted, 
they were to be further examined by physicians who had not been involved in the initial assessment to 
corroborate the diagnosis, and that patients were visited once a month by an external physician.  
636 “...una tal Lucrezia Gambassi in stato demente, che inquieta notte, e giorno con’ urli le carceri...” Petition 
sent from the Stinche, signed by Michel’Angelo Mugnaini in the name of the female prisoners, ASF, CR, 
Fiscale, F. 760, no. 21, March 1769.  
637 Medical testimony of Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti and Antonio Lulli, Ibid.  
638 “Non essendo certamente le carceri delle Stinche un luogo proprio per custodire i Pazzarelli; e la malattia 
della predetta donna riescendo gravosa alle supplicanti carcerate, alle quali in certa maniera si accresce la pena 




The problem was, however, that the woman was from the Tuscan locality of 
Montevarchi, and thus her admission to Santa Dorotea, if decided, was to be at the expense of 
that local community, which was under the jurisdiction of the Magistrato dei Nove. Never 
during the proceedings was her pauperism put into doubt, only the seriousness of her mental 
condition. Suggesting a careful study of public resources and a clear intention of limiting its 
expenditure to the minimum possible, the head official of the Nove considered Gambassi to 
be suffering a madness that was not of the “furious kind”, given her madness “consists only in 
howling.”639 As such, he continued, she could not fall into the category of furious madness 
(pazzia furiosa) that was accountable for committal in Santa Dorotea at public expense. She 
posed no serious threat to public quietness and public honesty, and so they were not willing to 
pay for her confinement.  
The line of argument exposed in this case is revealing. Administrative criteria were 
placed against medical knowledge, and the victory went to the former. Any welfare provision 
for the mentally-ill poor was tightly dependent upon the availability of resources, an 
availability that in this case was entrenched in matters that had more to do with the 
administrative issues of the Tuscan dominion in its relation to Florence than with a 
determined approach to the problem of madness. Since Gambassi had already been convicted 
and was serving time in the Stinche at public expense (that is, covered by the central 
administration), it is comprehensible that the officials of the Nove put their best effort to 
avoid transferring that weight to the provinces. In fact, they could resolve the matter easily on 
this occasion precisely because she was already in a public facility under custody, was under 
the category of convicted criminal fallen into madness, and was not a furious abandoned 
vagrant.   
One further consideration can be drawn from the Gambassi case. The Gambassi 
episode illustrates particularly well the nature of the medical involvement in the 
institutionalization of madness in the eighteenth century. The category of the pazzo furioso 
was not a medical one, in the sense that it related firstly to the public consequences of mad 
behaviour, and was only secondarily intended to constitute a medical diagnosis of a disease. 
The predominance of legal (and political) criteria observed in the category of pazzo furioso 
                                                                                                                                                   
thief, sentenced to 10 years in the Stinche in 1755, where she had been kept at public expense. We have no 
information regarding her mental state at the moment of the trial, so we should not assume that an insanity plea 
was put forward in her defence. On the contrary, some suggestions made by the Auditore Fiscale regarding the 
years after her conviction suggest that her mental affliction developed afterwards or, at least, that it was 
identified afterwards. 




cannot be interpreted, nonetheless, as evidence of a deliberate exclusion of medical opinion in 
matters of the mind.640 Languages of madness had to adapt to each institutional space, and in 
eighteenth-century Tuscany, the admission procedure to the mental hospital, even if it 
required medical certification, contained much more of the legal and political languages we 
have been observing in criminal and civil procedures than the language common to medical 
literature. But, medical knowledge was developed in a parallel path to their involvement with 
legal practice, and this development can be only clearly observed in the court records toward 
the end of the century, as the next chapter will argue. For most of the century, physicians 
moved between the legal and medical worlds, adapting their language to the requirements of 
each space (and the same can be said regarding the domestic space). Eighteenth-century 
medical notions of madness were not constrained by the category of mania or pazzia furiosa, 
chosen as the template against which madness was to be measured to ground confinement. 
Likewise, medical considerations regarding the best environment for mad people to achieve 
the best custodial and therapeutic results were not only dictated by legal and governmental 
commands of the kind issued by the Motuproprio. This is proved by the fact that Giovanni 
Targioni Tozzetti, who had been involved with criminal medicine for at least a decade, 
recommended for Gambassi’s internment in Santa Dorotea even if he also acknowledged that 
she was not a pazza furiosa. The omission of the category in his testimony cited above (he 
had only declared she was demente) should not be taken as a fortuitous lapse but as the 
conscious choice of a man long familiar with legal procedures and administrative concerns. 
He could have said melensa, or mentecatta (the categories that we know were contentious in 
the discussion about the admission procedure to Santa Dorotea), but he chose the still legal, 
but less definitive demente.641  
Although Gambassi’s mental condition had been ratified by the two physicians 
specifically appointed for certifying madness and accountable for committal, her transfer to 
the hospital was not permitted. Medical knowledge, governmental concerns, legal 
requirements and familial preferences were in continual negotiation among each other in an 
                                                
640 Cf. Michel Foucault, History of Madness, particularly pp. 122-131. Foucualt’s assertions regarding the lack 
of involvement of medicine in madness before the nineteenth century have been challenged by numerous 
historians. For studies regarding Tuscany, see Roscioni, Magherini and Biotti, Mellyn, but except for the latter 
less attention has been paid to ways in which the legal requirements shaped medical knowledge of madness. 
Roscioni, Il governo della follia; Magherini and Biotti, L’isola delle Stinche and Mellyn in Mad Tuscans and 
Their Families.   
641 In fact, the examination of his medical perizie between 1750 and 1788 shows him more than once assuming a 
position of defence in the interests of prisoners, criminals and the interdicted against the otherwise inexorable 




ebb and flow that marked the foundation of welfare provision. To understand this negotiation, 
this chapter has proposed the model of the itineraries of madness, to underline the extent to 
which families and authorities resorted to more than one mechanism in their mutual quest to 
address the problems of madness, accommodating languages and interests in a careful, but 
unstable, balance. To understand this model better a closer study of the role of the office of 
the Auditore Fiscale is required, which is the purpose of the next section.   
 
5. 3. Madness as a Police Matter: Special Requests “Per porre freno a detti disordini” 
The experience and identification of and reactions to madness were not limited to 
interdiction procedures, criminal insanity or confinement. Interdiction, criminal prosecution 
and confinement, we have seen, were temporary measures and should be considered as a last 
resort, or a desperate measure to address situations that many times had taken place long 
before, and had long been part of the family’s experience. Responses to madness were the 
result of a concerted effort between family members, society and government authorities, and 
could take many forms according to the spaces provided by the ducal system. A valuable 
source for examining madness in a different context than the one provided by interdictions, 
criminal prosecution and hospital records are the matters handled by the office of the Auditore 
Fiscale, where many special requests (suppliche) and summary measures affecting people 
openly labelled as mad or with features closely resembling madness were directed.    
The records of these special matters handled by the Auditore Fiscale are filed in the 
archive of the Consiglio di Reggenza, covering 1737 to 1765, which corresponds to the 
periods of Filippo Luci, Giovanni Brichieri Colombi and his son Domenico Brichieri Colombi 
as Auditori Fiscali.642 Evidence gathered from the records of the Magistrato dei Pupilli reveal 
that the office’s intervention in the public and private problems caused by madness dates from 
before the period covered by the records held in the Consiglio di Reggenza archive. There are 
numerous allusions to biglietti sent by the Auditore Fiscale regarding people who were under 
the curatorship of the Magistrato dei Pupilli in the previous years, of which we otherwise 
have no records. 
The Auditore Fiscale supervised criminal sentences, participated in the Consulta and 
the Council of State, and as head of police administered the orders of confinement to Santa 
                                                




Dorotea.643 His executive power allowed him to order other forms of confinement that could 
escape the ordinary legal proceedings. But, his sphere of manoeuvre was not limited to 
confinement. The evidence reveals how the Auditori Fiscali exerted wide array of corrective 
and persuasive mechanisms in their efforts to curve deviant behaviours without having to 
resort to confinement. Counting on their legal training, they could artfully combine legal 
reasoning with police concerns and medical arguments, as we will see.  
The powers of the Auditore Fiscale grew stronger during the Regency and were 
intensified after 1765.644 This progressive involvement with Florentine police matters and his 
increasing supervision over the criminal matters of the rest of the Tuscan territory dates back 
to before the arrival of Peter Leopold, nonetheless. During the Regency the Auditore Fiscale 
progressively handled matters of preventive policing, boosting his executive powers. From 
1768 on, the Fiscale directly managed all Florentine matters relating to public order coming 
into the Otto di Guardia, which he handled using his power of arbitrio.645 His dual position as 
supervisor of criminal justice and head of police came to be seen with suspicion by Peter 
Leopold himself, which eventually lead to the suppression of the office in 1784.646  
In terms of social profile, these cases were not restricted to the aristocracy nor to 
Florence. They involve wealthy and privileged people who were particularly cautious so as to 
avoid the shame of having to use the ordinary legal channels, but also families from different 
social backgrounds who sought the government’s direct intervention as a desperate resource. 
Lastly, we find police matters involving poor individuals, many times abandoned by society 
and their families, who in their marginality had become a matter of police and public concern. 
In this sense, these records illuminate the picture of the forging of notions of madness from a 
                                                
643 The office of the Auditore Fiscale was initially created in 1543 to supervise the interests of the fisc in the 
administration of justice. With time the Auditore Fiscale increasingly gained importance, acting as the guarantor 
of the interests of the Grand Duke in front of the Otto di Guardia e Balìa, whose independence was thus 
progressively limited. Around 1558, the Otto di Guardia, and every other tribunal of Florence or the dominion 
had to send a copy of their sentences to the Auditore Fiscale, who had the power of veto over them. Antonelli, 
“La magistratura degli Otto”, pp. 33-36 
644 As noted by Alessandra Contini, there was a “remarkable intensification of the activities of political and 
social control exerted by the Auditore” after the arrival of Peter Leopold in 1765. Alessandra Contini, “La città 
regolata: polizia e amministrazione nella Firenze leopoldina (1777-1782)”, in Istituzioni e società in Toscana 
nell’età moderna. Atti delle giornate di studio dedicate a G. Pansini (Firenze 4-5 dicembre 1992), Vol. 1 (Rome: 
Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici, 1994), p. 456, my translation. 
See also Carlo Mangio, La polizia toscana. Organizzazione e criteri d’intervento (1765-1808) (Milan: Giuffrè, 
1988). 
645 “La Città regolata: polizia e amministrazione nella Firenze leopoldina”, in Istituzioni e società in Toscana 
nell’età moderna, p. 456 infra.  
646 Ibid and, Giorgia Alessi, “Le riforme di polizia nell’Italia del Settecento: Granducato di Toscana e Regno di 




broad perspective, including a wide social spectrum, and presenting a more balanced picture 
in terms of gender.   
Very much entrenched in the tradition of negotiated public intervention in private life, 
supplications to the Grand Duke, centralized in the Consulta, could also concern matters that 
were not intended to follow any of the traditional legal channels provided by the judicial 
structure. The problems that deviant or openly mad behaviour exerted on the lives of Tuscan 
families sometimes required abbreviated, but also discreet, measures. Echoing what we have 
seen in interdiction petitions, families disclosed to the authorities these cases of deviant 
behaviour primarily “to impose restraint to the said disorders” (per porre freno a detti 
disordini).647 
These special requests, filed in the archive of the Consiglio di Reggenza, were directly 
handled by the Auditore Fiscale, who acted under the attentive inspection of the members of 
the Council of Regency and the Consulta. In conjunction with supplications we also find 
special police matters relating to madness and general deviance. Starting from the 
identification of deviant behaviours and the negotiation of possible ways to correct them, the 
boundaries of normality were continuously discussed and reshaped. Thus these sources 
provide an interesting opportunity to examine the conjunction of different gazes, interests and 
expertise in a space whose mediating purpose enriches the discussion. The evidence examined 
suggests that the office of the Auditore Fiscale came to have a key role in the handling of 
delicate and special matters regarding the insane. We already know that the Auditore Fiscale 
was the ducal authority that coordinated committal of the pazzi furiosi in Santa Dorotea. But 
the involvement with mental deviance of this powerful office did not end there.  
A close scrutiny of matters directly handled by the Auditore Fiscale further broadens 
the picture of the shaping of lay understandings of madness and the range of measures and 
reactions taken to address its familial and social consequences. The realm of what was 
categorized as product or symptom of mental distress was not exhausted in the legal 
categories of mental incapacity, nor in the legal, but increasingly medical category of pazzia 
furiosa. Madness was constituted by a broad set of symptoms, recognized in certain deviant 
behaviours that were categorized and interpreted in manifold ways.  
Madness could be shaped so as to fit into the legal category of mental incapacity, cast 
with gestures and actions that were carefully selected to prove that one was a prodigal or 
                                                
647 Petition signed by the wife of the deranged Francesco del Mazza, reputed to be extravagant and mad, vicious, 




demented and in need of interdiction. Deviance could be moulded so that a person was a 
criminally insane pazza or a matto, hence not accountable for their actions and thus deserving 
of a mitigated penalty. Alternatively, it could also be cast with the necessary features of 
pazzia furiosa in order to secure admission to a mental institution. But madness could also be 
identified in behaviours that would not lead to any of these legal outcomes. Interdiction, 
criminal insanity and confinement capture the moments in which madness was enclosed 
within specific categories that conditioned its shape. The special cases dealt with by the 
Auditore Fiscale, in contrast, disclose situations and behaviours that were not (yet) 
constrained by the requirement of legal categories. Some involve behaviours and mental 
states that, if aggravated, could eventually lead to interdiction, conviction or confinement. 
Others concern cases of madness framed in terms of the juridical categories that we have been 
examining, but which for one reason or another were dealt with by resorting to the summary 
measures provided by the Auditore Fiscale. In this sense, recourse to the Auditore Fiscale 
directly or via the Consulta could be both a preventive and a contingent measure.  
If we were to classify the deviations appearing in the files of the Auditore Fiscale, we 
would see that there are at least four categories that recurrently appear: disobedient behaviour; 
violent behaviour; sexual misconduct; and extravagances in various forms. The latter 
pervaded most of the cases – extravagance was, indeed, at the root of the understanding of 
madness, while disobedience and violence are better exemplified by the figure of the young 
discoli. Sexual misconduct was a concern that evidently preoccupied eighteenth-century 
society, demonstrating the appearance of new forms of social relations between the sexes that 
breached the codes of traditionally expected roles.648 They are all behavioural tendencies that 
we have seen present in the interdiction narratives and criminal records. Moreover, they all 
correspond to characteristics that, when aggravated, could constitute a felony or be 
accountable for committal, and correspond to behaviour that was not necessarily attributed to 
insanity. The interest arises, in my view, when exploring when and why the connection with 
insanity was made, and with what results.  
Disobedience and defiance to established behavioural norms were at the root of the 
reasons leading to the identification of deviant behaviour in early modern Europe.649 Tuscany 
was not an exception, as we have seen in the previous chapters. Unruliness (indocilità) was a 
                                                
648 This contrast between conflicting views on gender relations, affections and sexual desire has been beautifully 
examined by Roberto Bizzocchi. To understand the figure of the cicisbei, he examines private letters, contrasting 
them with a wide variety of sources, from travel literature to the theatre of Goldoni. See Bizzocchi, Cicisbei.      




major concern of the eighteenth century, and efforts to prevent it are to be understood as a 
coordinated effort that was attempted from various fronts. In a society that was challenged by 
ground-breaking political changes and economic challenges, defiance to expected social 
identity came to be seen as particularly threatening. The scandalous disorders that had 
accompanied the last decades of the Medici rule and the destabilizing changes promoted by 
the Lorraine had pervading effects for Tuscan society, particularly the aristocracy.650 
Nonetheless, social position and political involvement were not the only realms at stake. The 
study of madness and deviance casts light on how this context of changing social hierarchies 
put the family under particular pressure. The breaching of codes of behaviour in the social and 
domestic spheres needs to be understood through this lens, for the debate, reactions to and 
repression of deviance respond to a context where the aristocracy, and one’s position in 
society generally, was under debate.  
The eighteenth century has been identified as a turning point for the history of the 
family, as is well known. The new sociability described by Bizzocchi is only one side of the 
situation of the family during the enlightenment, when new forms of understanding gender 
roles, personal liberty, affections and rationality were under discussion. These new 
perspectives produced virulent and even violent intergenerational conflicts, and introduced a 
new component to matrimonial litigation, as the rich scholarship on the history of the family 
has shown.651 Changes in models of the family, conflicts of co-habitation, new conceptions of 
gender roles, parenting and matrimony can be also examined through the debates surrounding 
mental deviance. During the eighteenth century, family members debated each other’s 
conflicting views of their roles and mutual expectations. The configuration of prodigality and 
dementia, as we have seen, demonstrated that family roles and gender identities were under 
public scrutiny during the eighteenth century. At the root of interdiction procedures we find 
the clash of conflicting views about family roles. Interdictions, regardless of the category 
classifying the denunciation, served as a mechanism to debate proper parenthood or the 
expected behaviour of a spouse, a son or a father, all framed under the overarching discussion 
of economic management. But these discussions are also reflected in the special requests 
managed by the Auditore Fiscale directly or via the Otto di Guardia. Families from all social 
                                                
650 The Medici bureaucracy of patricians was replaced by middle-class functionaries in the Lorrain 
administration, which was accompanied by reforms that proposed new definition of nobility. See Litchfield, 
Emergence of a bureaucracy and Verga, Da “cittadini” a “nobili”.  
651 Many of these works have been cited in this thesis. Let me here make reference to Bizzocchi, Cisicbei; 




backgrounds repeatedly resorted to government authorities for help in controlling unruly and 
deviant relatives. By request of the families, government officials, judicial structures and 
public institutions played a decisive role in enforcing respect for traditional family hierarchies 
and gender roles. Social discipline appears here as a joint effort of families and authorities to 
settle a rational, productive and emotionally regulated family model.652 A model which – 
judging from the rising numbers of interdiction petitions, requests for admission to a mental 
hospital or a prison, and petitions for the arbitration of ever-growing family conflicts – was 
anything but settled.  
 
Disobedience and Violent Behaviours 
Many of the cases filed in the office of the Auditore Fiscale relate to parental requests 
to incarcerate or, more frequently, embark disobedient young men, labelled discoli, in a 
ship.653 Closely resembling the features of prodigals interdicted and placed under 
guardianship, a discolo was sometimes a less wealthy version of the prodigal and other times 
his forerunner. In other respects the discolo can be seen as a sort of criminal counterpart of the 
prodigal, so long as their cases were handled as a police matter, either through the Otto di 
Guardia e Balìa or directly through the office of the Auditore Fiscale.654 Because a discolo’s 
behaviour was part of the prehistory of the prodigal, the narratives of these unruly and 
dissolute young men illuminate the initial steps of what could develop into prodigal 
behaviour, presenting tendencies that could eventually lead to criminal activities, and strongly 
marked by the association between moral degradation and mental derangement.  
In general terms, a discolo was a disobedient young man who refused to work or 
study, was frequently violent and lived a life of debauchery. Accusations ranged from 
                                                
652 We are here close to the approach of the uses of justice that have been at the root of discussions regarding 
matrimonial litigation, but also related to notions of negotiated or bottom up processes of social discipline. See 
Daniela Lombardi, “Giustizia ecclesiastica e composizione dei conflitti matrimoniali (Firenze, secoli XVI-
XVIII)”, Seidel Menchi and Quaglioni, I tribunali del matrimonio, pp. 577-607; Dinges, “Usi della giustizia.” 
653 The Dizionario della Crusca defined the discolo firstly as one who is in constant opposition to everything 
and cares for nobody else than themselves, secondly as an idiot or illiterate and thirdly as man of disreputable 
customs, riotous and intolerable. See Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca (4th ed, 1729-1738), s.v. 
“discolo”,  http://www.lessicografia.it/discolo, accessed May 13, 2014.     
654 These cases can be found throughout the eighteenth century in the Suppliche and Filze Straordinarie of the 
Otto di Guardia e Balìa archive, and in the section corresponding to the affairs of the Auditore Fiscale in the 




“impertinences and disrespect for their parents”,655 to different degrees of unreasonable and 
often violent reactions against household members that could even assume the form of death 
threats.656 As prodigals, they were the object of widespread moral condemnation, with their 
disruptive breach of social norms, their unruly characters, their obstinate idleness and strong 
refusal to work or do “useful” things.  
A discolo was a dissipater par excellence, as were prodigals. His dissipation, 
nonetheless, would not necessarily lead to interdiction. Some of these young men were 
denounced before the age of 18 and were interdicted afterwards when they came of age, or 
when they eventually inherited. But the great majority of discoli do not appear in the records 
of the Magistrato dei Pupilli. Mostly, a discolo was a second-born son with no inheritance 
rights, or a firstborn with a patrimony that was not considerable enough as to justify (and 
finance) interdiction. They were aged between fourteen and their early twenties, and came 
from a varied social spectrum, including nobles, professionals, merchants and artisans. 
Closely resembling the prodigal, as I have said, we can find three major differences: the 
discoli came from varied social origins, they were mostly denounced by their fathers, and 
their disorder was entrenched to a greater extent in criminality.657  
Given that in the majority of the cases the discoli were not direct holders of a family 
patrimony, their greatest offence against property was committed through domestic stealing 
(furti domestici). They were usually pictured as compulsive stealers of household goods of all 
sorts, which they would afterwards sell in order to finance their debauchery.658 The degree of 
compulsiveness varied from case to case, but in many of them we see the same component 
that could be observed in the descriptions of compulsive selling of household goods carried 
out by the interdicted prodigals and demented. It was as if a driving force compelled them to 
steal, in this case, and afterwards sell the household goods to finance their vices, which 
                                                
655 A certain Angel’ Santi Caponi describing his son when requesting his incarceration, ASF, OGB, Suppliche, 
F. 2530, no. 45, June 1750.   
656 As stated in regard to the discolo Filippo Laghi, “se ne vive ozioso con strapazzare e percuotere i supplicanti, 
minacciando ancora di volerli uccidere”. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 759, no. 77, October 1758. 
657 This is also explainable due to the judicial arena in which they appear. The Magistrato dei Pupilli posed 
different requirements and used a different language from the much more criminalized contexts of the office of 
the Auditore Fiscale and the Otto di Guardia. When they were denounced by their mothers, as happened with 
prodigals, the issue of the absence of paternal authority was considered decisive for explaining their 
misdemeanour and vices. See, for example, ASF, OGB, Straordinarie, F. 2679, no. 132, July 1756, where a 
mother denounced her son because he refused to work, spent his days in Florence gambling, and resorted to 
strategies such as selling the family’s goods and resources to finance his vices. 
658 Lorenzo Bini said of his son Zanobi that he had “...portato via dalla propria casa quantità di mobili, abiti, 
argenti, gioie, denari, grano, olio, et altre cose, con avere a tale effetto sfondato usci, armadi, cassettoni, ed altri 




denoted both viciousness and lack of will power. The inability to control one’s impulses, and 
the tendency to be overcome by irrational need were indicative, as we have seen, of the 
absence of normal reasoning faculties.659  
In accordance with the preventive nature of the measures exerted by the Auditore 
Fiscale, many of these accusations were sustained by the supposition that if the conduct were 
to continue, they would become a serious threat to themselves and their families’ honour. As 
expressed in a particular case, because he “fears neither God nor men, if he were to continue 
living every day in the taverns without any expected revenue and without earnings, it can be 
justly feared that he in little time will precipitate into some mistake that will cause serious 
dishonour to the whole family.”660 Unruliness and persistent economic and sexual debauchery 
were widely feared by eighteenth-century European societies, identified as a clear path 
towards future degeneration and criminality.661 Even during early youth an uncontrolled 
discolo could expose himself to irreversible damage, such as a 13-year-old boy found hanged 
in the cellar by his mother after weeks of disobedience, disrespectful behaviour and refusal to 
engage in any productive activity. The inquiry conducted by the Auditore Fiscale to determine 
if his death had indeed been self-inflicted demonstrated that the boy fitted the usual 
parameters of a discolo, with his “nature predominantly unruly and impertinent”, his refusal 
to work, escapes from home, and disturbed disposition (the day of his death his mother 
“observed him confused and with a disturbed face.”)662      
Prodigals and discoli shared the same vice and committed the same offence against 
property. A discolo, nonetheless, was closer to criminality than his counterpart, with the main 
indicator of deviance being displaced from dissipation to unruliness and incorrigibility. This 
served the purpose of justifying the need for the intervention of the Auditore Fiscale, who 
would order their embarkation in a vessel only when it could be established that they were 
                                                
659 As with Panfilo Fabbri, a young man who would sell anything that came into his hands, from the money his 
father gave him to finance his studies in Pisa, to clothes, household goods and even his own bed. ASF, CR, 
Fiscale, F. 761, no. 12, July 1763. See also, for example, the case of Matteo Panicacci, denounced by his 
paternal uncles a decade earlier. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 756, no. 39, July 1750. 
660 “...n’avendo timore ne di Dio, ne degl’uomini, continuando a vivere tutto giorno per le Bische senza 
assegnamenti, e senza guadagni, si può giustamente temere, che egli in poco tempo ne precipiti in qualche 
trascorso da cagionare alla famiglia tutta un qualche grave disonore”, said Giovan Battista Cinnati about his 
brother. ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2531, no. 53, September 1751.  
661 Phillips, The Profligate Son, Lis and Soly, Disordered lives.  
662 “...naturale più tosto impertinente e discolo...”, “...la madre l’osservo confuso, e torbo in viso”. Report of 
Domenico Brichieri Colombi, ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 758, no. 64, December 1754. Brichieri Colombi’s inquiry 
determined that the boy had provoked his own death, and although the attitude of the mother was found rather 
negligent for she had not been able to tame him in time, she was considered punished enough by her son’s death 




“reduced to the most extreme degree of incorrigibility.”663 Establishing these men’s 
stubbornness and incorrigibility was part of the judicial script required to justify the 
involvement of the Auditore Fiscale. So, the interest for us here does not lie in the 
descriptions of unruliness and violent reactions per se, but in the extent to which these 
reactions were taken to be signs of a perturbed mind.  
  Their mental state comes to the fore sometimes through marginal but straightforward 
comments, other times only through hints suggesting the perception that a deranged mind was 
involved in the disorder. There are also cases in which a disturbed mental state is placed at the 
very foundation of the accusation, established as the dominating cause of the disorder. 
Although the primary purpose of these petitions was to convince the authorities about the 
seriousness of the case, these petitions all the same denote a profound reflexion about what it 
meant to be sane, and which were the signs indicating that the line had been crossed. In some 
cases allusions to a disordered mind are reduced to timid hints in the midst of descriptions 
centred on descriptions of dissoluteness, disobedience and proto-criminal activities, at other 
times registered in more straightforward comments. Of this latter type, descriptions of the 
violent reactions that often characterized a discolo’s behaviour, often leading to seriously 
danger situations, are particularly meaningful.  
The notion of incorrigibility, and its kinship with madness, is best elucidated by the 
ways in which family members described the exacerbated levels of violence reached by the 
discoli. Domestic theft was often combined with attempts on the lives of family members that 
could escalate to levels that closely resembled the furious fits that often overcame a pazzo 
furioso. Zanobi Bini, for instance, although he had been “kindly admonished [ammonito 
amorevolmente]” on various occasions by his parents for his uncontrollable stealing and 
unruly behaviour, had anyway “revolted against them, by attempting to kill them and having 
mistreated them in facts and words.”664 Once the attacks had been so fierce that his parents 
had been forced to escape and leave the house to save themselves. With no results, they had 
tried to curb him before by imprisoning him or enrolling him in the ducal army. Given that he 
                                                
663 “...ridotto al grado estremo della incorreggibilità”, Report of the Magistrato Supremo supporting the 
accusations against Panfilo Fabbri, ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 761, no. 12, July 1763.  
664 “...essendo stato più volte ammonito amorevolmente da suoi genitori, e parenti, si è rivoltato contro de’ 
medesimi con aver tentato di uccidergli, e con avergli maltrattati con fatti, e parole, avendo i detti suoi genitori 
dovuto in varie congiunture difendersi, o colla fuga, o in altra forma.” ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2523, no. 107, 
December 1743. For a similar cases, see also ASF, Consiglio di Reggenza, F. 754, ins. “Consegna di rei”, case 




had lately made an attempt against the life of his mother, they were petitioning again, this 
time requesting forced embarkation as crew member in any vessel that would take him.  
The events leading to Bini’s embarkation are substantially similar to many of the 
situations that forced family members to petition for committal in Santa Dorotea. Accusations 
of life-threatening domestic violence were at the core of causes of separatio thori argued 
before the ecclesiastical courts of the period, and life-threatening violence in criminal courts 
was not considered per se a sign of mental derangement.665 But when we examine how 
petitions of committal to Santa Dorotea framed deranged violence we can better grasp what 
made violence, or violent reactions, an indicator of madness, and even more clearly, how 
these same indicators could be shaped and labelled with different terms according to the 
institutional space of its disclosure. A wife, for instance, petitioned for her husband’s 
committal arguing he had ceased to be a “good and diligent” head of family, neglecting his 
duties and becoming a “disordered [man] and a dissipater, no different than a maniac and 
mad.”666 The family had tried to curb his disorder through imprisonment, but it had proved to 
be insufficient, for even if at first he gave some “signs of correction and of being liberated 
from his fixations and madness,” shortly after his release he resumed his past mad behaviour. 
Given that he made an attempt against the life of his wife and children, he was again 
imprisoned while the petition for his committal was being processed. Whilst this man’s 
disordered and violent behaviour was medically categorized as pazzia furiosa in 1770, Zanobi 
Bini had been only labelled as discolo in 1743 with no recourse to medical opinion.  
This situation and the assessment of its consequences were extraordinarily similar, the 
discolo being the younger version of the married pazzo furioso, in this case. There are 
evidently many circumstances that explain why a violent individual was labelled as discolo, 
prodigal, demente or pazzo furioso. For once, the institutional space to which they were 
disclosed dramatically shaped the narratives and language employed. But the question should 
rather be why families resorted to hospital, prison or interdiction. The particularities of each 
family group, their past history and their previous involvement with deviance are certainly 
                                                
665 In order to obtain ecclesiastical separation of bed and board, litigants, mostly women, had to prove that the 
violence exerted by their husbands was repetitive and life threatening. Although there were other just causes of 
separation (like adultery, heresy or contagious diseases), the most cited cause was physical abuse (sevizie). On 
this, see La Rocca, Tra moglie e marito, pp. 245-282.   
666 “...Mattia Labardi di lei marito fino nell’anno 1767 fece passaggio dal essere un buono, e diligente padre di 
famiglia, buon economo, savio, ed accurato nelle cose sue, e nei suoi lavori; con esser divenuto trascurato... 
sregolato, e dissipatore, nulla diverso da un maniaco, e pazzo...”, said Labardi’s wife in her petition. ASF, SD, 




variables to take into account, although we generally have to rely on suppositions to 
reconstruct them. What seems clear is that age, gender and social backgrounds were the most 
definitive elements conditioning the appearance in one or other space, shaping in turn the 
narratives and the labels employed to describe them. But both behaviours were essentially 
perceived in a similar manner; dissipation and disordered or uncontrolled behaviour combined 
with escalating violence against family members or against themselves were undoubtedly 
perceived as the effects of a deranged mind by eighteenth-century lay society. To obstinately 
go against the agreed norms of behaviour was considered a sign of mental disturbance. For, 
who in his right mind would make an attempt against the life of his own mother? 
The previous attempts of the families to induce a discolo to change his behaviour are 
always highlighted in the narratives, to give a clear sign that the disorder was inveterate and 
immune to any reprimand or coercive measure taken hitherto. The issue is significant for us 
so long as it presents the key that connects incorrigibility with madness. The accusations 
brought against discoli, at first sight connecting them solely to matters of police and 
preventive disciplining, reveal an interesting presence of notions of madness at a social level 
that are interesting to examine. It is in the evaluation of the recklessness or the violence 
shown by the discolo where we find the most interesting hints. The key to the connection with 
madness can be found in the frequency of the denounced violent outbursts, who their victims 
were and what were the circumstances.667 For instance, the fact that they repeatedly released 
their anger against their parents was considered a revealing detail. It was distorted and 
abnormal to try to kill one’s own mother, even more so if the episode became a tendency. For 
centuries, Tuscan families had demonstrated an ability to appropriate notions of madness that 
precisely circumscribed the presence of mental derangement to these types of behaviour.668 
However, to request the embarkation of a discolo did not require the actual use of the legal 
labels of madness that were required in criminal prosecution of civil litigation. It was not a 
matter of defining civil capacity or determining liability for a crime (which, if anything, was 
intended to be prevented), but rather a matter for the police.  
                                                
667 Chiara La Rocca, for instance, examines how male domestic violence could be codified as corrective and 
deserved by the wife, and thus, be considered a rational act, provided the correction (generally in the form of 
bastonate) had been controlled and the husband had not let himself be governed by passion. La Rocca, Tra 
moglie e marito, 275-278. See also Foyster, “Male Honour, Social Control and Wife Beating”, Bailey, Unquiet 
lives.  




There are clues suggesting that the connection with insanity was in many times made, 
although not always verbalized. The proof is found in the use of certain concepts that we have 
seen profusely used in the other institutional spaces that I have examined so far. We have 
expressions such as “extravagant brain” (cervello stravagante),669 or references to their 
“irregular” and “unruly” characters,670 their disturbed or troubled humour (umore troppo 
torbido),671 or their being of a “difficult, disturbed and uneasy disposition” (animo difficile, 
torbido e inquieto),672 which we know were seen as symptoms of altered states of mind.673 
For instance, a former discolo who had been troublesome since his early youth and had been 
alternatively incarcerated, exiled and incarcerated again for decades, was defined in a manner 
that increasingly resembled the features of a madman. Although he was not openly 
categorized as such, he was described recurring to terms we have seen present in the 
narratives of madness both in interdiction petitions and in criminal records. When this 
troublesome noble was 62 years old, the Auditore Fiscale Domenico Brichieri Colombi 
described him as “incorrigible, being a gambler, blasphemer, inclined to drunkenness and to 
every other vice, particularly to those of stealing, attacking in brawls and creating 
scandals.”674 To prevent his release when he was 67 years old, his relatives categorized his 
behaviour as utterly extravagant, describing him as “a brutish man [uomo bestiale, used here 
in the sense of out of his senses], and of bad inclinations.”675    
                                                
669 Anton Gaetano Mori Ubaldini, said to have shown a bad inclination (cattiva inclinazione) since early 
childhood, maintained a “idle and libertine life”, was insolent, unruly and a “standard” dissipater, identified by 
his relatives for his “cervello stravagante”. This denomination, used in the petition signed by his mother, was not 
repeated in the authorities’ report. In other words, the element was not considered to add further relevant 
information to the features of his disordered behaviour. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 760, no. 53, 1760.  
670 A young man who would not sleep at home but in a public inn, “e conduce i suoi giorni in una maniera molto 
irregolare.” He was arrogant and had an unruly (indocile) humour, said the mother. ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 
2540, no. 58, November 1764. 
671 Filippo Laghi was a discolo who had threatened the life of his mother and brothers too many times, was 
stubbornly idle, intended to marry a woman whom he had gotten pregnant although he was engaged in a 
previous matrimonial contract with a different woman. His actions revealed what the Auditore Fiscale framed as 
his “disturbed humour” (umor suo troppo torbido).  ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 759, no. 77, October 1758. 
672 Brichieri Colombi regarding Pietro Maria Genovini when the latter requested his release from the 
incarceration requested by his father. He denied the request on the basis that “...essendomi più volte convenuto 
di farlo passare dalle carceri delle Stinche a quelle de gli otto, e dalla pubblica alle segrete anco con i ferri a 
piedi, avendo non ostante dimostrato sempre con animo difficile, torbido, e inquieto il predetto Genovini.”  ASF, 
CR, Fiscale, F. 759, no. 62, January 1760. His troubled mental state led him to being interdicted 10 years later, 
after his father died and while he was still imprisoned. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2308, no. 11, March 1770.  
673 For a comprehensive examination of these concepts, see Chapter 7.  
674 “...incorreggibile, come giocatore, bestemmiatore, dedito alle ubriachezze e a tutti i vizi, e particolarmente a 
quelli di rubare, di attaccar risse e mettere scandali.” Report of Domenico Brichieri Colombi regarding a certain 
Giulio Gherardi, noble from Pistoia. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 759, no. 37, April 1754.  
675 He committed the “...maggiori stravaganze del mondo, si nell’onore, come nella persona: perche essendo 




Juvenile disobedience and unruliness were certainly not the only disorder disclosed to 
the Auditore Fiscale in order to be curbed or restrained. The feature of disobedience was not 
only present in young men, but also in middle-aged, married men and young or married 
women, mirroring the scenario we have elaborated through interdiction procedures. The 
disruption caused by married men had similar features, but was conflated with their failure as 
heads of family and their matrimonial conflicts. The violence exerted by discoli assumed 
different targets in the case of married men, and gave occasion to their wives to request for 
temporary separations to escape from them. We witness the same refusal to work and death 
threats to household members, only the latter were especially directed against the wife, and 
aggravated by drunkenness.676  
Women’s disobedience, on the contrary, is usually portrayed through more passive 
behaviour, although cases of violent or even murderous women can also be found. Female 
deviance was frequently represented in their defiance to masculine power, and a certain desire 
to live with “too much liberty.”677 We have seen them portrayed in the records of the 
Magistrato dei Pupilli in open defiance of masculine authority, whether their father’s, 
husband’s or men of the government administration. Many of these cases of unruliness were 
connected to certain degrees of mental disturbance, recognized in a constitutional incapacity 
to follow rules and submit to the world’s order. This characteristic is particularly illustrated 
by the case of a woman sentenced to home restraint because she had failed to offer due 
respect to the Commissario of Prato, a distant relative of hers. The Commissario was so 
offended by her lack of good manners that he initially requested her confinement in a convent 
in order to give her the necessary environment to help her repent from her actions [rientrare 
in se stessa]. However, because she was known to be of a “head not that well governed” 
[persona di capo non troppo ben regolato], her fault was ultimately condoned. The 
                                                                                                                                                   
che se meritato le esilio da tutta l’Italia, e da altri paesi esteri.” Petition of Gherardi’s relatives, Ibid., September 
1759. 
676 See, for instance, the case of a man who according to his wife had never contributed to the family’s 
maintenance, demonstrated “no willingness to work”, usually returned home “full of wine [ripieno di vino]” and 
blasphemed in front of his daughters. The wife requested that her husband be employed outside Florence, 
alleging he was frequently violent and had declared his intention to murder her, which had forced her on many 
occasions to sleep outside their home to protect herself. ASF, OGB, Straordinarie, F. 2679, no. 9, circa May 
1755. For similar cases see, for instance, ASF, OGB, Straordinarie, F. 2675, no. 18, November 1749; ASF, CR, 
Fiscale, F. 756, no. 38, July 1750 and F. 757, no. 15, July 1751. 
677 These characteristics are also commonly found in the accusations (or defence) of husbands in marriage 




Commissario yielded to the suggestions of the Auditore Fiscale, and finally decided that the 
matter was not worth pursuing considering her public reputation as a “loose” head.678  
 
Sexual Misconduct 
Also related to disobedience and defiance to behavioural norms, sexual misconduct is 
revealed as a ubiquitous characteristic ascribed to disordered men and women denounced to 
the Tuscan authorities. There were different levels to the categorization of sexual misconduct, 
from the libertine and dissolute tendencies of single men, through the adulterous relationships 
of men and women to homosexual practices. The connection of these behaviours with 
madness may be tricky, particularly if we aim to avoid falling into the trap of equating what 
was perceived as sexual depravation to madness. For this reason, my intention here is to 
identify connections between certain behaviours and madness, in the sense of examining the 
way in which sexual misconduct was found to be indicative of certain degrees of mental 
derangement, which is not to say that sexual misconduct per se was equated to madness.   
Idleness, vices and debauchery usually come together with sexual misconduct in the 
narratives that denounced disordered men. We have seen it regarding prodigals and demented 
taken under the authority of the Magistrato dei Pupilli, and we can recognize it in the young 
men falling into the category of discoli and in disordered middle-aged married men. Libertine 
tendencies were the common territory of prodigals and discoli, leaving the dishonourable 
mark of the French disease (syphilis).679 Sexual disorders became a characteristic of 
disordered men under the form of illicit and improper affairs with women usually of a lower 
social status. Women in these cases are invariably presented as the instigators of men’s vices, 
who in their weakness fall into the schemes of these dissolute and depraved, diverting them 
from the path of obedience, decorum, labour and virtue.680 This tendency was generally 
controlled through police measures like formal precepts prohibiting the union or decreeing the 
woman’s exile. But, some of these cases represented a step further towards abnormal male 
behaviour. The issue was, nonetheless, that many of these men made a habit of their weakness 
                                                
678 Case of Maria Maddalena Buonamici. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 758, no. 1, April 1753.  
679 See, for instance, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 134, July 1749 or ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 756, no. 39, 
July 1750. 
680 See, for example, the case of a young man and his relationship with a woman with whom he spent “almost 
all the hours of the day, and all those of the night”, who “seduced” him not to marry the woman proposed by his 
father. ASF, OGB, Straordinarie, F. 2679, no. 180, January 1757. For a similar case, see Ibid., no. 141, August 




for licentious practices, even making a total fool of themselves by proclaiming publicly their 
“passion” for a woman and their intention to marry her even he was already married, to be 
caught later under dubious circumstances that gave space to accusations of sodomy.681  
The vision of the female power of seduction, which had pervaded religious writings in 
their campaign against pre-marital relations and, particularly, against unequal marriages 
between elite men and low-born women since the late seventeenth century, acquire interesting 
meanings in relation to notions of masculinity and the kind of mental state expected in a 
man.682 The significant element of the cases handled by the Auditore Fiscale can be found in 
the way male weakness was portrayed, and how it was used to reflect poor rational faculties. 
Rather than pointing towards the traditional view of the malice and seductive arts of women, 
the narratives highlighted these men’s lack of rational powers to respond to “female” 
schemes. The fact that these men were repeatedly involved in these kinds of situations, in the 
same degree that the disorder of a discolo was found to be inveterate, lead us to the same 
conclusion.  
A disordered mind was indicated by certain forms of a deliberate breaching of 
behavioural codes. Thus, the circumstances and events that surrounded the act of deviation 
constitute the key to its interpretation. For instance, a man was first denounced when he 
intended to marry a servant, again when he eloped with another woman taking away valuable 
household goods, and a last time when involved in a shooting by reason of a promise of 
marriage to a third woman.683 The tendency of falling into the “trap” of women was combined 
with a complete weakness on men’s part to defend themselves from the greediness of these 
women and their families, pictured invariably as conspiring to take away from them as many 
resources as possible.684 That love under the form of a strong passion could dangerously 
obscure men’s mental faculties was also observed by the “moral rigour” that characterized the 
eighteenth-century religious understanding of the dangers of love.685 But the suggestions 
regarding altered, or weakened mental faculties caused by passionate affection and heightened 
                                                
681 I am referring here to a particular case affecting a Marquis Baldinucci, involved in a scandal with a peasant 
girl for whom he declared a hopeless passion and his intention to marry her, even if he was already married. He 
was involved 6 years later in rumours of sodomitical practices and “other filthiness” (altre laidezze).  ASF, CR, 
Fiscale, F. 759, no. 28, March 1756 and 1762. 
682 On the religious campaign against pre-marital relations, and against mismatched marriages, which during the 
eighteenth century enjoyed the practical aid of law and the police, see Lombardi, Matrimonio di antico regime, 
p. 359-375.  
683 ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 758, no. 24,  no. 27 and no. 62, 1754.  
684 See ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 756, no. 32, April 1750, or Idem, no. 41, August 1750.   




by schemes of women served here, interestingly, to diminish these men’s responsibility for 
their wrongdoings. In fact, the common provision against these kinds of disorder was to 
ensure the woman’s banishment from the surroundings of the helpless man, so that he could 
return to the good path. Either because of their “fickleness” (leggerezze) or their excessive 
“volubility”, they let themselves be “persuaded” by these women into committing actions that 
were detrimental to them.686 What was only hinted at in some cases was openly expressed in 
others, such as when a father explicitly referred to his son’s “weakness”, and “little and no 
judgement” (poco e niuno giudizio) to explain his involvement with three different women 
and his engagement in two parallel marriage promises. The same weakness and little 
judgement that led this man to be interdicted some years later.687 
Sexual depravation appears connected to madness more than once, present in the 
different spaces where madness could make a public appearance in the eighteenth century. 
Interdiction petitions, criminal insanity, hospital and medical records all mention at a certain 
point the presence of wrongly oriented passions and deviant sexual practices. The explicitness 
of the connection with mental derangement varies, though, depending on the context in which 
sexual deprivation appears. Men under the curatorship of the Pupilli were commonly involved 
in accusations of lecherous behaviour, as were some of the women. For instance, Lorenzo 
Baldinotti, whose madness was disclosed through the four interdictions that affected him 
between 1725 and 1755, caused repeated trouble for his family and the authorities on account 
of his disordered sexual behaviour.688 He faced rape charges in 1729 and in 1755 was still 
creating trouble due to his “dissolute” behaviour, “illicit pleasures” and “public sensuality.”689 
In the case of Baldinotti’s son, said to have inherited the “brain and character” of a father 
                                                
686 This was said regarding Bindo Maria Peruzzi, who eloped with a woman while involved in matrimonial 
negotiations with another one. Attesting to the perception that he suffered some sort of mental derangement, he 
was interdicted 10 years later. See, ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 759, no. 41, July 1754 and ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 
2306, no. 128, October 1764.  
687 Report of the Auditore Fiscale referring the words of Orazio Pennetti’s father. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 755, no. 
72, July-August 1747. In 1751 he was prosecuted of stupro against a third woman, and was finally interdicted in 
1754. In the following years the case continues to appear with regards to Pennetti’s difficult personality, 
involving alternatively the Pupilli officials and the Auditore Fiscale. See respectively ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 
2531, no. 55, September 1751; ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 179, May 1754; ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 
2537, no. 162, 23 July 1761.The interdiction can be seen in ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 179, May 
1754. 
688 See Chapter 3, section 1. 
689 ASF, OGB, Negozi dei Rettori, F. 1729, Negozio 7067, no.4, 3-8 March 1729 and ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 759, 
no. 11, July 1755 respectively. The connection between sexual crimes and interdiction sentences could be further 
developed in the future. The fact that I have found “by chance” so many cases of interdicted men involved in 
diverse criminal activities, broadens the picture of how problematic the interdicted could become for public life. 
A more thorough search in the archives of the Otto di Guardia could eventually shed clearer light on the 




“whose extreme extravagance was notorious”, his lecherousness assumed the form of 
sodomitic tendencies. Having shown early signs of extravagance and a behaviour close to that 
of a discolo, Antonio Baldinotti faced criminal charges of sodomy in his early twenties, which 
fortunately for him and his family were left open due to lack of evidence.690 All the same 
there were once again rumours about him, this time saying he had developed an “irrational 
passion” (irragionevole passione) for a man he kept living with him as a lackey in the same 
countryside villa that had witnessed his father’s scandals.691 After a request by his relatives, 
Antonio was sent back to Florence under direct order of the Auditore Fiscale, to be kept under 
direct surveillance while his interdiction was being approved. Antonio’s next of kin not only 
requested the interdiction, but also solicited his banishment in Volterra or Portoferraio.692  
The discreet and expedited action of the authorities to conceal a behaviour that had by 
then achieved too much publicity speaks not only of Antonio’s privileges before the law. 
Aristocratic privileges in this case constitute only the first and most evident layer of a much 
more complex problem when we take into account the whole context. The Baldinotti family 
had been exposed to the consequences of mad behaviour and had made use of the 
mechanisms available to control it for half the century at least. At the same time, this 
provided them with the necessary ability to make convenient use of mechanisms such as 
incarceration, home restraint, banishment, interdiction and criminal prosecution. The 
characteristics of the mental derangement that allegedly affected father and son are 
sufficiently recurrent and consistent so as to interpret their cases as the result of mere 
machination and abuse. Without having to settle clear boundaries between reality and fiction, 
what the Baldinotti case underpins is a social awareness of the characteristics of madness and 
how certain behaviours and emotional reactions were its most definitive tokens. In the case of 
Antonio’s sodomitic tendencies, his weakness for same-sex relationships were unanimously 
singled out as caused by the mental disturbance he inherited from his father, being as he was, 
“a young man of little brain and little conduct.”693 
                                                
690 ASF, OGB, Giornale di Negozi, F. 1071, fols. 220v-221, 17 July 1765. 
691 ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2542, no. 163, November 1768. 
692 Idem and ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2307, no. 169, September 1768. 
693 “...giovane di poco cervello, e di poca condotta”. Report of Domenico Brichieri Colombi. ASF, OGB, 




A similar approach had been taken by the relatives of a man convicted of sodomy 
when they argued his impunity on account of his “fatuity and foolishness.”694 We have seen 
how the criminally insane were held unaccountable for their actions. By the same token, 
insanity diminished the responsibility of the individual for indulging vices and moral 
corruptions such as sodomitical practices. Madness explained their “vicious” tendencies at the 
same time as it exculpated them for indulging them. But, I have found no evidence suggesting 
that sodomy on its own was considered to be a kind of madness. In the cases where sodomy 
appears connected to the argument of diminished responsibility by reason of insanity, there is 
nothing to suggest that sodomitical practices were considered to be the symptom of madness. 
On the contrary, the argument was that, because the suspect was considered to be mad, he 
could not restrain himself from committing the crime. As pointed out by critics of Foucault’s 
contention that homosexuality was included in the categories of madness in the eighteenth 
century, we must bear in mind that homosexuality was “fiercely punished” by law, while 
madness exculpated the individuals on account of their diminished responsibility.695    
So long as madness presupposed the incapacity to perform rational actions and take 
rational decisions, mad people were considered as particularly prone to sexual deviances such 
as the ones performed by the Baldinotti. For instance, a man committed to Santa Dorotea, 
whose sentence had been suspended on account of his insanity, was released from the hospital 
when his pazzia furiosa turned into a “mixture of stupidity and dementia.” To illustrate his 
current mental condition, the hospital’s physician said he “is not furious, and neither disturbs 
the peace of those around him nor falls into lascivious acts, but has simply become a little 
imbecile of mind and foolish [stoliduccio].”696      
The configuration of mental deviance can thus be read as part of a more general 
campaign to control sexual behaviour and discipline moral behaviours which began at the end 
of the seventeenth century with a strong religious mark but which became progressively 
secularized during the eighteenth century and materialized, among other things, in the 
                                                
694 I am referring here to Lorenzo Buonriposi, convicted of sodomy in 1743, whose case was examined in the 
section “Criminal Insanity” at the beginning of this chapter. ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2523, no. 14, August 
1743. 
695 I am drawing here on Claude Quétel’s argument against Foucault’s theory regarding homosexuality as a 
category of madness in the Ancien Régime. Claude Quétel, “Hay que criticar a Foucault?”, in Elisabeth 
Roudinesco (et. al.), Pensar la locura. Ensayos sobre Michel Foucault (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1996) [French 
edition Penser la folie. Essais sur Michel Foucault (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1992)], p. 73.   
696 “...non è furioso, ne turba la quiete di chi li stà d’intorno ne tampoco da in atti lascivi ma semplicemente è 
restato un poco imbecille di mente e stoliduccio, et in grado di non dovere più stare nel suddetto spedale.” 





enforcement of the office of the Auditore Fiscale.697 Measures taken to ensure the 
maintenance of the buon governo and guard the inhabitants’ good morals were easily 
conflated with mechanisms to neutralize the consequences of madness. Nonetheless, even if 
madness and moral depravation produced similar consequences, we must be cautious. 
Evidently, not every morally reprehensible act was considered to be the expression of a 
deranged mind. For instance, female prostitution and male engagement in same-sex lascivious 
acts were not per se categorized as mad behaviour. Quite the contrary, they were well defined 
crimes, punishable by law. But, the fact is that insanity constituted a disruption of the public 
peace and morality, which is to say that the insane behaviour that caught public attention was 
precisely the kind that was disclosed through violent or indecent acts, as we have seen. 
Therefore, it was not sodomy, adultery, debauchery or lecherousness by themselves what 
constituted madness, but the way in which these behaviours were enacted by some of the men 
and women whose cases were brought before the Auditore Fiscale.  
Attesting for an eighteenth century particularly preoccupied with sexual behaviour, 
and placing Tuscany in the larger scenario of the European enlightenment, women were also 
involved in these sexual scandals, giving occasion to a different set of measures to control the 
problem, but to not so different arguments to condemn it. Again, the primary division is given 
by property and women’s exclusion from it. In the case of men, the common resolution taken 
to prevent the consequences of libertine practices was to banish the woman in question. But 
when women were the protagonists of the scandal they were confined, usually in either of the 
two Florentine Conservatories that held women of bad living, the Mendicanti and the 
Malmaritate. It seems clear that such conservatories served the purpose of secluding women 
of bad reputation to protect their honour. They were either women lacking family networks to 
protect them, or married women accused of adulterous behaviour. The Mendicanti in 
particular, according to the study by Daniela Lombardi, was used as a temporal solution to 
matrimonial conflicts that prevented the need to turn to more definitive solutions through the 
ecclesiastical justice.698 We have seen that female insanity was hidden in monasteries and 
conservatories, leaving a trace that is hard to follow, and was often conflated with the female 
disorders that traditionally dominated masculine anxieties. Here again, the involvement of the 
                                                
697 See Lombardi, Matrimonio di antico regime; Mangio, La polizia toscana; Alessi, “Le riforme di polizia 
nell’Italia del Settecento” and Contini, “La Città regolata”. 




Auditore Fiscale served as an abbreviated and discreet measure to silence the dishonour 
married women allegedly provoked for their husbands.  
As in other cases, the interesting aspect for us here lies not in the delineation of 
categories of female disorder connected to sexual behaviour, but rather in the recourse to 
descriptors of madness. Denunciations of female libertinage and female unruliness, 
particularly concerning aristocratic women, recurred to categories echoing the words and lines 
of argument employed to argue for mental incapacity. Dissolute and lecherous tendencies in 
women were blended with concerns over their husband’s honour and tied to concerns over 
patrimony, so the moral economy is still in the background of these descriptions. This is 
finely illustrated by the case of Chiara Maria Fondora, a noblewoman from Lucca confined at 
request of her husband in the Mendicanti in 1747. She was said to have a “most wicked 
character” (pessimo carattere), which earned her “universal scorn.” Among her faults, we are 
told of her multiple adventures with different men, her intimate attitude towards her cicisbei, 
the growing debts she incurred to keep them, and her habit of receiving visitors in her bed. 
She frequented men with “improper liberty” and “illicit confidence”, spending outrageous 
amounts of money on her illicit friendships, allowing for her intimate friends to spend the 
night in the house and giving them expensive gifts, because, “to the one I have given my 
heart, she said, I can also give gold and silver.”699 She was seen in the company of men of 
diverse origins, from tailors to priests, strolling around the city with them until late at night. 
She shamelessly pursued her affection, and what was seen as even worse, she revealed her 
state using words of “foolish love [sciocco amore]”, which revealed her carnal impulses.700  
Enlightened sociability had brought new conceptions of social relations and 
affectionate bonds between the sexes. According to Bizzocchi, the practise of cicisbei was 
widely spread among the Italian aristocracy, creating an interesting triangle between the two 
spouses and the cicisbeo. The latter not only counted on the approval of the husband, but 
often played a crucial role in the marriage, mediating between the spouses and acting as an 
                                                
699 “Un attestato d’una persona fiorentina del di primo settembre 1747 che asserisce avere la detta Sig. Chiara 
Maria Fondora ne Catani detto, che dette a Monfù Sufflè suo caro Amico un sacchettino di Ruspi [zecchini, that 
is, gold coins], quando ebbe a partire di Firenze, e che niente gli dolsero, perche a chi ho donato il cuore, potevo, 
diceva ella, donarli anche l’oro, e l’argento”. “Estratto dei Documenti, e Recapiti riguardanti il contegno della 
vita e costumi praticati tanto per il passato, che di presente dalla Signora Chiara Maria Fondora, moglie del Sig. 
Ant. Raffaelo Catani.” ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 755, no. 35, 1747. 
700 “...doppo esser’ partita per Lucca disigillata d’un frate d’Ognissanti, nella quella palesavagli il suo 
grand’affetto con sommo dispiacere d’aver lasciato i suoi begl’occhi risplendenti, ma quando fosse ritornato, 




outlet of energies that worked for both husband and wife.701 But a careful examination of the 
case of Chiara Maria Fondora suggests that she practiced a particular variant of cicisbeismo in 
stark opposition to social parity, and included more escorts in the equation than what was 
appropriate. But there is more to it, for although the narratives place her disorder around her 
behaviour with her cicisbei, taking into account how her mental and emotional state are 
portrayed introduces an interesting aspect to consider. Having in mind how the case was 
argued, one could suggest that Chiara Maria Fondora’s breaching of behavioural norms was 
not her practice of having cicisbei, but how she behaved with them and, most of all, the extent 
to which her behaviour was taken to denote her inner (mental and/or emotional) instability. 
For although having a cicisbeo was accepted in aristocratic society, there were certain rules 
that both women and their escorts (cavalieri serventi) had to comply. The lady’s escort was 
suppose to finance and provide for her needs, according to the rules of gallant society, but not 
the other way around. The husband’s resources were not supposed to be openly wasted on the 
cicisbeo, let alone could she openly admit to have lost her mind over him (them in this case).  
In a context where love affections were thought to inflict a damaging effect on 
people’s minds, these women aggravated their conduct with their demonstrations of “foolish 
love”, and the “immoderate passion [sregolata passione]” that “blinded” them.702 The line 
separating accepted and improper behaviour was a matter of debate, and so was the border 
between sanity and insanity. This debate, illuminated through the denunciations brought to 
the Auditore Fiscale, bears witness to conflicting visions about the limits of liberty and how a 
person, particularly a woman in this case, was expected to “navigate” across her affections 
(and not necessarily repress them).703   
Let me examine a case where we find a direct association between persistent libertine 
behaviour and madness. Angiola della Renna, married to a cavaliere and noble herself, was 
first confined at her villa in Pelago (in the vicinity of Pontassieve), and later sent to the 
Mendicanti, on account of her persistent and scandalous libertinage.704 The usual features are 
present here as well: excessive liberty in her treatment with men, their staying overnight at her 
residence, the public scandal her behaviour caused in the surrounding population. Angiola’s 
                                                
701 Bizzocchi, Cicisbei. 
702 The widow Margherita Roselli fell under the effects of an immoderate passion for a surgeon, which blinded 
her, obscuring her judgement. The man was accused of taking advantage of her and her economic situation, and 
was consequently sent to exile far away from her. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 758, no. 64, August 1757.  
703 William Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).   




high rank demanded a special treatment, recognized in the discreteness by which her 
behaviour was treated and through the fact that the Auditore Fiscale attended her case by 
direct command of the Consulta, and not by the usual mechanism of a request sent by the 
offended husband.705 Even if the senator Giulio Rucellai, close collaborator of the Council of 
Regency, and the administration of the Mendicanti had manifested their reluctance in 
admitting such a highly ranked and disordered woman, she was transferred there in June of 
1759. Her public performance was concluded with a final scandal, featuring an attempt to 
escape from the authorities sent to restrain her across the roofs of Pelago in the company of a 
younger and lower-ranked man.  
Throughout the four years Angiola della Rena was confined in the Mendicanti, Giulio 
Rucellai acted as the mediator between her, the government, the Auditore Fiscale and her 
husband. From the beginning he had been reluctant to admit her into the Conservatory, 
adducing that “the wicked manner of this woman is by a great extent the consequence of a 
kind of madness that makes her trespass every obligation.”706 When five months later she 
requested her release so that she could give birth in “the house of her own husband”, Rucellai 
not only denied the request, but called into doubt the alleged pregnancy.707 He nonetheless 
called attention to the inappropriate situation in which she had been left in the Conservatory, 
where “except for the food, she lacks almost everything.” He considered that her situation 
needed to be improved, given that “the extravagance mingled with the foolishness [stoltizia] 
that agitates the heart of this woman” were not reason enough to deprive her of the treatment 
a lady deserved.708  
Angiola della Renna’s extravagance, wicked manners and the foolishness that 
disturbed her heart, as Rucellai had put it, continued to hamper her release, despite the fact 
                                                
705 Her case in fact posed a particular problem for the ducal administration, given that her high rank demanded 
special treatment at the Mendicanti, particularly an individual room, putting a strain on the institution. Before 
commanding her confinement in the Mendicanti, the Council of Regency requested a special survey to find out if 
there was a precedent in sending highly ranked women to the institution, and a list of 7 women received between 
1739 and 1759 was produced. 
706 “...il cattivo costume di questa donna, è in gran parte conseguenza d’una specie di follia, che la fa passar 
sopra a ogni dovere.” Giulio Rucellai to the Consulta, 30 June 1759, ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 760, no. 26. 
707 A surgeon certified her grown abdomen, but could recognize no movement of the fetus, which for the 7 
months pregnancy she claimed to have, was fundamental to assess the veracity of her claim. No further allusion 
was made to the pregnancy, but years later she made reference to a damaged state of health due to bad humours. 
The whole issue of the pregnancy is certainly very interesting, probably pointing towards a physical illness that 
caused the skipping of her period and the swollen abdomen. However, we cannot dismiss the possibility that she 
was in fact pregnant only because there are no further records on the matter.  
708 “...la stravaganza mescolata alla stoltizia ch’agita il cuore di questa donna, non mi sembra un titolo 
sufficiente per farle mancare un necessario che corrisponda alla maschera di dama, ch’ella ha rappresentato fin’ 




that she sent various subsequent petitions with eloquent promises of amendment, attributing 
her past disorders to her “juvenile fickleness” (leggerezze).709 With no results, she promised 
in the future to live subject to the authority of her husband. Nonetheless, facts proved to 
undermine her promises, given that in August 1762 the Auditore Fiscale informed that 
Angiola “either not understanding reason or not intending to follow it, seems to be obstinate 
in her strange way of thinking.”710 She was finally released after four years with serious 
admonitions on the part of Rucellai and Brichieri Colombi, being threatened with further 
punishment if she were not to keep her promise of acting “with the wisdom and decorum 
convenient to her state and condition.”711  
We know that the office of the Auditore Fiscale provided the secrecy to deal with 
these kinds of matters in a discrete and quick way that ensured preservation of honour and 
prevented the need to resort to more definitive measures like requesting a separatio thori 
before the ecclesiastical court. The interesting thing is that implicit or direct references to 
altered states of mind in these disordered women can be seen as serving the same purpose: it 
both diminished their guilt and preserved their husbands’ honour. Suggesting their mind was 
compromised secured a favourable response from the authorities and at the same time 
activated the mechanisms to resolve the problem, inflicting less damage to the husband’s 
honour than if he had to recognize his own failure. The inability to keep a disordered wife 
whose mind was not in the right state under control left, at least, the husband’s manliness 
intact.  
 
Notions of Mental Disturbance in Family Litigation 
Many of the private conflicts that the office of the Auditore Fiscale had to attend to 
were related to family conflicts, as we have seen, among which matrimonial disputes take a 
leading part. Accusations of licentious behaviour and a lax sense of matrimonial fidelity 
worked many times as crossfire between spouses. In the matrimonial contentions disclosed 
                                                
709 In her petitions to be released from the Mendicanti, Angiola also made reference to the mortification the 
confinement produced in her, the deep vexation it caused her to be separated from her “numerous and very 
young children”, and various physical ailments caused by a “wicked disposition of humours.” Petitions of 
Angiola della Renna, 1761, Ibid. 
710 “...la stessa o non intendendo ragione, o non volendola abbracciare, pare che si sia ostinata nella strana sua 
maniera di pensare...” Domenico Brichieri Colombi to the Council of Regency, August 1762, Ibid.  
711 “...l’avverta seriamente a condursi in avvenire colla quella saviezza e decoro che conviene al di lei stato e 
condizione per non sottoporsi in caso diverso a qualche più sensibile mortificazione”. Council of Regency to 




before the authorities, patrimonial concerns were blended into denunciations of behaviours 
that were supposed to reveal a disordered state of mind. These disputes demonstrate 
particularly well how litigants resorted to the vocabulary of madness to illustrate their 
accusations against each other and based the need for the authorities’ intervention. The 
instrumental use of labels of madness at a lay level suggests a social awareness of the causes 
and symptoms of mental derangement, broadening our comprehension of the ways in which 
madness was identified, perceived, and explained.   
As is common to find in the narratives of deviant behaviour, mental disturbance 
appears in close connection with notions of virtue, morality and family roles. Disordered 
women, we have seen, were usually portrayed in open defiance to their husband’s authority. 
However, the obstinacy they showed in keeping their disordered behaviour and, particularly, 
their reluctance to yield to their husband’s authority was only the edge of a more complicated 
understanding of what their disorder was. The connection with mental disturbance can be 
found once we cross that edge. It was not unruliness or libertinage in itself which indicated 
that the mind was compromised, but their disordered disposition (animo sregolato), their 
“utterly extravagant declarations”, their caprices.712 That is, the demonstrations of their inner 
disposition accompanying those acts of unruliness.  
Immoderate emotions – whether violent reactions, extreme sadness or passionate 
affections – could be the cause of different forms of mental affliction, contemporaneous 
medical knowledge was establishing.713 What was becoming widely accepted in medical 
knowledge is reflected in the narratives of disordered behaviour and the ways in which 
relatives and authorities interpreted them. These women’s amorous affections were defined as 
“foolish” and their passion “immoderate”, their mind and soul were said to be disordered 
(animo sregolato), or extravagant. If we consider that these connections were neither random 
nor casual, we can assert that husbands made use of a shared knowledge that connected 
immoderate emotions to mental disturbance as a mechanism to support their pleas against 
their disordered wives. The fact that they showed a “disordered disposition” (animo 
                                                
712 Margherita del Tira’s husband resorted to the Auditore Fiscale because she refused to abandon her enclosure 
at the Malmaritate: “si è costantemente dichiarata di non voler ritornare presso del marito, ne di voler passare in 
altro ritiro, ma bensì di volere andare a suo capriccio, e contro la di sua volontà ove più le piacerà, e così vivere 
come se ella fosse sua Iuris, e non dovesse in cosa di tanto rilievo dipendere in alcuna maniera dal marito. Ma 
perche l’esecuzione di tali stravagantissime dichiarazioni, specialmente in una donna giovine, sembrano 
diametralmente opposta alle disposizioni delle Leggi Divine, e Umane, alla pubblica onestà, e al decoro del 
supplicante, e di sua famiglia.” ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 758, no. 69, March-July 1755.  




sregolato) served to justify the need, as the Auditore Fiscale framed it, to be restrained (sia 
tenuta a freno) and persuaded to recognize her duties.714  
For instance, the noblewoman from Lucca confined in the Mendicanti for her wicked 
character, her behaviour towards her cicisbei and, particularly, her shameless manifestations 
of affection towards her foolish love, tried to counter her husband’s accusations by attacking 
him with recourse to similar arguments. Relying on the principle that a deranged mind was 
manifested through odd economic behaviour, she accused her husband of “extravagancy”, 
explaining that she had been impelled to live separately from him for over 14 years due to his 
failure to feed her and their children to the extent that one of them died from hunger.715 
However, in the marital dispute between Chiara Maria Fondora and her husband, her fame as 
a licentious and libertine woman proved to be stronger than her accusations against her 
husband. Her husband’s extravagancy was considered less serious in the eyes of the Fiscale 
compared to her repeated demonstrations of “foolish love” (sciocco amore) and scandalous 
libertinage.  
If in this case the husband’s allegations against his wife were favoured over the 
latter’s, there are plenty of cases with the opposite outcome. Interdiction procedures, largely 
portraying disordered men through women’s accusations, are a clear proof. Extravagancy and 
the different forms madness could assume were not constrained to one gender. Accusations of 
male extravagancy also served to describe their altered minds and disordered dispositions, but 
this time in close connection to economic behaviour. Although these factors were taken to 
indicate both male and female mental disorders, economic behaviour was at the very 
foundation of the model against which male sanity was measured. Male extravagancy related 
to economic behaviour was recognized in any behaviour that went against the wellbeing of 
the household, being it dissipation, or hoarding to the point of withholding the necessary 
means of maintenance to the family.     
Prodigality had an antithesis that was as revealing as its counterpart of the presence of 
male mental derangement. For instance, a nobleman from Montepulciano, involved in a bitter 
matrimonial dispute, was described as a miserly head of family who “moved by violent 
                                                
714 According to Brichieri Colombi’s analysis, the conflict between Margherita del Tira and her husband 
resulted from a mixture of the husband’s lack of ability in controlling his wife, and the wife’s refusal to assume 
her subjection to him, her preference for a “life in liberty” (preferendo più tosto la stessa di vivere con libertà, e 
senza soggezione del marito), and her disordered and uncontrolled state of mind (animo affatto sregolato). ASF, 
CR, Fiscale, F. 758, no. 69, March-July 1755.  
715 Petition of Chiara Maria Fondora requesting her release from the Mendicanti. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 755, no. 




passions of sordid avarice” (guidato da violente passione di sordidissima avarizia), refused to 
spend on his family’s most basic needs, banishing salt and spices for being too expensive, and 
withholding from them food, clothing and medical attention, leaving his children to scream 
with hunger. All these signs, combined with the fact that he insulted and beat his wife in the 
most indecorous and unfounded way, denoted his “disturbed humour” (torbido umore) and 
that he was “disordered in his thinking” (stravolto nel pensare), all indicators of an 
“extravagant head” (capo stravagante). Although the local authorities and the wife’s kin 
proposed that the man be interdicted and placed under guardianship, the Auditore Fiscale 
considered that this was not to be recommended in this case as it would only lead to further 
disturbance in the couple’s life.716    
The familial disputes placed under the authority of the Auditore Fiscale for arbitration 
made use of the features of madness as arguments to base opposed accusations. Violence, 
dilapidation, sexual misconduct, extravagance, and in general, behaviours that denoted an 
absence of self-control were mechanisms to accuse a family member of deviancies that could 
only be explained by some sort of mental derangement. Furthermore, these deviations, more 
or less explicitly defined as forms of insanity, were used to win the dispute and convince the 
Auditore Fiscale of one’s position. Interestingly, then, the arbitration practiced by the 
Auditore Fiscale served as a space for the discussion of the boundaries of normal behaviour, 
and the shaping of insanity.  
It might be important to note here that evidently not every family dispute handled by 
the Auditore Fiscale, or the Magistrato dei Pupilli and Otto di Guardia e Balìa, for that matter, 
made use of the language of madness, or interpreted every deviant behaviour as sign of 
madness. However, the evidence suggests that the eighteenth-century awareness of the 
dangers and problems of madness made it a common, if not winning argument. The 
increasing attention paid to madness during the eighteenth century in Europe also has this 
other, less evident variable, usually neglected by the specialized scholarship.  
 
5. 4. The Itineraries of Madness 
The Auditore Fiscale’s authority over madness was definitively established during the 
Regency, and officially sealed by the 1750 reforms of Santa Dorotea. But, as we have seen, 
                                                
716 Various testimonies, and report of Brichieri Colombi regarding the nobleman Giulio Cocconi. ASF, CR, 




the involvement of the office in matters related to deviance in general, and with madness 
specifically, surpassed the responsibility stated by the Motuproprio of 1750. In its quality of 
head of police and supervisor of the criminal justice, the Auditore Fiscale dealt with madness 
within the scope of controlling the consequences posed by deviant behaviour in social life, 
both in terms of security and morality. This explains why the office handled not only requests 
for the institutionalization or incarceration of deviant relatives, but also requests soliciting its 
direct involvement through face-to-face conversations, official reprimands and other types of 
admonishments.  
The Auditori Fiscali could count on various mechanisms to resolve the familial 
conflicts and at the same time control the public disorders they generated. The mechanisms 
ranged from persuasive measures to confinement and exile, all with the goal of restoring 
social and family order. A close examination of the pattern behind the office’s usual course of 
action shows that there were a series of graduated stages of public intervention. The ultimate 
aim was to control and hopefully overturn the disordered behaviour, disclosing an underlying 
belief that deviant behaviours could be controlled, disciplined and thus changed. Even if in 
the form of mental derangement, human will was to be held victorious in its fight against 
unreason.  
Denunciations of male disobedience and unruliness usually aimed to request 
incarceration or forced embarkation as a way to curb or tame the disorder. The latter was 
requested usually when the former had proven to be innocuous, even if these men had been 
subjected to harsh regimes of “bread and water” and daily whipping to induce them to submit 
to the rational norms of social life.717 Incarceration was considered a measure of force aimed 
at curbing unruliness and, at the same time, it protected the rest of the household from the 
individual’s extravagances and violence. Incarceration on request served as a disciplining 
measure “to attempt with this remedy to induce him back to the due course from his past 
irregularities.”718 It aimed to “mortify” the unruly individual, and worked in combination with 
the admonishments of the Auditore Fiscale in describing the harsher punishments that would 
be inflicted on them if they were to continue on the same path. Forced embarkation in a vessel 
                                                
717 As it was said regarding the Vincenzio Malesci, “...non essendo serviti i gastighi di averlo tenuto in carcere, 
con il gastigo di poco cibo, e frustate il giorno, ma niente è giovato...”. ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2532, no. 44, 
October 1752.  
718 “per tentare con questo rimedio di ridurlo a dovere dalle passate sue irregolarità”, said the Auditore Fiscale 





was the only solution left when incarceration had been ineffective, and when families could 
not keep financing (or had never been able to) their confinement. Forced embarkation, which 
inevitably recalls the Foucauldian ship of fools, rested upon the principle that the rigours and 
discipline of maritime life might help curb these men’s ungovernable desires and passions.719  
Incarceration and forced embarkation were both intended as a punishment that had the 
scope of taming (domare) them through punishment,720 “correct” them of their mistakes,721 
“moderate” their disobedience,722 and hopefully keep them away from the predestined future 
of crime determined by their bad “inclination” and tendency to vices.723 Similar principles 
guided the practice of confining disordered and disreputable women in monasteries or 
conservatories for the protection of female virtue. Although confinement of deviance behind 
monastic walls was not a solution exerted exclusively against women, it is more visible in 
their case.724 Fully endorsing the principles that sustained the patriarchal family, authorities 
understood “taming” or the process of correction as subjugation to behavioural norms and an 
acknowledgment of family hierarchies. Sons and daughters were supposed to respect their 
fathers, married women their husbands, married men were supposed to follow their “natural” 
role as heads of family.   
Confinement in a vessel, in prison, in a fortress, in a monastery or in a hospital 
inevitably appears as a desperate measure taken to control mental deviance. Confinement was 
often decided upon in combination with other measures, such as official admonitions, home-
restraint, or interdiction, sometimes simultaneously and other times as an escalating effort to 
tame the behaviour and control its consequences. The records of the Pupilli, when combined 
with the kinds of records under examination here demonstrate that people could be interdicted 
while they were being held prisoners in a fortress, or be episodically imprisoned after they 
were interdicted. However, important considerations need to be taken into account to put into 
                                                
719 Coercive measures varied according to social origin and family situation. Embarkation, for example, was not 
considered suitable for the privileged, in whose case confinement in a fortress was preferred (see the case of 
Anton Gaetano Mori Ubaldini. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 760, no. 53, December 1760). Similarly, embarkation was 
intended only for young single men, while imprisonment or internal exile were the preferred mechanisms to 
control married men with underage children (See for example ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2537, no. 16, July 1760 
and ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2540, no. 3, January 1764). 
720 ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 759, no. 77, October 1758.  
721 ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 754, no. 56, March 1742. 
722 ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 755, no. 11, January 1746/47. 
723 Attesting for the preventive nature of the punishment, the Auditore Fiscale explained it was intended “...per 
togliere l’occasioni al medesimo di commettere errori, e delitto grave, a i quali è proclive nella pessima sua 
inclinazione...”. ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2530, no. 60, June 1750, case of Gaetano Giorgi. 
724 There is evidence that monasteries were considered as suitable environments for deranged men, particularly 




perspective the notion of the great confinement. Historiography has established that 
confinement in its various forms was a desperate measure, and never worked as a permanent 
solution. The major characteristic found throughout early modern Europe is that confinement, 
regardless of whether it was in a hospital, prison or monastery, was temporary, and 
constituted only the tip of a much more nuanced process.725 For this reason I have chosen to 
use the model of the itineraries of madness to suggest mobility through the different courses 
of action available to families in their quest to deal with the problems posed by madness. This 
approach to deviance explains from an interesting angle the lack of definitive measures 
adopted against criminal insanity and mental incapacity.  
Many cases reveal how mad people were moved from one place to another. We 
observe them being moved from their domestic care to a paid private residence, from their 
confinement in a countryside villa to a fortress, from incarceration to a hospital, and from 
hospital to home custody again. As we have seen, the periods of confinement in Santa 
Dorotea and Santa Maria Nuova were generally short, even if this meant the same person was 
admitted behind its walls several times. Evidently, these temporary solutions to the custodial 
problem of the insane were directly dependant upon the economic resources of each family, 
but evidence suggests that even poor families moved their mentally afflicted members from 
one place to the other.  
Madness became the concern of the Auditore Fiscale the moment it affected public 
life. From this office, families, magistrates, government authorities and physicians 
coordinated the series of joint measures for the management of madness and the control of its 
consequences. Thus we see the Fiscale taking part in the attempts of families strained by the 
presence of troublesome forms of madness. The case of the cavaliere Francesco del Sera, who 
was first ordered to be transferred to a countryside villa and afterwards compelled by force to 
receive medical treatment to cure his persistent madness, is telling. He was so “obstinately 
unruly” that he violently rejected any cure or help, on account of which his curator requested 
military help to restrain him and thus force him to receive the cure.726 His behaviour was so 
utterly difficult to manage that government officials declared he could not be allowed to live 
in society, for he had persistently disturbed public life with his extravagances, frenzies and his 
                                                
725 Much has been written to discuss and counterbalance Foucault’s main contribution to the history of madness. 
For an overview, see Porter, Mind-Forg’d Manacles; Roscioni, Il governo della follia; Roudinesco, Pensar la 
locura.  
726 Cavaliere Francesco del Sera, said to be pazzo affatto and imbecille di mente. ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 755, no. 




“not ordinary alteration of spirit.”727 Drawing on the undisputed fact that his “dementia” had 
aggravated over the years, the debate between his distinguished relatives, the Auditore Fiscale 
and the members of the Council of Regency was centred on the difficulties of having him 
secured at home versus the advantages of transferring him to a monastery.728 Likewise, male 
and female pazzi furiosi were often held incarcerated while their admission to Santa Dorotea 
was settled. The residential situation of the mentally disordered was a burden that families 
were often unable to resolve without the intervention of the public authorities, who, in the 
many cases where family cohabitation proved to be unbearable, had to provide alternative 
measures.  
An interdiction sentence was not sufficient to put an end to the difficulties generated 
by madness. Even if following the interdiction the Pupilli officials were permanently involved 
in every situation or conflict surrounding their wards, the involvement of the Fiscale was 
often required. The Auditore Fiscale often participated in the attempts of the Pupilli to 
provide for the wellbeing of both the families and the interdicted, ordering temporary 
incarcerations or coordinating the availability of places where they could be taken care of.729 
Interdiction, as with any other measure to cope with madness, constituted an option in a 
network of connected measures. In some cases the interdicted had been incarcerated for short 
periods by request of their relatives before the interdiction, and some continued to be so 
afterwards.730 In other cases the Auditore Fiscale was called to intervene in defence of the 
administrator who had to suffer the interdicted’s surges of anger when they saw their 
disempowerment. Growing mistreatments on the part of the mentally afflicted were a 
common trigger to request the authorities intervention, as in the case of Francesca Paoli del 
Feo. As we saw in the previous chapter, her unbearable personality obliged her relatives to 
make recurrent requests to the Auditore Fiscale and to the Pupilli officials to try to find a 
                                                
727 Report of Brichieri Colombi, ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 758, no. 60, June 1755.  
728 The debate about his destiny in 1755 arrives at the point when the authorities decided to keep him under 
house arrest until a more suitable place, like the proposed monastery, was found. We have further notice of his 
life in 1770 when he appears married to a younger woman, still subjected to serious periods of crises, but now 
said to enjoy lucid intervals. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2308, no. 47, August 1770 and no. 333, December 
1772.  
729 The daily accounts of the resolutions and matters affecting each of the minors and incapacitated adults under 
the authority of the Pupilli attest to this coordination. ASF, MPAP, Campione di deliberazioni e partiti, F. 112, 
1717 to F. 165, 1770.   
730 See, for example, Cosimo Casacci, interdicted as demente in July 1722, and afterwards alternatively 
incarcerated for short periods and held under home restraint for many years before he was definitively sent to 
Santa Dorotea where he died in 1743. See ASF, MPAP, Campione di deliberazioni e partiti, F. 112-138 and 




suitable solution for her custody. She was interdicted twice, first in 1751 by reason of 
dementia, and then in 1755 by reason of prodigality. In 1764 she was confined in the 
Malmaritate, for she was not mad (pazza) enough as to be committed to Santa Dorotea, but 
neither was she sufficiently “wise” as to be left “free in the streets.”731 Dressing indecently 
and permanently drunk, she tormented her daughter near the monastery where she was 
promised as a nun.  
Intergenerational and matrimonial conflicts abounded in the tensions aroused by a 
cohabitation with madness. Temporary marital separation was granted by the authorities in 
cases of confirmed dangerous madness, to which a series of coordinated attempts to reunite 
the couple would follow. Confinement in the Malmaritate or the Mendicanti was used as a 
temporary measure to contain the effects of a marital conflict in need of being concealed from 
public sight. But it also served the purpose of providing a temporary solution to the problem 
of female deviance in cases in which no other residential provision could be found. Female 
deviance, particularly when presented in the form of extravagance and imprudence, often 
melded with matrimonial disputes in which both spouses were singled out as disordered, one 
ending up committed, the other sent to the Malmaritate to avoid further scandal stemming 
from their frequent, nearly fatal, quarrels.732  
The Auditore Fiscale and the Pupilli officials, with the help of other eminent 
government and regional authorities, arbitrated in marital disputes, dealt with the enlarged 
conflicts that often confronted the spouse’s kin, and designed strategies of mutual 
compromise that could secure a peaceful reunion.733 Conflicts of cohabitation were conflated 
with the problem of the special care the mentally afflicted often required. Not only because 
familial responsibility over weak members of the family often had to be enforced by law, but 
also because the problematic characters that usually accompanied mental afflictions made it 
difficult to provide permanent solutions.   
                                                
731 ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 762, no. 2, August 1765.  
732 Case of the interdicted Domenico degl’Albizzi and his wife Maria Caterina Fioravanti. ASF, CR, F. 746, no. 
12, March 1751.    
733 The connection between matrimonial disputes and madness is an understudied aspect of marital life in early 
modern Tuscany. For examples, see the dispute between Caterina Angeloni and her husband Franco Giorgi, 
ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 760, no. 43, June 1760, and the dispute between Maria Caterina Inghirami and Ferdinando 
Ginori in ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 754, N. 5, July 1738- December 1739. For similar cases involving interdicted 
men and their wives, see for example the disputes between Maria Caterina Fioravanti and Alfiero Domenico 
degli Albizi, ASF, CR, Pupilli, F. 746, no. 12, 1750-51; Rosa Caterina Pandolfini and Adimaro Adimari, ASF, 
MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, nos. 216, 379 and 397, 1727-1732; Giuseppe Rossi and Francesca Arcangeli in 
ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, N. 195, 1726; Antonio Becciani and Maddalena Palloni in ASF, MPAP, 




The destiny of the insane became a matter of public concern not only when they had 
transgressed the limits of law, but primarily on the direct request of family members. The 
itineraries of madness, between home, institutional confinement, incarceration and several 
private places where they were kept in return for payment were coordinated between the 
Auditore Fiscale and the Magistrato dei Pupilli. The “insufferable frenzies” (frenesie 
insoffribili) that episodically overcame Lorenzo Maestrini, a wealthy Florentine who had been 
Cancelliere of Empoli, are particularly illustrative. They forced his wife and daughter to 
request his internment in Santa Dorotea several times, but because he was never held there too 
long, they had to resort to any other available measure to prevent his return home.734 In 1730 
his wife submitted a petition declaring that his madness had long been an issue to the family 
life with irreparable economic and emotional consequences, on account of which she 
requested not only the interdiction but also his committal to Santa Dorotea.735 Both requests 
were granted given there were several signs that proved his derangement, including his past 
committal to the hospital. Nonetheless, Maestrini’s episodic madness (“he sometimes enjoys 
lucid intervals”, it was said) sealed his fate, making it impossible to find a permanent solution 
for his situation.  
After he was released from Santa Dorotea while experiencing a period of lucidity, he 
relapsed into “greater madnesses” (maggiori pazzie), forcing the Auditore Fiscale to keep him 
under close custody in the fortress of San Martino. His episodes of madness always alternated 
with periods of lucidity, which resulted in further itinerancy. He was kept under the custody 
of one person after another, never lasting long at one place.736 In 1735 the Auditore Fiscale 
voiced the appreciation, shared by Maestrini’s relatives and the Pupilli officials, that his 
liberty could simply not be granted, not even during the episodes of sanity he enjoyed, 
considering that liberty to move around freely and socialize could be particularly harmful for 
his madness, for “too much discourse is precisely what can be prejudicial to him.”737 Thus 
motivated by this concern, the Auditore Fiscale Filippo Luci turned to the “preventive 
                                                
734 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 471, February-March 1734/35 and no. 492, November 1735. 
735 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 311, June 1730, the order to arrest him and send him to Santa Dorotea 
can be found in ASF, MPAP, Atti, F. 1193, June 1730, f. 435.  
736 “Fù da detto Aud Fiscale fatto levare di Fortezza, e porre ora appresso d’uno, e ora appresso d’un’altro dove 
mai non ha retto”, Report of the Pupilli, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 471, March 1734/35. 
737 “Benchè presentemente il supplicante non mostri segni di pazzia, è però in stato molto pericoloso di tornare 
nell’antica infermità, ed ho stimato rimedio di prevenzione di tenerlo, per quanto sia stato possibile, lontano da 
praticare con quella libertà, che egli desiderebbe, giacchè il troppo discorrere è quello appunto che può 




remedy” of depriving him of his liberty, albeit unsuccessfully.738 It was never possible to 
“have him steadily in one place”, and he constantly contravened the Fiscale’s authority, 
whether managing to be ejected from the places he was kept “due to his madness, wretched 
behaviour and mistreatments,” or “escaping brutally” from them.739  
 
5. 5. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the understandings of madness in other spaces of its 
appearance, such as the criminal courts, mental hospitals and special requests to the central 
authorities. Madness captured the attention of families, judges and authorities, producing a 
lively debate to devise the most suitable solution to the problems posed by madness. This 
chapter has argued that the public response to madness should be understood as the effect of a 
collective effort, resulting from a careful negotiation between families, judges and authorities 
regarding what it meant to be mentally afflicted and what could be done to cure and/or 
discipline it, and to address its most pressing consequences.  
The itineraries of severely deranged wealthy men and women like Lorenzo Maestrini, 
Lorenzo Baldinotti and Francesca Paoli del Feo were not unusual in Tuscany during the 
eighteenth century, as we have seen. Interestingly, the perception of their mental derangement 
drifted and changed according to the requirements of each new space of appearance and the 
phase which their mental derangement was in. The flexible language we observe employed in 
private requests to control deviant behaviour is at variance with the plainness of criminal 
language and the accurate but not necessarily more expressive medical language employed in 
the admission procedure to Santa Dorotea. For this reason, the picture of the perception of 
madness and the measures taken to manage it are further nuanced when we bear in mind the 
different places where madness appears. Hospital committal is only one of the stations in 
                                                
738 Ibid.  
739 “mediante la sua pazzia, e pessimi portamenti, e strapazzi, che faceva è stato cacciato da quei luoghi ove 
s’era posto”, Report of the Magistrato dei Pupilli, MPAP, F. 2300, no 492, November 1735; and “è scappato 
bruttalmente dalla casa del Sig. Dottor Lami suo congiunto... vedendo io che per tenerlo a dovere è necessario 
usar con esso del rigore...” Biglietto of Filippo Luci, MPAP, F. 2300, no. 483, August 1735. In November 1735 
the Pupilli informed that there was no other solution left but to confine him in a fortress again, given that even 
the Santa Maria Nuova hospital had declined to take him into their custody. His trace disappears after this until 
1739, when his relatives initiated a long suit for his inheritance. We are told that he died in 1736. See ASF, 
MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 56, August 1739; Ibid., Atti, F. 1240, f. 1022, April 1742 and ASF, MS, 




which madness is recorded, and should be considered neither as the end nor as the beginning 
of the process of identification and handling madness.  
Thus, instead of an image pointing to a Foucauldian “great confinement”, we observe 
temporary and flexible measures. The model of the itineraries of madness serves to give the 
idea of a series of stages, that did not follow linear or pre-conceived courses, but responded 
and adapted to the dynamics and necessities of each case. In some cases these measures were 
taken simultaneously, in others in succession and, above all, the cases suggest that eighteenth-
century Tuscans were well aware of the characteristics and consequences of each space, and 
resorted to one or the other seeking particular aims. The chapter has shed light on the process 
of private, lay and family-based identification of madness, and how, after this primary 
definition of madness, the authorities were involved, to what extent and with what outcomes, 
and how the dialogue between authorities and families regarding the handling of madness 
developed.  
 The chapter has also demonstrated that the characteristics of mental incapacity 
appearing in interdiction records are echoed in broader social scenarios covered by the 
criminal records and the office of the Auditore Fiscale. Requests received directly by the 
latter or through the Otto di Guardia portraying cases of deviance that made use of the 
argument of mental instability to differentiate the case from “normal” criminal behaviour 
display the pervasiveness of a language of madness through different social groups. Deviant 
behaviour caused by different levels of mental disturbance was a present experience in early 
modern Tuscany, pervading different social groups, and suggesting that notions of mental 
incapacity were not only held by the wealthy families who could finance interdiction. The 
matters ending up in the files of the Auditore Fiscale suggest that more or less similar notions 
of madness were present in different scenarios, presenting flexible vocabularies that 
nonetheless enclosed a similar conception about what it meant to be mentally afflicted.  
With definitions that were strongly contextual and relational, notions of madness 
adapted to each space of appearance. However, although each procedural space conditioned 
the way madness was portrayed: in all of the institutional spaces where madness made a 
public appearance, the official categories were very few and simple. The role of legal 
categories of mental incapacity and insanity in the different procedural spaces examined in 
this chapter proved to be flexible and sufficiently vague as to enclose culturally meaningful 
understandings. Recourse to one or other of the institutional spaces available for managing 




which in turn underscores that the involved parties knew how to manoeuvre through the legal 
structure in order to obtain favourable outcomes. In this situation, as we have seen, there were 
no fixed weaker or victimized parties, for we recurrently see the alleged insane successfully 
arguing their case in their favour on the one hand, and women assuming the leading and 





Chapter 6: Experts and Authorities on Madness 
 
As stated by the jurist Marc’Antonio Savelli, in civil law prodigality and insanity could be 
proven by the oath of close relatives and the supporting testimonies of two reliable 
witnesses.740 In contrast, Savelli reported that exemption from punishment on the basis of 
insanity (furiosi, dementi or pazzi) was strictly dependent upon the judgment of medical 
practitioners.741 However, both criminal and civil procedures carried out in Tuscany during 
the eighteenth-century to determine soundness of mind reveal the relatively reduced role 
played by medical opinion. Although legal theory had long called for the introduction of 
medical opinion as expert witnesses to identify insanity in court, Tuscan legal practice still 
largely relied on lay testimonies.  
Tuscan judicial practice privileged the family gaze in the assessment of madness and 
responses to its consequences, and only secondarily resorted to external opinion. In the civil 
and criminal procedures involving madness, the ultimate authorities on madness were the 
families. The identification of madness, as is well known, first occurred in the domestic 
space, and was discussed among family members. Only when families had reached a 
conclusion regarding their relative’s behaviour, usually resulting in conflicting views about 
what to do with it, was the case made known to the authorities.  
During the early modern period, the family was the primary locus of care for the 
mentally afflicted.742 For this reason, given that any public provision devised to address the 
problem of madness followed the primary purpose of serving as a subsidiary help for the 
families, it seems obvious that they remained the primary authorities on the matter. Given the 
purposes of the provisions devised to help families cope with the problems posed by madness, 
the assessment of madness necessarily had to rely first and foremost on the opinion of those 
who knew the mentally afflicted. Long-term views and discussions based on familiarity with 
the defendant were preferred in order to determine the extent to which madness had provoked 
the kind of disorder that required public intervention. In general terms, the authorities’ 
deliberations in order to assess soundness of mind do not show a direct resort to medical 
                                                
740 “Che la prodigalità, e furore si provi per l’asserzione de’ congiunti... vedi detto Statuto [Statuto Fiorentino 
lib.2 Rub.118], che ricerca il giuramento de’ congiunti, e due testimoni di fama.” Savelli, Pratica Universale, p. 
264. 
741 “Delinquenti, e simili se siano furiosi, dementi, o pazzi ad effetto di scusarli dalle pene, o cose simili si deve 
stare al giudizio de’ Medici”, Ibid., p. 107.    




opinion, and the language used tends to be unspecific and non-medicalized. Although legal 
theory recommended the opposite, eighteenth-century legal practice reveals that medical 
opinion was not a requirement. Furthermore, medical practitioners were neither the only nor 
the most decisive experts involved in the assessment of mental incapacity 
 This chapter elaborates on the involvement of opinion “external” to the families and 
their supporting neighbourhoods, with especial attention to the uses of language, its 
circulation and meanings. It first examines the involvement of medical opinion in the 
assessment of criminal insanity and mental incapacity, to then study the participation of 
clergymen and the involvement of the Auditore Fiscale. The chapter elaborates on the weight 
of medical knowledge in civil and criminal procedures, with a close examination of the 
language employed by medical practitioners in their testimonies. It aims to explore how and 
when they introduced precise medical categories, and to what extent these categories 
circulated among the different agents participating in a suit. The chapter argues that medical 
practitioners disputed their secondary place as authorities over matters of the mind (behind 
the families) equally with members of the cloth and government authorities, among which the 
Auditore Fiscale assumed an increasingly leading role. The language of madness appears this 
way as largely built upon lay notions of mental deviance that were negotiated with the 
government authorities and ratified by “mind specialists”, a category that comprised medical 
practitioners and priests in equal terms.   
 
6. 1. Separated Spheres? Use of Medical Opinion to Assert Mental Incapacity 
To understand the involvement of medical opinion in legal inquiries into mental 
capacity we must bear in mind that interdiction procedures were based on the Florentine 
Statutes, which in its 2nd book, 118th rubric stated that interdiction requests adducing the 
incapacity to manage one’s affairs needed to be submitted by a close relative and supported 
by the testimony of two witnesses “of good reputation”. These republican statutes were still in 
use in the eighteenth century, and were recurrently recalled by the Pupilli officials in the first 
period after the 1717 statute reform of the Pupilli office that endorsed its jurisdiction over 
interdictions and adult curatorship.743 
                                                
743 See, for instance, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 249, July 1728, no. 399, October 1732 and no. 457, 
November 1734. As stated above, the statutes were also cited by Savelli with regards to the requirements of civil 




Although the foundational statutes regulating the procedure to interdict a mentally 
incapacitated person stated by omission that medical expertise was unnecessary to assess 
mental incapacity, there was a wide acknowledgement of the place of medical authority in the 
diagnosis of any kind of disease, including madness. In fact, Italian courts had developed a 
long tradition of forensics during the early modern period, accompanied by the abundant 
medico-juridical literature of the time that praised its importance. Physicians gained public 
recognition in legal proceedings insofar as they could play a valuable role in the examination 
of criminal evidence. Both in legal theory and in legal practice medical experts were 
considered the ultimate experts on the body, and the perito fiscale was a permanent presence 
at trials in order to assess the quality of wounds, their seriousness, possible causes and 
consequences.744 Nonetheless, scholars agree on the fact that “of all the various medico-legal 
specialties, forensic psychiatry is the one where medical authority has met with most 
resistance.”745  
The legal assessment of insanity in criminal and civil courts during the eighteenth 
century continued to be a matter of common sense largely throughout Europe. Despite the 
relatively high value ascribed to medical experts in the criminal courts of continental Europe, 
they continued to play a minor role in the assessment of madness both in civil and criminal 
courts until the nineteenth century. A similar scenario is identified in the English and Scottish 
courts. As Houston has put it, expert medical opinion was not necessary because “the aim in a 
civil or criminal court was not to arrive at ‘the truth’, but to pick through fragmented, 
tendentious and ambiguous evidence in search of a conclusion.”746 This would explain, 
according to him, the predominance of hearsay testimony throughout the long eighteenth 
century in most of Europe.   
The progressive involvement of medical knowledge in the management and 
perception of madness in early modern Tuscany has been, with some exceptions, generally 
overrated. Magherini and Biotti, for instance, have stated that towards the end of the sixteenth 
century “greater attention came to be paid to the medical approach in the offices and courts 
                                                
744 The development of legal medicine and the growing importance acquired by medical practitioners as expert 
authorities on the body in Italian early modern courts has been the subject of the studies carried out by 
Alessandro Pastore and Silvia de Renzi. See Pastore, Il medico in tribunale: La perizia medica nella procedura 
penale d’antico regime (secoli XVI-XVIII) (Bellinzona: Casagrande, 1998); Silvia De Renzi, “Medical Expertise, 
Bodies and the Law in Early Modern Courts”, Isis 98, no. 2 (2007), pp. 315-322.  
745 Clark and Crawford, Legal medicine in history, “Introduction”, p. 10.    
746 Houston, “Professions and the Identification of Mental Incapacity”, p. 444. See also Houston, “Courts, 




when establishing a subject’s mental condition. The physician came to assume responsibility 
both for ascertaining the presence or absence of insanity and evaluating the evidence gathered 
by judges.”747 They argue that the judicial changes brought in by the Duchy, particularly the 
introduction of the vernacular, allowed for the infiltration of “new” medical concepts to the 
legal arena, such as mania and melancholy.  
Zacchia’s call for the importance of medical opinion in the legal assessment of 
insanity is sufficiently known, seconded in Tuscany by jurists like Savelli, whose Pratica 
Universale recommended criminal insanity be directly scrutinized by judges and further 
certified by medical opinion.748 In turn, the practice of civil law over the years had also 
demanded the more regular involvement of medical opinion in order to provide expert 
witnesses of insanity. In 1734, for instance, a report of the Magistrato Supremo voiced the 
concern that mental incapacity should be assessed by medical practitioners, and not be based 
exclusively upon the opinion of petitioners and lay testimonies. The latter, so the magistrates 
considered, could only describe the signs that enabled them to deduce someone’s incapacity, 
but they could not judge if these signs were enough to declare the person incapable.749  
Nevertheless, in practice legal proceedings in which a mental condition was under 
scrutiny proved not to be in need of medical certification. Evidence shows that medical 
opinion was not necessary to determine mental incapacity, and that it was only required in 
contested cases, or in cases where the defendant had contacted medical practitioners in the 
past in order to consult or treat their mental condition (notably, those who had roamed over 
most of the different destinations in the itineraries of madness). Evidence also shows that 
medical testimonies were used to a greater degree to attest physical ailments with damaging 
mental consequences, such as apoplexy and epilepsy. By and large medical opinion was used 
at the petitioners’ discretion, only rarely being a direct requirement of the authorities. 
Although it is possible to find voices calling for medical expertise to assess madness, 
the signs of a change only became discernible in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
Contradicting what has been previously asserted, an examination of the use of medical 
testimonies in civil and criminal procedures gives no evidence of a clear evolution towards 
                                                
747 Magherini and Biotti, “Madness in Florence”, p. 362. As I commented in the previous chapter, Elizabeth 
Mellyn has also challenged the notion of the leading role played by medical knowledge and medico-legal 
treatises like Zacchia’s in the shaping of lay notions of insanity. See, Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families, 
Chapter 5. 
748 Savelli, Pratica Universale, p. 107-108.  
749 Report of the Magistrato Supremo regarding the petition to interdict Diacinto Cicci, not granted. ASF, MS, 




the medicalization of madness in legal practice. We can neither find a clear increase in the 
recourse to medical opinion, nor observe a progressive infiltration of medical terminology in 
the language of judges, petitioners or witnesses.750 We do find a cautious change from 1750 
onwards, coinciding with the obligation to medically certify the pazzo furioso in order to 
determine committal to Santa Dorotea.751 The appointment of a medico fiscale to certify 
madness for committal in the name of the state also presupposed the development of the 
practical expertise of physicians such as Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti and Francesco Antonio 
Viligiardi, whose involvement in the assessment of cases of insanity progressively surpassed 
their connection to Santa Dorotea. Nonetheless, this change is, to my view, profoundly slow, 
and markedly shared by the rise of other “experts” on madness, such as the Auditore Fiscale. 
By and large, throughout the century authority over madness continued to be in the hands of 
those who had traditionally held it, that is families and priests.  
The absence of direct medical opinion in criminal trials leaves us with plain, non-
medical categories of insanity, such as pazzo, matto, mentecatto, demente, stolido or scemo. 
These denominations are usually accompanied by more factual descriptions, still lay in origin, 
such as “suffer in the brain” (patire nel cervello), “without brain” (senza cervello) or 
“diminished in the brain” (scemo di cervello), “imbecile and unsound mind” (imbecille e 
mente non sana), “imperfect cognition” or “devoid of judgement” (non perfetta cognizione 
and mancanza di giudizio), “foolishness” or “simplicity” (sciocchezza and semplicità). Some 
recurrence to more specific concepts such as lucid intervals, melancholy or frenzy (frenesia) 
can be found in some records that were particularly generous in their descriptions, but they 
nonetheless correspond to concepts that had been largely present in the medico-legal language 
introduced by Renaissance jurists. 
Although the absence of medical opinion in the records of criminal insanity reflects 
more the way in which criminal records were kept rather than an actual exclusion of medical 
opinion, there are many signs suggesting their limited weight in legal proceedings in general. 
When compared to the legal procedures that did directly record medical opinion, their limited 
influence appears as deliberately constant. Interdiction records reveal a limited recourse to 
medical opinion between 1720 and 1775. Of a total of 192 interdictions for dementia, only 50 
                                                
750 This is similar to what characterized other European courts during the eighteenth century. According to 
Houston “the medical men who gave evidence in civil courts generally did not use medical classifications, and 
lay people almost never did. If members of either group did deploy such terms it is far from clear that they did so 
either consistently or ‘correctly’.” Houston, Madness and Society, p. 25. 




procedures, amounting to 26%, presented expert medical opinion in order to certify the 
alleged mental incapacity. The number increases slightly if we also take into account those 
cases in which either the plaintiffs or the magistrates made reference to a past or current 
committal in one of the pazzerie (Santa Maria Nuova or Santa Dorotea). In 7% of 
interdictions for dementia we find a reference to one of the pazzerie, which aggregated with 
the 26% that resorted to expert medical opinion to certify the alleged dementia amounts to 
33% (see Table 3 and Figure 4). If we were to measure the incidence of medical opinion 
(taking the reference to the pazzerie as a kind of medical certification) against the whole 
sample of interdictions decreed between 1720 and 1775, we find that the 33% decreases to 
11%, with a total of only 63 procedures involving recourse to medical opinion against 526 
interdictions decreed without the involvement of medical expertise. 
 
Table 3: Recourse to expert medical opinion to assess mental incapacity in interdiction 
procedures between 1720 and 1775 
 
Interdictions for Dementia 
Number % 
Reference to past or current committal in a mental 
institution 13 6.8% 
Recourse to medical opinion 50 26.0% 
No recourse to medical opinion 129 67.2% 
Total of interdictions for dementia 192 100% 
 
Interdictions for dementia, prodigality, undefined 
incapacity Number % 
Reference to past or current committal in a mental 
institution 13 2.2% 
Recourse to medical opinion 50 8.5% 
No recourse to medical opinion 526 89.3% 
Total of interdictions  589 100% 
 
Note: The category of “reference to past or current committal” includes those interdiction procedures in which 
either the supplicants or the magistrates mention that the defendant was or had been in Santa Dorotea or the 
pazzeria of Santa Maria Nuova, without cross-examining with the mental institutions to corroborate the 
information. In contrast, when a current or past committal is attested to by the medical authorities of the 










We should take into account the fact that medical experts were probably involved in 
the identification of insanity in a larger proportion than is revealed by the records. Given that 
the aims of interdiction were directed towards the economic consequences of insanity, 
proving that the alleged economic mismanagement was a consequence of mental incapacity 
signified more than presenting a medical diagnosis for it. Even so, interdictions were decreed 
on the basis of a mixture of written testimonies and official enquiries carried out in the field 
that often involved consultation with medical experts which, we can assume, was not 
necessarily recorded on paper. We know this because in some cases although the interdiction 
proceedings present no record of the involvement of medical assessment, later proceedings 
relating to the management of the guardianship reveal that it was otherwise. For instance, it 
can happen that medical practitioners had treated the defendant’s mental affliction before the 
interdiction, or that the interdicted had been committed in Santa Maria Nuova or Santa 
Dorotea, but nothing of the sort was revealed in the interdiction proceedings. This is 
particularly the case when we only have access to the decrees of interdiction but not to its 
reason, or when the lawsuit was initiated directly before the court and not through written 
petitions, thus leaving less information.752 Nonetheless, through the cases that do leave 
                                                
752 As I explained in the first chapter, there were two ways to initiate an interdiction procedure: one was to 
request it as a grazia via a supplication to the Grand Duke, the other was to appear directly in front of the court 
of the Magistrato Supremo (and less often to that of the Pupilli) to initiate the law suit with its supporting 
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records we know that medical opinion was generally requested in contested cases, which 
happen to coincide with those that leave records. As a result, we can safely assume that a 
significant proportion of medical opinion is not concealed within the cases of unknown 
categories of incapacity. On the other hand, the high number of interdictions where the 
declared reason is dementia but where we fail to find any indication of the permeation of 
medical language, particularly in the first half of the century, suggests that even if we were to 
take into account that medical practitioners were consulted but their testimonies not recorded, 
the fact remains that medical language had a low incidence in the shaping of narratives and 
perceptions of mental incapacity.     
We do find indirect recourse to medical opinion through the second-hand transmission 
of oral medical testimonies, particularly in cases from the provinces of the Florentine 
Dominion. In these cases, inquiries were conducted via the local administrative authorities, 
who when requested to investigate the mental condition of a defendant generally responded 
by making reference to medical opinion but without presenting it directly. Local authorities 
were always asked to make further enquiries regarding denunciations of mental incapacity, 
even when petitioners had already provided the two statutory testimonies. The Podestà, 
Commissari and Governatori generally made a summary of their investigation that indicated 
how they had interrogated several credible witnesses (degne di fede) to corroborate the 
denunciation, in a narrative that, as usual, blended economic and public behaviour with signs 
of mental or psychological distemper, along with the employment of one or more of the 
common categories of mental incapacity. In some cases they specified that medical 
practitioners (generally the physician and surgeon condotti) had been interrogated as one of 
the trustworthy people questioned regarding the case, although at other times there is no 
specification as to who provided the credible testimonies.753 In any case, the inquiries 
conducted by the provincial authorities generally compared the information gathered against 
                                                                                                                                                   
present their judgement to the Consulta. The Consulta could ask (or not) the position of the officials of the 
Pupilli before deciding on the matter. Only once the defendant had been interdicted did the case pass to the 
Pupilli, from where all the matters regarding the appointment of the guardian and the administration of the 
patrimony were managed. When the procedures were opened before the Magistrato Supremo, the “justifications” 
of the case are often lost in the massive archive of this Magistracy. On this see my comments in Chapter 1.   
753 This was the case, for example, with the interdiction of Giuseppe Pasqui from Castiglion Fiorentino, decreed 
based on the information gathered by the Podestà. The Podestà had come to the conclusion that Pasqui was 
“completely weak of mind, and mentecatto, and certainly incapable of administering his patrimony” based on his 
questioning of the local physician and surgeon (both condotti), the parish priest (curato) and other respectable 
members of the local society. Interestingly, Pasqui’s interdiction was revoked a few months later after his 
brother petitioned alleging his soundness of mind. A new inquiry followed which ended with the Pupilli’s 
admission that the interdiction had been decreed based on insincere information. See, respectively, ASF, MPAP, 




their own acquaintance with the defendant and their families, regardless of whether medical 
practitioners had been consulted. 
Inquiries to ascertain the veracity behind accusations of mental incapacity conducted 
in Florence and its surroundings were less likely to leave the same records than the cases on 
the provinces, given that in the former the investigation was carried out directly by the 
Supremo or the Pupilli officials, which often resulted in the absence of written records. 
However, testimonies provided by medical practitioners from Florence tend, conversely, to be 
more precise in their medical language, and increasingly more specialized towards the end of 
the century. This tendency is enhanced by the fact that towards the end of 1760, interdictions 
for dementia increasingly came to be certified directly by the medical authorities of Santa 
Dorotea.  
Overall we can observe that the mid-eighteenth century appears as a turning point for 
the use of medical opinion in interdiction procedures. Of the 50 interdiction procedures for 
dementia with the use of medical opinion, 33 were decreed after 1750. A modest 
specialization of language can also be observed, as I will show. Similarly, after the reforms of 
the administration and scope of Santa Dorotea, the involvement of medical practitioners in the 
assessment of mental incapacity and madness in general was institutionalized, supplying 
medical experts especially commissioned by the ducal administration to assess madness. 
However, given the very small numbers of medical opinion given when compared to the 
massive amount of interdictions decreed without recourse to expert testimonies, we find that 
quality and function are more interesting features to examine than quantity.  
 
The Function of Medical Testimonies 
It is far more revealing to investigate how medical opinion became involved and with 
what consequences than the frequency in which medical opinion was invoked. The evaluation 
of the weight and involvement of medical knowledge in the shaping of legal categories of 
insanity requires a close examination of the cases where we do find recourse to medical 
opinion, with particular attention being paid to the vocabulary employed by medical experts 
themselves. This should then be contrasted with the other narratives that constitute the 
interdiction procedure.   
Following the precepts established by the legal practice of interdictions in Tuscany, it 




reason, medical experts were summoned in the majority of the cases by family members in 
the form of written testimonies that were added to the compiled testimonies supporting the 
petition of interdiction. We can identify four types of medical testimonies during the century: 
1) those signed by both a doctor and a surgeon who had been for some time in charge of the 
health of the defendant; 2) those signed by doctors or surgeons who had been called with the 
sole purpose of assessing the individual’s mental state in order to proceed with an interdiction 
petition; 3) those signed by medici and cerusici condotti, doctors and surgeons from the 
provinces officially appointed and paid by the town’s administration;754 and finally 4) those 
signed by the surgeons or physicians of either of the existing mental institutions.  
The vocabulary employed in these testimonies appears again conditioned by the aims 
of the legal procedure they were produced for. Marked by the need to demonstrate that the 
alleged mental incapacity resulted in a kind of economic mismanagement that posed a serious 
threat to the family patrimony, medical testimonies generally employed non-medicalized 
terms that were closer to legal language than to medical practice. In this sense, an important 
proportion of medical testimonies employed categories such as mentecatto and demente in 
combination to more descriptive expressions such as illness of the mind (infermità di mente), 
illness of madness (infermo di pazzia), devoid of cognition, judgement, brain or intellect 
(privo di cognizione, di senno, di cervello, d’intelletto), and imbecility of mind (imbecillità di 
mente), to name a few.755 As I will argue later, the appointment of medici fiscali to certify 
pazzia furiosa in the Santa Dorotea admission procedures resulted in a gradual change, with 
the appearance of new experts who by the 1760s and the 1770s can be differentiated from the 
rest of the medical witnesses. 
Rather than giving a concise medical diagnosis, the aim of a medical testimony in 
interdiction petitions was to attest for the connection between the alleged mental incapacity 
and the likelihood of financial ruin. Medical practitioners were supposed to give their expert 
opinion regarding the consequences of the alleged mental derangement on the quotidian life 
of the afflicted, customarily framed in terms of a mental ailment that had rendered them 
                                                
754 The practice of appointing a medical practitioner from the community (condotto) was designed to provide a 
medical cure for those who could not pay for it privately. According to the studies of Cipolla, inquiries carried 
out by the Grand Duchy in times of epidemics suggest that the distribution of medical practitioners throughout 
the territory was surprisingly high. See Carlo Cipolla, Contro un nemico invisibile. Epidemie e strutture 
sanitarie nell’Italia del Rinascimento (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1985), p. 287.  




“incapable of managing his interests.”756 The precise characteristics of the mental ailment, its 
symptoms or treatment were secondary in comparison to how the condition affected the 
individual’s life, or for how long.  
 As a consequence, there are many cases in which the difference between a medical 
testimony and the rest of the testimonies supporting the interdiction petition is not really 
marked. The main categories in these cases are the same, and the expertise contributed by 
medical practitioners is not necessarily discernible in terms of language. For instance, Maria 
Maddalena Scardigli from Empoli was interdicted in 1749 on the request of her nephews, who 
claimed she suffered from “dementia and madness” (demenza e pazzia). The interdiction 
petition was accompanied by two testimonies, one signed by various persons and the other by 
a priest and the medico condotto. While the former made reference to Maria Maddalena’s 
poor economic situation, boosted by her solitude and “incapacity to make a living for she is 
deprived of reason and mad”, the latter declared that she “is devoid of reasoning and almost 
completely impotens sui since many years ago and especially now, and is incapable of reason, 
and on account of her madness she has reduced herself to misery” after having consumed all 
she possessed.757   
As proves to be the case in the majority of the testimonies signed by medical 
practitioners, nothing particularly medical was revealed in this testimony. Not only was the 
medical testimony signed by a priest, but it was also written using the conventional non-
specialized terms to testify for mental incapacity. At first glance, therefore, the signature of a 
medical practitioner is equated with that of a priest, their occupations being valued as equally 
pertinent for the assessment of madness. In procedures of interdiction, the authority of priests 
and medical practitioners was founded on their overarching acquaintance with the 
individual’s life rather than in a medical knowledge of mental diseases. In fact, medical 
practitioners, particularly when medici condotti, as in this case, framed their testimonies by 
                                                
756 Giovanni Gualberto Bechi, declared a Florentine physician, “si ritrova guardando il letto per cagione d'un 
accidente d'Apoplessia qualle lo ha tolta la favella, e lo ha reso demente, et incapace d'agire nei suoi interessi.” 
His testimony was also signed by a priest. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 137, July 1749. For similar 
testimonies, see ASF, MS, Atti, F. 1914, fol.1000, December 1730, interdiction of Benedetto Meozzi; ASF, 
MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 559, August 1737 and ASF, MS, Atti, F. 1986, fol. 388, August 1737, 
Interdiction of Maria Maddalena Bianchi; ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 50, June 1752, interdiction of 
Domenic Cugi, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 85, December 1756, interdiction of Niccolò Sinibaldo 
Reali, among others. 
757 Respectively, “è sola e miserabile, senza avere modo da potersi sostentare, et incapace di guadagnarsi il vitto 
per essere priva di ragione e pazza…” and “...è mancante di raziocinio, et è quasi affatto impotens sui da molti 
anni in qua, et ora massime, e non capace di ragione, et è per la sua pazzia ridotta miserabile, avendo dato fine 




alluding to their long-term knowledge of their patients’ behaviour, whom they claimed to 
have treated on several occasions. For even if the medico condotto had only treated them for 
physical complaints, they were able to assess their patients’ current and past mental condition 
based on their privileged long-term observation. Indeed, medical practitioners often illustrated 
their testimonies with observations on their patient’s biography, with expressions such as “he 
has always been”, or has “never been” demented.  
Bearing witness to the role played by medical testimonies in the identification of 
mental incapacity, many medical practitioners not only shared their place with priests as key 
witnesses, but even their signature was sometimes inserted between the names that signed the 
collective testimonies of mental incapacity.758 Testimonies supporting an interdiction petition 
generally consisted of the narrative of the person’s misdeeds and economic mismanagement, 
some with descriptions of their deviant behaviour, others with straightforward references to 
their allegedly disturbed mental state. The amount of detail varies greatly from one case to 
another, and some are even clearly statements written by the petitioners themselves or their 
procurators, and were only given to the deponents to sign. Thus, a testimony of mental 
incapacity could be signed by many people, with the medical practitioners inserted in between 
as one more name, the difference being that their profession was recorded. In these cases, 
medical practitioners sometimes signed and added a further comment next to their name, but 
it was only slightly different from the main text of the testimony, and was written using the 
same legal, non-medically specific terms.759 
Medical testimonies were used to assert both mental incapacity and soundness of 
mind. Medical opinion was sometimes directly sought by the authorities to corroborate the 
petitioners’ claims, only to find in some cases that the defendant was “not demented but 
rather too calm (quietone) and fairly cold.”760 In one of the rare direct references to the 
principles of the humoral doctrine, the intentions of this young man’s paternal uncle to place 
him under curatorship were thus truncated by the “secret and sincere information” about the 
defendant’s mental condition requested by the Florentine magistrates, who explicitly asked 
                                                
758 Although customary practice dictated that two credible testimonies supporting a petition for interdiction were 
sufficient, many of these testimonies were signed by more than ten people. Among the names, servants, kin, 
authorities, priests and medical practitioners were mingled in no clear order. When the witness could not write 
his or her name, a comment was added stating that the testimony had been signed by another in the witness’s 
presence, at his or her request, and after its content had been read to them. Some of these names had an 
individual comment added to the signature.    
759 See, for instance the interdiction of Orazio Penci, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 50, August 1752.  
760 “...non è demente ma bensi quietone, e assai freddo...”, petition to interdict Michel Arcangelo Fini, not 




for the opinion of the “physician or surgeon of the place.”761 Nonetheless, rather than the 
reference to his personality and mental condition, what moved the magistrates not to concede 
the interdiction was that the report proved that the man behaved in accordance to what was 
expected of a pater familias and, although he did not administer his patrimony directly, it was 
in good hands and in a perfect state. Hence, even if it was demonstrated that he did not have 
the most brilliant of minds, the authorities considered that his patrimony was better protected 
as things stood than by placing him under interdiction, which would subsequently mean that 
the greedy uncle, whose personal qualities were dubious, would be able to takeover the 
administration. 
Medical opinion was also introduced to prove a defendant’s soundness of mind in 
petitions for the interdiction to be lifted. In some of these cases medical testimonies asserted 
that the person’s mental disturbance had abated and they were no longer suffering from any 
kind of mental disturbance. This is particularly the case with individuals subject to periods of 
episodic madness who were recurrently interdicted and even periodically committed to one of 
the pazzerie, but who nonetheless strived to live “normal” lives, marrying, having offspring, 
and managing their affairs whenever they were (considered to be) mentally fit to do so. 
Interdiction, we must keep in mind, was a transitory solution that sought to control the effects 
of madness and prodigality, as transitory as any of the other available measures.   
Occasionally, medical testimonies were included to support petitions for the 
revocation of interdictions that had been decreed with no recourse to medical opinion. Eight 
out of the 50 interdiction procedures with recourse to medical opinion correspond to these 
cases. Petitions to regain full legal capacity and to be released from curatorship were fairly 
common. In some cases they were sent only once for a favourable outcome, while in other 
cases a petition needed to be sent several times before there was a positive response. The role 
played by medical practitioners in these kinds of petitions is slightly different than when they 
acted as proof of incapacity, for declaring someone’s soundness of mind was even less 
medically specific than attesting for someone’s mental incapacity. Assertions such as “he has 
never been demented nor deprived of proper cognition, and I have always found him to be of 
a perfectly healthy mind, though indisposed in body”, are not rare to find.762 To a greater 
                                                
761 Ibid., June 1755.  
762 One year after being interdicted by reason of dementia, Lorenzo Galli petitioned for the revocation of his 
interdiction by presenting two supporting testimonies. Both stated in general terms that he had always been 
known to be “of perfect and purged mind [mente perfettissima, e purgata], able to rightly distinguish 




degree than when attesting for mental incapacity, medical practitioners supporting petitions 
for an interdiction to be revoked centred their arguments on their patient’s capacities to 
perform daily tasks, the impeccable management of their affairs and, particularly in cases 
concerning old men, their general fitness.763 After all, mental disturbance, when measured in 
terms of mental incapacity or criminal insanity, had different levels according to social 
performance. Men and women could be considered able to manage their affairs even though 
they presented some degree of mental disability, just as they could also be considered liable in 
order to be punished for a crime.   
But, even more interestingly, in some cases a medical category was only provided in 
this last stage of the interdiction, exclusively to assert that the individual was no longer 
suffering from it. Someone who had been interdicted through legal proceedings that employed 
the usual non-specific references to dissipation and economic mismanagement, with no 
recourse to either medical opinion or medical categories, could have his or her civil rights 
restored on the basis of a medical testimony that asserted they were “presently sound of mind 
and of the whole body, not troubled by any frenzy, and thus capable of dealing and managing 
any of his most important interests.”764 Implicitly, therefore, the proceedings to end the 
interdiction and guardianship could reveal that an interdiction had really been decreed for a 
suspected dementia in cases that had been based solely on narratives suggesting economic 
mismanagement and classic prodigality.    
Proving the flexible function ascribed to medical opinion, a medical testimony 
asserting someone’s mental incapacity could be introduced only when the defendant 
petitioned for the interdiction to be revoked, and not when it had originally been decreed. The 
70-year-old Gaetano Migliorini, for instance, was interdicted in 1767 for a dementia he had 
allegedly suffered since the age of 24. The petition was made by his daughter-in-law with the 
                                                                                                                                                   
soul and his body.” The testimony was signed by four people, three priests and one physician. The latter added 
further, personal testimony to his name (cited in English above): “non è mai stato demente, ne privo di ogni 
dovuta cognizione, et l’ho sempre trovato sanissima di mente, benche indisposto di corpo.” ASF, MPAP, 
Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 235, January 1727/28. 
763 See, for example, the testimony of the surgeon Leonardo Berti from San Gaudenzio attesting for Gaspero 
Pratesi’s fitness and capacity to administer his affairs. The surgeon specified that, despite his advanced age, 
Gaspero was in possession of a healthy body, and was consequently still successfully active in the public world. 
Pratesi had been interdicted for being allegedly rimbambito, but when he petitioned immediately afterwards, the 
magistrates considered that his successful businesses and the testimonies he provided proved that he was neither 
prodigal nor imbecile. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 262 and no. 284, august 1766.  
764 “...lo riconosco al presente sano di mente, e di tutto il corpo, ne occupato da alcuna frenesia, è pero capace a 
trattare, e maneggiare qualsisia suo più premuroso interesse...” Testimony of the physician Francesco Arrighi 
supporting Giovan Battista Barsi’s petition for his interdiction to be lifted. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 




support of a collective testimony stating that he “is not and has never been able to administer 
his possessions, not only because he is demented and has no rational understanding, but also 
because he is unable to distinguish his interests, and is prodigal...”765 No further proof of his 
mental incapacity was required by the authorities to declare him interdicted, and at this stage 
we find no record of medical involvement of any kind. However, when Gaetano himself 
petitioned for the interdiction to be lifted, his daughter-in-law argued against his petition and 
produced a note from Santa Dorotea declaring Gaetano Migliorini had been committed 
there.766 The testimony just about declared that his name could be found in the records of the 
hospital and made no reference to Migliorini’s past or current mental condition. Even so, the 
fact of his past committal was considered grounds enough not to revoke the interdiction.   
Even if the reference to Santa Dorotea was indisputably considered as proof of mental 
incapacity, it was not necessary to make reference to a past committal to secure an 
interdiction sentence. As we have seen on many occasions, lay witnesses attesting for past or 
current mental disturbances were proof enough, particularly so long as these testimonies made 
the connection between mental state and daily performance in the different fronts of public, 
professional and family life. This was something a testimony from Santa Dorotea or Santa 
Maria Nuova was simply not able to do. In fact, for most of the period under study here, 
testimonies from either of the mental hospitals are limited to attesting for someone’s 
committal, only occasionally giving fuller versions of the reason for such internment. 
Towards the 1760s, nonetheless, categories such as “demented”, “deprived of brain” and “ill 
of madness” progressively give space to more precise categories such as “continual delirium”, 
“lucid intervals”, “perturbation” or “alteration of fantasy”, “melancholic delirium” or “furious 
mania” (mania furiosa).767 But the use of such categories works more as anecdotal detail than 
as a necessary component of a certification, the primary purpose of which was to attest that 
the individual was or had been committed to the mental institution, regardless of how medical 
knowledge understood the specific mental suffering.  
                                                
765 “...non è ne è stato mai capace di amministrare i suoi beni non solo per essere stato demente, e non avere 
intendimento di ragione quantochè per essere persona non capace di distinguere il suo interesse, e prodigo...” 
ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2307, no. 2, March 1767. 
766 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2307, no. 22, April 1767. 
767 See, for instance, the interdiction proceedings of Angiolo Barchesi in ASF, MPAP, Atti, F. 1214, fol. 1432, 
November 1735, Ibid, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 100, November 1740 and ASF, MS, Atti, 2016, fol. 125; 
Giuseppe Bracci, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 25, march 1748; Jacopo Romanelli, ASF, MPAP, F. 
2301, no. 76, February 1739/40 and ASF, MS, Atti, F. 2009, fol. 504; Antonio Corsini, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, 




Surprisingly, there are several cases of men and women interdicted without reference 
to their committal to the mental institutions, who nonetheless appear in the records of Santa 
Dorotea in complete isolation from the proceedings recorded in the Pupilli. Interdiction and 
confinement in a mental institution were two completely unrelated legal procedures, with 
different language requirements and no necessary references to each other. Further revealing 
of the malleability and contextual nature of categories is the fact that some people whose 
interdiction was decreed without stating the cause of incapacity, or with no mention of a past 
or current committal, appear in the records of Santa Dorotea or Santa Maria Nuova. Most 
notably is the case of a man who was interdicted for prodigality and who appears in the 
records of both hospitals in Florence.768 Thus, although being committed to Santa Dorotea or 
the pazzeria of Santa Maria Nuova was considered as legal confirmation of dementia,769 the 
judicial practice made it neither mandatory nor necessary. 
Although recourse to medical opinion was not the general practice in civil or criminal 
procedures, when medical opinion was involved it was generally taken as indisputable proof. 
It is rare to find occasions when the medical testimonies were contradicted by the government 
authorities. There are two situations that led the magistrates to go against medical opinion. 
The most common was when medical testimonies asserting someone’s soundness of mind 
were not considered grounds enough for the interdiction to be lifted. But, there are a few cases 
in which the information first gathered to decree an interdiction was later considered to have 
been wrong, either through new inquiries carried out by the Pupilli, or because the medical 
practitioner himself reconsidered his first assessment.770 Finally, there are also cases in which 
                                                
768 This is the case of Geri Gori, interdicted for prodigality in 1750. See ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 
198, July 1750; ASF, Santa Maria Nuova (SMN), F. 206, fol. 808, when he was transferred to Santa Dorotea in 
1754; ASF, SD, Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 1, no. 67 and no. 74, 1755, when he was released from S. Dorotea 
and interned again months later. See also Niccolò Mannucci, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 490, January 
1735/36 and ASF, SD, F. 23, no. 3, 1741; Margherita Bellini, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 131, August 
1757 and ASF, SD, Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 1, no. 6, December 1751. However, the majority of patients 
committed in Santa Dorotea do not appear in the records of the Pupilli, attesting for the complete dissociation 
between interdiction and confinement. After the changes to the legal framework in Tuscany at the end of the 
eighteenth century, interdiction and confinement came to be united in the same procedure.   
769 The Pupilli officials stated, regarding Antonio Corsini, that “per la sua incapacità in agire, e per trovarsi 
ristretto, e riservato in detto Spedale non solo è necessario interdirgli l’amministrazione il che anche segue per 
opera della legge istesa essendo la sua demenza resa notoria.” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 87, March 
1757.   
770 Girolamo Cocci, interdicted for the second time in 1756 for his advanced age and alleged dementia caused 
by epileptic fits, tried to have the interdiction rejected by petitioning for its revocation, supported by medical 
testimony asserting that he was presently in “optimal health, and during his past [physical] illnesses has never 
given any sign of being mentecatto, so that he is in perfect wits and has good cognition to manage his interests.” 
According to the inquiry carried out by the Pupilli officers, however, the medical testimony had been signed by 




the same medical practitioner attested first for someone’s unsoundness of mind only to later 
declare that this person’s mind works fine and he is (and has always been) consequently 
perfectly capable of managing his affairs.771 Notwithstanding these few exceptions, it is 
generally rare to find medical opinion openly contradicted by judges, magistrates, petitioners 
or defendants. In other words, even if medical opinion was not concomitant with the legal 
identification of mental incapacity, medical knowledge of physical and mental distempers 
was largely accepted and uncontested.  
 
Contents of Medical Testimonies and the Use of Precise Medical Categories 
Overall, the medical testimonies we find in the legal proceedings of the eighteenth 
century tend to be medically unspecific, although towards the second half of the century we 
can observe a mild change. By 1750 we increasingly encounter medical testimonies that were 
more straightforward in their use of medical categories, such as epilepsy, apoplexy, delirio 
melanconico, alterazione di fantasia, or fissazioni di mente. Nonetheless, when medical 
diagnostic categories were incorporated into Tuscan legal practice, it was invariably followed 
by the traditional formula aimed at establishing the defendant’s level of estrangement from 
reason. In this sense eighteenth-century medical testimonies are striking for their unchanged 
entrenchment in the medico-legal tradition that had been established since the introduction of 
the vernacular in the sixteenth century.772 Medical labels were meaningful so long as they 
established that the episode of derangement, accident or long-term disease had left the 
individual estranged from reason, deprived of cognition or out of his or her wits (privo di 
intelletto or di cervello, privo di cognizione, sbalordito, uscito fuori di se, tolta la favela, 
                                                                                                                                                   
authorities that Girolamo had indeed suffered an “apoplectic accident” and, as a result, his memory was weak, 
and he was unable to keep a rational discourse. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 70, October 1756.  
771 See, for instance, the proceedings regarding Gaspero Maria Pratesi, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 
262 and no. 284, August 1766, where the same surgeon attests first to his mental incapacity and later declares 
that although he is of advanced age, has a healthy body and is perfectly capable to manage his affairs. The 
interesting thing here is that the physician did not actually contradict his first statement, for his second testimony 
is centred on the fact of Pratesi’s healthy body and practical capacity to attend to his affairs. For other examples, 
see ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2305, no. 35, January 1760 and no. 71, June 1760; ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 
2303, nos. 8 and 48, November 1751-March 1752.  
772 The evidence studied by Elizabeth Mellyn, mostly corresponding to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, is 
striking for its similarity in many aspects with the eighteenth-century lexicon. Part of the terminology, 
particularly that most deeply entrenched in the Roman legal tradition, was falling into disuse. But, by and large, 
reference to the effects of madness in terms of making the individual devoid of reason, alienated from reason, 
taking them out of their senses (lo cavano del cervello, lo cava del sentimento), which formed the basis of the 
juridical treatment of madness in the previous centuries, is still at the core of the medical argumentation in the 




alienato dalla ragione), thus rendering them mentecatti or dementi. In other words, even 
when medical testimonies provide a diagnostic category, it is anyhow accompanied by the 
usual lexicon employed by lay witnesses and supplicants to legitimize the assessment of 
mental incapacity. Furthermore, medical testimonies tend to be repetitive, with a deliberate 
tendency to simplify medical references, hardly ever delving into the causalities behind the 
diagnostic category and sometimes not even making reference to its defining features.773 
With medicine of the mind in its early stages, there is nothing particularly strange in 
the lack of specificity observed in judicial medical testimonies. The notion of mental disorder 
as an organic disease and, as such, as a problem pertaining to medicine had started to prevail 
in Early Modern Europe, with an increasing proliferation of medical literature devoted to the 
problems of mental diseases. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, madness was 
experiencing the general secularization that pervaded different areas of knowledge at the 
dawn of the enlightenment and, for instance, theological conceptions were opened to medical 
understandings of mental disease to explain phenomena such as demonic possession.774  
However, although madness was progressively entering the realm of medicine, the 
causes and explanations of mental diseases were still highly exploratory in the medical 
profession itself. After all, “before the mid-eighteenth century, hardly anyone specialized 
exclusively in mental disorders.”775 The medical understanding of mental afflictions was built 
upon observation and empirical knowledge of medical practitioners who encountered 
madness in the course of their general practice of medicine. Although new theories were 
developing that pointed towards the mind, nerves and passions as the primary concerns in the 
aetiology of mental diseases, most of the medical reflection was still trapped in the dilemma 
of how mental disturbances could be assessed and treated using only the evidence obtained 
through the observation of the body and the accumulation of somatic symptoms.776  
                                                
773 The same argument is made by Lisa Roscioni regarding the medical perizie that preceded committal to Santa 
Dorotea. See Roscioni, Il governo della follia, p. 269. 
774 For an overview of the “making of psychiatry”, see Porter, Mind-Forg’d Manacles; Brambilla, Corpi invasi e 
viaggi dell’anima; Midelfort, A History of Madness; Andrew Scull, Hysteria: The Biography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). On the secularization brought in by the enlightenment, see the classic work of Paul 
Hazard, The Crisis of the European Mind, 1680-1715 (New York: New York Review Books, 2013).  
775 Porter, Mind-Forg’d Manacles, p. 174.  
776 Allan Ingram, The Madhouse of Language. Writing and Reading Madness in the Eighteenth Century 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 23. See, for example, the clinical description given by Giuseppe 
del Papa (1648-1735) for a medical consultation involving a “universal emaciation and weakness with some 
stupidity of mind”: the patient suffered “...dolori di capo or più, or meno pungitivi, or più, or meno impetuosi, ai 
quali di mano in mano con la debita proporzione si sono uniti la stracchezza, ed il languore della mente, 




Akihito Suzuki has argued that, for most of the early modern period, medical literature 
on mental afflictions deliberately highlighted the corporeal dimension of insanity in order to 
escape the dilemma of conceiving a diseased mind (understood here as the incorporeal 
dimension of the soul). A diseased mind would have implied that the soul could be corrupted, 
affecting the principle of its immortality.777 As a result, the body and its manifestations 
continued largely to be the centre of attention, to the detriment of the mind and its 
manifestations, with melancholy, mania and frenzy regarded as organic diseases of the brain, 
caused by a complex network of physiological distempers.778    
 Expertise over mental afflictions was not even settled within the sanitary profession, 
and at least until the first half of the eighteenth century both physicians and surgeons were 
considered as experts on the matter.779 The patients of Santa Dorotea were under the custody 
of a surgeon until 1756, when the hospital was assigned its first permanent physician with the 
appointment of Antonio Lulli. Still, physicians and surgeons equally disputed their role as 
medical authorities in forensic affairs, including the assessment of madness. For most of the 
eighteenth century it is not possible to determine a qualitative difference between testimonies 
signed by doctors and those signed by surgeons (cerusici). Most of the time, doctors and 
surgeons signed either two different testimonies that were, however, written using similar 
terms, or only one testimony signed by both. Hence, during the whole period not only did 
                                                                                                                                                   
un notabile smagrimento del corpo tutto, ed altri non pochi effetti di una sfera consimile; questa serie di 
accidenti parmi, che a viva forza mi persuada a credere, la cagione di simigliante infermità risedere per entro ai 
nervi, ed al cerebro, fonte, ed origine di tutti i nervi...” Giuseppe del Papa, Consulti Medici, vol. I (Rome: 
Giovanni Maria Salvioni, 1733), Consulto XIX, “Emaciazione universale, e debolezza, con qualche stupidità di 
mente”, pp. 92-94.  
777 Primarily based on British medical writings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Akihito Suzuki has 
argued that, “madness constructed within the dominant medical systems was not conceived as a disease of the 
mind until the latter half of the eighteenth century. Earlier medical writers conceptualized madness exclusively 
as a bodily disease, locating the problem in what the body represented to the mind and maintaining that the soul 
and the higher mental faculties of the patient remained intact. With the shift of emphasis from what the mind 
received to what the mind did, madness became the disease of the mind per se.” Akihito Suzuki, “Dualism and 
the Transformation of Psychiatric Language in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, History of Science 33 
no. 4 (1995), p. 437.  
778 For the understandings of mental diseases in the Italian medicine before the eighteenth century, see Roscioni, 
Il governo della follia, pp. 217-243; Dini, Il medico e la follia and Mazza, “La malattia mentale nella medicina 
del Cinquecento: tassonomia e casi clinici”, in De Bernardi, Follia, psichiatria, società, pp. 304-317. On the 
basic conceptualization of madness as melancholy, frenzy and mania, see Gowland’s useful overview based on 
the overarching category of melancholy in Angus Gowland, The worlds of Renaissance melancholy: Robert 
Burton in context (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 33-97.     
779 Doctors had a university education and were from the upper classes. On the contrary, surgeons were 
generally of lower status, and started to receive practical training in hospitals only in around the seventeenth 
century. Considered as artisans, surgeons theoretically could only work on the external surface of the body. See 
Brambilla, “La medicina del Settecento: dal monopolio dogmatico alla professione scientifica”, pp. 5-81 and 




medical practitioners share their status alongside the clergy as the best suitable experts for 
assessing madness, but the medical profession itself remained insecure and highly 
contradictory regarding their expertise in the field.  
It is well known that early modern medical experts in madness made their appearance 
hand in hand with the development of specialized institutional spaces for the treatment and, 
increasingly, the cure of the mentally afflicted.780 The institutional changes brought by the 
Regency, particularly the dispositions that changed the admission procedure for Santa 
Dorotea were, nonetheless, the signs of an initial shift in the balance between surgeons and 
doctors. As explained in the previous chapter, since 1750 pazzia furiosa had to be certified by 
a doctor (not a surgeon), while since 1756 Santa Dorotea had a permanent physician in charge 
of admissions, treatments and the discharging of patients. Moreover, the increasing numbers 
of petitions for committal made it necessary to appoint two additional physicians as the 
official public experts (periti fiscali) to determine the cases worthy of committal.  
These changes, in combination with the increasing number of petitions for interdiction 
and committal towards the mid-eighteenth century, contributed to the appearance of new 
medical experts in madness. Figures such as Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti, Antonio Lulli and 
Francesco Antonio Viligiardi developed their expertise on mental diseases through their 
practical contact with and treatment of patients in Santa Dorotea, and their roles of periti 
fiscali in the civil and criminal courts of the duchy.781 The names of these physicians start to 
become differentiated from the rest of the medical testimonies in the records of the Pupilli, 
appearing with increasing recurrence and being those that used more specific medical 
terminology.  
However, despite these official gestures that placed medicine and particularly 
physicians in charge of the realm of mental afflictions, judicial practice remained ambivalent 
towards the role of medical knowledge in matters of the mind. The difficulty of providing 
evidence for mental derangement except through behaviour and gestures was what made it so 
                                                
780 See, for instance, Roscioni, Il governo della follia; Porter, Mind-Forg’d Manacles; Andrews and Scull, 
Customers and Patrons. 
781 Antonio Lulli was the physician of Santa Dorotea between 1756 and 1788. Lodovico Scutellari was medico 
fiscale between 1756 and 1758, Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti was first the physician of the Stinche prison, and 
then appointed medico fiscale in 1758. In 1757 he was in charge of the official assessment of pazzia furiosa in 
the admission procedure of S. Dorotea together with Scutellari. Francesco Antonio Viligiardi was appointed 
substitute medico fiscale in 1758. Their involvement in the treatment and assessment of madness has been 
studied by Roscioni, Il governo della follia, pp. 265-292 and passim. An interesting sample of Targioni 
Tozzetti’s expert reports in cases of madness requested by the Otto di Guardia, the Auditore Fiscale, Santa 
Dorotea and the Magistrato dei Pupilli can be found in BNCF, Manoscritti, GTT, N. 235, vol. III, “Relazioni in 




difficult for medical professionals to be recognised as the most suitable expert authorities over 
matters of the mind in civil and criminal courts. Given that “the ‘facts’ of insanity were the 
common property of laymen and doctors alike,”782 medical testimonies were not really 
distinguishable from the rest of the testimonies that built a judicial process. Most of the time 
they made allusion to some physical distempers, often avoiding the outer limits of the mental 
disease under question. As argued by Eigen, medical testimonies played only a “legitimating 
function” in the legal assessment of madness before the nineteenth century, not only in 
Tuscany but throughout Europe. As he puts it, medical testimonies during the long eighteenth 
century are characterized by their “utter lack of technical terms, esoteric jargon, or physicalist 
imagery... After several neighbours testified that the accused exhibited bizarre behaviour, the 
physician was sworn and simply stated that the defendant was indeed deranged. No 
‘diagnosis’ as such was given beyond the usual statement, ‘I have looked upon him as a man 
insane’.”783  
Epilepsy and Apoplexy 
In this scenario, the visibility of epileptic and apoplectic “accidents”, as they were 
called, is hardly surprising. Epilepsy and apoplexy are the diagnostic categories that appear in 
most of the medical testimonies that I have found in the records of the Magistrato dei 
Pupilli.784 This incidence is paralleled in the records of the Otto di Guardia, particularly 
towards the second half of the century, when we increasingly observe Giovanni Targioni 
Tozzetti providing his medical expert opinion on the mental and physical effects of epilepsy 
and apoplexy, which entitled convicted prisoners to a remission of their sentence for health 
reasons. In other words, most medical practitioners were called to testify in those cases where 
madness left clearer physical signs. However, precisely given its clear physical signs, epilepsy 
and apoplexy were recurrently employed by petitioners both in criminal and civil courts to 
craft a petition for interdiction or reduction of sentence without resorting to medical opinion.  
Both conditions were somehow intertwined and not really differentiated, although 
apoplexy was particularly associated with old age, and singled out as the mark of inevitable 
physical and mental decay. Situated at the interstices between bodily and mental ailments, the 
                                                
782 Clark and Crawford, “Introduction” to Legal medicine in history,  p. 10.  
783 Eigen, “Intentionality and insanity”, p. 43. 
784 Nine of the 49 interdiction procedures that use medical testimony declare the cause of dementia to be 
epilepsy or apoplexy. The other 40 cases either employ undefined medical categories, or, less frequently, the 




aetiology of epilepsy and apoplexy may not have been completely clear to non-specialists, but 
their bodily signs and effects on intellectual faculties were indisputable even to a lay observer. 
The typical events that signalled the presence of epilepsy and apoplexy, such as convulsive 
seizures, partial or complete paralysis, loss of speech and/or vision, and severe mental 
confusion, among the most commonly cited, appear to have been widely known to lay 
petitioners in the criminal and civil courts.785  
The narratives of epilepsy and apoplexy assume a slightly different tone depending on 
the context and in accordance with the requisites of each legal space. Epilepsy, still widely 
known as “mal caduco”, and strokes resulting in various levels of paralysis were commonly 
employed by prisoners to justify petitions for the reduction of a sentence, as we have seen. 
These petitions were generally accompanied by medical testimonies from the medico fiscale, 
or medico condotto if they were not held in the Stinche but serving a sentence of public labour 
or internal exile (confino). Intended to demonstrate that the convicted felon deserved a lenient 
sentence, medical testimonies in these cases were almost invariably dominated by the 
physical consequences of both conditions. The person’s mental state was, consequently, left 
in the background. Following the principles of criminal law, these medical testimonies had to 
convince the authorities of the condition of the felon’s physical health, which had to be severe 
enough as to prevent him from performing hard labour or to require a better environment and 
special treatment.786  
Medical testimonies that argued for the seriousness of an apoplectic or epileptic 
condition affecting a convicted felon were not necessarily more generous in their descriptions 
than the medical testimonies presented in interdiction procedures. As Targioni Tozzetti 
explained to the Otto di Guardia in 1768, the argument generally was that the convulsive 
seizures of epilepsy, when presented frequently and within short intervals, could easily give 
rise to apoplexy and ultimately result in death.787 The formula could vary, but the quantity of 
                                                
785 For example, according to Stolberg, “The dangers of a stroke appear to have been widely known among the 
general population, and the more technical synonym ‘apoplexy’ was commonly used”, and even more, “It seems 
that laypeople thought about apoplexy and its causes in much the same way as physicians”. Similarly, epilepsy, 
he states, was not only widely known but especially feared. Michael Stolberg, Experiencing Illness and the Sick 
Body in Early Modern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 92-93 and p. 52, respectively. For an 
overview of the development of apoplexy and epilepsy as diseases pertaining to the sphere of psychiatry, 
although mostly centred on the modern period, see Malcolm Nicolson, “Stroke and other Vascular Disorders”, in 
Berrios and Porter, A History of Clinical Psychiatry, 86-94 and Roy Porter, “Epilepsy”, Ibid., pp. 164-173. 
786 See, for instance, ASF, OGB, Straordinarie, F. 2664, no. 69, 1728; ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2530, no. 132, 
July 1750 or ASF, OGB, Suppliche, 2540, no. 41, September 1764. 
787 Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti on the prisoner Giuseppe Martini, charged with murder and convicted arbitrarily 




information was equally scant. However, although the stress had to be placed on the physical 
risks, issues such as the emotional distress caused by prison life were progressively brought to 
the fore by physicians such as Targioni Tozzetti. The life threat posed by epilepsy was 
aggravated, he stated on more than one occasion, by the negative conditions experienced in 
prison, and even further worsened by “every perturbation of the mind.”788   
Allusions to epilepsy and apoplexy in interdiction procedures were primarily argued as 
evidence of mental incapacity, even if as a mental incapacity that possessed the most evident 
physical evidence possible. To understand this connection between physical and mental 
incapacity we should keep in mind that interdictions were thought to mitigate the 
consequences of dementia, prodigality and deafness or muteness, so at the very core of its 
conception we find the conflation of physical and mental disability. The narratives of 
interdiction in fact suggest that mental incapacity in its various forms was in many occasions 
conflated with different levels of physical impairment, as we have seen. In the particular case 
of apoplexy and epilepsy, intensifying physical impairment was indisputably correlated with 
increasing mental impairment. The purpose of interdiction procedures made it important to 
highlight the latter, while the criminal context made it pivotal to highlight the former.  
Interdiction procedures demonstrate particularly well how, notwithstanding the fact 
that the basic characteristics of epilepsy and apoplexy were known to lay society, families 
argued for it in a different way from medical practitioners. Medical testimonies generally 
presented apoplexy and epilepsy as illustrations of the physiological damage produced in the 
person’s mental faculties. For instance, Francesco Antonio Viligiardi declared his patient had 
suffered “fierce epilepsy”, a “serious and incurable illness” that had rendered him “amente”, 
which together with his advanced age dramatically reduced his possibilities of recovery.789 
Medical testimonies of apoplectic or epileptic accidents would sometimes go a little further, 
contextualizing the circumstances in which the person found herself, in terms of movement, 
                                                                                                                                                   
of his epilepsy, but after almost two years he petitioned again for the grazia “to be liberated from prison, or his 
penalty to be commuted to a lenient one that could keep him alive [che sia liberato dalla carcere, ò permutata in 
altra pena più mite per conservarsi in vita]”. Targioni Tozzetti supported the petition with the argument that 
“come l’Epilessia, detta volgarmente Mal Caduco, è di sua natura malattia grande e molto pericolosa, massime 
quando i di lei parossismi sono assai frequenti, e con poco intervallo di quiete fra l’uno e l’altro, poiché 
comunemente sogliono passare all’Apoplessia, e terminare colla morte”. ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2542, no. 
130, July 1768. 
788 “...suole per ogni turbazione d’animo risvegliarsi, ed aggravarsi...”. ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2542, no. 130, 
July 1768. 
789 Interdiction of Rinaldo Tedaldi. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2305, no. 150, August 1761. For a similar case 
see the testimony of a surgeon in the interdiction procedure of Giovanni Gualberto Bechi. ASF, MPAP, 




care, and the kind of treatment they had received. In contrast, lay petitioners tended to skip 
the part of the medical diagnosis (which was sometimes even referred to simply as 
“accidents”790) and went straight to the mental incapacity caused by a convulsive episode or 
stroke, on account of which “he has gone so out of himself [uscito talmente fuori di se] that he 
has become mentecatto”,791 or that it had left the afflicted “subject to an almost continual 
dementia”,792 “weak of mind”,793 or “reduced to the level of imbecility of forces and mind.”794 
The sick bodies of the allegedly mentally incapable were a matter of concern generally 
after the interdiction, once the Pupilli had to figure out the best measures to ensure that they 
were properly taken care of. Here, more accurate accounts regarding their mental and bodily 
health could be useful. For instance, Xaverio Valloni, a Florentine of advanced age and with 
no offspring, was interdicted in 1748 on the request of his caretakers, who simply declared he 
had become “demented”, without presenting any medical testimony.795 Along with the 
interdiction, the petitioners requested that they be appointed as administrators and be put in 
charge of Valloni’s custody and assistance. However, later proceedings inform us that his 
condition was understood as “melancholy and fixations” further aggravated by an apoplectic 
stroke which left him severely physically impaired. Close scrutiny of the labels used, the 
voices involved and the situations that prompted the use of one or another term is valuable in 
examining the principles regulating the configuration of languages of madness.  
Xaverio Valloni’s case resurfaces two years later when his two sisters, both 
consecrated nuns, initiated a litigation against his caretakers over his assistance and custody. 
The sisters accused the caretakers, a mother and her son, of misappropriation, opportunistic 
motives and ill treatment of the defenceless Valloni, who “had fallen little by little into a 
                                                
790 See, for instance, the interdiction of Maria Maddalena Panfi, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 201, 
September 1743. .   
791 Interdiction of Cessare Maghini, who suffered an “apoplectic accident.” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, 
no. 54, July 1756. 
792 Interdiction of Rinaldo Tedaldi, subject to “frequent epileptic insults.” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2305, no. 
150, August 1761.  
793 Interdiction of Francesco Albertini, who had suffered a “strong apoplectic fit” (tocco di apoplessia). ASF, 
MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 71, January 1757. 
794 Interdiction of Girolamo Cocci, subject to recurring epileptic accidents; no medical testimony added in this 
case. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 59, October 1756. 
795 The interdiction decree only stated that he had become “demented” based on the “testimonies and 
justifications” presented in court. When the justifications to support a petition for interdiction were made in 
person, they were usually recorded in the Atti of the Magistrato Supremo, which for the months in question 
unfortunately is not available for consultation. A copy of these testimonies, nonetheless, was provided in 1750 in 
ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 202, June 1750, and thus we know that Valloni’s mental incapacity was 
assessed without recourse to medical opinion. The interdiction decree can be found in ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, 




fierce melancholy and fixations.”796 The Pupilli’s report informs us that on top of the 
melancholy and fixations afflicting him since many years before “rendering him stupid and 
melenso”, Valloni was suffering severe physical complications due to a more recent 
apoplectic stroke.797 Medical and lay testimonies were included to demonstrate Valloni’s 
physical complications, to argue both that he needed constant care and that he was already 
receiving it.  
This case is interesting because it highlights the use and function of medical 
testimonies. Whilst it had not been necessary to medically certify Valloni’s alleged 
melancholy and fixations (they were not even recorded), his apoplexy and its consequences 
were. When the interdiction proceedings began, the caretakers not only had been informally 
in charge of managing the affairs of Valloni for some time, but had also assumed his custody 
and the attendance of his domestic needs. The assertion regarding his mental incapacity was 
in fact not under discussion until the two sisters intervened. And when they did, what was 
contested was not the nature of Valloni’s mental affliction, but instead who was to be in 
charge of his custody and assistance, given that his sisters were unable to provide this 
themselves as they were consecrated nuns, and what was to happen to his property. The two 
nuns claimed that their brother’s caretakers, also appointed administrators of his patrimony, 
had come to “dominate him completely”, seizing upon his weakness to take advantage of him 
and consume his patrimony.798 To make matters worse, Valloni made a donation to the 
woman who had assisted him over the years, which his heirs – the two sisters and their 
Monastery – tried to impugn on the grounds of his alleged mental incapacity.799 
A doctor and a surgeon signed a testimony declaring that they had treated Valloni for 
the past five months, and that he was “sick with an apoplectic malady, an indisposition which 
requires, beyond our cure, the continual assistance of a person day and night to custody the 
said infirm.”800 Still not completely convinced of the actual situation of their ward, the Pupilli 
officers resolved to send an informant, most probably a medical practitioner, to directly 
                                                
796 “...per aver dato a poco, a poco in una fiera malinconia, e fissazione si ritrova da qualche anno in qua senza 
spirito di operare, e di ben dirigere il governo di sue stanze...” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 178, March 
1750. 
797 “... sendo [sic] divenuto per una fiera malinconia, e fissazione, stupido, e melenso...” Ibid.  
798 “...questi lo dominano totalmente, godendo tutto il di lui patrimonio...” Ibid.  
799 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 202, June and July 1750. 
800 “...infermo d’un male Apopletico, per la quale indisposizione è necessaria, oltre la nostra cura una continua 
assistenza di persone giorno, e notte per custodire detto infermo et ad ogni sua occorrenza, a ciò possiamo dire, 
et attestare per le continue visite fatte al medesimo e che continuamente li fanno...” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 




observe Valloni’s state and his caretakers’ behaviour.801 The testimony that the informer 
wrote for the Pupilli is particularly telling, and striking for its accurate description of the old 
man’s body and mental state. He described that he had found Valloni “lying on a resting chair 
[sedia da riposo], stupid, astonished, pusillanimous, taciturn and incapable of reasonable 
discourse”, to the extent that he only was able to respond with small and insignificant words 
to the informant’s questioning.802 He could not recall any past events, and continuously 
answered “I do not remember.”803 When he was asked to stand up, he could hardly get on his 
feet, showing a “considerable weakness” (debolezza non lieve) and loss of energy in his body 
to the extent that he could not move his legs without help. The informant explained that all 
these signs indicated that “for some time apoplexy has resided in this imbecile head, and as a 
fatal and malign guest has left, as its probably indelible print, the organ of the brain defected, 
inefficacious and weak”, affecting not only his wits, but also preventing his animal spirits 
from distributing movement to his extremities.804 
These kinds of descriptions, so common in the eighteenth-century Consulti Medici, for 
example, are undeniably atypical in court records, particularly for their insights into the 
workings of the brain vessels and the interconnection between body and mind through the 
animal spirits.805 The testimony just quoted made explicit reference to apoplexy as producing 
irreparable damage to the brain, which in turn affected bodily motion by immobilizing the 
animal spirits. In the medical testimonies of interdiction procedures, the word brain is not 
usually employed to mean the organ that sends impulses to the rest of the body to command 
its functioning (whether through animal spirits or electric impulses), but rather to name the 
                                                
801 The informant signed only with his name, but was referred to as dottore by the Pupilli officials. In general, 
physicians used the titles of “medico fisico”, “dottore in medicina”, or “membro del Collegio dei Medici”, 
however, the accurate medical details provided by this report suggest that he was a doctor in medicine.     
802 “...giacente sovra una sedia [d]a riposo, stupido, attonito, pusillanime, taciturno, ed incapace di discorso 
sensato; a talche non altro potei estorcer da lui con più interrogazioni fattegli, che poche, tronche, ed 
insignificanti parole.” ASF, MPAP, Atti e sentenze, F. 1280, June 1750, fol. 994. 
803 “...Interrogatolo sopra l’epoca del suo male, mostrò di non ricordarsene, e da altre richieste pure si sbrigò 
coll’istesa ripetizione non me ne ricordo.” Ibid. Emphasis in the original.  
804 “essersi [da] un tempo domiciliata in questo capo imbecille l’Apoplessia, la quale, comecchè ospite funesta, 
e maligna, vi ha lasciato come per impronta forse indelebile, difettoso, inefficace, e languido l’organo del 
cervello il quale oltre al non lavorar più ne’ mirabili suoi separatori spiriti brillanti e vivaci, gli somministra 
eziandio poveri, e scarsi alle parti, e a quelle massimamente, che, come sono le gambe, più son lontane dal 
capo.” Ibid.      
805 See, for instance, how the Tuscan physician Giueppe del Papa explained the epileptic and apoplectic 
accidents suffered contemporaneously by a patient. “Accidenti epilettici, ed apoplettici insieme uniti”, in 




source of the faculty of reason.806 But again, given that the primary aim of the inquiry was to 
assess Valloni’s physical state, the description delves into the kinds of organic details that 
were usually left outside such medical testimonies.  
We find a similar situation regarding a troublesome interdicted man who had been 
confined in the fortress of Volterra, when he requested permission from the Council of 
Regency to be allowed to return to Florence due to the violent epileptic fits he was suffering. 
His petition was supported by an exceptionally elaborate medical testimony. It declared that 
he was “frequently subjected to stretching [stiramenti] of the nerves and convulsions, and 
especially during the month of July last year he was afflicted by an inflammatory fever 
accompanied by grave and dangerous epileptic accidents, on account of which he was on the 
brink of losing his life.”807 Nerves, convulsions, fevers and other precise indications of 
physical sufferings are not usually integrated in medical testimonies, however. Furthermore, 
in this case the core of the physician’s argument in favour of transferring the interdicted back 
to Florence was that the weather in Volterra was especially harmful to the patient’s health. 
Once again, the core of the discussion was placed on the interdicted’s physical condition, and 
not on his troubled mind, although we know he had been interdicted for being a riotous, 
extravagant and uneasy (inquieto) mad man (pazzo). 
Due to their variety and regularity across the evidence under scrutiny here, petitions 
claiming epilepsy or apoplexy in order to argue for mental incapacity with the support of 
medical opinion are highly valuable for studying the circulation of languages madness. On the 
one hand, the very conflation between the physical and mental symptomatology 
accompanying both conditions explains why petitioners were so at ease with its 
characteristics. Yet, on the other hand, this same conflation suggests the involvement of 
medical opinion. Given its recurrence and highly disabling physical consequences, we must 
assume that medical practitioners were consulted more frequently for ailments related to 
                                                
806 The spirits according to the Hippocratic-Galenic explanatory framework were the connectors between the 
body and the soul, and the animal spirits were the “messengers” between the brain and the cognitive functions 
and the body. Mechanistic explanations gradually conceptualized the movement of animal spirits as commanded 
by the brain through a network of fibres, which was to become the nervous system. For an overview, see Elena 
Carrera, “Anger and the Mind-Body connection in Medieval and Early Modern Medicine”, in Elena Carrera, 
Emotions and Health. 1200-1700 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013), pp. 112-116 and Roy Porter, Flesh in the Age of 
Reason. The Modern Foundations of Body and Soul (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004, 
pp. 44-61.  
807 “...essendo spessissimo soggetto a stiramenti di nervi, e convulsioni, e specialmente nel mese di luglio 
dell’anno passato fù soppresso da una febbre infiammatoria accompagnata da gravi, e pericolosi accidenti 
epilettici, per cui si ridusse presso che a perdere la vita...”, Testimony of Girolamo Ricci, “first physician” of 
Volterra, ASF, CR, F. 758, no. 20, May 1753. No medical testimony had been required to assess Francesco del 




epilepsy and apoplexy, than for other mental afflictions. Especially when the latter were 
manifested in forms that were not physically harmful either to the patient or to others, as was 
the case with many of the interdicted.    
  Bearing witness to the permeation of medical discourse regarding epilepsy and 
apoplexy, legal practice by the eighteenth century had widely accepted the precepts of health 
and disease that dictated, for example, better air and diet, a change of climate and ideally 
avoiding situations that generated emotional distress (the so called passioni di animo). All 
these conditions, according to the principles of the six non-naturals, were to be carefully 
managed if one intended to preserve or be restored to health.808 Epilepsy and apoplexy were 
no exceptions. As explained by the Italian physician Andrea Pasta (1706-1782) regarding 
epilepsy, it was “not always derived from humoral causes”, and when it was, “it is undeniable 
that the scosse d’animo frequently can control and make it disappear.”809 This explains why 
the authorities considered the argument of epileptic or apoplectic felons who requested their 
penalties be mitigated or pardoned valid. Similarly, the Pupilli officials frequently supported 
requests for a “change of air”, better living conditions or change of diet. The principles of the 
six-non naturals, still strongly present as the primary preventive mechanism for health 
preservation, apply, evidently, not only to apoplexy and epilepsy, but in general to all 
physical or mental distempers.   
Other Medical Categories: Delirio, Turbazioni di Fantasia and Fissazioni 
When we leave the context provided by epilepsy and apoplexy, the sample of medical 
categories employed becomes less definitive and much more explorative. The more medical 
knowledge left the realm of the body and its physical evidence to explore the signs of mental 
derangement, the more references to altered emotional states were placed at the centre. When 
medical testimonies left the secure frames provided by medico-legal terminology, it was to 
introduce concepts that invariably refer to the realm of alterations of judgement and emotional 
disruptions. Modestly throughout the eighteenth century – with some acceleration towards the 
                                                
808 According to the Hippocratic-Galenic system, there were six non-natural factors commanding health and 
disease: air, sleep and waking, food and drink, excretion and retention, movement and rest, and passions or 
accidents of the soul. For two examples of how this theory marked the experience of health and the body, see 
Cavallo and Storey, Healthy Living and Séverine Pilloud and Micheline Louis-Courvoisier, “The Intimate 
Experience of the Body in the Eighteenth Century: Between Interiority and Exteriority”, Medical History 47 
(2003), pp. 451-472.   
809 Andrea Pasta, Dei mali senza materia. Discorso medico del celebre Andrea Pasta colla giunta di vari 




second half – medical testimonies started to attach to the traditional frenesie and the old-
fashioned melancholy new concepts such as delirio, fissazioni and alterazioni or turbazioni di 
fantasia. Contrasting with the plain, unspecialized and generic medical testimonies of the first 
part of the century, Lulli and Targioni Tozzetti explained their patient’s mental incapacity by 
making reference to their perturbed fantasies, their deliriums and their mental fixations. The 
Tuscan physicians thus appear immersed in the eighteenth-century transformation of the 
conceptual model of madness, manifested by the adoption of a new psychologized 
language.810  
This shift in the understanding of madness is particularly clear in the changes suffered 
by the term melancholy. Scholars have engaged in vast discussions about the European 
fascination for this mental affliction, regarded at the same time as a fashionable disease and as 
a pitiable malady, associated with artistic geniality, intellectual occupations and the elite, but 
also with deep suffering and suicide. With religious, political and cultural meanings that 
alternatively shaped its form, melancholy was probably the most employed term to classify 
mental affliction between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Its characteristics, 
meanings and explanations were widely available and pervaded a wide spectrum of early 
modern European society.811 Tuscany, according to Elizabeth Mellyn, was no exception. 
Melancholy was the preferred term for madness in the civil and criminal court records of 
Tuscany towards the seventeenth century, and lay society demonstrated the capacity to argue 
for its signs and characteristics without the direct help of medical practitioners.812  
However, compared to its previous success as a flexible and overarching category, 
melancholy by the eighteenth century makes only a modest appearance in the Tuscan records. 
From being the most used category to define mental incapacity in the previous centuries, 
melancholy had now been dissolved into the even more generic dementia as the preferred 
category of mental incapacity in non-medical narratives. The category is likewise 
predominantly uncommon in medical testimonies, and when we do find the term, we see it 
                                                
810 Suzuki, “Dualism and the Transformation of Psychiatric Language”.  
811 For a sample of this fruitful scholarship, see Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and 
Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art (New York: Basic Books, 1964); 
Angela Groppi, “La malinconia di Lucrezia Barberini d’Este”, in Francesca Cantù (ed.) I linguaggi del potere 
nell’età barocca, Vol. 2. Donne e sfera pubblica (Rome: Viella, 2009), pp. 197-227; Magdalena S. Sánchez, 
“Melancholy and Female Illness: Habsburg Women and Politics at the Court of Philip III”, Journal of Women's 
History 8, no. 2 (1996), pp. 81-102; Schmidt, Melancholy and the Care of the Soul; Gowland, The worlds of 
Renaissance melancholy; MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam; Midelfort, A History of Madness. Recent 
historiography has cast doubt on the extent to which the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can be defined as 
the “age of melancholy”. Cavallo and Storey, Healthy Living, pp. 179-208. 




accompanied by a second indicator that transfers the major source of the disease from the 
body to the mind. Melancholy during the eighteenth century appears in medical testimonies as 
descriptor or qualifier of the concepts fissazioni and delirio, and it hardly ever appears alone. 
The same happens in the records of Santa Dorotea, where we find the term only as 
melancholic delirium or melancholic fixation. That the delirium or the fixation was 
melancholic indicated, on the one hand, the proximity between melancholy and frenzy, and on 
the other, that suicidal thoughts were involved. The presence of an altered fantasy, a fixation 
or a delirium served to differentiate the melancholy conceived as an emotional disposition 
from the melancholy entailing serious mental derangement, which could easily turn into 
frenzy or which could lead its victim to making an attempt against his or her own life.813 
We need to consider that these observations are conditioned by the sources under 
study here, which give a partial vision that by no means can be taken as the medical approach 
to and understanding of mental afflictions. Melancholy, in fact, had always been at the 
intersection between sanity and insanity, for it did not necessarily imply loss of cognition or 
the complete compromising of one’s mental faculties. Thus, with the normalization of 
interdiction procedures over the centuries, melancholy by itself ceased to be a category 
accountable for interdiction, even less for criminal insanity, for the compromising of the 
mental faculties was arguable. Taking into account the standardization of judicial procedures 
in terms of how mental incapacity and criminal insanity were supposed to be argued, the 
relative decline in the use of melancholy assumes a more complicated form. In fact it can be 
interpreted as the result of the requirements of judicial practice rather than as a reflection of 
its actual disuse as a diagnostic category to frame and explain mental disturbance at a social 
level. Nonetheless, even if it responds to changes in judicial practice, the fact is that while 
Mellyn identifies melancholy as the preferred category to frame the mental incapacity of a 
relative during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, by the eighteenth it no longer 
prevailed.  
                                                
813 See for instance the delirio malinconico suffered by Girolamo Gozzini. ASF, CR, Santa Dorotea, F. 426, Ins. 
7, March 1759 or the admissions of Lorenzo Colleschi, “aggravato da delirio malinconico, e da una fiera mania” 
in ASF, SD, Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 1, no. 45, January 1754 and Giovanni Belmonte, admitted because he 
suffered “quel genere di demenza, che i medici chiamano Delirio Melanconico, negli accessi più forti del quale, 
egli frequentemente diventa furioso quasi quanto i Maniaci,” in BNCF, Manoscritti, GTT, N. 235, vol. III, 
“Relazioni in casi di demenza”, fol. 208. However, cases of suicidal or murderous behaviour were generally 
framed simply as pazzia furiosa by the authorities in the admission procedures to Santa Dorotea. On the medical 
use of delirio, fissazioni, fantasia alterata as symptoms of eighteenth-century Tuscan madness see Roscioni, Il 




Throughout Europe, the “making of psychiatry” during the eighteenth century entailed 
the introduction of “mentalist” or psychologized explanations for mental disturbances. To 
conceptualize a diseased mind, medical knowledge created a new language that could express 
a new form of addressing the dualism between mind and body.814 Lets take, again, the 
conceptualization of melancholy, which exemplifies particularly well the reluctance of early 
modern medicine to enter into matters of the mind/soul. During its moment of glory, 
melancholy was like a chameleon that could assume manifold forms, but whose predominant 
characteristics were delusions, fearfulness and sadness.815 However, even if it supposed the 
presence of a corrupted imagination and altered intellectual faculties, it was configured pre-
eminently as an organic disease, understood to be the effect of humoral imbalance caused by 
the excess of black bile. Furthermore, the hydraulic model of humoral theory allowed for the 
rational will to remain intact, for “the whole process of the representation of false image and 
the subsequent involuntary motion did not involve any damage to the soul/mind.”816 Only 
when rational will was involved in the conceptualization of madness, could the traditional 
body-mind relationship be inverted.  
Mental fixations (fissazioni) or alterations of fantasy (alterazione di fantasia) had been 
part of the previous conceptions of melancholy, but by the eighteenth century they served to 
highlight the role of ideas and emotions as triggers of mental disturbance. While the delirium 
that characterized melancholy in the previous centuries was marked by its physiological basis 
and ruled by humoral imbalance, the melancholic delirium of eighteenth century was based in 
the mind and increasingly responded solely to it. Delirium, which progressively came to be 
equated to madness, was understood as being originated on the mind, and not dependant on 
the exterior, nor on physical perception. Originated in the mind and responding solely to it, 
insanity by the end of the eighteenth century came to be conceived as an alteration of 
judgement recognized in delusions, false imaginations, fixations or a distorted perception of 
reality.817  
                                                
814 Porter, Mind-Forg’d Manacles, pp. 169-228 and Suzuki, “Dualism and the Transformation of Psychiatric 
Language”. This new language was largely fed by the contemporary philosophy of the mind. 
815 MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam, p. 153. For a general view of the European medical connotations of 
melancholy and its symptoms see German Berrios and Roy Porter, “Mood disorders”, Clinical and Social 
sections, in Berrios and Porter, A History of Clinical Psychiatry, pp. 384-420.  
816 Suzuki, “Dualism and the Transformation of Psychiatric Language”, p. 423. 
817 On delirium and delusion, see Berrios, The History of Mental Symptoms, pp. 85-104; Andrews and Scull, 




Although the relationship between body and mind continued to be an unresolved 
dilemma, and the causality of mental afflictions was still a highly controversial matter, during 
the eighteenth century new approaches tended to favour explanations that increasingly 
pointed towards the predominance of the mind over the body. This process progressively 
shifted medical attention from the standardized patterns of physical reaction predicted by 
humoral theory towards the patients’ biographies, their individuality and their emotional 
disruptions.818  
Passions were not a new factor in the aetiology of madness. As the last of the six non-
natural factors that could affect a person’s health – together with air, bodily excretions, diet, 
sleep and exercise – passions of the soul could alter the humoral balance and produce serious 
maladies and even death. As will be discussed in the next chapter, by the eighteenth century, 
with the introduction of the theory of the nerves, angustie d’animo or mind perturbations were 
held to have the power to “mutate and correct the structure of the brain and of the nerves.”819 
Causalities such as strong emotional experiences or life changing events were discussed as 
triggers of mental affliction producing aetiologies that increasingly positioned emotions and 
the brain as the predominant sources of mental disease. The intricate debate over the 
connections between mind and body that took place during the eighteenth century would 
ultimately lead to emotional disturbances being conceived as originating in the brain.820  
The change observed in the Tuscan medical testimonies towards the mid-eighteenth 
century, thus, needs to be interpreted in a larger framework, even if the depths of their 
preoccupation appear circumscribed to the requisites of the legal procedures. What seems 
particularly remarkable is the introduction of specific terms to depict altered mental or 
emotional states in medical testimonies that had predominantly been built around economic 
performance and deviance from behavioural norms. Despite their being accompanied by the 
indispensable demente, melenso and mentecatto, the terms fissazioni di mente, turbazioni di 
mente/fantasia or alterazioni di mente/fantasia were introduced to describe the individual’s 
                                                
818 However, we should be cautious regarding the extent to which humoral medical theories standardized the 
physiological reactions to each emotion. According to Elena Carrera, we should not draw a direct line between 
temperament and passion, so as to thus acknowledge the varied and personal ways in which different people 
responded to different emotions. See Carrera, “Anger and the Mind-Body Connection”, in Carrera, Emotions 
and Health. 
819 Pasta, Dei mali senza materia, p. 18.  
820 As Fay Alberti has warned us, this process was “neither linear nor straightforward”. Fay Bound Alberti, 
“Emotions in the Early Modern Medical Tradition”, in Fay Bound Alberti (ed.) Medicine, Emotion and Disease, 
1700-1950 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), p. 2. The role of emotions in the conceptualization of madness is 




state of mind as proof of mental incapacity. This change is closely connected to the 
identification of emotional anguish or emotional perturbations (angustie d’animo or 
turbazione d’animo) as triggers of mental derangement.  
Medical practitioners generally did not disclose the contents of their patients’ mental 
fixations or the images produced by their altered fantasies. Most times we are left only with 
the declaration that the person was subjected to a “melancholic delirium that seriously 
affected his fantasy”, or that he had “fallen into some mind fixations.”821 But sometimes they 
slip in certain comments regarding the object of the delusional symptoms and mind fixations 
of their patients. One was prone “to conceive false ideas of a suspicion of being poisoned”, 
another suffered “false persecutory ideas” and yet another was “subject to many 
extravagancies of fantasy, expressed with impious and obscene words.”822 Delusion 
(fissazione) led one to believe that he owned a house he in fact had rented for many years, and 
in another case it made him believe that he was a nobleman who had been promised in 
marriage to the Princess of Wales.823 “Alterations of mind” could also be present in the form 
of an “amorous passion” in which the “delirious intellect” of the patient would be “fixated in 
the object of her madness.”824 Delusions and hallucinations were not new to the medical 
understanding of madness, but historians have identified a shift towards the secularization of 
the imagination in the increasing importance attributed to delusions as a symptom of serious 
cases of derangement.825 From earlier conceptions of fantasy that saw it as potential object of 
demonic possession, medical understanding opened up to conceive of the altered fantasy as 
the effect of the imagination fixated in a wrong or “unreal” idea, which could assume the 
                                                
821 Respectively, Girolamo Gozzini in ASF, CR, F. 426, no. 7, March 1759 and Giuseppe Casini in ASF, 
MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 245, February 1755.  
822 “...ha concepite delle false idee di sospetto di veleno...”, “...false idee di persecuzioni...” and “...è stato 
soggetto a molte stravaganze di fantasia, espresse con parole impie, ed oscene...” Respectively, ASF, SD, 
Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 3, no. 41, December 1758 and no. 39, October 1758, and Ibid., F. 8, no. 72, January 
1771. 
823 Respectively, ASF, SD, Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 8, no. 90, April 1771 and ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 756, no. 
7, July 1760.  
824 “...per riconoscere con sicurezza in che stato oggi giorno si trovi l’alterazione della sua mente, sono in 
obbligo d’attestare per la verità quell’istesso appunto, che altre volte mi son dato l’onore di rappresentare, e che 
è oramai noto alla più infima plebe, cioè che la medesima persiste tuttavia ciecamente, nell’antica sua fortissima 
passione amorosa, e tal segno, che non è capace su quest’articolo di dar luogo a persuasiva, o  minaccia veruna, 
comparendo al delirante suo intelletto giustissime le più mal consigliate, ed inique pretensioni, opposte alle leggi 
umane, e divine, fissata torno a ripetere, nell’oggetto della sua follia, non comprendendo, che è stato l’origine 
della presente sua inreparabile [sic] rovina, ed abiezione”, Testimony of Gio Francesco Viligiardi regarding 
Antonia Perini. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2309, no. 114, July 1773. Antonia Perini was confined and 
interdicted on account of her “furore erotico” and “pazzione amorosa”. Her case has been examined by Lisa 
Roscioni, Il governo della follia, pp. 3-18. See also Chapter 4.  




form of ungrounded fears, “erotic furore”, or even the creation of a whole false, imaginary 
world. Furthermore, it was increasingly approached as brain damage, with expressions such 
as “altered mind” and “delirious intellect”, progressively understood as the epitome of 
madness.  
Two final medical categories deserve further examination here, both because of their 
rare appearance. The eighteenth century has been singled out as the century that witnessed the 
shift from medical explanations of mental afflictions based on the humoral theory to 
explanations resorting to the framework provided by the new theories of the nervous system. 
Nonetheless, “nervous affections” and their paramount diseases, the male hypochondria and 
the female hysteria, are striking for their absence in the Tuscan court records. For instance, 
when we take into account the range of diseases covered by any volume of medical 
consultations published in the eighteenth century, it appears clear that mental afflictions are 
predominantly represented by hysteric and hypochondriac affections. Second in the list of the 
most recurrent mental afflictions in medical consultations are epileptic or apoplectic fits. 
Other types of mental disorders, such as melancholic delirium or some unspecified “mental 
perturbations” appear in a clear minority compared to the other three.826  
Nervous diseases assumed a new fashionable tone in European elite societies and, 
judging from the Italian medical consultations, Italy seems to have been no exception. 
However, as Jonathan Andrews has warned us, the configuration of nervous complaints was a 
matter of contention among the medical profession during the eighteenth century, particularly 
regarding the boundaries between sanity and insanity, and whether nervous diseases could be 
considered as sufficient cause, for instance, to determine the necessity of someone’s 
confinement.827 Against this context, it is not particularly strange that nervous complaints 
were not used to argue mental incapacity or an insanity defence. Nervous complaints were too 
exclusive and undetermined categories to be raised before a court of law. In fact, when they 
do appear, they are camouflaged, framed as “hypochondriac dementia”, as if to dismiss any 
                                                
826 See the work of Tuscan physicians such as Giuseppe del Papa (1648-1735), Antonio Cocchi (1685-1758) or 
Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti (1712-1783), paralleled by the publications of other Italian physicians. Del Papa, 
Consulti Medici, vols I and II; Antonio Cocchi, Consulti Medici, Vols. I and II (Bergamo: Vincenzo Antoine, 
1791); BNCF, Manoscritti, GTT, N. 234, “Consultationes medicae”, cart.2, fasc. X, Consulti per affezioni 
ipocondriache ed isteriche”; Consulti Medici di vari professori... Raccolti, e pubblicati dal Dottor Gaetano 
Armillei , vols. I and II; Niccolò Cirillo, Consulti Medici, vols. I and II, among others.  
827 Jonathan Andrews, “‘In Her Vapours… [or] Indeed in Her Madness’? Mrs Clerke’s Case: An Early 




doubts regarding their reality and damaging mental effects, or argued in later proceedings to 
highlight physical impairment.828  
 
Circulation of Medical Languages 
The representation of the mental sufferings of Antonio Corsini, interdicted and 
committed at least twice to Santa Dorotea, is particularly salient when examining the 
flexibility of these medical categories, and the evolution they underwent during the second 
half of the eighteenth century.829 In December 1756 Giuseppe Nardi, a distant cousin of 
Antonio Corsini, made two parallel requests to the Grand Duke, one to interdict and the other 
one to confine Antonio Corsini in Santa Dorotea. The vocabulary used in both petitions was 
remarkably plain: one spoke of Corsini’s dementia, the other of his pazzia.830 Nonetheless, the 
supporting testimonies and further enquiries undertaken to respond to the interdiction petition 
reveal the use of a broader range of categories. Although he was admitted to Santa Dorotea in 
early December, his interdiction was only decreed at the beginning of April 1757. As the 
Pupilli officials reported, Corsini’s “unhealthy state of mind” (poco sano stato di mente) was 
not doubted by the authorities, but its consequences, and who was to be entrusted with the 
administration of his patrimony generated months of discussion. The Pupilli advocated that 
they have jurisdiction for overseeing the guardianship (instead of the Magistrato Supremo, as 
the petitioner requested), and at the same time they strongly opposed the appointment of 
Nardi as administrator. 
Three physicians were involved in Corsini’s interdiction, which was decreed in April 
1757: a local physician from Prato; Antonio Lulli from Santa Dorotea in Florence; and 
Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti in his role as medico fiscale and consultant physician of the 
mental hospital. The first diagnosis that we know of was made by the physician of Prato, who 
                                                
828 See, respectively, the interdiction of Francesco Galantini in ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 67, 
December 1752 and the case of Lorenzo Buonaccorsi Perini who, notwithstanding his interdiction, was facing 
the prospect of incarceration for his unpaid debts. To save him from prison his sons petitioned by claiming a 
serious of physical indispositions that were framed under the overarching category of “nervous complaints” by 
the doctor Giovanni Francesco Viligiardi. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 140, December 1764.  
829 As a result of their different nature, the records of his committal are far more mundane than the records of the 
interdiction procedure, which contain exceptionally vivid accounts of Corsini’s mental affliction. See, ASF, 
MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, n. 87, December 1756-April 1757 and no. 223, January 1759, compared to ASF, 
SD, Motupropri, Rescritti…, F. 2, no. 40, December 1756 and Ibid, F. 3, no. 11, April 1758 and no. 44 February 
1759.  
830 See, respectively, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 87, December 1756 and ASF, SD, Motupropri, 




reported in November 1756 that for six months he had seen Corsini affected by “a 
melancholic delirium without fever” accompanied “by a grave fear and a profound sadness 
caused by mournful [funesti] thoughts and the imaginary dangers that his altered fantasy 
represents in his mind, which with obstinate fixation, become his spirit’s continual 
occupation.”831 With the intention of proving the necessity of his interdiction to the 
government authorities, the physician recounted that Corsini had strongly refused any kind of 
treatment or care and rejected medical advice. Contravening direct medical indications, 
Corsini refused to practice the physical activities that were usually recommended for the 
improvement of mental and physical health, such as riding or maintaining an active social 
life. On the contrary, he preferred solitude, had slept dressed for weeks, and had even refused 
to eat to the extent that it had been necessary “to make him eat by force, so that he would not 
perish.”832  
Still attuned to the humoral principle of the six non-naturals, the local physician spoke 
of Corsini’s altered state of mind as manifested through bodily signs that were presented as 
proof of mental derangement. However, his testimony was not concerned with physical 
humoral imbalance, but with Corsini’s behaviour and distorted imagination as the ultimate 
way of accessing the patient’s state of mind. He defied the expected codes of behaviour by 
living deprived of amusements, by refusing to take care of his health, and by being indifferent 
to his domestic affairs. But the testimony identified the definitive key to the patient’s mental 
state in his delusions and “altered fantasy”, which subjected him to suicidal thoughts and 
imaginary fears.  
From Santa Dorotea, Antonio Lulli declared that Antonio Corsini was subject to a 
“considerable corruption [depravazione] of the mind,” on account of which he was indeed 
admitted to the hospital when Nardi had made the request.833 However, Corsini’s madness 
was intersected with lucid intervals, so that after only a couple of months at Santa Dorotea 
Lulli wrote a report claiming that “although he has suffered in the past from mental 
alienations and disturbances of his fantasy originated by angustie d’animo, for some time now 
                                                
831 “...l’ho sempre riconosciuto, e giudicato ammalato di delirio melanconico senza febbre congiunto ora più ora 
meno ad un grave timore, et ad una profonda tristezza cagionatale da funesti pensieri, e dagli imaginari pericoli, 
che le rappresenta alla mente la fantasia alterata, e di quali con ostinata fissazione fa la sua continua occupazione 
il suo spirito.” Testimony of the physician Giovanni Torello Leoni, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 87, 
November 1756.  
832 Idem. According to the principles of the six non-naturals, attention to physical and social activities, diet and 
sleep were considered paramount elements to preserve health or counteract disease. 




he has nevertheless become greatly recovered, and enjoys continuous lucid intervals for most 
of the day”, on account of which a promising recovery could be expected.834  
The prospect of lucid intervals posed a delicate problem for the legal management of 
insanity, as their episodic nature put any standardized response into question. However, this 
issue was more relevant for determining the level of liability of the criminally insane than in 
assessing mental incapacity. Compared to the difficulty of determining if the person had been 
having a lucid interval when a crime had been committed, given that interdiction was a 
temporary measure, the likelihood of lucid intervals only entailed that the person could more 
easily be released from curatorship. Antonio Corsini himself utilized the reference to his lucid 
intervals to ground his plea for protection against his ill-intentioned relatives. Writing while 
still confined in Santa Dorotea, the employment of the notion of lucid intervals allowed him 
to argue that he was lucid enough so as to have a say in the choosing of a suitable 
administrator. But, at the same time, he sought to blame his mental affliction on the iniquities 
of his relatives, for which it served him better to highlight the depth of his affliction rather 
than its episodic nature. And so, instead of denying his mental incapacity, he declared that he 
suffered from mental disturbances (turbazione di mente) but these were interrupted by lucid 
intervals, which placed him, all the same, in need of an “expert and honest administrator” who 
could protect his patrimony and defend him against his relatives.835   
To illustrate the depth of his fear of his relatives, he dwelt upon the particularities of 
his mental disorder, disclosing how he conceived and made sense of it, in which his 
biography and his family played a major part. His petition can thus be taken as a re-
elaboration of the medical diagnosis to support his claim against his relatives. Giuseppe Nardi 
was the son of Corsini’s former tutor, a man whom he did not trust and probably feared. 
Having become an orphan while underage, Antonio’s guardianship had been entrusted to 
Domenico Nardi following his father’s testamentary dispositions. Married to his paternal 
aunt, the Nardis were the only family left to Antonio and, as such, they had intervened in his 
                                                
834 “...benche abbia per il passato sofferto delle alienazioni di mente, e turbazioni di sua fantasia originate da 
angustie d’animo, tuttavolta da qualche tempo in qua, è rimasto molto migliorato, e gode per la maggiore parte 
dei giorni di continuati luci d’intervalli, nei quali da segno di buona regressione, di modo che più sperarsi il di 
lui totale ristabilimento”. Testimony signed by Antonio Lulli and Antonio Sani, respectively physician and 
surgeon of Santa Dorotea, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 87, March 1757.  
835 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 87, March 1757. In fact, following Corsini’s request, the 




economic affairs even after he had come of age.836 Although it seems that Antonio lived alone 
in Florence for a while, by the time Giuseppe Nardi made both requests Antonio resided with 
them in Prato, where he had been affected by the delirio melanconico, as the local physician 
framed it. However, Antonio Corsini, whose primary interest was to keep the Nardis as far 
away from his affairs and his patrimony as possible, chose the labels employed by the Santa 
Dorotea physicians to explain his mental sufferings, but ascribed them new meaning. 
Building upon his biography, Corsini enumerated to the authorities the series of situations that 
had led to the animo angustiato that ultimately produced the “fixation, and perturbations of 
mind and fantasy” (fissazione, e turbazione di mente, e fantasia) that had affected him.837 
Corsini decided to frame his “mental perturbation” as being triggered by the anguish his 
adverse familial situation generated on him. As he saw it, he had not only been left in the 
authority of a greedy and dishonest uncle while underage, but the man had extended his 
authority after he had come of age, first withholding from him his patrimony and refusing to 
give accounts of his administration, to afterwards persuading him to engage in dubious 
contracts, which caused Corsini to incur considerable debts that he did not know how to 
settle.  
Antonio Corsini framed his mental illness as caused by the angustie d’animo that these 
concrete adverse circumstances produced in him, as did many other interdicted persons and 
prisoners. It is not rare to find eighteenth-century defendants and patients signalling wrong or 
inexpert economic performance and potential bankruptcy as sources of anguish leading to 
mental derangement.838 Together with on-going family conflicts, marriage disputes and love 
affairs, these causes were frequently cited not only by the Tuscan sufferers, but also, for 
instance, by the patients recorded in the casebook of the British mad-doctor John Monro 
(1715-1791).839 Furthermore, family, social life and economic setbacks were also identified as 
                                                
836 According to Antonio Corsini’s recounting, Domenico Nardi was his testamentary tutor for four years, in 
which position he continued unofficially for a further nine years. He was, then, at least 27 years old when 
interdicted and confined to Santa Dorotea.  
837 “...per le quali cose trovandosi sommamente nel di lui animo angustiato è caduto in qualche fissazione, e 
turbazione di mente, e fantasia, che per tal cagione di presente rimane custodito nell’Ospedale di S. Dorotea...” 
Petition of Antonio Corsini, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2304, no. 87, March 1757. Angustia was defined as 
“Miseria, Affanno, Afflizione, Travaglio”, coming from the Latin “Anxietas, solicitudo, angustia”, with a second 
meaning “istrettezza, brevità”. Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca, 4th ed., (1729-1738), s.v. “angustia”, 
http://www.lessicografia.it/angustia, accessed 13 January 2015.  
838 On the uses of the term angustia or angustiato, see Chapter 7 section 3.  




sources of stress and anxiety in the previous centuries, as evidenced by Napier’s casebook.840 
The novelty here, then, is not so much the connection between these sources of anxiety and 
madness, but the vocabulary employed and the legal context of its appearance. Antonio 
Corsini was able to intersect his personal agenda and experience with the possibilities of 
interdiction procedures and the contemporary medical terminology, for he did not stop at the 
anguish he felt by these events, but he presented them only as the antecedents of his 
subsequent “fixation” and “disturbance of mind and fantasy.” Furthermore, he was able to 
employ these medical categories on his own behalf, for the evidence suggests that he actually 
managed to keep the Nardis at a desired distance from himself and his patrimony.  
As in many other interdiction procedures, the narratives of Corsini’s mental affliction 
acquired more precise tones as the family conflict behind the interdiction petition was 
unravelled, evolving from the unspecific demente and pazzo to the more defined delirio 
melanconico, turbazione di fantasia and ostinata fissazione. This case demonstrates 
particularly well that the introduction of a more precise terminology of mental disturbance 
responded to a complex series of events that not always were strictly connected to the actual 
mental condition they were supposed to describe, or to its evolution, but much more to the 
agency of the involved parties. Categories were not only flexible, but their use was also 
carefully studied. Antonio Corsini understood that he could build a better case if he presented 
himself as the victim of the abusive schemes of his relatives, which had even caused him to 
fall into the “fixations, and perturbations of mind and fantasy” that led him into the hospital. 
In contrast, his uncle, who had been acquainted with the different doctors who had assessed 
Corsini’s state of mind when he made the interdiction petition, decided not to include any of 
the precise medical categories that they used to describe his sufferings.  
The incorporation of precise medical categories seems to have been strongly bound to 
the frequency by which those employing them had been exposed to medical notions, which 
went hand in hand with the perceived seriousness of the mental condition under examination. 
However, the incorporation of medical terminology was not only determined by the 
involvement or not of medical practitioners in order to treat or to legally assert a given mental 
disturbance. In many cases, lay narratives demonstrate an appropriation of traditional medical 
understandings of the workings of the mind and the signs of insanity where we have no record 
of direct medical involvement.  
                                                




The characteristics of the narratives when there is no direct involvement of medical 
opinion suggest that litigants and authorities had a background of their own to turn to when 
they wanted to define and characterize mental disturbance. This background was built upon 
centuries of litigation that required the exercise of reflecting what constituted mental 
incapacity, how mental disturbance could be identified and which were its most defining 
indicators. This knowledge transmitted across generations was also influenced by the 
increasing circulation of books of medical advice destined for a lay public.841 Additionally, 
the context and biography of the sufferer strongly conditioned the articulation of a mental 
condition and the words chosen to describe it. For once, recurrent private resort to medical 
practitioners to treat mental ailments was a luxury which only the privileged could afford. 
But, the characteristics of the family group or the household composition, among other 
circumstances, also played their part. The narratives of madness coming out of judicial 
records are in this way a re-elaboration of the personal and family biography using the setting 
provided by public provision, legal framework and medical knowledge.  
Categories were actively chosen to secure determinate outcomes, in close accordance 
with the context and circumstances that surrounded the denounced deviant behaviour.842 The 
actual problem of assessing the level of permeation of medical notions regarding madness in 
lay society lies precisely in the contextual nature of the languages of madness, their 
malleability and the ability demonstrated by petitioners to adapt their language according to 
the required circumstances. However, this by contrast reveals the agency of petitioners, and 
underpins their capacity to move the strings of the institutional apparatus to achieve their 
aims. When petitioners needed to make a strong argument regarding the nature of mental 
afflictions, they almost invariably demonstrated their ability to delve into its foundations. The 
evidence provided by criminal records but, particularly, also by civil law inquiries into mental 
capacity and other forms of disclosing mental deviance allows me to suggest that the 
language of madness was culturally embedded and consisted in a combination of lay 
understandings, legal requirements and medical knowledge.   
 
                                                
841 Roy Porter (ed.), The Popularization of medicine, 1650-1850 (London, New York: Routledge, 1992). See 
also the next chapter.  
842 It may be important to bear in mind here that interdiction petitions cannot be reduced to being interpreted 




The Instrumental Choosing of Categories 
Medical practitioners introduced their categories in accordance with the purposes of 
each legal procedure. Their language, instead of acting as fair mirror of the actual mental 
condition they were supposed to describe, responded to the contextual nature that 
characterized the disclosure of madness, as we have seen. Not because the choice was utterly 
arbitrary or the mental condition had been invented by the witness in complete disconnection 
from the behaviour they were supposed to be labelling. Rather, as in the case of lay 
testimonies, medical practitioners decided how much they would reveal and in what way, 
precisely in accordance with the purposes and aims they were supposed to serve. Whether to 
support a petition for interdiction, to support a defendant’s contention of sanity, or a 
criminal’s claim of insanity, the vocabulary with which testimonies were composed was the 
outcome of careful considerations.  
In July 1752 the wife and brother of Domenico Cugi requested his interdiction, 
claiming that for a long time he had been “bereft of cognition, and as a demented [person], he 
is unable to attend to his own interests.”843 In support of Cugi’s relatives, we find a testimony 
signed by the medico condotto and the local priest, which repeated the same formula and was 
as equally unspecific, save for the physician’s signature. Building the veracity of his 
testimony upon his long-term knowledge of the patient’s medical history, the doctor added to 
his name the specification that he was the “physician of the city of Prato and attending 
physician of the household of the Signori Cugi.”844 The petition was thus crafted by recourse 
to the usual terms and was found to be enough to prove Cugi’s “defect of unsound mind” 
(difetto di sana mente), and that he had become “stupido e melenso.”845  
Strikingly, only six months after the interdiction was decreed, the original supplicants 
turned again to the authorities, but this time to request that Cugi’s interdiction be revoked. 
The petition was supported by a testimony of the same physician, but this time he attested for 
Cugi’s sanity of mind employing a completely different set of categories. The state of “being 
completely bereft of cognition”, on account of which the doctor declared Cugi could not 
“distinguish what he does or says”, was now revealed to had been caused by a “continual 
fixation.” While the first testimony had been framed following the formula that placed the 
                                                
843 “...da molto tempo in qua e privo di cognizione, e come demente, è senza potere accudire ai propri 
interessi...” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 50, July 1752 
844 Ibid., June 1752. 




accent on the person’s long term incapacity as revealed by his daily performance, the second 
testimony was framed in much more precise medical terms. The physician explained that 
Cugi “had been for a long time in a state of not being able to attend his own interests due to a 
continual fixation that had him alienated from reason, [but] it can now be said that he has 
cleared [sgombrata] his mind from the said fixation.”846  
Not only was he declared sound of mind by the same medical practitioner who only a 
few months earlier declared he had been bereft of cognition for eight years, but also that state 
of severe mental impairment had changed into a mind fixation. That is, from being a 
characteristic not likely to change (a “defect”, as the Pupilli officers framed it), Cugi’s mental 
condition was transformed into a phase from which he had been able to emerge. How could 
such a serious and apparently permanent condition have abated in just months?  
As in many other cases, the choice of terms here responds more to the desired 
outcome they were intended to produce rather than as accurate descriptions of a precise 
mental condition. The interdiction had been secured by the assertion that he suffered a mental 
incapacity that was framed as a long-term intellectual impairment, giving the impression it 
was irreversible. Conversely, for the interdiction to be revoked, the implication that it was 
irreversible had to be changed so as to suggest instead that it had been a temporary state. To 
his end, the term fixation was especially suggestive. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
physician chose the expression of “continual fixation”, references to mental fixations were 
usually employed to describe episodic madness rather than permanent intellectual 
impairment. Furthermore, mind fixations gave space to lucid intervals, which were considered 
grounds enough for the Pupilli to lift, even if temporarily, an interdiction, regardless of 
whether it meant that it would have to be re-established once the individual fell again into 
madness.  
Given that the case disappears from the records after the interdiction was lifted in 
March 1753, we can only speculate on what might have happened. Probably what changed in 
the six months that elapsed since the interdiction was decreed had less to do with Cugi’s 
mental condition and more to do with the household dynamics, particularly the relationship 
between the two brothers and the role played by Cugi’s wife. Drawing on the evidence of 
other cases, we can also assume that the first description had been simplified in order to fit the 
                                                
846 “...il Sig. Domenico Cugi essendo stato molto tempo in stato di non potere agire i propri interessi per una 
fissazione continua, che lo teneva alienato dalla ragione, si puo dire adesso, che il medesimo abbia sgombrata la 
mente da quella predetta fissazione e possa trattare liberamente, e con serietà d’ogni suo interesse...” ASF, 




conventions. Many interdiction procedures were argued by using simple labels, concentrating 
the debate on more practical matters, such as the individual’s economic performance, his or 
her deviation from the behavioural norms and their general resemblance to the stereotypes of 
mental incapacity. It is only in the cases that were contested by the defendants, or those 
disclosing complicated family tensions that would not abate once the interdiction was 
decreed, that we are given further details on how the given mental affliction was perceived, 
framed and explained.  
The change in the configuration of Cugi’s mental affliction reveals the strong agency 
of litigants behind interdiction procedures, but it also suggests that the categories employed 
were carefully and collectively chosen. By and large, court records show that medical 
practitioners had to adapt their language both to the constraints imposed by the judicial 
system, and to the requirements set out by the litigants. How much a doctor would elaborate 
regarding the characteristics of a given mental affliction depends not only on the requirements 
of the institutional space, but also on the specific circumstances surrounding each case. In a 
feature that applies in general to the specification of the language of madness, the more 
complex the familial situation, the greater the need for more precise explanations for the 
disorder.  
This partly explains why medical testimonies were generally repetitive and non-
medicalized. It also explains the absence of nervous diseases among the categories employed 
by medical practitioners in their testimonies of mental incapacity, despite the fact that we 
know they were in vogue at the time. More precise medical terms were often simply not 
required. However, the lack of specialization in the terms used and, above all, the malleability 
of the categories employed by medical practitioners also attest to the exploratory nature that 
characterized medical knowledge of mental afflictions during the early modern period. 
Furthermore, the definition of mental disorders and the measures taken to deal with them 
were inserted in wider social developments, such as the negotiation over power relations, 
behavioural norms and the authority of medical knowledge.847 Medical practitioners had to 
                                                
847 The appearance of mad-doctors and the development of expert medical knowledge on madness, together with 
the definitions of what was to be understood by mental afflictions, how nervous complaints widened the picture, 
and how actors dealt with them has been explored by Jonathan Andrews starting from the public and medical 
controversy aroused by a case of unlawful confinement in London at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 
The case enables him to argue that what was understood as insanity and what to make of the increasingly 
fashionable nervous afflictions were a matter of contention and even sometimes ambiguous medical response. 
Andrews, “‘In Her Vapours… [or] Indeed in Her Madness’?”, pp. 125-143. The issue is also explored in 




serve the interests of their patients, and at the same time they had to make themselves 
necessary by pointing out new areas where they held exclusive expertise.  
The capacity to adapt to the context and shape testimonies in accordance with the 
circumstances can be observed even in the writings of eminent physicians such as Giovanni 
Targioni Tozzetti, whose narratives and lines of argument tend to change according to the 
audience (and institutional space) to which they were directed. His testimonies in the Otto di 
Guardia were highly physical, responding to the necessity to demonstrate that, for example, 
the life of a prisoner was at serious risk if he was not transferred to a better environment. As 
we have seen, he managed to intercept some observations regarding the world of emotions 
and the connections between mind and body but, in general, he failed to elaborate on the 
nature of the mental afflictions he had identified. Furthermore, categories such as delirio 
melanconico or fissazioni di mente are, to my knowledge, generally absent in Targioni 
Tozzeti’s testimonies to support supplications for the reduction of penalties. On the contrary, 
his “Relazioni in casi di demenza”, which comprised his expert opinion for the admission 
procedure to Santa Dorotea and several assessments on the mental condition of people held in 
prison (not necessarily convicted felons), are framed in much more precise medical terms, and 
blend precise information on their mental condition with its physical effects.848 By the same 
token, the categories he used to attest mental incapacity before the Magistrato dei Pupilli are 
also generally different from the ones he employed to frame pazzia furiosa in the admission 
procedures to Santa Dorotea. While in the case of the former categories point towards the 
degree to which the cognitive faculties of the person were involved, in the case of the latter 
categories stressed the person’s level of dangerousness. Similarly, categories that were 
frequently used by him to frame mental disturbance in his Consulti Medici are virtually absent 
from his legal assessments. Significantly, affezioni isteriche and affezioni ipocondriache, the 
two overarching categories of mental affliction that became the new fashionable frameworks 
                                                
848 For instance, a prisoner who was held in the “secret prison” of the Otto di Guardia (which only tells us that 
he had not been convicted, although it does not reveal whether he was about to be tried, or if his imprisonment 
had been done on an executive measure) was said to demonstrate “fixations [under the form] of distorted ideas” 
[fissazioni di idee stravolte], and was subsumed in “a total dementia of the category of melancholic delirium”, 
which made him “want to be always naked like a beast, even in the present cold, surrounded by filth, feeding 
disorderly and always making improper gestures and discourses, like a mad man.” [una totale demenza, della 
categoria dei deliri melancolici, nella quale persiste fino al presente giorno, volendo stare sempre nudo come una 
bestia, anche nei presenti freschi, in mezzo a immondizie, nutrendosi sregolatamente, e sempre facendo gesti e 
discorsi impropri, e da pazzo] This particular testimony, however, which so evidently meets the traditional 
image of madness, is not so common in Targioni Tozzetti’s writings. Accompanying this description we find 
comments regarding the origin of the person’s ailment, which he found to be the exhaustion from a long journey 
and a great fear, which caused in him a fever that later resulted in the melancholic delirium. BNCF, Manoscritti, 




of mental disease in the eighteenth century, appear very rarely in the court records of the 
period, as mentioned before.849   
The interesting issue for us here is to elaborate on how the use of certain categories 
over others is indicative or not of how the people employing them conceived mental 
disturbance. The over-repetitive use of basic categories of mental incapacity such as demente, 
pazzo/a, melensa/o or mentecatto/a by no means implies that mental disturbance was 
conceived in such basic terms, and only in connection to patrimony. The requirements of the 
institutional space in which the mental disturbance was disclosed are one thing, and how the 
mental disturbance was perceived and framed something else. The same argument may be 
used to understand the problem of the circulation of languages, and the permeation of medical 
categories. As in the case of Cugi cited above, the use of medical categories often seems 
circumstantial rather than deliberative, as if the concept had slipped into the testimony almost 
by error. Furthermore, these more precise medical categories that gradually infiltrated the 
courts came to name phenomena and realities that were not new, and which had been 
explained in lay terms for most of the century. Rather than “colonizing” the realm of the 
mind, medical discourse was ascribing names to realities that had been first brought to the 
attention of medical professionals by the sufferers and their families.850   
 
6. 2. Experts of the Soul 
Even though medical opinion was hardly ever openly contradicted, most legal 
procedures to determine mental incapacity or criminal insanity were argued without the 
involvement of medical practitioners. In the debate over the boundaries between sane and 
insane behaviour in order to ascertain civil capacity, medical practitioners, members of the 
clergy and lay society were experts on equal grounds. However, if we were to assign a 
hierarchy of experts, the primacy would be tightly contested between the next of kin and 
members of the clergy. Parish priests in particular held not only an undisputable authority 
over matters of the soul and, thus, over psychological and mental states, but were also 
responsible for the morality of their parish. In early modern cultures, morality and madness 
were the two indissoluble sides of the same realm. Although in the eighteenth century 
                                                
849 BNCF, Manoscritti, GTT, N. 234, “Consultationes medicae”, cart.2, fasc. X, Consulti per affezioni 
ipocondriache ed isteriche”. 
850 Chapter 7 provides further clues to elucidate this problem through an in-depth examination of the use of lay 




madness came to be conceived as a disease that was progressively connected to the mind, it 
was a disease whose primary manifestation was through moral behaviour.  
The involvement of religion in matters of the mind and moral behaviour inevitably 
recalls the disciplining strategies of confessionalization developed after the Protestant and 
Catholic Reformations.851 Any examination into the long-lasting role of the Catholic Church 
as the ultimate authority over moral behaviour should take into account the penetration of the 
campaigns of the Post-Tridentine Church to discipline spirituality, religious conscience and 
introspection.852  The renewal of the divided Church entailed new strategies to normalize 
behaviour and scrutinize interiority, devising patterns of expected behaviour and spiritual life, 
which in the Catholic areas was entrusted to the supervision of the clergy. Efforts to enforce 
compliance with the precepts of confession and communion made priests the direct recipients 
of the hidden secrets of moral life. As a result, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
the concern for the inner world and the powers of fantasy had mostly been a competence of 
the Church. Theological discussions had carefully mapped the workings of the mind in order 
to detect any religious transgression, and thus be able to explain and differentiate true from 
false sanctity, demonic possession from mental disease.853  
Historians have generally considered the secularization of madness as one of the 
crucial moments of inflection in the history of madness, generally identified as taking place 
between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.854 For instance, Elena Brambilla has 
examined this development through the transition in the perception of the phenomenon of 
possession from diabolic invasion to hysteria. She argues that towards the end of the 
seventeenth century, theological explanations progressively gave space to the medical 
                                                
851 For two overviews, see Lyndal Roper, Oedipus and the Devil: Witchcraft, Sexuality, and Religion in Early 
Modern Europe (London: Routledge, 1994) and Ronnie Po-Chia Hsia, The World of Catholic Renewal, 1540-
1770 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).   
852 For a comprehensive overview of the Catholic Church’s display and strategies in the post-Tridentine Italian 
peninsula, see Adriano Prosperi, Tribunali della coscienza: inquisitori, confessori, missionari (Turin: G. 
Einaudi, 1996). 
853 See Ibid., particularly pp. 431-475; Schutte, Aspiring Saints; Zarri, Finzione e Santità.    
854 The study of the relationship between madness and religion in the early modern period has mostly focused on 
the Protestant territories, centred particularly on the seventeenth-century vogue for melancholy and the religious 
significance of that mental condition. To my knowledge, less attention has been paid to this issue in Catholic 
areas, where madness and religion have been examined in the context of the spirituality of the Counter-
Reformation, with its excesses, deviances and cases of false sanctity (particularly through inquisitorial 
processes), but the lay conception of the religious significance of mental disturbance still needs to be explored. 




language that framed the phenomenon in terms of a nervous disease.855 Scholarship has 
nonetheless warned against overstressing the process of secularization as the only factor 
explaining the rise of psychiatry. To this we might add that it is one thing to take into account 
that madness was progressively understood as an organic disease whose aetiology was 
shifting from humoral imbalance to a malfunctioning in the brain and a disorder in the nerves. 
But it is something else to interpret this as a sign suggesting that mental deviance had ceased 
to be the concern of religion. The brain might have been understood as the location of the 
mind and as the source of madness, but behaviour was still largely measured against the 
Christian precepts regulating behaviour.  
Bearing witness to this, during the eighteenth century petitioners still largely relied on 
testimonies of the clergy to support denunciations of mental incapacity. These testimonies 
were generally centred around the defendants’ social performance and their compliance with 
the Christian precepts. In their testimonies, priests mostly commented on the moral qualities 
of the person and their observance of Catholic precepts. Madness was revealed through the 
defendant’s reluctance to attend to Church on a weekly basis, in his or her failure to follow 
the rules regarding confession and Holy Communion, and even in their refusal to pay the 
tithe. But, this served more to demonstrate that the person’s general behaviour was at odds 
with normativity than to suggest that un-Catholic behaviour was madness per se. 
In addition to Christian behaviour, priests evaluated the defendant’s social 
performance in accordance with the established gender roles.856 Men were assessed in their 
capacity of heads of family, based on whether they acted as virtuous educators, if they set a 
moral and rational example to their children, if they demonstrated the capacity to control 
themselves, and if they complied with family hierarchies and exerted the proper amount of 
power (i.e. they were not ordered around by their wives). Women’s mental capacity was 
assessed in terms of how they performed their maternal or wifely duties, the fame of their 
virtue or the ways in which they raised their children.  
So long as the evaluation of insane behaviour was tied to conceptions about morality 
and Christianity, it was still believed that members of the clergy were the most qualified 
“external” authorities (after the family) to ascertain a deviation from the norm. This both 
because they were the authorities over matters of the soul and spiritual life, and because they 
                                                
855 See Brambilla, Corpi invasi e viaggi dell’anima. See also Porter, Mind-Forg’d Manacles; MacDonald, 
Mystical Bedlam or Jonathan Andrews and Andrew Scull, Undertaker of the Mind. John Monro and Mad-
Doctoring in Eighteenth-Century England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 




acted as witnesses whose credibility was widely considered indisputable. Testimonies signed 
by members of the clergy were not only invariably considered essential to corroborate 
interdiction petitions, but were also preferred by the interdicted to demonstrate their 
soundness of mind. These testimonies, thus, shed light on the extent to which Church efforts 
to discipline the family and promote certain values were negotiated alongside lay notions and 
family demands, such as those disclosed by interdiction procedures.  
The clergy’s authority on mental incapacity can also be explained by taking into 
account their prerogatives over family life. Priests acted as guardians of the institution of the 
family, they were the undisputable mediators in family conflicts, and were the first source of 
aid to turn to in times of trouble. This role, at the forefront of matrimonial litigation, for 
instance, but also of “infra-judicial” negotiations to resolve conflicts at community levels, 
also comes to the fore in the social and familial management of mental deviance.857 Priests 
were the first external actor to be called to mediate between a family and a troublesome 
relative. As petitioners repeatedly stated, they resorted to the interdiction once all other 
strategies to convince the defendants to change their behaviour had failed, among which they 
generally recalled how local priests or personal confessors had unsuccessfully tried to exert 
their influence. In this context, when priests offered proof of evidence to certify incapacity or 
certify soundness of mind, it was because they were considered the most qualified “external” 
agents to do so. In comparison with medical opinion, the testimony of priests was validated 
by their long-term knowledge of the defendant and their family circumstances.  
When defendants in an interdiction procedure had to choose their witnesses, they 
almost invariably turned to members of the clergy to certify their mental capacities and 
undisputed moral standards. In the legal context posed by interdiction procedures, priests 
acted through their status as men of good faith capable of providing a truthful testimony on 
the perturbed state of mind of the defendant. Priests enjoyed such universal approval that 
petitioners and defendants alike turned to them for support. When matters were contentious 
and the interdicted had everything to lose if he or she were declared mentally incapacitated, 
they trusted priests first and foremost. The inclusion of a testimony signed by a member of the 
clergy did not automatically result in a favourable response, particularly when there were 
                                                
857 For instance, Chiara La Rocca has demonstrated that priests were at the background of strategies to solve 
matrimonial crises before a couple would resort to the separatio thori. La Rocca, Tra moglie e marito, p. 315. 
The role of priests as mediators between social actors and governmental institutions in the administration of 





conflicting testimonies. But, in general, the testimony of a priest counted as proof of truth, 
with the assertion being cast in the tones of a moral authority that was difficult to contradict. 
This is why someone who had been interdicted for a medically-certified mental incapacity 
could later succeed in obtaining its revocation based solely on the defendant’s and a 
clergymen’s assertion of his or her soundness of mind. Furthermore, on such occasions the 
initial medical testimony was openly contradicted in practice.  
Maria Maddalena Panfi, for instance, was interdicted in 1743 on the request of her two 
sons. The petition claimed that not only was she the victim of certain “corporal 
indispositions”, but that she had lately “suffered many accidents,” which rendered her in a 
state of “mental obfuscation and deprived of memory.”858 Her sons’ contention was supported 
by a medical testimony which explained Maddalena had suffered an “epileptic accident, 
which proved to be very serious, and rendered her confused of mind [imbarazzata di testa] 
the whole day, as happens on most occasions with these accidents.”859  
In other words, the case was built upon a medical language that identified very precise 
organic consequences to demonstrate the defendant’s inability to manage her affairs. For even 
if the medical testimony only referred to her past epileptic fit, according to the supplicants she 
was still prone to suffering them, which accounted for a condition that was likely to be 
maintained over time. Based on what was asserted by witnesses at the viva voce on her 
dissipation, and especially taking into account the fact that the medical testimony 
demonstrated that she “suffers from epileptic accidents that cause her great heaviness [molta 
gravezza] and mental obfuscations”, the officials of the Pupilli considered Maddalena Panfi 
liable for interdiction.860  
Two years later Maddalena petitioned for her interdiction to be lifted alleging it was 
completely false that she was, or had ever been, of unsound mind.861 To prove her claim, she 
presented the testimony of various priests attesting she had always been of sound body and 
                                                
858 “…quale per le sue indisposizioni corporali, et in specie per avere il di 28 Agosto 1743 prossimo passato 
sofferto più accidenti, si ritrova con qualche offuscazione di mente, e priva di memoria.” ASF, MPAP, 
Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 201, September 1743.  
859 Idem.  
860 “...che patisce d'accidenti epilettici, che le cagionano molta gravezza, et offuscazione di mente, come 
dall'annessa fede del Dottor Giovanni Sebastiano Franchi...” Idem. “Gravezza” could also mean affliction, 
trouble or anguish. See Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca, 4th ed, 1729-1738, s.v. “gravezza” in 
http://www.lessicografia.it/gravezza, accessed May 17, 2014.   
861 “...lo che essendo onestamente falso, mentre ritrovasi l'oratrice per la Dio grazia sanissima di corpo e di 
mente, come chiaramente si può conoscere, non solo dalle fedi giù annesse, fra quali ve n'è una d'un proprio suo 




mind, which was considered enough to prove her claim and thus achieve her request. The 
interesting issue, in my view, lies in the fact that Maddalena Panfi’s argument for revocation 
was not that she had been cured from her previous ailment, but instead that she had never 
suffered from a disease that affected her mind. Furthermore, she chose to support her claim 
with the clergymen’s testimony, without recourse to medical opinion. The evidence provided 
by the clergymen regarding her soundness of mind was proof enough for the Pupilli to revoke 
the interdiction, as if there had never been a medical testimony involved in the initial 
assessment. The Pupilli’s decision here demonstrates once more that the criteria that 
predominated in these matters was always a practical one. If the clergymen could confirm that 
Maddalena was of right mind, and provided the patrimony was of modest proportions and she 
herself demonstrated the necessary will to resume her administration, they were likely to 
concede the petition.862  
Although testimonies written by clergymen sometimes repeated the categories 
employed by petitioners or by other witnesses, they often made no reference to the 
defendant’s mental state. Clergymen assessed mental capacity with a different measure. A 
defendant who according to the medical testimony suffered from a melancholic delirium with 
epileptic fits, could be defined simply as a mentecatto who “is not capable of managing his 
own affairs, being indisposed in bed, and is neither capable of receiving the Holy 
Sacraments.”863 Not only was the medical category completely unrelated to the cleric’s 
testimony, but the model against which the person’s mental incapacity was measured also 
differed. His state of mind, from the point of view of the priest, was so altered that he could 
no longer receive the Holy Communion, grounds enough to attest that he was indeed mentally 
incapacitated. How and based on what indicators the priest considered this person incapable 
of receiving Communion was not explained on this occasion. But, in other testimonies priests 
were more loquacious on the signs that led them to concluding that somebody was out of his 
or her mind.  
                                                
862 The contention that the patrimony affected by the interdiction was not sufficient so as to be able to pay for 
long the fees of the interdiction and the involvement of the Pupilli was a common argument made by the 
interdicted when they petitioned to regain their civil rights. The Pupilli’s response varied according to the 
particularities of each case, but it was generally agreed that what mattered most was the conservation of the 
economic resources, so if the interdiction proved to be more detrimental than the allegedly poor administration 
of the interdicted, then the latter was considered the lesser evil.   
863  “...è mentecatto, e non è capace di accudire a suoi interessi, ritrovandosi in letto indisposto siccome non è 




The usual line of argumentation in these cases is illustrated by the following example. 
In 1768, a priest testified on the extent to which a 65-year-old man, widely reputed as pazzo, 
prodigal, disturbed, violent and extravagant, deserved interdiction. The priest confirmed “he 
has always been a man whose behaviour is not only of little advantage for his house and 
family, but also of an unchristian character.” He continued by recounting that the man had 
ruined his family with his dissipation, litigations and robberies, which had led to his 
imprisonment on many occasions. But his “mad behaviour” had also caused him to be 
committed twice to the madhouse, at a time when the witness had been in charge of the 
parish. He concluded by declaring “he lives very badly, having no devotion for God, and 
during this present year of 1768 to this day he has not fulfilled his Easter precept”, or paid the 
fifth. Consequently, “it is clear [he said], that such a man is not good neither in his soul nor in 
his body.”864      
 
6. 3. The Expertise of the Auditore Fiscale 
During the eighteenth century, the mechanisms available to control the consequences 
of madness were essentially temporary, as we have seen. Thus, in the context of inherent 
changeability that characterized the itineraries of madness, public institutions such as the 
office of the Auditore Fiscale and the Magistrato dei Pupilli provided a sense of stability. 
There was a difference, however, in the way these two institutions exercised their steady 
involvement. While it is true that the officials of the Pupilli practised a close surveillance of 
the lives and interests of the mentally afflicted throughout extended periods, the task was 
generally undertaken by the Magistracy as a whole, without it being assigned to a particular 
magistrate. In contrast, the Auditori Fiscali engaged personally with the mentally afflicted and 
their families. Furthermore, given that the office was not subject to the continual changes 
experienced by the Tuscan magistracies, the Auditore Fiscale offered a permanency that the 
rest of the provisional measures lacked. During the period under scrutiny here, only three men 
held the office. Filippo Luci was Auditore Fiscale between 1737 and 1746, followed by 
                                                
864 “...è stato sempre un’ uomo per i suoi portamenti non solo di ni un vantaggio pella sua casa e famiglia, ma 
ancora di carattere poco cristiano. Questi ha gia rovinata la sua casa, e sempre attendendo a liti, a scipare, e 
contradizioni ha sciupate gran somme di danaro, e stato più volte in prigione, e per la sua pazza condotta è stato 
fino a tempo di mio curato due volte nello Spedale dei mentecatti. Vive molto male, non avendo devozione, e 
timor di Dio, e in questo presente anno 1768 non ha ne pure fino al giorno presente soddisfatto al precetto 
pasquale, e nella passata raccolta non ha ne pure pagata la dovuta decima alla Chiesa. Onde ben vedesi, che un 
tal’uomo non è buon ne per l’Anima, ne per il corpo.” Interdiction procedure of Cosimo Cambellotti. ASF, 




Giovanni Brichieri Colombi until 1753 and then by the latter’s son, Domenico, who held the 
office until 1784, when the office of the Auditore Fiscale was abolished.   
The records suggest that the Auditori Fiscali developed a practical knowledge of 
madness through their repeated interventions to control its public consequences. They were in 
continual contact with families, physicians and other government officials to decide the 
destiny of the mentally afflicted. Furthermore, their role as mediators between family 
concerns, defence of the principles of the buon governo (the eighteenth-century principle 
behind police practice), and medical conceptions of insanity positioned them as a privileged 
point of convergence for the negotiation of the understandings of madness. The characteristics 
of the office and the detailed records kept by the Tuscan administrations allowed for a 
transmission of this practical knowledge from one Auditore Fiscale to the other, and across 
the governmental administration. This is particularly clear through the cases of markedly 
troublesome individuals whose cases were dealt with by two or three different Auditori 
Fiscali, most notably, Lorenzo Baldinotti, whose case was handled by the three Auditori 
Fiscali of the period under study (Filippo Luci, Giovanni and Domenico Brichieri Colombi). 
Between 1725 and 1755 Lorenzo Baldinotti had been alternatively imprisoned and under 
home arrest in Florence and in one of the properties the family possessed in the Tuscan 
territory. He had been committed to both Santa Maria Nuova and Santa Dorotea for short 
periods and had resided, with a struggle, in his brother’s parish and several public and private 
places.865   
The role of the Auditore Fiscale as the authority that evaluated and authorized 
committal in the name of the Grand Duke is further elucidated when we bear in mind that his 
involvement with madness went further and beyond that. In fact, many of the people 
committed to Santa Dorotea were old acquaintances of the office. Furthermore, given that 
mad people were generally only accepted for short periods at a time, when they were released 
from the hospital, the Auditore Fiscale continued to exercise his authority over them on the 
request of family members or by direct command of the Council of Regency.  
The criterion of the pazzo furioso, which differentiated those in need of being 
committed from those whose custody was a family responsibility, was certainly not enough to 
solve the problem madness posed for both private and public life. Even if the patient ceased to 
present signs of mania at Santa Dorotea, this was no guarantee that his or her problematic 
                                                




behaviour would come to an end. Recurrent episodes of raving madness followed by periods 
that according to the medical gaze entailed no danger to public life often contradicted the 
specific situations that accompanied madness. The criteria applied to deal with such cases 
were not univocal but, when public safety was concerned, the Auditore Fiscale held the final 
word. For instance, Lorenzo Maestrini had been released in 1735 from Santa Dorotea during a 
lucid interval, against the opinion of the Magistrato dei Pupilli. The Pupilli’s authority 
concerned only Maestrini’s guardianship and the administration of his patrimony, while his 
care, because it concerned public order, fell under the jurisdiction of the Fiscale.866  
Cases of episodic madness such as the kind that affected Lorenzo Maestrini and 
Lorenzo Baldinotti, both discussed in previous chapters, were usually triggers for the 
involvement of the Auditore Fiscale. The perpetual need to make space for new patients 
forced the medical administration of Santa Dorotea to release from their custody any 
“maniac” who gave proof of a “notable recovery.”867 This happened with Giorgio Jacquet, a 
French citizen who was released from Santa Dorotea in 1757 because he ceased to give 
“manifest signs of madness” once he had been committed. In the eyes of the hospital 
authorities, this proved that “the furious excesses committed against his own wife and 
children are the effect of inebriation.”868 However, this was precisely the difficulty with 
Jacquet’s madness, for he was repeatedly “subject to some melancholic delirium, that most of 
the times he foments with his immoderate habit of drinking wine and liquor.”869 As a 
consequence, although he was released from Santa Dorotea in 1757 with the special 
recommendation, entrusted to Domenico Brichieri Colombi, to instruct Jacquet’s father of the 
need to provide proper custody for his son and particularly to ensure he was “kept completely 
distant” from wine,870 Jacquet continued to seriously disturb the social life, forcing both his 
family and the authorities to resort to committal at various times. But neither Santa Dorotea 
nor the Fortezza da Basso were successful solutions for his problem. Wine, viewed as the sole 
                                                
866 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 471, February-March 1734/35.  
867 Note of the Council of Regency to Brichieri Colombi referring to the situation as reported by the 
administrative board of Santa Dorotea, October 1757. ASF, CR, F. 426, Ins. 4, October 1757.  
868 “...non avendo in quel luogo dato manifesti segni di pazzia, ha fatto chiaramente conoscere essere effetti di 
ubriachezza li eccessi furiosi commessi contro la propria moglie, e figli.” Ibid.  
869 “...sottoposto a qualche delirio melanconico, che il più delle volte viene da lui fomentato coll’uso smoderato 
di bere vino, e liquori.” Note of D. Brichieri Colombi to the Council of Regency, October 1758. ASF, CR, 
Fiscale, F. 759, no. 76.  
870 Note of the Council of Regency to Brichieri Colombi referring to the situation as reported by the 




source of all the inconveniences that his mental disturbance occasioned, continued to produce 
the same results.    
Demonstrating the depth of his role, Brichieri Colombi not only supervised Jacquet’s 
committals to Santa Dorotea, but also mediated between him and his desperate wife, who 
continuously protested the impossibility of cohabiting with her violent husband. In 1758, after 
a second period in Santa Dorotea, Brichieri Colombi coordinated Jacquet’s arrest and 
reclusion in the Fortress of Basso while he once more tried to convince his father to assume 
responsibility for his son. All the same, the problem persisted and in 1761 we find him once 
more in the hospital, where the administrative board intended to release him once he ceased to 
give signs of his recurrent frenzies.871     
As on other occasions, Brichieri Colombi’s narratives are both a recapitulation of the 
concepts used by petitioners, medical experts and magistrates to describe Jacquet’s mental 
condition, and the point where new meanings were attached to them. The reports of the 
Auditori Fiscali describing the characteristics and consequences of mad behaviour are to be 
examined therefore as the act of synthesis and recreation, as the product of the accumulation 
of different gazes and the result of their own interpretation. They voice the concerns and 
perceptions of family members that were usually not expressed in written form but in oral 
conversations, which they combined with the written reports of medical practitioners and 
government officials. Although in the case of Jacquet we have access to the medical reports 
from Santa Dorotea, the commands given by the Council of Regency and the petitions from 
Jacquet’s father, it is in Domenico Brichieri Colombi’s narratives that we find the most telling 
details. The medical category of delirio melanconico employed in his reports is combined 
with descriptions of Jacquet’s frenzies, used by the Fiscale to explain to the grand ducal 
authorities the real danger posed by his frantic behaviour. Jacquet’s melancholic delirium is 
further revealed with reference to the “extravagances” he continually committed, and his habit 
of walking around armed and attacking people indiscriminately, and even snatching food 
from villagers with “sword in hand.”872 His frenzy, Brichieri Colombi noted, was of a 
“sensible kind”, so long as it was “fomented by his excessive drinking.” While the medical 
authorities in charge of Santa Dorotea were concerned with the symptoms and possible cures 
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of madness, the Auditore Fiscale dealt directly with its consequences, utilising mechanisms of 
control and disciplining that were routinely employed in police matters.  
In their management of madness, the Auditori Fiscali combined their legal training 
with more practical knowledge gathered in the exercise of their duties. In this sense, the 
demanding wealthy families who sought to involve the office aimed to address the problem of 
madness in a speedy and discreet way provide us with useful insight into the characteristics of 
madness that served to assess cases where less privileged people were involved. The 
circulation of language took place through the office of the Auditore Fiscale, where different 
social backgrounds and disciplines met.  
The Auditori Fiscali developed a sort of practical specialized knowledge on madness 
due to their close management of the cases of episodic madness that most called for their 
intervention. For instance, in the case of Maestrini discussed above, the officials of the Pupilli 
consulted the expert opinion of the Auditore Fiscale Filippo Luci to expand on the 
particularities of the case. The Auditori Fiscali had become “authorities” on the characteristics 
and dangers of madness, and their view was considered crucial to devise the appropriate 
measures for handling it. Sometimes they were in contact with physicians and the medici 
fiscali, but many cases were handled without recourse to medical opinion. The authority of 
the Auditore Fiscale over madness was particularly expanded from the second half of the 
eighteenth century, in part due to the office’s involvement in the admission procedure to 
Santa Dorotea, as I have discussed. This increase in their involvement is accompanied by the 
rise in cases of deviant behaviour openly or obliquely connected to madness disclosed directly 
to the office of the Fiscale. By 1770, Domenico Brichieri Colombi, who had headed the office 
since 1753, officially had a reputation as an expert in madness among government authorities 
and magistrates, so it was only logical that he was consulted on the state of mind of people 
denounced for mental incapacity to the Magistrato dei Pupilli.  
Madness was an object of police interest, regardless of whether it made its appearance 
in civil procedures, criminal prosecution or private requests that did not go to trial. 
Nonetheless, the involvement of the Fiscale was no longer limited merely to order and 
control, and he had begun to play a more decisive role as an expert of madness. His gradually 
accumulated expert opinion on madness was therefore integrated with his previous power to 
imprison and acquit individuals based on criteria of order and good government. In a 
characteristic more evident with Domenico Brichieri Colombi than his predecessors, we see 




practical involvement with mental deviance, to the extent of providing precise categorizations 
of madness that closely resembled medical diagnosis. We thus observe him giving 
straightforward judgements regarding the mental state of people who had previously only 
been vaguely described in other testimonies.  
A close examination of the evolution of the categories used to describe the mental 
incapacity of a certain Cosimo Cambellotti is indicative of the role that the Auditore Fiscale 
came to play in determining legal mental incapacity. Cambelloti was interdicted for the first 
time in 1768, at 65 years old, followed by a second interdiction seven years later, both times 
on the request of his son. The main focus of both petitions, as usual, was on Cosimo’s 
advanced age and economic mismanagement, whose inveterate lack of economy, negligent 
administration and compulsive selling of household goods had resulted in repeated 
incarcerations.873 The connection between his bad administration and mental derangement 
was made explicit in the supporting testimonies, which, as in other occasions, gave a more 
nuanced description of Cambellotti’s mental state. In the first interdiction, the son’s allegation 
was supported by two testimonies signed by two men of the cloth and several acquaintances, 
stating he was known to be “not only of weak head, but also half mad” (capo debole and 
mezzo pazzo), so that due to his “mad conduct” (pazza condotta) he had not only reduced 
himself to a miserable state, but had also been incarcerated several times, and even committed 
to hospital on two occasions.874  
No further information was required to decree the interdiction in 1768. However, in 
1775 Cambelloti was again denounced by his son, who now described the family’s precarious 
economic situation as a result of his father’s “advanced age”, “extravagances” and violent 
reactions. On this occasion, the authorities resorted the Auditore Fiscale to gather further 
information. Domenico Brichieri Colombi, who at that point had over two decades of 
practical experience with madness, gave a testimony that was not limited just to confirming 
the economic mismanagement and public disorder caused by the defendant. Testimonies had 
asserted that Cambellotti was a “disturbed, violent and uneasy man” (uomo torbido, violento 
ed inquieto) who lived “arbitrarily” and hampered the cultivation of his lands, “moved only 
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by his extravagant ideas and his uneasy spirit.”875 In the eyes of the Brichieri Colombi, the 
defendant’s behaviour, “given that it tended to the destruction of his own possessions and that 
of the petitioner’s, his son, seems to be that of a person who has an altered fantasy”, which 
combined with his “disturbed, violent and uneasy nature” and the four criminal prosecutions 
carried out against him hitherto, were more than enough to declare his mental incapacity and 
order the interdiction.876 The Fiscale’s testimony was both the synthesis of the different gazes 
involved in the case, and the creation of new diagnostic categories nurtured by his previous 
involvement in similar cases, as seen in the inclusion of the idea of an altered fantasy to 
explain Cambellotti’s wrongful behaviour.       
 
6. 4. Conclusions 
The examination of the languages of madness suggests that the eighteenth century 
witnessed the rise of two new experts on the mind, who came to contest a position that had 
traditionally been occupied by the families and priests. The study of the parties involved in 
the assessment of mental incapacity demonstrated the appearance of two new authorities on 
matters of the mind: medical practitioners and the Auditore Fiscale. Their success was not 
even, however. On the one hand, the evidence suggests that the introduction of medical 
knowledge in the Tuscan courts was as slow as in other European societies. Medical 
testimonies were neither necessary nor sufficient to assess mental incapacity or criminal 
insanity in the eighteenth-century courts of law. In contrast, the office of the Auditore Fiscale 
became more relevant to the legal assessment of mental affliction. The records show them 
exerting increasing influence on the decisions of the authorities and in the resolution of 
conflicts involving madness.   
Physicians and priests adjusted their vocabulary to the needs and concerns of 
petitioners, resulting in a language that was predominantly simple and concentrated on 
practical indicators of deviant performance. Thus, not only did the lexicon of petitioners and 
lay witnesses change but so did that of medical practitioners and priests, according to the 
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context in which they appeared. This careful choice of the contextual lexicon is paralleled by 
the authorities, who similarly employed their categories according to each context, adapting 
their languages to the requirements of each space. This is particularly clear in the vocabulary 
of the Auditori Fiscali, who through their increasing involvement with madness were able to 
construct a language of their own that adapted according to whether they were acting in their 
capacity as chief of police, as regulators of the admission procedure to the mental hospital, as 
supervisors of criminal justice, or as mediators between the families, the central 
administration, and the mentally afflicted. 
 Any assessment on who were the recognized authorities and experts on madness, and 
on how their insight was valued must take the agency of the petitioners into account. The 
introduction of testimonies signed by priests or medical practitioners, or recourse to the 
authority of the Auditore Fiscale underscore the agency of the parties involved, and the 
strategies employed by family members to resolve their private conflicts. Even the figure of 
the Auditore Fiscale, who apparently personifies the progressive concentration of executive 
power of the Ancien Régime, can be seen negotiating with family members, intervening in 
private conflicts and being called as an expert on matters of the family and the mind by the 
Magistrato dei Pupilli. Medical practitioners and priests played the role requested by family 
members, whether to prove someone’s sanity or assert his or her insanity. For this reason, in 
my view the involvement of medical testimonies in the legal assessment of mental 
disturbance reflects more the strategies adopted by families to litigate their cases than to the 
absence of a recognized authority over matters of the mind.  
That said, although medical practitioners had little impact in the Tuscan institutional 
and legal management of madness, there is sufficient evidence in the records to assert that a 
specialized medicine of the mind had started to develop (and be recognized as such). This 
change is observed in the growing technicality assumed by the lexicon of medical 
practitioners towards the second half of the century, which coincides with the fact that certain 
names start to reappear in the testimonies. In the second half of the century, Tuscan judicial 
practice did begin to ascribe a certain place to medical practitioners as the new experts of the 
mind, which we can see in the roles assumed by Antonio Lulli and Giovanni Targioni 
Tozzetti.   
The relatively low impact of medical testimonies in interdiction procedures and 
criminal justice should not be taken as proof of the lack of weight of the medical profession in 




developments, such as the lack of specialization of the profession in the field, the lack of 
available resources to cure them and, especially, the fact that the mind could still be 
approached through physical therapeutics adhering to the principle of the six non-naturals, 
which were widely socially embedded. Furthermore, it could also happen that the family of a 
defendant who had sought medical treatment for a mental affliction would argue its case in an 
interdiction petition using simple unmedicalized vocabulary, making no reference to medical 
opinion. Judicial practice simply did not require the involvement of medicine and, 
furthermore, socially meaningful descriptions were preferred to medical diagnostic categories. 
In other words, when assessing the involvement of medical knowledge in the shaping 
of notions of insanity we must bear in mind that litigation and the public management of 
madness constitutes a source that gives only a partial view of the phenomenon. The fact that 
in some cases, after years of litigation, we are informed that medical practitioners had been in 
contact with both the litigants and the authorities is particularly revealing. The institutional 
spaces of madness, accessed through legal records and supplication narratives, simply did not 












Chapter 7: Emotions in the Eighteenth-Century Cultural Understandings 
of Madness 
 
Scholars generally concur that emotions acquired a new visibility during the eighteenth 
century. Although there is less agreement on whether this defines the eighteenth century as 
the century of sensibility, scholarly opinions agree that the century witnessed a renewed 
debate on the role of emotions in social life, family relationships, religious practice, and in 
economics and politics. William Reddy has argued that in Revolutionary France, “for a few 
decades, emotions were deemed to be as important as reason in the foundation of states and 
the conduct of politics. After 1794, not only was this idea rejected, even its memory was 
extinguished.”877 In contrast, and taking issue with the approach to the period as the age of 
sentimentalism, Thomas Dixon has claimed that it “was not merely an ‘Age of Reason’, but 
nor was it merely an ‘Age of Passions’. It was an age of reason, conscience, self-love, 
interests, passions, sentiments, affections, feeling and sensibility.”878 In turn, scholarship on 
the medical understandings of madness has identified the century as the period in which 
emotions entered the spectrum of both the conceptualization of mental disturbance and the 
approach to therapies for it, preparing what was to become moral treatment.879 From the point 
of view of medical thinking, the emotional world also made an appearance as a crucial factor 
in aetiologies and explanations of madness. However, the connections and interplay between 
medical knowledge and lay understandings in this development remains an open field of 
study.  
This chapter has a twofold purpose. Firstly, it aims to provide an account of how 
displays of emotional distress were increasingly posited as evidence of mental disturbance. 
Secondly, it seeks to examine the correlations that can be found between medical, legal and 
lay understandings of madness and the role each ascribed to emotions. Drawing from judicial 
records and medical consultations, I suggest that during the eighteenth century emotional 
disturbances increasingly come to the fore in the languages of madness. Towards the second 
half of the century, disturbed emotions were ascribed a crucial role in the identification of 
mental afflictions, considered as both a cause and symptom of madness. From narratives that 
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at the beginning of the century were primarily focused on economic performance and 
practical behaviour, towards the second half of the century we increasingly encounter 
narratives that delve into the realm of emotional disturbances as a way to prove, describe or 
illustrate mental affliction, whether one’s own or that of another.  
The chapter attempts to chart the connection between madness and emotional 
disruptions by studying the concepts of distressed emotional states that were singled out as 
evidence of mental disturbance. Following the approach taken by Thomas Dixon, William 
Reddy and Barbara Rosenwein in the particular attention they pay to the appearance of certain 
words as a means to examine emotions, the chapter examines the use and meanings of 
expressions denoting emotional displays that were thought to indicate mental disturbance. It 
pays particular attention to the context accompanying these expressions, adopting the idea 
that the context that surrounds the employment of a term affects, shapes and conditions its 
meaning.880 
Medical, legal and lay narratives of madness tended to ascribe increasing importance 
to manifestations of disturbed emotions, in a process that placed madness in the broader 
discussion of acceptable emotional reactions. For this reason, the language of madness, and 
the new role ascribed to emotional disturbances as its most determinant indicator are the 
reverse of the debate about acceptable emotional life. In this sense, I suggest that the 
eighteenth-century Tuscan provisions for the problem of madness served as a space to debate 
the limits of acceptable emotional displays and the implications of disturbed emotions. 
Furthermore, that lay society transferred to this debate wider concerns about changing values 
of family life, intergenerational conflicts and gender relations, all framed under the 
overarching concern about economic behaviour. The language of madness thus illuminates a 
debate about what were the accepted outward emotional displays according to age, gender and 
social position. We could thus consider that this debate is linked to what Barbara Rosenwein 
has called “emotional communities.”881 Emotional displays were evaluated according to each 
particular context, but there were wider notions that were supposed to be respected according 
to each space: the domestic space, the street, the space of economic transactions, the space of 
sociability. We see the Tuscan aristocracy preoccupied about the emotional instability that 
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prevented a man from taking economic decisions, or the uneasiness of an old father who had 
unsettled the household, and the extravagance of another who spent above his means.  
The negotiation of proper and improper emotional reactions entailed the configuration 
of new understandings about madness in close connection to the formulation of behavioural 
norms, within a collective process that was highly contingent upon each circumstance. I 
suggest that the evaluation of emotional displays, and their categorization as acceptable or as 
deviant, was therefore a contextual process. The labelling of a certain emotion as deviant was 
deeply entrenched in the circumstances and space in which it was displayed. The evaluation 
was dependent upon gender, social status and age, how and where the emotion was displayed, 
and, furthermore, it was contingent upon the institutional space and the purpose of its 
disclosure. Depending on these circumstances, an emotional reaction could be considered 
evidence of blameless mental incapacity or of guilty criminality.  
I employ the terms emotions and emotional disturbances being well aware that they 
are extemporaneous to the eighteenth-century Italian language.882 The word emozione was not 
in use during the century, but the terms sentiment, and passion are not more fruitful. The word 
sentimento continued to be largely used to mean rational opinion, in the manner of a belief, 
commonly employed by authorities when they gave their final position on a particular matter. 
The Vocabolario degli accademici della Crusca published in 1729-1738 defined 
“sentimento” as “sense, intellect, judgement” (senso, intelletto, senno), and alternatively as 
“significance, excellence and beauty of a conception”, and “concept, thought, opinion”. In 
fact, expressions such as “uscir del sentimento” and “esser fuor del sentimento” were still 
used to mean “lose one’s senses, grow mad, be mad” (perdere il senno, impazzare, esser 
pazzo).883 Neither senno (which meant intellect, wisdom, knowledge and judgement) nor the 
derivations from sentimento (sensibilità, sensibile) had a connection to emotions at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century in the Italian language. The word passion was critical for 
medical language and criminal records during the period, but it hardly appears in the 
interdiction records. Thus, framing emotional disturbances under the medical “passions of the 
soul” was also deemed inadequate. 
References to emotional displays appear grouped in the lay sources around concepts 
such as animo and spirito. Neither of the two terms were disentangled from traditional 
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religious and humoral notions of the soul, but were increasingly employed to mean the 
psychological disposition or “emotional” state. To reflect the estrangement from reason in 
which the person found him or herself, these terms were coupled with passione, stravagante, 
inquieto, volubile or irregolare to name the same thing. It is by thinking with these terms that 
I employ the concept of “emotional disturbances”, to convey the idea that lay, medical and 
legal languages considered the manifestations of a disturbed, irregular, changeable or unstable 
disposition the key to a disordered mind. 
The forms of emotional disturbance under examination here shed light on how 
individuals, their families, the authorities and medical or legal professionals reflected on, 
interpreted, valued or condemned certain forms of emotional expression. Given that I am 
interested in the evaluation and interpretation of certain emotions, the problem of how they 
were felt or even whether they were actually felt is not of relevance here. This is not to say 
that the narratives under study constitute fictions that were completely detached from the 
reality they were supposed to be describing – in fact, the characteristics of the negotiation 
between authorities and families sometimes entailed that some denunciations were indeed 
considered to be deliberate lies, or simply exaggerations, misinterpretations or partial truths, 
to the same extent that others were judged to be accurate descriptions. But the focus here is 
different. For the purpose of elaborating on the shaping of the understanding of madness, and 
how certain forms of emotional display were increasingly assumed to provide evidence of 
mental disturbance, the mere allusion to indicators of these types of emotional display proves 
the point, regardless of its veracity. In this sense, the scope of this chapter is to assess the 
instrumental value of denouncing a person for manifesting indicators of emotional 
disturbance, which simultaneously attests to how emotions were regarded and how certain 
types of deviant forms of emotional reaction came to be connected with madness.  Thus, the 
very weakness of the sources – their instrumental nature – provides an entry into the 
processes by which families and authorities negotiated forms of accepted behaviour and 
emotional responses.  
 
7. 1. Medical Understandings of Disturbed Emotions and their Effect on the Mind 
According to the Hippocratic-Galenic explanatory model, “passions”, “accidents of 
the soul”, “affections of the mind”, as emotions were termed in medical writings, played a 




natural factor, which after air, sleep and waking, food and drink, excretion and retention, 
movement and rest, had to be carefully managed in order to preserve good health. Recent 
studies on the history of emotions have shown that medical literature aimed at a lay public 
warned its readers about the effects passions could inflict on health. For instance, the 
regimens for healthy living written in the vernacular that became popular between the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Italy focused on the correct management of the 
accidents of the soul as part of their advice on how to preserve one’s health.884  
Passions could either harm or restore health, depending on their intensity and the 
person’s constitution. These accidents of the soul were understood as the result of the 
interaction between the body and the environment, manifested through the movement of the 
spirits towards the heart and away from it to around the body as they reacted to external 
stimuli. This movement changed the balance of the humours, body temperature and the 
functioning of the organs, and proved to be seriously harmful or, in some cases, even 
beneficial, depending on its intensity and direction, the person’s own humoral constitution 
(temperament), and their gender and age.885  
According to Elena Carrera, early modern medical authors did not make a clear-cut 
opposition between reason and the accidents of the soul. Conceptualized as a cognitive 
process and as a physiological event, passions were not necessarily signalled as a sign of 
irrationality.886 However, although the Hippocratic-Galenic explanatory framework conceived 
of the accidents of the soul as cognitive and physiological events that assumed different forms 
according to each person’s personal qualities, the effects of such events were primarily seen 
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in bodily terms. The focus of attention was placed on the damaging effects passions were able 
to cause in the body. Strong passions, and particularly abrupt changes of mood were widely 
feared for their dangerous life-threatening effects. But what was conceived as diseased and 
imperilled was the body and not, yet, the mind.   
Recent scholarship in the field claims that historiography has tended to oversimplify 
the power of humoralism over the passions, rendering the individual helpless to their force 
and inevitably conditioned to certain passions according to their natural complexion. In 
contrast, new studies have emphasized the role attributed to willpower and agency by the 
doctrine of the six non-naturals. Early modern health regimens stressed the importance of 
balanced lifestyles and careful management of the six non-natural health factors. Hence, even 
if the accidents of the soul operated differently according to a person’s constitution, age and 
gender, they could be conveniently disciplined, moderated or even supressed through 
willpower.887  
Early Modern physicians promoted the careful evaluation, regulation and moderation 
of one’s passions. Health regimes and other medical writings advocated for the control, 
avoidance or regulation of emotional reactions to preserve health. For instance, the harmful 
effects of passions could be counterbalanced through the manifestation of other passions 
(anger counterbalanced with joy, for instance). According to Cavallo and Storey, there were 
three major approaches to the management of the accidents of the soul in late Renaissance 
Italy. “One medical, based broadly on managing the body’s physiology and spirits; one 
religious, intent on disciplining and dominating the rebellious appetites; and one 
philosophical, based on redirecting ones thoughts and bringing the ‘passions’ under the ‘strict 
control of the intellect’.”888 Whether through physical therapy, willpower or distracting 
mechanisms, the accidents of the soul were supposed to be managed.  
By the end of the seventeenth century, medical treatises paid increasing attention to 
emotions in their examination of the causes, symptoms and treatments of mental afflictions, 
giving birth to a new conceptualization of the relationship between the body and mind. The 
studies of the nervous system conducted by the English physicians Thomas Sydenham (1624-
1689) and Thomas Willis (1622-75) produced a different understanding of the workings of 
the brain and its principal connectors with the body, the “animal spirits”. These studies first 
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changed the causal relation between body, passions and brain. For instance, Willis conceived 
of the “anatomy of the nerves” as the part of the body that reveals “the true and genuine 
reasons for very many of the actions and passions that take place in our body, which 
otherwise seem most difficult to explain.”889  
New medical conceptions about the brain as the seat and cause of mental afflictions 
are best illustrated through the change in the aetiology of hysteria, which towards the 
seventeenth century lost its uterine explanations. Willis’ studies on the origin of epileptic and 
hysteric convulsions in the brain significantly changed the focus of attention towards the 
brain, challenging the traditional explanation of the wandering womb and its capacity to 
suffocate women. Nonetheless, Thomas Sydenham’s explorations led to further connections 
between passions and diseases of the mind.890 The new aetiology of the brain allowed for the 
male counterpart of hysteria, hypochondria, to come to the fore, positing both men 
(particularly sedentary men) and women as the possible victims of their passions. Sydenham 
considered that people who frequently experienced passions such as “grief... terror, anger, 
distrust, and other hateful passions” were more exposed to hysteria and hypochondria than 
those who experienced them only rarely. For in the first case “the mind is still more 
disordered, it being in the nature of this disease to be attended with an incurable despair; so 
that they cannot bear with patience to be told that there is hope of their recovery, easily 
imagining that they are liable to all the miseries that can befall mankind; and presaging the 
worst evils to themselves.”891  
While Sydenham saw in the passions of the mind a contributing factor to hysteria and 
hypochondria that would be aggravated during the illness, later explorations drove medical 
knowledge to consider passions as the core causality of afflictions such as hysteria and 
hypochondria. We can see this connection particularly in the Italian medical literature of the 
late seventeenth century and eighteenth centuries. The Papal physician Giorgio Baglivi (1668-
1706) believed that passions of the mind were the cause of many diseases, among them, 
hysteria.892 Similarly, in the published volumes of consultations by letter, and in treatises 
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1965), pp. 137-151. Baglivi published his De praxi medica in 1696, which had included a chapter on mental 




specifically on mental diseases, Italian physicians highlighted how passions of the soul 
(passioni d’animo) or perturbations of the soul (perturbazione dell’animo) were not only clear 
indicators of a disturbed mind, but its very origin.  
Andrea Pasta (1706-1782) claimed in his Dei mali senza materia, published 
posthumously in 1791, that emotional afflictions, regardless of whether they were triggered 
by real or imagined events, had the power to affect the nerves and the structure of the brain, 
causing illnesses such as hysteria and hypochondria, but also curing them when treatments 
were properly conducted. He explained that these diseases were caused “not from excess or 
vice in the humours, but from a disorder and disturbance in the nervous system” produced by 
perturbazione dell’animo or the guai dell’animo such as fear, anger or indignation, sadness or 
efforts of the mind. The brain, explained the physician from Bergamo, was particularly 
sensible to the stimulus of the passions of the mind.893   
Over the century, medical consultations frequently cited the “diverse and frequent 
passions of the soul and mental agitations,”894 “mental fixation on unhappy thoughts,”895 “a 
long and dark passion of the soul”, accompanied by “obstinate wakefulness” and “disquieting 
dreams” (sonni inquieti),896 or even a “great passion of fear”897 as triggers of mental diseases, 
which meant that there was a need to avoid the passioni d’animo at all costs if one was to be 
restored to health. Hence the importance ascribed to seeking “ilarità dell’animo”898 through a 
regulated life, indulging in cheerful situations, favouring social life over solitude, and 
practicing physical exercise. The goal was to achieve the necessary “quietness” and 
                                                
893 “Io tengo che i mali nervosi di questa schiatta non dipendano da ridondanza, nè da vizio di umori, ma da 
sregolatezza e scomposizione del sistema nervoso, e che tale sconcerto de’ nervi e stravagante dissonanza della 
loro irritabilità proceda interamente da precedute afflizioni, perturbazioni o intensioni smodate e forzose 
dell’animo. E uno che voglia seriamente razzolare addentro di questi mali, troverà che la sorgente ne suol esser 
l’animo passionato, o intensamente applicato sia agli studi, sia agli affari politici, militari, o economici; che le 
morbose impressioni fatte dagli oggetti sì esterni che interni nella sostanza midollar del cervello, e propagate a 
quella de’ nervi che n’è una continuazione e un allungamento, no si distolgono nè si scancellano colle missioni 
di sangue...”, Pasta, Dei mali senza materia, p. 50-57.  
894 Consulti Medici di Vari professori, Vol. II, “Affezione Scorbutico-melancolica”, p. 97. 
895 Cocchi, Consulti Medici, Vol. I, Consulto XXXI, “Ipocondria”, p. 96.  
896 Consulti Medici di Vari professori..., Volume II, Agostino Danieli Med. D’Imola, “Affezione isterico-
ipocondriaca”, p. 163.  
897 This “grande passione di timore” was followed by “perturbati fantasmi, e sogni spaventevoli”, which 
affected the patient’s brain in such a way that it caused him to suffer a complicated epileptic disorder, causing 
organic failure in the brain that explained the persistence of the ailment. Cirillo, Consulti Medici, T. II, Consulto 
XL, “Epilessia Idiopatica da Timore. Per l’Ecc. Sig. Aloisio Manini Nobile Veneziano”, p. 89 




“tranquillity” of mind (quiete d’animo and tranquillità d’animo), “far away from any fear.”899 
Given that the predominant source of these diseases were emotional disturbances, the best 
way in which to control and cure them was for patients to learn how to manage them. 
Therapeutics during the eighteenth century was moving away from the traditional bleeding 
and purgatives, but it still remained within the framework left by the principles of the six non-
naturals. The combination of weather, diet, environment and emotions were still the key 
elements in use to counterbalance and hopefully restrain the effects of mental afflictions.900  
The renowned Tuscan naturalist and physician Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti declared in 
one of his medical consultations of 1765 that, due to his occupation as medico fiscale, he was 
“obliged to visit and examine almost every malati di demenza” there was in Tuscany, and he 
counted up to 80 a year. Of these 80 mentally afflicted patients, he declared that 95% suffered 
from melancholic delirium caused by emotional disturbances (deliranti melancolici, per 
motivo di angustie d’animo). The important thing to bear in mind, however, is that at least 
90% of these patients would usually completely recover in a few weeks.901 
As the history of psychiatry has stressed, passions played a fundamental role in the 
construction of psychiatry, where the example of moral management appears paradigmatic.902 
Scholarship critical of the Foucauldian model of the medicalization of madness has 
demonstrated that moral treatment, characterized by “the psychological means of control and 
care dispensed at specialized institutions, had been practised long before it was propagated by 
Pinel and the Tukes.”903 The recommendations of the Italian Consulti Medici cited above bear 
witness both to the accuracy of this assertion and the fact that this process surpassed national 
geographies, to acquire a European dimension. Medical literature promoting health regimes 
and, particularly, emotional management circulated throughout Europe, and Italian authors 
                                                
899 Consulti Medici di Vari professori..., Volume II, Gaetano Armillei, Consulto XLIII, “Affezione isterico-
ipocondriaco spasmodica con disposizione all’idrope”, p. 87 and Consulto XLIV, “Affezione ipocondriaca 
vera”, p. 89 respectively.  
900 For a discussion on the available therapeutic methods in use at Santa Dorotea and more widely in Europe 
during the eighteenth century, see Roscioni, Il governo della follia, pp. 217-292; Porter, Mind-Forg’d Manacles; 
Andrews and Scull, Customers and Patrons.  
901 BNCF, Manoscritti, GTT, N. 234, “Consultationes medicae”, cart.2, fasc. X, Consulti per affezioni 
ipocondriache ed isteriche, Targioni Tozzetti’s opinion on a consultation he gave in 1765, fol. 158v. It is 
interesting also to note here the figures given by Targioni Tozzetti.   
902 Kathleen M. Grange, “Pinel and eighteenth-century psychiatry”, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 35 
(1961), pp. 442-453; Showalter, The female malady, Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997); Rousseau, “Depression’s forgotten genealogy”; Fiorino, Matti, indemoniate e 
vagabondi; Roscioni, Il governo della follia, among others.  
903 Suzuki, “Dualism and the Transformation of Psychiatric Language”, p. 418. The work of Roy Porter was 





usually based part of their arguments on references to the famous European authors who 
wrote on such subjects.  
We know that throughout eighteenth-century Europe the six non-naturals continued to 
frame conceptions of health and hygiene, although they were “gradually subsumed under 
wider classifications” and were combined with new notions such as contagion and the 
importance of cleanliness, which were being introduced.904 Popular medical treatises such as 
those published by the French physician Sammuel August Tissot (1728-1797), the Scot 
William Buchan (1729-1805) and the Italian Bernardo Ramazzini (1633-1714) continued to 
call attention to the importance of the correct management of the passions in order to enjoy 
good health. Similarly to what was being observed with health regimes in previous centuries, 
eighteenth-century medical writings that aimed at a non-specialized public still recommended 
a “healthy” management of the passions of the soul, which had to be either avoided, 
controlled or diverted, depending on the disease and the patient’s circumstances.  
Hence, we can see that there was a wider context for the preoccupation with the 
dangers of emotional disturbances and their connection with mental diseases. According to 
the study by Storey and Cavallo, the influence of medical ideas on the danger of uncontrolled 
passions and their detrimental effects on one’s health can be traced, for instance, in the private 
correspondence of the Italian elite already in the previous century.905 Also, we know that 
medical literature containing health advice underwent a revival in the eighteenth century and 
was now published in cheaper editions, which meant higher sales figures. Emotional troubles 
were in fact repeatedly incorporated in the aetiology of mental afflictions in narratives of both 
the solicitors of the medical consultation and in the responses of the doctors.906 The 
                                                
904 Christopher Lawrence, “William Buchan: Medicine Laid Open”, Medical History 19 (1975), p. 25. On the 
proliferation of popular books of medical advice during the eighteenth century, see Porter, The Popularization of 
medicine, 1650-1850. 
905 They claim that, “Despite the complexities of medical accounts of the passions, contemporary 
correspondence provides considerable evidence that the link between emotional turmoil and illness was widely 
accepted at the time amongst the laity.” See Cavallo and Storey, Healthy Living, p. 189. 
906 Research on medical consultation by letter has mainly focused on the experience of the body, the patient-
physician relationship, the development of medical practice in terms of diagnosis and cures, and also the 
construction of medical networks. The general characteristic of this genre in Europe is that letters were sent by 
socially privileged people to famous physicians (as is the case of the medical consultations examined here). 
These letters were not necessarily written by the patient herself, but by relatives, or by the patient’s physician. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that what has survived was the correspondence that involved elite patients, 
although, as Steinke and Stuber observe, “we cannot exclude that consultation by letter was also practised on a 
more local level by country doctors.” Steinke and Stuber, “Medical Correspondence in Early Modern Europe”, 
p. 146. The study by Barbara Duden, The Woman Beneath the Skin, attests to this possibility. See also Pilloud 





appropriation of the notions of the six non-naturals can be observed particularly well in the 
interdiction narratives, where petitioners and witnesses made reference to the hygiene 
principles the doctrine commanded, pointing towards the connections between sleep and good 
health, the right amount of work, managing one’s preoccupations, and the ill effects of 
weather and certain environments, all of which were common pieces of advice in the medical 
literature that had been circulating in previous centuries.907  
For instance, Francesco del Mazza, interdicted and submitted to the authority of the 
Magistrato Supremo given his numerous extravagances, libertine tendencies and violent 
attacks against his wife, was confined in the Fortezza of Volterra. From there he requested a 
few years later that he be released, citing his need for better weather in order to be able to 
resist the violent epileptic fits he repeatedly suffered, which worsened during the winters.908 
The principle behind the decision to lift the order of confinement against Francesco del Mazza 
was the same as that which grounded many testimonies written by Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti 
for prisoners at the Stinche or even patients at Santa Dorotea.  
Studies on medical consultation by letter in the eighteenth century have shown that the 
humoral theory was still the predominant explanatory model with which to explain, 
understand and cure diseases during the eighteenth century.909 As a result, some of these 
studies assert, physical and emotional suffering were still inseparable experiences and held 
inextricable connections. Early modern concepts of the body escape the traditional mapping 
of the organs, their workings and connections, as Barbara Duden has eloquently shown. Early 
modern patients and doctors believed that fluids needed to be released through any available 
orifice, even if this meant that blood from suppressed menses was expelled through a finger 
wound or stored in a head bump.910  
However, although eighteenth-century observers and sufferers made different 
connections regarding the mind-body relationship, and the mind was still first and foremost 
accessed through the body, the fact remains that there is evidence that the concept of a 
diseased brain was shared by lay society, and that emotional disturbances were identified as 
its most defining signs. The court records under study here reveal that the incapacity to exert 
control or management over the passions was singled out as evidence of a disease the source 
                                                
907 Cavallo and Storey, Healthy Living.  
908 ASF, Consiglio di Reggenza, Fiscale, F. 758, no. 20, 1753.  
909 Smith, “‘An Account of an Unaccountable Distemper’”, p. 463. 




of which was to be found in the mind. This sheds light on the problem of the connections 
between lay and medical knowledge from an interesting angle, as these narratives suggest that 
medical notions circulated among laity, in a flux that was not just in one direction. Influences 
ran in multiple directions, acting along different layers, producing a common resource from 
which litigants, judges and magistrates, medical practitioners and priests could resort to in 
order to come up with a suitable formula to describe mental affliction. Instability, uneasiness, 
abrupt fits of anger, or any emotional display seen to systematically breach the accepted 
norms were increasingly cited as grounds for the interdiction petitions.      
 
7. 2. Family Narratives and the Re-elaboration of Medical Language: The Key Factor of 
Emotional Disturbances  
Interdiction narratives involving defendants who had been interdicted several times or 
whose families had been involved in various interdiction procedures during the century are 
especially useful for uncovering the circulation of languages of madness across different 
cultural groups. Given that these cases shed light on the experience and management of 
madness over extended periods of time, they allow us to grasp how the language used to 
explain mental disorder was constructed, and how it evolved with time. By the same token, 
they enable us to examine the involvement of medical knowledge and medical explanations in 
the process of identifying and denouncing a family member for mental incapacity. They also 
allow us to reconstruct particularly well the process by which a family, after identifying a 
mental disturbance, followed a series of strategies to make sense of the disorder and manage 
its consequences.  
Any attempt to assess the foundations of the lexicon used to describe mental 
incapacity and the meanings it conveyed must take account of the possible contacts that 
petitioners and family members may have had with medical knowledge prior to the 
interdiction petition. Previous interdictions in the family history, past illnesses or long-term 
mental afflictions of family members may have resulted in a medical practitioner being 
contacted.911 In any case, it must be borne in mind that studies on the treatment of madness 
                                                
911 Patients could resort to a wide range of medical practitioners depending on their concerns, their motivations 
and economic resources. Charlatans, unlicensed healers, priests, officially-appointed surgeons and doctors 
(cerusici and medici condotti), private surgeons or doctors called in specific circumstances, or personal 
physicians called repeatedly were among the options. For an interesting account on how the choice was made, 




outside mental institutions in early modern Europe concur with what has been asserted for the 
treatment of diseases in general. Patients sought medical advice once they had already 
identified “what was wrong with them”, asserted a diagnosis and attempted self-treatment or 
any treatment that was readily available.912 Furthermore, particularly towards the eighteenth 
century, there was a wide spectrum of options for accessing basic medical knowledge, 
producing what has been called “the popularization of medicine.”913 As a result, lay and 
medical languages of madness were intermingled in a way that is sometimes difficult to 
separate.   
When medical practitioners were involved in interdiction procedures, their testimonies 
did not always disclose whether their assessment on the patient’s condition was based on a 
one-time visit or on long-term treatment. As discussed in the previous chapter, doctors and 
surgeons condotti often gave their testimony more in their capacity as privileged social 
witnesses, rather than as expert medical practitioners with a particular knowledge of the 
mental condition under examination. On other occasions, we find clues on the contacts that 
the family had with medical practitioners before the interdiction in certain comments in the 
petitions.    
The evidence suggests that familiarity with the procedure and its requirements or the 
recourse to medical treatment did not necessarily result in a more precise medical lexicon of 
mental incapacity. The tendency in those instances where we know that medical practitioners 
had been involved is for petitioners and defendants to adopt, reshape and re-signify medical 
categories. For instance, in 1761 the relatives of 72-year-old Francesco Rossetti said he had 
been assaulted by a furore maniaco many years before, which his relatives had been forced to 
treat medically “with great expenditure to the house”, and after that he had suffered “a similar 
mania more, and more times.”914 In this case, the category of mental incapacity used to 
sustain the interdiction petition is a medical one, but it is employed in a way that is almost 
detached from its actual symptoms, which were, on this occasion, not described. When the 
                                                
912 Ibid, p. 74. See also Stolberg, Experiencing Illness. Similar conclusions regarding the process that led to 
medical help being sought for mental afflictions were made by MacDonald and, more recently, Andrews and 
Scull. Self-diagnosis and diseases first identified by families were also combined with diseases whose existence 
and identification were raised by the doctors as it was in their interest to expand the realm of their practice and 
make it more profitable. Andrews and Scull, Customers and Patrons and MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam.  
913 Porter, The Popularization of medicine.  
914 “...fù parecchi anni sono assalito da un furore maniaco per cui dovette tenersi lungo tempo sotto la cura dei 
medici con grave dispendio della casa, e come più e più volte ha sofferto una simil mania di cui di tanto in tanto 
dimostra sensibilissimi effetti, per i quali rendesi inabile all’amministrazione della casa...” ASF, MPAP, 




case appears again in the records, however, this medical category is not employed. Instead, 
explanations for the defendant’s mental condition were reduced to references to his 
“decrepitude” and his “capricious” – thus, illogical and irrational – act of abandoning his 
son’s residence, guided by an absurd desire “of being better [stare meglio].”915 The medical 
category of furore maniaco had been replaced by the more culturally meaningful reference to 
his unstable and capricious character, with references to the manifestations of emotional 
disturbance that came to be the preferred evidence of mental incapacity, as the next section 
will show.   
 
Patterns in the Incorporation of Medical Categories in Lay Narratives 
Conceptions and perceptions of madness circulated fluidly between the medical and 
lay languages, though precise medical categories were largely unnecessary. Taking into 
account lay narratives and the voice of the mad allows us to elaborate more deeply on the 
dynamics of the circulation of languages and the interplay between medical, legal and lay 
perceptions of insanity.  
How and why families and the sufferers themselves made use of medical terminology 
was not necessarily conditioned by the direct involvement of medical practitioners. We have 
seen how in the cases of Lorenzo Baldinotti and Lorenzo Maestrini, both from the first half of 
the century, their mental disorders were largely addressed through lay and legally embedded 
terms, even if they had been in contact with medical practitioners. A different situation is 
exemplified by the case of Angiolo Barchesi, interdicted five times between 1735 and 1754. 
Not only were his interdiction procedures conducted with the direct involvement of medical 
opinion, but furthermore, the narratives of the parties involved, including himself, 
demonstrate an interesting appropriation and re-elaboration of the medical terms employed in 
the expert testimonies. His first interdiction was decreed in November 1735, based on a 
testimony from Santa Dorotea that attested he was in the hospital, having been afflicted by a 
semi-manic insanity (insania semimaniosa).916  
Further characteristics and the behavioural signs of his insanity were disclosed only in 
the second interdiction, decreed in May 1737, this time without recourse to medical opinion. 
                                                
915 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2307, no. 95, December 1767. 
916 Testimony of Francesco Giampieri, cameriere (keeper) of Santa Dorotea, ASF, MS, Atti, F. 1214, 18 




While in the first case we have access only to the testimony given by the keeper of Santa 
Dorotea, who employed a category rarely used in the hospital records, in the second case we 
only have access to the description given in a testimony signed by Barchesi’s mother, 
neighbours and a priest. In this lay testimony the too technical term of semi-manic insanity 
was diluted into plain “dementia”, “madness” (pazzia) and the description of mad actions. 
The testimony explained that although he had regained his soundness of mind for a while, he 
had relapsed into his “dementia”, as manifested in “doing diverse things of a man of unsound 
mind, such as [engaging in economic] contracts with great and evident prejudice for him”, 
accompanied by illogical violent reactions, which made him attack people for no reason.917 
Based upon these signs, and perhaps taking into account the expert testimony given in 1735, 
the interdiction decree of 1737 declared that the lay testimony revealed Barchesi “had become 
entirely demented and furious.”918 The interdiction decree made a hybrid compound between 
the lay testimonies, the official category and the medical label, replacing furiosity with the 
medical manic insanity (the medical term for the institutional pazzia furiosa that 
circumscribed cases accountable for committal), and combining it with the unavoidable legal 
demente. 
The interesting point to observe here is that the narratives describing Barchesi’s 
mental afflictions evolved along the years so as to introduce the dimension of emotional 
affliction. While the two following interdiction procedures were built upon the unspecific 
categories of infermo di pazzia (third interdiction with testimony of the pazzeria of Santa 
Maria Nuova, 1740)919 and demenza (fourth interdiction, based on the information that he had 
been sent again to the pazzeria, 1746),920 from 1753 onwards the narratives incorporated more 
precise categories to describe Barchesi’s mental condition. The change in the lexicon is even 
more interesting if we take into account how Barchesi himself explained his sufferings.  
We have access to Barchesi’s voice only after four interdiction procedures and at least 
four committals – let us not forget that they were decreed through two separate legal 
                                                
917 “...per haver [sic] veduto il medesimo fare diverse cose di uomo di mente non sana, come contrattare con un 
sommo, ed evidente di lui pregiudizio, volere dare a persone senz’alcuna causa, e molt’altre cose simili...”, ASF, 
MS, Atti, F. 1983, 29 April 1737, f. 377. 
918 “...era divenuto affatto demente e furioso...”, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2300, no. 547, May 1737. 
919 “...da quattro mesi in qua si ritrova in detto Spedale infermo di pazzia...”, Testimony of Gaetano Pellegrini, 
medico fisico of Santa Maria Nuova, ASF, MS, Atti, F. 2016, 15 November 1740, f. 125.   
920 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 206(2º), 20 May 1746. In this case the interdiction was directly 




proceedings.921 During the time that elapsed between 1735, when the first interdiction was 
requested, and 1753, when Barchesi sent a written testimony giving his side of the story, his 
family group had changed. While the first procedures were conducted by Barchesi’s mother, 
by 1753 his wife and marriage kin had taken that role. His episodic madness evolved together 
with his family situation, and his position of weakness inside the family structure changed 
from him being the responsibility of his mother to that of his wife. Barchesi’s narratives 
centre precisely around this change. The involvement of his wife’s male kin, and her 
behaviour towards him were at the core of his anguish, to the point of inducing him to break 
his silence and make his voice heard.   
According to Barchesi’s recounting, the third episode of mental disturbance that sent 
him once more to Santa Maria Nuova had been triggered by the profound distress his wife’s 
“cruelties” (sevizie) caused him. She had “capriciously” left the matrimonial residence to live 
with her father, “on account of which the informant thus troubled, had a fierce oppression of 
spirits [soppressione di spiriti] that took him out of himself,” causing him to be committed, 
yet again, to the madhouse.922 But his tribulations went beyond his episode of derangement, 
for after he “came to his senses” (il cielo gli fece la grazia dopo pochi mesi di ritornarlo in 
se), he had to face a long confrontation with his brother-in-law, who had been appointed 
administrator during his interdiction. In Barchesi’s eyes, his marriage kin had only taken 
advantage of his situation, making ill use of his resources, refusing to hand over the accounts 
of the administration and obstructing his business as librarian. Once he had regained his 
soundness of mind and had his civil rights restored, Barchesi initiated litigation against his 
marriage kin, demanding that they pay a series of debts they had incurred during their 
administration. Although the authorities sided with Barchesi, his debtors pulled every 
available string to delay the payment for as long as possible, which ultimately resulted in 
further unbearable afflictions for Barchesi, who appears to have again been interdicted a year 
later, and this time he was said to be “afflicted by a continual delirium.”923  
                                                
921 I have not been able to find records of Angiolo Barchesi’s committals in Santa Dorotea or Santa Maria 
Nuova. Before 1750 the records of Santa Dorotea have lacunae, and those of the pazzeria of Santa Maria Nuova 
nearly non-existent.     
922 Regarding the litigation he initiated against his marriage kin, Barchesi recounted: “Dal processo presentato a 
V.S. Illma restò concludentemente giustificato la sevizie di detta sua moglie contro l’Informante, che 
capricciosamente si partì dalla casa sua, e andò presso del padre, motivo che l’informante così tribolato ebbe una 
fiera soppressione di spiriti, che lo levò a fatto di se onde fù provveduto alla sua persona col’ commetterlo in S. 
Mª Nuova.” ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 118, July 1753. 
923 “...travagliato da un continuo delirio...”, Testimony of Giuseppe Sguanci Cameriere of the pazzeria of Santa 




Over the years, what had been initially framed in terms of a deviant economic 
performance and a tendency to furious reactions evolved into emotional anguish provoked by 
a combination of familial conflicts and economic setbacks. However, even more revealing is 
the fact that the transition was voiced by the sufferer himself, demonstrating a clear awareness 
of his episodic mental disturbances, of what triggered them and of his capacity to overcome 
them after some months. He could have chosen to deny his past insanity, as many other 
interdicted men and women did, but instead he chose to use it in the civil litigation against his 
marriage kin to his advantage. Attesting once more for the awareness litigants demonstrate of 
the consequences of the vocabulary they chose and the situations they disclosed to the 
authorities, Barchesi decided to highlight the emotional distress the cruelties and subsequent 
“capricious” abandonment of his wife had inflicted on him. Further revealing for our purpose 
here, he explicitly connected emotional distress with insanity, and demonstrated an ability to 
explain it without recurring to any specific medical category.  
The transformation at work in the characterization of Barchesi’s insanity should not be 
interpreted, in my view, as necessarily connected to an actual change in the manifestation of 
his mental disturbance. That in 1735 Barchesi suffered a violent type of madness that placed 
him under what in those times was typified as mania and frenzy, which later evolved into 
anguish and anxiety, to finally result in a (melancholic) delirium is only one way to interpret 
it, not necessarily an accurate one and it does not shed sufficient light on how his madness 
was understood and experienced. Rather, I propose to interpret the categories employed as 
being the result of various layers of factors, in which the influence of medical knowledge and 
the evolution of the affliction mingle with cultural notions, private concerns, agency and 
circumstantial developments. Insanity was depicted according to the contexts of manifestation 
and disclosure, adapting to the evolution of the family history, and assuming the forms that 
most suited the purpose of each litigation.   
 Even if the depiction of Barchesi’s madness was contingent upon his familial 
situation, the line of argumentation chosen by litigants attests to wider changes operating in 
the perception and understandings of madness towards the second half of the century. In this 
sense, it is not a coincidence that they referred to the emotional disruptions his familial 
conflicts caused him after 1750, but not before. The same applies for the narratives of 
Antonio Corsini and Lorenzo Baldinotti, discussed in the previous chapters. The connection 




as determinant indicators of madness became particularly visible towards the second half of 
the century.       
 
Circulation and Re-elaboration of the Lexicon of Emotional Disturbance 
Particularly towards the second half of the century, interdiction procedures involving 
people who repeatedly relapsed into a state of mental incapacity tend to incorporate more 
vivid descriptions as the cases reappear. Over time and with the experience gained in each 
litigation, the narratives of mothers, wives, brothers and sons begin to acquire an increasing 
level of complexity. The more complex the litigation became and the more frequently 
relatives turned to the authorities for mediation, the more nuanced the meanings of mental 
incapacity and the more complicated the scope of its consequences become. From initial 
descriptions that were mainly centred around economic mismanagement or dissipation, 
subsequent petitions predominantly concern the relational dimensions of mental incapacity, 
delineating with increasing accuracy the consequences it caused to family life. Similarly, the 
testimonies produced by the sufferers themselves also tend to have a richer vocabulary, 
depending on their relapse into mental incapacity, and so does the reported level of familial 
conflict surrounding their disorders. The dynamics of family discord and the evolution of the 
given mental disorder also played a part in the shaping of the languages of mental incapacity.  
Probably no other case exemplifies the dynamics and depths of the shaping of a 
vocabulary of madness better than that of Antonio Becciani, whose mental disturbance 
underwent an evolution closely connected with the exacerbation of the familial conflicts 
surrounding him. Antonio Becciani, from the Tuscan locality of Barberino di Mugello, was 
first interdicted in 1764 for allegedly being “melenso, stupido, e quasi mentecatto”, and then 
interdicted a second time in 1771 because for some years he had been under “a profound 
melancholy, stupid and macilent.” Subsequently, his mental condition evolved into 
“dangerous imbecility”, “melancholic humour” and a tendency to be overpowered by his 
“overheated fantasy.”924 The interdiction proceedings for Antonio Becciani and the recurring 
litigations surrounding them conceal, as on many other occasions, profound discords, strong 
animosity and conflicting agencies in the life of a family that had been strained by the 
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presence of insanity for more than a generation. The leading voices were assumed, as on other 
occasions, by two women, Antonio’s mother and his wife.  
Until 1771 we find no trace of emotional disturbance in the narratives of Becciani’s 
mental incapacity, and in fact if we were to set aside the later developments of his judicial 
case, we would be tempted to catalogue Becciani’s proceedings as one more example of the 
apparent predominance of intellectual impairment as a cause of mental incapacity. In 1764 
Becciani’s mother had declared him to be foolish and stupid (melenso, stupido e quasi 
mentecatto) to the extent of not being able to distinguish between what was useful and what 
was harmful. Similarly, on that occasion the supporting testimonies claimed he was unable to 
manage his affairs even though he was 30 years old on account of his “short discernment.”925 
However, later proceedings on the case showed that Becciani’s condition was far more 
episodic and with stronger emotional consequences than is revealed in these initial 
proceedings. His plain foolishness became a state provoked by a profoundly disturbed 
emotional life, built upon a sense of betrayal by his mother, which caused him deep vexation 
and recurrent episodes of anguish and aggressive agitation. At least that is how he and his 
wife articulated his affliction.  
Only a few months after the first interdiction had been decreed, Antonio petitioned for 
it to be lifted, arguing that it was not true that he was the stolido and prodigal his mother had 
made him appear to be. He claimed that the interdiction had been engineered by his mother 
who, motivated by her preference for her younger son, aimed to deprive Antonio of the 
patrimony, and give it instead to her second-born, so that he could have the prospect of a 
better marriage.926 Antonio’s petition won, but his mother and brother nonetheless were 
successful in their aims in 1767 when they managed to secure a semi-interdiction that 
restricted Antonio’s economic management by placing him under the supervision of local 
authorities, followed by a full interdiction decree in 1771.  
In the interdiction petition of 1771, Antonio’s mother and brother still presented his 
mental incapacity as being “for some years now... imbecile and mentecatto.”927 The core of 
their argument still rested on a combination of lack of experience and “weakness of spirit”, as 
the officials of the Supremo summarized. Nonetheless, enquiries carried out by the authorities 
                                                
925 “...non ostante la sua età di circa a trent’anni non è capace di regolare per il suo corto discernimento alcuna 
sorte d’interessi...” respectively. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 120, August 1764.    
926 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 162, November 1764. 
927 “...da qualche anno in qua si trova detto Becciani Imbecille, e mentecatto, e affatto incapace di accudire, e 




provided a new testimony, signed by priests and other dignitaries of Barberino, stating that 
Becciani was subject to “...a profound melancholy, [and was] stupid and macilent.”928 The 
language of madness and mental incapacity was flexible and overarching, and the 
superposition of categories had been common since the introduction of the Roman categories 
into the Tuscan legal system.929 For this reason, the imbecility and stupidity denounced by 
Becciani’s relatives in the second interdiction proceedings did not exclude the melancholy 
identified by the witnesses. Melancholic or not, Becciani continued to be considered in a state 
of diminished understanding, except the source of it was now located in his emotional 
sufferings.  
Concepts were carefully chosen to frame interdiction petitions. This becomes 
particularly clear if we take into account that given Becciani’s father had also been interdicted 
in 1747, the Becciani family had been familiar with the uses of the Magistrato dei Pupilli long 
before Antonio’s interdiction. Consequently, we can assume that they were perfectly aware of 
how necessary it was to disclose and identify so as to sustain an interdiction petition. This 
seems particularly to have been the case with Becciani’s mother, Caterina Puccini, who had 
been directly affected by the interdiction of her husband. Giovan Battista Becciani’s 
interdiction had been decreed in 1747 after some unidentified relatives claimed he was 
mentecatto, and the authorities’ enquiries demonstrated that he was “so imbecile and of little 
soundness of mind [poco sano di mente]” that nobody believed him capable of properly 
managing his affairs.930  
The script employed in the interdiction proceedings of Antonio Becciani was 
remarkably similar to the one that had been employed to interdict his predecessor twenty 
years before. The interesting thing is that in 1747, the petitioners, witnesses and authorities 
agreed that Giovan Battista’s wife was not only equally incapable of assuming the 
management of her husband’s affairs, but she was even held responsible for the perilous state 
of the patrimony. Given that everyone considered Giovan Battista to be weak and imbecile, 
the economic mismanagement was primarily attributed to Caterina, who lived separately from 
her husband, who dissipated it to satisfy her “splendid” tendencies as she even withheld 
money from Becciani.   
                                                
928 Ibid.  
929 Mellyn, Mad Tuscans and Their Families and Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
930 “...Becciani è talmente imbecille, e poco sano di mente che non viene stimato da veruno capace di potere 




Consequently, it is particularly interesting to note that around 20 years later she 
decided to denounce her son for economic mismanagement, resorting to almost the same 
arguments raised against her and her spouse when the latter had been interdicted. Hereditary 
mental disturbance was a visible and acknowledged reality in the eighteenth century, and so 
when Caterina Puccini decided to frame her son’s incapacity in similar terms to those used in 
her husband’s interdiction, she was relying on this awareness.931 The economy of words and 
frugality of terms is in part thus explained, not only because the categories of demente, 
mentecatto or melenso were generally sufficient when backed up by reliable witnesses, but 
even more because the antecedent of a father interdicted for a similar mental condition was by 
itself convincing. However, later developments in the story reveal that the words initially 
chosen to describe Becciani’s mental incapacity give an incomplete image on how his 
relatives actually perceived it. In what proves to be a pattern rather than an exception, 
standardized narratives often conceal nuanced conceptions of what mental incapacity 
amounted to, what its consequences beyond the risk posed to the patrimony were, and how 
disturbed emotions were becoming a decisive sign. Furthermore, families demonstrate a clear 
awareness of the implications attached to the argument of mental incapacity, which it was 
possible to direct according to one’s means.   
The disclosure of more nuanced perceptions of mental incapacity is tied to changes in 
the familial dynamics of the situations that led its members to resort to the interdiction in the 
first place. The narratives in the above case delve into the depths of Antonio’s mental 
sufferings in response to the disputes that flared up between the family members, bearing 
witness to the extent to which madness was a contextual and relational reality. Shortly after 
the second interdiction, Antonio Becciani’s wife, Maddalena Palloni, claimed her husband 
had been declared melenso by her in-laws with the sole purpose of taking advantage of him. 
The woman’s argument was that her husband, whom the Beccianis had sought to present as 
“imbecile of mind”, was not “the mad person [non è quel mentecatto] depicted by Benedetto 
his brother.”932 She acknowledged that her husband was a “man by nature weak in cognition 
and spirit, [and] prone to be seduced”, but this only made him unable to defend himself from 
his brother’s schemes. Benedetto’s machinations were also directed against her, resorting to 
                                                
931 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of conceptions of hereditary madness and how families gathered expertise and 
familiarity with the forms of the procedure through experiences of interdiction across the generations.   
932 “...fusse imbecille di mente...” and “...il medesimo non è quel mentecatto, che si dipinge da Benedetto di lui 
fratello...”, Written testimony sent by Maddalena Palloni to illustrate her petition to be appointed again 




all sort of strategies, arriving even to physical attacks, to try to keep Maddalena away from 
her husband and the administration of the interdicted patrimony.933  
The claim that he was not as mad as his brother had intended him to appear, but was 
still of a weak cognition and spirit evolved into “dangerous imbecility” and “melancholic 
humour” in the subsequent petitions by Maddalena Palloni. Becciani, who had initially been 
depicted as of weak character and suffering a certain degree of mental impairment, was in 
1773 described as prone to suffering outbursts of anger that put his wife’s life in serious 
danger. One of these aggressive episodes was considered so serious that the Pupilli were 
moved to order the provisional separation of the couple. All the efforts conducted by the 
officials “to procure peace and reunite the couple” had by now proved unsuccessful in 
overcoming “the imbecility and extravagancy of Anton Luigi Becciani, his cruelties against 
his wife and the abuses she has suffered, the unwise and disrespectful behaviour of Benedetto 
Becciani, the indiscretion of Caterina Puccini, and her mistreatment of her daughter-in-
law.”934   
About a month later Maddalena requested that she be allowed to resume her life at her 
husband’s side, claiming that, notwithstanding his past abuses and mistreatments, she did not 
fear the “dangerous imbecility of her spouse, which makes him fall sometimes into 
extravagances.”935 She explained that, although Becciani’s “melancholic humour” could not 
be “controverted”, she had “not the least fear”, judging from the “practice she [had] acquired 
of his nature in the many years they lived together.”  If her husband had committed “some 
extravagances” against her (that is, if he had reacted aggressively by attacking and beating her 
                                                
933 “...per essere uomo per natural debolezza di cognizione, e di spirito, facile ad essere sedotto...”, Petition of 
Maddalena Palloni, ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2308, no. 108, February 1771. Maddalena was referring here to 
a period in which Antonio, persuaded by his kin, felt a strong animosity towards her. As a result, he sent a 
petition to the Pupilli requesting them to send her away from him, declaring that Maddalena had inflicted 
“insufferable abuses” on him. The case discloses a long-term conflict between Maddalena and her brother-in-law 
whom, she claimed, had always hated her and opposed her marriage. Her narratives depict Benedetto as violent 
and capable of any scheme in pursuit of his abusive intentions. In contrast, Benedetto tried to attack her 
credibility by accusing her of marrying for opportunism, of dissipating her husband’s resources and of 
maintaining dishonourable friendships with various men. His testimony is striking for its obvious similarities 
with the line of accusation made against his mother Caterina when the late Giovan Battista Becciani had been 
interdicted in 1747. Disputes between women and their brothers-in-law are a common ingredient of the familial 
conflicts disclosed to the Pupilli for mediation. See Calvi, Il contratto morale, pp. 87-105. 
934 “...la imbecillità, e stravaganza d’Ant. Luigi Becciani, le di lui sevizie contro la moglie, e gli strapazzi da 
questa sofferti, il poco savio, e rispettoso contegno di Benedetto Becciani, l’indiscretezza della Caterina Puccini, 
et i mali trattamenti, che essa fa alla sua nuora.” Report of the officials of the Magistrato dei Pupilli, ASF, 
MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2309, no. 147, August 1773.  
935 “...l’imbecillità pericolosa del consorte, che lo fa cadere alcune volte in stravaguanze [sic]...” Before she 
made this request, Maddalena herself attempted to send him to Santa Dorotea but he was not found to suffer the 




with different objects), this was due to his mother’s and brother’s instigation. They, she said, 
oppressed Becciani and “overheated his fantasy” with ill-intentioned insinuations against 
her.936  
In the many petitions Maddalena Palloni sent to the Pupilli we see her ability to define 
and fluently elaborate on her husband’s mental condition. The instrumental incorporation of 
concepts in accordance with the goal of the narrative becomes particularly clear in this case. 
Becciani’s mother and brother alleged his imbecility and stupidity to obtain the two 
interdiction decrees. Maddalena Palloni, on her part, raised the concepts of his “weakness” 
and natural tendency to be oppressed by his relatives’ machinations, his tendency to suffer 
melancholic episodes during which he became violent, his irritable and easily influenced 
imagination, among other things, to explain Becciani’s irascible reactions towards her. 
Especially interesting is her use of the terms melancholy and melancholic humour, which she 
frames as a “temporary bad humour” or “the critical moments when her husband is seized 
[sorpreso] by some melancholy.” She explains that these critical moments were engineered 
by “their common enemies”, who “disconcerted... his spirit.” Furthermore, during the period 
they lived apart from Becciani’s relatives, he was free of these episodes, and they had been 
able to spend their time harmoniously.937 
Her explanations are particularly interesting for us as they underscore the shift that can 
be observed in the ways mental afflictions were conceived by lay society during the second 
half of the eighteenth century. The conception of cyclical episodes of melancholy were, of 
course, not new but the difference here is how she explains her husband’s disease in 
connection to his individuality and his biography. Maddalena employed the terms 
“sconcertare” “spirito” and “cattivo umore”, which were the traditional terms used to frame 
the humoral imbalance responsible for diseases such as melancholy. The difference lies, 
however, in how she framed them. Her descriptions do not allude to physical sensations or to 
                                                
936 “...per quanto non possa controvertersi l’umore malinconico del marito, pur tutta volta per la pratica che essa 
ha acquistata del di lui naturale, ne più anni che vive insieme, non ha il minimo timore di sorpresa, e se qualche 
stravaganza detto suo marito ha commessa è stata sempre per istigazione di chi con spirito cattivo tenta di vedere 
l’oppressione del marito della supplicante, e de loro figli... l’ultima commessa fragilità è stata originata per 
essergli stata riscaldata la fantasia sempre a danno dell’oratrice, come il medesimo suo marito ha replicatamente 
confessato”. Ibid. 
937 “Poteva veramente la supplicante sottrarsi da questo travaglio e scansare facilmente il passeggiero cattivo 
umore di suo consorte, per la ragione sopra espressa di ben conoscere i momenti critici, che suo marito è 
sorpreso da qualche malinconia, sempre originata dai nostri comuni nemici, che sanno sconcertare quando più 
gli piace il di lui spirito, ed’ è pur troppo vero, che quando la supplicante è vissuta sola col marito, e con i figli, 
cioè lontana da chi gli giurò perpetua guerra, hanno goduto di quella pace, che desidera la supplicante a tutti i 




corporeal phenomena, but are entirely related to the realm of the mind and the emotional 
suffering he endured due to disquieting familial situations. Her narratives suggest she 
understood her husband’s disease as the effects of a perturbed (and thus sick) mind.  
Maddalena’s lexicon denotes the shift that, according to Michael Stolberg, can be 
observed in the letters of eighteenth-century French and German patients’ regarding the 
meanings attributed to the terms temperament and humour. According to Stolberg, references 
to a bad, lively or fluctuating humour during this century were more related to what we today 
understand as mood or disposition than to the balance between the four humours.938 This 
assertion can be taken further if we consider the role ascribed to Becciani’s mind. Although 
we cannot determine if Maddalena conceived of Becciani’s disposition as rooted in the body 
–as Stolberg claims most laypeople and medical practitioners did at the time – we can 
certainly observe that she conceived of Becciani’s mind as being responsible for creating the 
fluctuations of his temperament. Rather than ascribing Becciani’s mental affliction to the 
effects of a sick body or to the result of humoral imbalance, Maddalena’s narratives centre on 
the distorted ideas his mind created. The ideas about Maddalena’s supposed dishonourable 
friendships were so powerful that just the possibility of her infidelity obsessed him to the 
extent of clouding his judgement and disturbing his mind. His exacerbated jealousy was held 
to have such a pernicious effect on his damaged mind, that it isolated him from reality and 
made him reject their new-born, conviced that he was illegitimate.  
Maddalena’s line of argument was shared by the rest of the narratives that comprise 
the proceedings. The Podestà had in fact given notification that Becciani’s disturbed fantasy 
had been triggered by a jealousy harboured as a result of the rumours, inflated by his brother 
and mother, regarding Maddalena’s alleged infidelities. Siding in this with Becciani’s kin, he 
claimed that “most of the petitioner’s passions and turbazioni d’animo come from his wife’s 
sociability.”939 Although the Podestà introduced a story that differed from what Maddalena 
Palloni had asserted that, all the same, he agreed with her on the nature and main source of 
Becciani’s mental disturbance. Whether labelled as passions, as turbazioni d’animo, 
overheated fantasy or melancholic humour, all the involved parties agreed on the fact that the 
cause of his mental affliction was ascribed to emotional disturbance.        
                                                
938 Stolberg, Experiencing Illness, p. 88 
939 “le maggiori passioni, e turbazioni d’animo dell’oratore procedino delle pratiche della moglie.” ASF, MPAP, 




There is one more issue to examine regarding the lexicon employed to articulate 
Becciani’s mental affliction. Maddalena Palloni, certain witnesses and the authorities talk 
about his melancholy and melancholic humour, but the descriptions also describe him as 
having a violent behaviour. We observe expressions such as that he was “infuriated” 
(infuriatosi), that “his fantasy was overheated” by his relatives (essergli stata riscaldata la 
fantasia), that he mistreated and inflicted “cruelties” against his wife (strapazzi and sevizie) or 
that he manifested a “dangerous imbecility” (imbecillità pericolosa), illustrated with 
references to a particular occasion when Maddalena had been forced to escape from the 
matrimonial residence, running desperately to find help against her husband’s fury. Thus, 
Becciani’s story suggests that lay society conceived the proximity between low spirits and 
mania as a natural consequence of the shifting emotional disturbances that characterized a 
deranged mind. Furthermore, it suggests that emotional agitation and shifting moods were at 
the centre of the cultural understanding of madness. 
Doctors frequently alerted the authorities to a melancholic delirium that could easily 
turn into a furious one, as attested by many of the Santa Dorotea records.940 In the Becciani 
story, we do not see the term delirium, or furioso, or mania, but nonetheless the 
symptomatology and medical categorization of mental diseases appear translated into 
unmedicalized contexts which suggest a very similar conceptualization. Judging from the 
narratives just examined, it seems that towards the second half of the century, lay 
understandings of mental disturbances were close to how contemporary medical knowledge 
approached them, without direct contact with medical practitioners being necessary.  
In the records of the interdiction and guardianship of Antonio Becciani, we find no 
evidence that medical opinion was involved. But, neither of the interested parties seemed to 
need expert opinion for a matter that could be observed and sufficiently argued by those 
around the sufferer. The lexicon they employed was neither particularly medical nor 
necessarily new, but its terms, such as “melancholy humour” or “overheated fantasy” were 
transposed to fit the new concerns of the eighteenth century.   
New social concerns made room for more individualistic representations of mental 
disturbance that saw in emotional displays the privileged indicators of the workings of the 
mind. The narratives of Becciani’s mental disturbance defined the characteristics of his 
disorder by following a new purpose. We have seen that since its origins interdiction 
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procedures were primarily aimed at protecting patrimony from the consequences of mental 
incapacity. Thus, requests were primarily argued in relation to property and economic 
behaviour. To a great extent, excessive expenditure, growing debts, the engagement in wrong 
or counterproductive economic transactions had all played a leading role as indicators of 
mental incapacity. This manner of arguing mental incapacity begins to change towards the 
second half of the eighteenth century, when more nuanced interpretations of what constituted 
mental incapacity start to be introduced. As the case of Becciani shows, mental incapacity at 
some point started to be defined not only in connection to patrimony. In this sense, I believe it 
could be argued that the change produced in the understandings of mental incapacity and 
madness during the eighteenth century are located precisely in this shift from patrimony to 
emotions and the mind. Mellyn has suggested that between the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries the novelty in understandings of mental incapacity was the pathologization of 
economic mismanagement.941 Although this existed during the eighteenth century, 
explanations shifted from external and practical behaviours to the manifestations of a 
disturbed mind. And here, mental disturbances played a leading role.   
Relatives and sufferers no longer argued only in relation to patrimony. Given that 
Becciani’s mental incapacity was never challenged, the narratives were not bound to 
economic behaviour. As happens with many other defendants of the eighteenth century, 
Becciani’s case continues to appear not in relation to patrimony administration, but because of 
the relational and emotional dimensions surrounding his mental disturbance. The issues under 
discussion were how and where the mentally afflicted were supposed to live, who was to take 
care of them, what were the responsibilities of their next of kin and what measures could be 
taken to discipline them, cure them, control them. To determine and solve these questions 
more accurate descriptions were necessary, for the conventional legal categories of mental 
incapacity had proved insufficient.   
Narratives acquired more nuanced tones the moment they left the realm of economic 
behaviour to enter the realm of relationships and emotions. Maddalena Palloni spoke of 
herself, her expectations with regards to her matrimony with a man she knew to be 
profoundly sick, but whose mental disturbances she accepted anyway, in what can be 
interpreted as a mixture of genuine affection and a more practical concern to ensure she was 
not separated from her children. Wives raising their voices and using this mixture of 
                                                




emotional and practical lines of argumentation are commonly found in the eighteenth century 
records. The possibility of losing one’s children often forced women to accept cohabitation 
with a mentally afflicted man, and this was among the standard issues negotiated between 
women and the authorities in interdiction procedures. But they received something valuable in 
exchange: the Pupilli usually placed them as administrators of their husband’s patrimony, and 
even if a third person was entrusted with this task, they were generally the preferred mediators 
between the government administration and the interdicted. 
As Maddalena Palloni defined her experiences and her sufferings in front of the 
authorities, she also delved into her husband’s experience. She was the ultimate authority on 
Becciani’s mental condition, and the government officials relied mostly on her to build their 
opinion on its characteristics. In the disclosure of the domestic space through the voice of 
women, we see male irrationality under the control of women, who are placed in the position 
of rational agents inside the household, a position that was in fact promoted and ratified by 
the authorities. The solution to family disorder and to patrimonial mismanagement were 
placed in the hands of women: mothers, wives or widows who were seen to have the power to 
produce the desired change in men. Or, if their men’s mental condition was conceived as 
irreparable, women were the best option to reduce the damage it caused.     
 
7. 3. Emotional Disturbances as Evidence of Mental Affliction 
What unifies the different spaces in which madness made its appearance during the 
eighteenth century is the increasing visibility acquired by emotional perturbations as evidence 
of mental disturbance. Although we have seen that medical terminology generally did not 
penetrate the civil and criminal courts, we can observe shared meanings of madness and 
common understandings to explain it, particularly regarding the role attributed to emotional 
disturbances. On the one hand, the tendency to manifest consistent and frequent emotional 
perturbations was employed by litigants and government officials to indicate a clouded 
judgement or a disturbed mind. On the other, the emotional perturbations suffered by those 
catalogued as mentally incapacitated increasingly became a major concern for the 
surrounding family members, as we saw in the previous section. The picture of the evolution 
undergone by the procedure of interdiction during the century is illustrative on this matter. At 
the beginning of the period, we have seen, interdictions were primarily based on the fact of 




to revoke the interdiction generally argued that the interdicted had recovered their capacity to 
administer, or they otherwise refuted the initial accusation of mismanagement. Consequently, 
roughly until the 1740s, interdiction proceedings showed little concern for the characteristics 
of the alleged mental incapacity besides its economic consequences. However, with time 
interdiction narratives came to pay increasing attention to deviant emotional displays both as 
a way of proving mental incapacity and as a way of illustrating its consequences on family 
life, thereby arguing for the intervention of the governmental apparatus.  
Actions and emotions were judged and interpreted according to specific contexts, in 
evaluations that were both gender specific and age specific. Context transformed a given 
emotional reaction into a sign of mental incapacity.942 Thus, each space of appearance 
constituted a sort of “emotional community”, to follow Barbara Rosenwein’s term.943 The 
same emotional reaction could be considered justified or utterly irrational depending on why, 
where and to whom it had been directed and disclosed. Not all forms of emotional distress 
singled out as breaching the accepted codes were identified as a sign of mental disturbance. 
Factors such as financial behaviour, quotidian behaviour and repetition of the events were 
what denoted mental disturbance.  
Which emotional perturbations constituted evidence of mental disturbance was 
contingent upon each case, based on an evaluation that was highly contextual in nature. 
Emotional displays were not assessed in the abstract, but in close connection to the 
circumstances that surrounded their expression. When, why and to whom a given emotional 
reaction was displayed, and who experienced it were key factors in deciding whether it was a 
just and correct expression of emotional distress, or if it breached the cannons of accepted 
behaviour.   
The universe of emotional reactions included can be organized under active and 
passive types or according to the emotion involved, which roughly correspond to the 
opposing poles of mania and melancholia. I have arranged them under anger, irritability and 
irascibility on the one hand, and emotional instability, anguish and inquietudine, on the other 
hand.  At the end I examine the concept of extravagance as an overarching category that 
encompassed the violent and the anguished form. Many of the terms employed to make 
reference to emotional disruption are words that also have very precise physical meanings, 
                                                
942 The contextual nature of the interpretations of emotions, its performative nature and the interplay between 
the cultural context and individual agency have been at the core of seminal studies for the history of emotions. 
See Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling and Rosenwein, Emotional Communities. 




bearing witness to the loose boundaries between mind and body. Inquietudine was at the same 
time restlessness and the feeling of disquiet, anguish could be used to mean that the heart or 
the lungs were under pressure, as well as to mean emotional anguish (angustia d’animo).944   
 
Anger, Irritability and Irascibility 
Passions and Crime 
Guided by the principles established by Roman law, the Tuscan criminal system 
considered that strong passions had the power to alter one’s judgement and capacity of 
discernment. Strong passions were considered to be attenuating circumstances provided it 
could be proven that they had left the suspect deprived of full discernment. However, 
diminished responsibility was not only determined by the assessment of the extent to which 
the passion had disturbed the person’s mind. According to Savelli’s compendium of judicial 
practices, “crimes committed moved by just rage, anger or pain caused by offences, 
provocations or other just causes are not punished with ordinary penalty, but with an 
arbitrary, more lenient one according to the quality of the fault and the person,” so long as the 
accused had not persevered in his or her intentions after the crime.945  
Diminished responsibility by reason of a disturbing passion was dependant upon the 
possibility of proving that the rage had been sudden and violent (no time could elapse 
between provocation and reaction), that it had been caused by justified reasons, and that the 
crime had not been premeditated. Although reacting violently to a serious offence was 
considered justified anger, if the anger had been controlled and later evolved into a studied 
revenge leading to an attack days after the first offence, the crime changed from 
                                                
944 Angustia and angustiato was employed in at least three contexts in the eighteenth century. Anguished 
(angustiato) could accompany patrimony and debts: a patrimony was anguished when it was at risk of 
bankruptcy, someone was anguished by creditors if he or she was oppressed by them. Additionally, angustia was 
used in medical language not only for psychological anguish (angustie d’animo), but also to describe the 
physical contraction or physical distress of an organ (as angustia di petto, angustia alla gola, angustie del 
respiro, sostanza del cervello... angustiata), which entailed a “sensation” of distress. This is one of the pieces of 
evidence identified by Smith in French and English medical consultations for the overlap between the mind and 
body. Smith, “‘An Account of an Unaccountable Distemper’”, p. 463. For examples on these, see Del Papa, 
Consulti Medici, vol. II, Consultations 30, 44 and 56. 
945 “Delitti commessi per iracondia, ira, o giusto dolore causato da ingiurie, provocazioni, o altre giuste cause 
non si puniscono di pena ordinaria, ma d’altra arbitraria più mite secondo la qualità dell’eccesso, e persone, 
mentre che il delinquente non perseverasse nella mala volontà ratificando anco doppo il delitto, ò che la causa 
dell’ira, ò provocazione fusse ingiusta, come se egli fusse stato il primo a provocare, ò in altra maniera facendo 
cosa illecita, e proibita, o che l’ira e causa di essa fusse stata molto leggiera, e non si provasse, perchè in questi 




unpremeditated murder to attempted murder. For instance, in a 1730 procedure for attempted 
murder resulting from a brawl, it was established that the suspect was motivated by a desire 
for revenge, considering the time that had elapsed between the insult that had elicited his rage 
and the actual attack, which occurred some days later.946 Even if a father was justly defending 
his daughter’s honour, if his need for revenge (ira) had moved him to prepare the assault, the 
just cause behind his passion was insufficient to diminish his culpability. On the contrary, it 
would prove that he had acted with conscience and malice. Intent, motivation and 
premeditation can be clearly established in these cases. Now, if the passion leading to the 
crime was unjustified, even if the action was unpremeditated, the suspect could be charged 
with the full rigour of the law.  
Crimes that were committed when driven by feelings of anger, hate, revenge or 
jealousy are common in the records of the Otto di Guardia, the majority of which were judged 
with the ordinary penalty. However, in some cases the crime was found to have been 
committed while under a perturbed state of mind caused by a strong passion. But solely the 
fact that a murder had been committed “under the heat of anger” felt by the offender when he 
found out that the victim had seriously injured a close relative was not necessarily enough 
grounds to reduce a sentence.947 The definitive signs that the line of sanity had been crossed 
lay in the pattern that could be identified behind the events. That is, it depended on the 
possibility of proving that the crime had been unpremeditated or fortuitous, the nature and 
intensity of the passion, but also on the person’s biography, for it was pertinent if they had a 
tendency to lose their temper to the point of irrationality.  
The key to how lawyers and judges assessed the emotional reaction under scrutiny is 
provided by the words accompanying the aforementioned feelings. Sometimes, the anger is 
only termed as “avutosi a male”, or “revocatosi all’animo”, or a “mal animo”, which needed 
to be “sfogato”, expressions that described the feeling of resentment and indignation caused 
by a certain event that eventually led to the need to vent it. However, in other cases the 
accused had been “infuriated” (infuriatosi) and with his “blood upside down” (il sangue 
sottosopra),948 acted in “the heat of anger” and the “heat of passion” (calore dell’ira and 
                                                
946 ASF, OGB, Negozi, F. 2135, Negozio 7357, no. 3, September 1730. On the contrary, a brawl with serious 
insults and a physical attack were reasons that justified murder in self defence, allowing the accused to escape 
the death sentence. See Ibid., Negozio 7358, no. 1, December 1730.   
947 ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2530, no. 95, July 1750.  




calore della passione),949 or “taken by anger” (preso dall’iracondia).950 Descriptions here 
draw on the usual physical changes that were thought to accompany an outburst of rage, to 
highlight the degree to which the feeling had clouded the suspect’s judgement.951    
Episodes of frantic anger appear in fact as an argument frequently put forward in 
petitions to reduce a sentence. Even if these petitions did not always result in a favourable 
response, they are indicative of the interpretations given to these emotions, and their power to 
alter a person’s mind. Resolutions regarding how to punish and when reductions of penalty 
were to be conceded, as we have seen, were passed after taking complicated aspects into 
consideration, ranging from the seriousness of the crime, to the familial, social and mental 
circumstances of the accused. For instance, a man charged with the murder of his father-in-
law was sentenced to the galleys for life, although the criminal proceedings established that 
he had acted “infuriated” by his wife’s denial to return him some items that belonged to him. 
So, the attack had been clearly fortuitous, and could be explained because he had “the blood 
upside down” by reason of his wife’s insults and refutation. Since the attack had been 
unpremeditated and he had not been in control of himself while he committed it, he was 
spared the death sentence. Nonetheless, this was not found to be reason enough to grant a 
further grazia, as the accused later requested.952 
Excessive displays of rage were frequently accompanied by inebriation, which 
theoretically served to prove further the extent to which the person had been bereft of reason 
when committing the crime. Drunkenness, it was widely agreed, exacerbated the inability to 
control one’s temper. Petitioners in fact tried to attenuate their responsibility using the 
argument that while “overheated with wine” (riscaldati dal vino) they had been “seized with 
anger” (sorpreso dalla collera)953 or “seized with violent passion and insurmountable anger” 
(sorpreso da violenta passione, e da insuperabile collera).954   
                                                
949 ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 754, no. 60, July 1743.  
950 ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2530, no. 95, July 1750.  
951 On the physical signs accompanying anger, see Carrera, “Anger and the Mind-Body Connection”; Kristine 
Steenbergh, “Green Wounds: Pain, Anger and Revenge in Early Modern Culture”, The Sense of Suffering: 
Constructions of Physical Pain in Early Modern Culture, Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen and Karl A. E. Enenkel 
(eds.) (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 165-188; Alberti, “‘An Angry and Malicious Mind’?”. 
952 ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2511, no. 8, April 1730.  
953 ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2537, no. 173, August 1761. 
954 ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2537, no. 202, August 1761. Because the there was always a concern for 
discipline, men who pointed to their inebriation to explain their irascible reaction were not likely to see their 
sentence commuted. The circumstances surrounding the crime and the individual’s past history were 




Defence of honour, revenge, “passions” and jealousy were the most commonly 
mentioned triggers of uncontrolled outbursts of passions leading to criminal prosecution.955 In 
all these cases petitioners singled out uncontrolled anger, of a kind that temporarily disturbed 
their judgements, as what moved them to act. Anger presented in the form of an irrational 
passion was not only present in lower-class street brawls, but was equally censured in the 
higher ranks of Tuscan society, whose social ethos demanded, especially from men, the 
capacity to reflect upon the manifestation of passion before taking an action. For instance, in 
1743 a noble man was denounced to the Auditore Fiscale because, sword in hand, he had 
demanded recompense for an offence. Instead of giving the offender enough time to defend 
himself, he let himself be overcome by the “heat of passion” and attacked immediately. The 
noble man himself attributed afterwards the episode to the “heat of anger”, which had not 
allowed him to “reflect” properly.956  
Anger, independently of whether it stemmed from unrequited love, jealousy, or just 
revenge, appears in criminal procedures as the quintessential passion that “blinded”, 
overpowered and transported the accused far from the realm of reason. While the power of 
passions to shatter one’s reason was widely accepted, judges often differed with petitioners 
regarding the extent its consequences could be condoned. Let’s compare two situations. A 
father shot a man “taken by passion and blinded” (presso dalla passione, ed accecato) to 
defend his daughter’s honour, whom the victim intended to “make love to” (amoreggiare) 
and had declared his intention to make her pregnant at any cost.957 In another case, a man shot 
his lover as he was “transported with passion” (trasportato dalla passione) when he found out 
that she intended to abandon him.958 Although in both cases the victim had survived the 
attack, in the first one the man was sentenced to internal exile (confino), while in the second 
                                                
955 Honour, revenge and jealousy appear to be the common denominator of the early modern criminal 
prosecution. See Brackett, Criminal Justice and Crime; Dean Crime and Justice in Late Medieval Italy or Trevor 
Dean, and K.J.P. Lowe, (eds.), Crime, Society and the Law in Renaissance Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). The connection between irrational emotions in the shaping of notions of criminal 
insanity still constitute an underexplored field, particularly in the Italian context.    
956 ASF, CR, Fiscale, F. 754, no. 60, July 1743. It is well known that duelling was not an act of uncontrolled 
anger or committed in the heat of passion, but was instead a controlled and well-planned settling of a dispute 
among elite societies. The ritualized forms of anger that characterized duelling have been the script for studies 
following Elias’ civilizing process. See for instance Edward Muir, Mad Blood Stirring: Vendetta in Renaissance 
Italy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) and Robert B. Shoemaker, “The Taming of the Duel: 
Masculinity, Honour and Ritual Violence in London, 1660-1800”, The Historical Journal 45, no. 3 (2002), pp. 
525-545. For a resent contribution on the connections between honour and violence, see Carolyn Strange, Robert 
Cribb and Christopher E. Forth (eds.), Honour, Violence and Emotions in History (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).    
957 ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2537, no. 93, January 1761.  




he was sentenced to death. Both passions were framed as irrational, but one was considered 
justified, the other not.  
We can observe that in both cases the effect of the passion over the person’s 
judgement was portrayed by the petitioners with the aim of moving the Grand Duke to grant 
them the grazia of their sentence. While subject to this feeling, the petitions intended to 
argue, the accused had not been able to command himself. Both defendants had allowed 
themselves to be commanded by passion, yielding to its force. In both cases this force 
assumed the form of uncontrollable rage. According to the Otto officials, in the case of the 
rejected lover, his amorous affection had mutated into “hate and grudge” against the woman 
(concepisse perciò verso di lei odio, e rancore), and the attack was thus explained by the urge 
to “vent” (sfogare) such hostility.959 Thus, what the petitioner intended to frame as a powerful 
force that captured his mind and commanded his will without him being able to do anything, 
the judges considered to be the effect of a “determination” (determinatosi di volersi sfogare) 
to “vent” his hatred. Unpremeditated attempts of murder under the effect of a disturbed state 
of mind were changed by the judges into deliberate revenge. In contrast, the need to defend a 
daughter’s honour, even if this resulted in attempted murder, was considered less 
reprehensible and the motives behind the action were not questioned. Nonetheless, it only 
served to spare the indicted the death sentence, but not to escape internal exile.960 
Similarly to what Natalie Davis has pointed out regarding sixteenth-century pardon 
tales, I have not found any cases where the disturbing powers exerted by anger over the mind 
were employed to diminish the responsibility of women for committing a crime.961 Women 
do appear engaged in crimes of murder, assault and slander, but their anger is generally not 
used as either a mitigating or an aggravating factor.962 In cases of quarrels and altercation that 
ended in physical violence, women were also said to have “taken it badly” (avutosi a male) 
when somebody had insulted them or their families, and so they threw a stone in response, for 
                                                
959 Ibid. 
960 Similarly, a man charged with the infanticide of his grandchild was spared the death sentence because he had 
acted driven by the passion that “overpowered” or “oppressed” him (sopraffatto dalla passione) when he found 
out about his daughter’s pregnancy, which was only when she gave birth. Although he requested a lenient 
sentence, it was not granted. ASF, OGB, Suppliche, F. 2523, no. 161, March 1743/44. 
961 Davis, Fiction in the Archives, p. 81-82. It is well known that more men than women were prosecuted for 
violent behaviour in the early modern courts. However, as Garthine Walker suggests, “This interpretative model 
of men’s violence as ‘normal’ and women’s as numerically and thus culturally insignificant is inadequate”. 
Garthine Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p. 75.     
962 However, to prove this assertion it would be necessary to conduct a more systematic study of the Tuscan 




instance.963 Female and male violence stemmed from similar motives: defence of honour, 
self-defence, jealousy, mere animosity or resentment, to name a few. Responding with insults, 
blows, throwing stones or any other violent reaction that could eventually lead to the death of 
an adversary was a likely reaction for both genders. However, female anger, I am tempted to 
say, was not used as evidence of a temporary state of mental obfuscation. The attenuating 
factors of their physical violence or murderous actions were more likely to be found in the 
principles of self-defence and honour, on the one hand, and lack of full discernment or plain 
simplicity (semplicità or sciocchezza), on the other – notably when women tried to excuse 
infanticide –  rather than in an uncontrollable fit of rage.964   
Angry Reactions in Civil Procedures 
When we leave the domain of criminal justice to enter interdiction procedures or 
special requests to denounce a disordered relative, the association between certain forms of 
anger and mental disturbance is revealed to be not only gender specific, but also age specific. 
While emotional instability was identified as evidence of both female and male mental 
disturbance, violent and particularly irascible reactions are almost invariably associated with 
men. Frequent and ungrounded outbursts of rage appear as a typical characteristic of male 
mental incapacity in interdiction records. Divenuto furioso, solito dare in frenesia, feroce, 
fiero or furibondo are characteristics that appear regularly in the family narratives disclosed to 
the Tuscan authorities. Different gradations of mistreatments (strapazzi) or physical and 
verbal abuse were frequently introduced as evidence of the disorder in which men in a state of 
mental incapacity found themselves. The signs of disturbed angry reactions were to be of an 
“unruly nature and a quarrelsome disposition” (natura poco docile e di animo rissoso) or a 
“ferocious nature” (naturale feroce), the tendency to be transported by sudden wrath or 
outbursts of fury for the most unexpected reasons (escandescenze and furiosi trasporti), being 
driven by a maddening fury and engaging in “excesses of fury” (furibondo frenetico and 
eccessi de furia).965  
                                                
963 ASF, OGB, Giornale di Negozzi del Banco di Città, F. 985, fol. 6, November 1749. Female violence was not 
only exerted between women, but also against men.  
964 See, for instance, the case of a woman tried for infanticide who claimed she had committed the crime to 
defend her honour and out of her “semplicità e sciocchezza” (simplicity and foolishness). ASF, OGB, Suppliche, 
F. 2499, no. 74, November 1720. 
965 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 286, September 1752; Ibid., F. 2302, no. 231, February 1751; Ibid., F. 




Although irascible reactions were given as evidence of male mental incapacity 
throughout the adult lifecycle, irascibility and a tendency to let themselves be galvanized by a 
surge of anger was more frequently associated with old age. Interdiction procedures suggest 
that irritability and illogical fits of anger were thought to be aggravated when men reached the 
last decades of their lives. When men were considered to have reached a “decrepit age” –
roughly in their 70s and 80s – they were depicted as particularly prone to being governed by 
their fits of fury.966 When interdiction narratives involving old men delved into the realm of 
disturbed emotions to evidence mental incapacity, the reaction that most frequently comes up 
is the product of maddening fury. A series of undesirable and reprehensible actions were said 
to be committed under the “heat of anger” or “under the impetuosity of indignation and 
anger.”967 Interdiction records portray the mental decay of old men as a stage in life 
characterized by an emotional instability that most of the times assumed the form of 
uncontrolled fits of fury.968  
Although emotional disturbances in old age remain an unexplored field, the 
historiography of the experience and the cultural meanings of early modern old age have 
usually described a tendency to low spirits as its most commonly attributed emotional 
affliction. Thus, the connection observed in interdiction procedures between growing 
irascibility and old age is at odds with what the specialized scholarship has determined based 
on different sources. In fact, humoral theory tended to view old age as a stage in life mostly 
governed by melancholy and phlegm, tending to passivity rather than to aggressiveness. 
According to studies of eighteenth-century medical literature on old age which have touched 
upon the emotional disturbances of old age, medical writing saw the elderly as no longer 
                                                
966 For instance, the interdiction proceedings of Filippo Catani, 89 years old; Carlo Felici, 84 years old, ASF, 
MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 218, April 1744; Giovanni Magherini, 70 years old, Antonio Forenzani of 90 
years old, Ibid, F. 2302, no. 73, January 1748/49; Francesco Taddei, of “advanced age”, Ibid, F. 2303, no. 213, 
September 1754.  
967 “...nel calore dell’iracondia, e della vendetta...” and “...nell'impeto dello sdegno, e dell'ira...” ASF, MPAP, 
Memoriali, F. 2301, no. 218, April 1744. Contrary to its English definition, the word impetuosity (impeto) in 
Italian meant not only to act “quickly and without thought or care”, but referred more to the emotional 
disposition that commanded the movement. Impeto was a “movement accompanied by violence and fury.” See, 
respectively, Oxford Dictionaries, s.v. “impetuous”, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/impetuous?q=impetuosity#impetuous__6 and Vocabolario 
degli accademici della Crusca, 4th ed. (1729-1738), s.v. “impeto”, http://www.lessicografia.it/IMPETO, both 
accessed 19 August 2014. 
968 See, for instance, Botelho, “The 17th century”, in Thane, The Long History of Old Age, p. 127-131 or 
Classen, Old Age in the Middle Ages, “Introduction”, p. 34. I have examined this topic in Mariana Labarca, “The 
Emotional Disturbances of Old Age: On the Articulation of Old-Age Mental Incapacity in Eighteenth-Century 




troubled by unwanted passions, for mental and physical decline was thought concomitant to 
“weakening of sensations, appetites and passions.”969 
    We need to bear in mind that the characteristics of the sources examined here, as I 
have pointed out several times, conditioned the narratives. The disruption to family life 
caused by prodigality and dementia changed according to the age of the defendant. While in 
the case of young men the issues at stake were their future families and the authority of their 
elders or, in the case of middle-aged men, the administration and care of a current family, in 
the case of the elderly the family was already grown up, and so it was a matter of legacy and 
inheritance. It could be argued, therefore, that the family conflicts surrounding the elderly 
made the interdiction narratives denouncing both old men and old women more open to 
descriptions regarding the emotional realm. But, besides these reasons, which could be 
circumstantial, the major difference between the emotional disturbances described in old age 
and those of younger ages can be found in the meanings attributed to such emotional displays. 
Whilst in the case of younger defendants interdiction narratives ascribed the manifestation of 
emotional disruptions to mental illness, in the case of the elderly they were invariably 
attributed to the effects of old age. In other words, old age produced the inability to control 
one’s emotions, together with the mental decay it entailed.  
The meanings of fury or any type of anger able to cloud one’s judgment when they 
appear in interdiction procedures should be examined against a bigger picture. Anger has been 
examined as an important force behind matrimonial litigations, for instance. Insults and 
verbal abuse, physical violence and even death threats were part of the family conflicts 
disclosed to Early Modern courts, and constituted the most common cause for matrimonial 
litigation. As scholars working with matrimonial disputes have pointed out, the fact that anger 
and violent reactions appear almost invariably associated with male behaviour has more to do 
with the uses and requirements of justice than with an actual gendered differentiation. For a 
request of separation to be successful, petitioners – predominantly female – had to present 
plausible stories and strong motives, among which sevizie (cruelties) and physical threats that 
put their life in danger were amongst the most effective.970 Against this context, there is 
nothing particularly remarkable in the repeated allusions to mistreatment and aggressive 
behaviour portrayed in interdiction procedures, except that they were argued as evidence of 
                                                
969 Troyansky, Old Age in the Old Regime, 119. See also Schäfer, “‘That Senescence Itself is an Illness’”.   
970 La Rocca, Tra moglie e marito, p. 256. In most European scenarios women were the most common initiators 
of matrimonial suits. See also Silvana Seidel Menchi, “I processi matrimoniali come fonte storica”, in Seidel 




mental incapacity and behavioural deviance. That is, violent reactions were used not only to 
prove the need to live separately from a husband, but to explain why a father, husband or son 
was thought to be subject to mental disorder.  
Complaints about spousal violence have been mostly examined from the point of view 
of expectations about marriage, the emergence of the so-called romantic family, power 
relations and behavioural norms. However, studies have generally not read these disputes 
from the point of view of the history of madness, thus missing the opportunity to elaborate on 
how litigants conceived of emotional distress, how it was thought to affect the mind, and how 
they made use of the argument to turn a litigation to their favour.  
Thus, the narratives under study here illuminate the problem of references to 
matrimonial violence from a different perspective. The fact that ungrounded or illogical 
violent outbursts were increasingly used as evidence of mental incapacity suggests interesting 
conclusions in this regard. For one, it portrays women as making use of shared codes about 
what constituted mental deviance, and how it affected one’s emotional displays. It also 
suggests that the notion that disturbed emotional reactions served as evidence of altered states 
of mind could have played a role in the change in the way that matrimonial disputes started to 
be settled towards the end of the century.971 Furthermore, women were generally ascribed 
with the role of temporary head of the family while their husbands or sons were in a state of 
mental incapacity, which inverts the traditional order of rationality inside the family, whereby 
judgement and reason were eminently masculine characteristics.   
Frantic fits of fury were at the core of the traditional image of madness. The raving 
mad running amok in the streets was a feature of the social fears that were responsible for 
having devised strategies such as confinement and interdiction to deal with the problem since 
antiquity. We have seen that the furioso was a Roman category that had passed and survived 
in the Tuscan judicial framework until the eighteenth century, even if it had fallen into disuse. 
And the pazzo furioso was the legal category that justified committal to the mental hospital, 
and which was transformed into mania furiosa by the medical language. But, violent reactions 
are not the most common emotional display cited as evidence of mental incapacity in 
interdiction proceedings or in the records of the office of the Auditore Fiscale. Particularly 
towards the second half of the century, emotional disruptions come to encompass a wider 
                                                
971 According to Daniela Lombardi, physical and verbal forms of abuse started to be considered an acceptable 
cause of separation even when life was not in danger towards the end of the century. Daniela Lombardi, “L’odio 
capitale, ovvero l’incompatibilità di carattere. Maria Falcini e Andrea lotti (Firenze 1773-1777)”, in Seidel 




array of displays, ranging from violence, to instability to what we today would call depressive 
states. But what seems even more interesting is the wide rage of emotional distresses 
associated with the same individual. What current psychiatry today calls bipolar disorder was 
a common feature of mental disturbances evidenced through emotional distress. Violent fits 
of anger and frenzy could easily coexist or alternate with low spirits and melancholy. As the 
next section will explore, at the core of these narratives is the perception that the key to 
ascertaining the presence of mental incapacity, instead of fury or persistent low spirits, was 
emotional instability. From the initial descriptions that were limited to the principles of the 
preservation of the family through good economic management, interdiction narratives 
increasingly opened up to more nuanced forms of understanding mental incapacity.   
 
Emotional Instability and Unpredictable Emotional Reactions 
Passions 
In 1756 a man prosecuted for contumacy for firing his arquebuse at his paternal uncles 
attempted to reduce his culpability by claiming he suffered from the “great misfortune” that 
“many times, particularly when agitated by some passion, he remains completely bereft of 
cognition, and totally demented and unable to understand his duty.”972 His petition was 
accompanied by the testimony of his uncles in which they ratified their nephew’s assertion by 
saying he was widely reputed to be pazzo and scemo di cervello. The interesting issue here is 
how the petitioner linked his fits of madness with his tendency to be agitated by some 
passion. Attesting to this new concern that can be observed in the records towards the 
sencond half of the century, the petition circumscribed the crime to an episode of temporary 
madness produced by a disturbing passion. The petition made use of the long-lasting legal 
tradition that attributed to passions the power to cloud a person’s judgement, only that here it 
was placed in a context of a person who was reputed to be evidently mad. In other words, it 
was not that a sudden overpowering rage had moved him to act, as in the majority of the cases 
examined above, but that he was overpowered by rage only becuase he was mentally ill. His 
emotional disturbances were directly framed as pathological, as caused by his mental illness.  
                                                
972 “...esso supplicante per sua gran disgrazia spesse volte, specialmente allora quando è agitato da qualche 
passione, resta affatto privo di cognizione, e totalmente demente, ed incapace di più conoscere il suo dovere...” 




In criminal records, passions are predominantly framed as a sudden feeling of rage, or 
as a tendency to experience fits of fury that resulted in the shattering of a person’s rational 
faculties. However, notwithsdanding the frequent references to passions as a powerful force 
capable of disturbing judgement in the criminal proceedings and supplications to the Otto di 
Guardia, the term makes a relatively minor appearance in the records of the Magistrato dei 
Pupili. The phemomenon is worth examining, particularly if we take into account that passion 
is singled out by scholars as the most common term of the early modern world for making 
reference to emotions, particularly when they were associated with irrationality. Passions was 
still the most frequently used term in eighteenth-century medical literature to make reference 
to disturbed emotions. Hysteria and hypochondria were generally termed Hysterical passion 
or Hypochondriac passion in the eighteenth-century Italian medical consultations. Both 
afflictions were strongly correlated with passioni d’animo, which was the most frequent 
medical expression that reference to those emotions that were capable of “irritating” the 
nerves and producing – or aggravating – mental afflictions.973  
Passion in the records of the Pupilli is mostly employed to make reference to the vital 
force guiding the behaviour of a young prodigal. It was either the “passion” to gamble, the 
need to “satisfy their passions” or the “passion that governs him” that drove them to 
dissipate.974 Passion appeared in this context as a force that took control over the individual, 
commanding his thoughts and actions, inducing unhappy consequences. The passion to spend, 
gamble, sell goods, or indulge in the pleasures of lavishness, women and alcohol was 
portrayed as a compelling force rather than as an overpowering feeling, albeit with the same 
end. The disturbing powers of the passion to gamble assumed particularly exacerbated levels 
when the gambler was confronted by his relatives. In one case, it was said that it turned into a 
“mad passion” (forsennata passione) driving him to engage in “excesses of fury” (eccesi di 
furia), and causing him to manifest “fierce agitations” (fieri trasporti) to the extent of 
“frenzy”, all signs that according to his wife proved his “uncertain temperament and 
                                                
973 See the medical consultations of Niccolò Cirillo, Giuseppe del Papa or Giovanni Targioni Tozzetti, to name a 
few. Cirillo, Consulti Medici; Del Papa, Consulti Medici; BNCF, Manoscritti, GTT, N. 234, “Consultationes 
medicae”, cart.2, fasc. X, Consulti per affezioni ipocondriache ed isteriche”. 
974 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2302, no. 128, April 1749; Ibid., F. 2303, no. 15, December 1751 and no. 59, 
August 1752, respectively. The term appears used in this sense in few more cases, see Ibid., F. 2305, no. 92, 




humour.”975 The compulsion driving the action of the eighteenth-century prodigal strongly 
resembles the driving force of a bipolar sufferer in a manic episode, with hyperactivity and  
an aggressive obstinacy that grew stronger as his gambling was impeded.976   
Alternatively, although to a lesser degree, passion was employed to mean amorous 
affection, lust, or occasional suffering, without implying a force capable of disturbing the 
mind. Contrary to what one might think when taking into account the contemporary medical 
lexicon of psychological suffering, interdiction narratives employed a quite rich and varied 
range of terms to allude to emotional turmoil. Instead of turning to the very common passioni 
d’animo (which I have been able to find only once in the records of the Pupilli), litigants and 
government officials preferred to attach the adjectives of irregular, unstable, uncertain, uneasy 
and extravagant (irregolare, volubile, incerto, inquieto and estravagante) to the nouns used to 
make reference to the psychological state (capo, temperamento, umore, spirito or animo). 
Rather than a persistent preference for one of the extremes of the emotional palette, 
interdiction narratives favoured the image of shifting moods as their preferred evidence for 
mental incapacity. I do not intend to imply here that this can be taken as a sign of a shift from 
passions to emotions. On the contrary, the overwhelming presence of the term in 
contemporary medical literature or in criminal records attests for its currency.977 But, the 
relative absence of the term in the Pupilli records does suggest that Tuscan society preferred a 
different set of terms to make reference to a disordered and uncertain disposition.  
Emotional instability was repeatedly singled out as evidence of some degree of mental 
perturbation in the evidence examined here. Extravagant and irregular characters, 
unpredictable or illogical reactions and unease abound in the narratives of interdiction 
procedures, a profusion replicated in descriptions of perturbed states of mind reported to the 
                                                
975 Accusations of Angiola Mori against her husband Gaetano Giorgi in her interdiction petition, which was not 
granted. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 293, September 1766. Notwithstanding these denunciations, he 
was interdicted only around 6 years later. The case appears again in Ibid., F. 2309, no. 78, May 1773.  
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authorities of the Grand Duchy. Furthermore, if we take into account that what was expected 
in a good pater familias or a virtuous administrator was that he was “well moderated in his 
actions” (ben regolato nelle sue operazioni),978 it becomes clear that lack of regulation over 
actions and emotions meant deviance. 
Behind this evaluation of self-government we find long philosophical and medical 
traditions, as we have seen. Renaissance culture had praised the self-government of passions 
and appetites, producing a vital discussion that visualized the importance of balanced life 
regimes not only for health, but also for social life and politics.979 Similarly, humoral theory 
was structured according to a ruling principle: the importance of regulation, of balance. If in 
the previous centuries emotional imbalance was primarily interpreted as a disarrangement in 
the levels of the four humours, towards the eighteenth century will and the mind were 
increasingly ascribed a predominant role as ultimate regulators of the passions. But, the 
importance of regulation was still at the core of the management of improper passions, 
organized under the belief that a regulated life equalled a healthy life, while lack of it 
inevitably entailed illness. The various forms of unpredictable reactions and emotional 
instability that we see recurrently cited as the predominant symptoms of mental affliction in 
eighteenth-century medical literature were similarly employed with increasing frequency as 
evidence of mental disturbance in lay social circles.  
 The medical recommendations given to patients complaining of mental afflictions or 
nervous complaints such as hysteria or hypochondria invariably point towards the importance 
of regulation. Patients had to rule their lives and follow regulated life systems, with a 
convenient amount of exercise and rest, a balanced diet and a proper combination of 
intellectual activities, domestic affairs and social amusements. Excess and lack of regulation 
were, in this sense, equated to unhealthy lives, and any patient who intended to counteract 
disease had to undertake serious changes to regulate his or her life. In particular, a regulated 
life was the only way to avoid the damaging effects of angutie d’animo, which were the evil 
elements often responsible for triggering mental disease.   
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Madness was supposed to rule in unregulated or disordered life systems. Giovanni 
Targioni Tozzetti, for instance, repeatedly argued for the importance of regulation, control 
and authority as an effective way of curing madness in his medical consultations and legal 
expert opinions.980 Targioni Tozzetti’s call for regulation is echoed in the various Consulti 
Medici published during the eighteenth century both in Italy and abroad. Even more 
interestingly, the importance of equilibrium and, particularly, the damaging effects of 
emotional instability and emotional excess also can be traced in the legal records under study 
here, and form an immanent layer of the lay narratives of mental disturbance.  
Uneasiness, Irregular Characters and Voluble Temperaments 
The inability to control one’s temper and appetites was a major concern for early 
modern families. Inner turmoil and lack of self-control, we have seen, were commonly 
employed to describe, and thus prove, mental incapacity. In particular shifts of temper, which 
denoted a lack of self-government and subsumed the fear for social disorder. As the second 
half of the eighteenth century drew near, petitioners increasingly tended to centre their claim 
of mental incapacity on the observation that their relatives manifested a persistent instability, 
indicated by their recurrent shifts of ideas, purposes or mood. That their expenditure and 
debts were capricious was only one aspect of a disorder that, on a relational level, was 
primarily perceived as an unpredictable character. Concomitant to the incapacity to follow 
rules and ascribe to the expected behaviour, petitioners singled out the defendant’s 
inconsistent or “irregular” (irregolare) “character”. Personalities were perceived as 
uncontrollable, not only because they refused to be tamed, but even more so because no 
patterns could be drawn to predict their behaviour. The resolutions, affections and animosities 
of these people could shift unexpectedly to any imaginable end at the slightest provocation.  
 The conception of the disrupted emotional state identified in prodigals and the 
demented is best summarized under the term inquietudine (uneasiness), which presupposed a 
lack of internal peace with physical and emotional manifestations. The allegedly mentally 
incapacitated men and women were often defined by their relatives as inquieto or inquieta, 
demonstrating a spirito inquietissimo or a naturale inquieto. Inquietudine was defined in the 
eighteenth century as “travaglio, passione, tribolazione”, that is, affliction, passion, 
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tribulation.981 In the sources under study here, the term was employed to define the emotional 
and physical sensation of feeling uneasy, disquieted, anguished, emotionally agitated and 
disturbed. It was usually accompanied by descriptions of the actions that indicated this state 
of disturbance, which served both to illustrate and categorize the type of mental affliction 
under observation. Inquietudine could affect a person’s mind at different levels, and was 
evidenced through a gradation of emotional displays, from fickleness, volatility and 
instability, to frenzy. Inquieto/a was used to characterize someone who stubbornly contested 
judicial resolutions or who engaged in a never-ending litigation. But, it also functioned to 
indicate the emotional state that accompanied a deranged behaviour, allowing us to identify 
the feeling of uneasiness that frequently vexed the mentally disturbed at the same time as it 
served to allude to its relational consequences. In fact, the term was employed not only to 
describe perturbed states of mind, but also to characterize the “disquieting” influence these 
behaviours exerted on the surrounding family members.   
The elasticity observed in the meanings and applications of inquietudine, shared by 
most of the judicial categories examined in this thesis, served to circumvent the need to 
employ more straightforward terms to mean mental disturbance. This is of particular interest 
when we examine more hidden meanings of the term, comparing them against the different 
contexts in which they could be used. Let me give an example. Disordered and deviant 
women were confined in the Medicanti for allegedly being donne inquiete, in the words of a 
woman who in 1759 complained she did not fit that pattern. To her misfortune, the Pupilli 
officials confirmed to the central administration that she was in fact an “uneasy woman” 
(inquietissima donna) and manifested “an extraordinarily uneasy nature” (naturale inquieto 
fuori di modo).982 Because there was no need for an interdiction, a more straightforward 
category of mental incapacity was not needed in her case. However, in other cases inquieto 
was coupled with “stupid in the brain” (scemo di cervello), “weakness of mind” (debolezza di 
mente), “signs of an unsound mind [segni di non sana mente]” or furioso, in which cases the 
link between the inner turmoil denoted by the word inquieto and mental illness was 
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straightforward.983 Moreover, the very presence of the term inquieto, when used in connection 
to other categories such as “prone to fall into frenzy” (solito dare in frenesia), “fantastical 
man” uomo fantastico and “madness” (pazzie) served to demonstrate that an accusation of 
dementia was sufficiently grounded.984  
The gender differentiation disclosed by the two examples presented above is not 
fortuitous. Although inquietudine was employed in descriptions of both men and women, its 
connotations and ambit of application were gender-specific. In women, it particularly denoted 
a difficult temper and questionable demeanour, and indicated passionate or unstable 
characters. Furthermore, women of “uneasy spirit” (spirito inquieto) were generally said to 
change their minds for no reason. In fact, the woman cited above who had been sent to the 
Mendicanti allegedly manifested an inquietudine that presented both characteristics; she was 
considered to be incapable of moderating her language, committed “great iniquities” and was 
“poorly capable of adapting to any plan.”985 Her uneasiness was further connected to 
fickleness, that is, the propensity to change loyalties and affections unexpectedly, becoming 
thus incapable of being faithful to one person.  
While women’s disturbed emotions, subsumed by the term inquietudine, were 
generally shown in their changing decisions, their misguided affections, their unfounded 
sufferings and vexations, men’s distress was often connected to displays of anger and periods 
of agitated hyperactivity. They were restless and anxious, constantly moving, unable to sleep 
at the recommended resting hours, constantly changing their location or activity.986 They were 
never satisfied, unable to yield and accept the rules, unable to settle. Their inherent uneasiness 
at times made them irritable and frantic, and at times excessively driven by a given sensation, 
a feeling or an idea. Thus, it also made them stubborn and fixed on irrational purposes or 
improper affections. Their inquietudine drove them to engage in futile and expensive 
litigations, which could be against their relatives, their creditors or whoever was opposed to 
their goals.987 Finally, it made them utterly confrontational to the commands of the Magistrato 
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dei Pupilli, making them to send petition after petition, or sometimes presenting themselves 
personally before the officials to try to get their way. Let’s not forget that Galluzzi subsumed 
his reprobation to the disordered nature manifested by the Grand Duchess Marguerite Louise 
by resorting to the term “uneasy spirit”.988 
Again the key to grasping the meanings ascribed to these concepts lies in the 
combinations of terms. One who was said to demonstrate a “rather uneasy and resented 
nature” (naturale alquanto inquieto e risentito) was also described as of an inquietissimo 
naturale, becoming in his advanced age “a character so irregular that treating him becomes 
impossible for everyone, and he gives sometimes signs of an unsound mind.”989 Thus the 
inner instability that characterized someone as inquieto was also linked to a character (in the 
sense of temper here) considered irregular (irregolare), unstable (volubile) and uncertain 
(incerto). The two extremes of this instability received unequal attention in the narratives, 
with a declared preference for the violent and angry edge. This should not lead us to assume 
that the low-spirited edge was not perceived but, rather, that it was the cause of far less 
disturbance for family life. There are some exceptions, nonetheless. One is when dejection led 
to suicidal intentions, in which case the low-spirited state was directly transformed into the 
medico-legal lexicon proper to the procedure of committal (most times through the plain 
pazzo/a furioso/a, on a few occasions termed delirio melanconico).990 The other exception is 
when dejection affected the financial performance of the sufferer, manifested through a 
profound insecurity or weakness of character that made him incapable of making decisions, or 
unable to stick to any plan (a characteristic termed volubile). Remarkable in this regard are the 
letters written by one interdicted person, where he disclosed his total impotence with regards 
to the management of his property, describing his desperation and the recurrent urges he had 
to disappear and leave everything behind (including his wife and children) “because like this I 
cannot live any more” (perche cosi non posso più vivere). In the eyes of the officials of the 
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Pupilli, these letters demonstrated his volubilità and complete incapacity to regulate his 
affairs.991  
It seems clear that Tuscan society in the eighteenth century conceived of madness as a 
disorder that could develop both extremes in the same person. This could change 
unexpectedly from laughter to tears, or periods of dejection that were intersected with periods 
of hyperactivity, extreme irritability and compulsive behaviour. The manic edge was also 
unstable, and did not suppose a constant state of frenzy. As said by a husband who petitioned 
for his wife’s committal in 1760, “she is mad [pazza], and many times goes from a cheerful 
madness [pazzia allegra] to a frenetic madness [pazzia frenetica].”992    
The unstable disposition that characterized a state of inquietudine supposed both that 
the person was governed by his or her emotional turmoil, which oscillated between two 
extremes, and at the same time an inability to act in accordance with behavioural norms. For 
this reason, inquietudine was also equated to an “irregular head” (capo irregolare), and a 
behaviour that was both improper and extravagant.993 A capo irregolare was also someone of 
an “extravagant humour”, who was demonstrated as being “indocile”, lived “irregularly” 
(meaning both beyond the law and with instability), committed “unreasonable arbitrary 
[actions]”, abused his wife, and was, thus, “half mad” (mezzo matto).994 The adjective 
irregolare highlighted not only that the person lived outside the rules, was disorderly (in these 
cases, coupled with sregolato, used also to indicate to the licentious activities of the prodigal), 
but, foremost, that this disorder came from an irregular head. A capo irregolare was very 
similar to an “extravagant brain” (cervello stravagante) and, in general, to the meanings 
behind any noun accompanied by the latter (i.e. natural, humour, behaviour, to name some).  
It has been stated that, during the eighteenth century, emotional disturbances were 
predominantly identified in women and that, consequently, emotions as a cause of madness 
were predominantly employed in descriptions of female mental disturbance. We saw in a 
previous chapter that feminist historiography following the study by Elaine Showalter has 
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identified the beginnings of the feminization of madness in the eighteenth century.995 Even 
Houston, who questioned that madness was a female malady, conceded that “emotional 
causes of insanity... were more likely to be cited as an explanation of a female’s descent into 
madness.”996 Taking into account the commonly held assertion regarding the chronology of 
the feminization of madness, it is interesting to note that the Tuscan legal records identified 
emotional causality for both male and female mental disturbances, suggesting that men were 
thought to be equally likely to be overcome by emotional suffering.  
The sources under examination here shine light predominantly on male mental 
disturbance. In the majority of the cases, we have men and women describing male 
disturbance, and not the other way around. This restriction in the sources allows us to draw 
interesting conclusions regarding the so-called feminization of madness. How emotional 
suffering was codified and evaluated, however, varied according to gender but this, to my 
view, has more to do with the different spaces in which madness was staged in the case of 
men compared to women (i.e. patrimony administration, public and professional life, etc.).  
It could be argued that this is explained by the structural bias of the sources under 
study here, which give a distorted image in terms of gender balance. However, the very fact 
that the sample of cases studied largely involved men proves that emotional imbalance was 
considered to affect both women and men. Furthermore, given that men were mostly 
denounced by women, interdiction narratives prove that women assumed the role of the 
rational and stable head of family that their husbands or sons had failed to assume. This 
position, as has been argued in other parts of this thesis, was promoted by the Tuscan 
administrators, who in fact considered that the best way out of the disorder produced by a 
mentally afflicted man in the family was to rely on the domestic capacities of women. In this 
sense, if anything, the Tuscan eighteenth-century records suggest that emotional instability 
was a masculine affliction whose best chances of being cured were to be placed under the 
rational (and tender) capacities of women.  
The danger of perturbed emotions for familial and personal life is not a novelty for the 
eighteenth century. On the contrary, it echoes the reprimands of contemporary religious 
writings praising the control of one’s passions, which also recognized that many of them were 
simply impossible to control (e.g. passionate love, which was thought to obfuscate the mind 
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and take control of one’s rational faculties). So strong could the power of sinful passions be 
that the only possible way to deal with them was to avoid those situations that usually 
triggered them.  
The obsession over inquietudine observed in the reactions and emotional displays of 
those deemed mentally afflicted, and the lack of inner peace they disclose bears a strong 
religious component. These narratives are certainly the products of a Catholic culture that had 
been bred under the precepts of Catholic strategies of confessionalization, and they speak of 
the appropriation of the religious commands regarding self-control, albeit codified through a 
different key. Historians of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation have stressed the role 
of religion in the construction of subjectivity. A well-known strand in this field are the studies 
on sanctity and possession, with the construction of “new maps of interiority”,997 and the role 
of confession and the spiritual adviser in creating the practice of self-examination.998 Female 
and male spirituality shaped the early modern emotional system, creating a new subjectivity 
that could easily become dangerous to the Protestant and Catholic churches. The subjective 
emotional world was thus shaped and even mapped by the cultural context, which can be 
traced in the negotiation of the proper ways of expressing feelings in the court records, but 
also in the religious sensibility.   
The late seventeenth and early eighteenth century witnessed a new map of interiority 
and the place of passions both in public and private life. Familial disorder seemed to be the 
rule, and the dangers of an uncontrolled imagination were now at the core of the Church’s 
concerns. The polemic emerged over quietism and the reform of the accepted signs of sanctity 
at the end of the seventeenth century condemned any external or visually provocative 
manifestations of mystical experience and other forms of devotional practices considered too 
sensible and carnal.999 The aims of confessionalization during the century were centred on the 
condemnation of juvenile manifestations of love and the excessive liberties promoted by the 
new sociability of the century and the renewed vigour of the practices of gambling and 
drinking, which now also involved women.1000   
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Particularly in Tuscany, the end of the Medici regime favoured a series of reforms 
aimed at a moral disciplining based on stricter moral codes. The beginning of the eighteenth 
century witnessed the reactivation of strategies on the part of the Catholic Church to enforce 
its control over moral behaviour, producing a new discourse on family roles that praised the 
simplicity and reclusion of the domestic space. As Elisa Nova Chavarria has argued, religious 
discourse towards the eighteenth century proclaimed the domestic space as a space of 
affection free from the dangers of the outside world as a way to safeguard the moral and 
affectionate cohesion of the family. The sermons of late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth 
century Jesuit preachers, among them the influential Paolo Segneri, particularly embody the 
renewed campaign against the dangers of passions, which needed to be controlled and purged. 
Men were advised to evade the temptations of gambling and alcohol offered by taverns by 
seeking refuge at home with their wives and children. Similarly, women, whom religious 
discourse had traditionally singled out as more inclined to human passions than men, were 
called on to seek refuge in their domestic roles as custodians of their children and as well as 
in the affection of their families. But the familial affections promoted by the sermons were of 
an increasingly controlled and authoritarian kind. Fathers were advised not to be too 
complacent with their children, and mothers were warned not to follow their natural tendency 
to express an excessively affectionate nature.1001  
Extravagance 
 Extravagance has been frequently pointed out as a characteristic that subsumed the 
manifold transgressions committed by the mentally ill. The characterization of mad people as 
extravagant, doing extravagant things, behaving extravagantly, or displaying extravagant 
emotions is a topos of madness in the early modern world. However, the meanings enclosed 
within the concept have been largely understudied. Although studies that examine the shaping 
of legal, medical or cultural languages of madness in the eighteenth century usually touch 
upon the use of extravagance (and its variations as extravagant humour, temper, discourse, 
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actions, etc.) to describe madness, I have not come upon a study that addresses the issue in 
depth.1002  
Extravagance is an overarching term that was frequently employed to characterize 
both the behaviour, actions and emotional reactions of the allegedly mentally incapable. 
Petitioners and authorities frequently summarized the problem of someone held to be 
mentally incapacitated by labelling their behaviour, mind and disposition as extravagant. As 
in the majority of the terms examined here, stravagante served to indicate the illogical 
workings of a deranged mind, the emotional turmoil that many times accompanied the former, 
and how these two were manifested through abnormal behaviour. A concept that was 
sufficiently imprecise as to be able to comprise manifold forms of deviation, extravagance 
was used to label the degree into which a given behaviour, practice and emotional display 
diverged from the boundaries of normality.  
The semantics of the term are rather imprecise, and are insufficient for understanding 
the manifold uses and interpretations given to it. “Stravagante” was defined as “fantastical, 
deformed, out of ordinary use.”1003 Something extravagant was something strange and 
different, that could not be reduced to standard forms and that escaped the known rules. An 
extravagant person was fantastical, which was also to be falotico and intrattabile, that is, 
abstract in the sense of detached from reality and intractable.1004 Thus, when used to 
characterize a person’s behaviour or personality, the breaching of rules and standards was 
closely related to madness and the world of fantasy and imagination. Extravagance then 
provided a dimension of uncanniness and lack of moderation, at the same time it conveyed 
the idea of emotional and mental instability.  
The usage given to the term extravagant in the sources examined here covers a wide 
range of contexts and discloses interesting meanings. It appears mostly after 1750 and, 
although we encounter both female and male extravagance, the concept appears largely 
associated with middle-aged and elderly men. In the few cases in which young men were 
described as extravagant, the concept was primarily used to catalogue the prodigal’s excessive 
expenditure, his fondness for grandeur, sociability, diversions and vices. The debauchery that 
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we have seen as concomitant to prodigality and the unruly discoli was indeed a form of 
extravagance, which served both to demonstrate their detachment from the accepted rules of 
behaviour and their “irregular mind” [capo irregolare].1005 Given that they acted outside the 
rules and their behaviour could not be predicted – as suggested by the terms extravagance and 
irregular – they could reach extremely undesirable extremes, such as making undesirable 
marriage proposals.1006  
Contrary to what can observed in the descriptions of older men and women, 
extravagance in young men appears particularly connected to eccentricity. Not only because 
their behaviour was off and unconventional, but because their oddness was particularly 
directed towards a compulsive need to spend in quantities that exceeded their means, their 
need for luxuries and constant diversions. These common features of prodigality could 
assume more serious forms, like a certain 19-year-old nobleman who intended to marry a 
lower-born woman with neither dowry nor respected relations, who had participated in the 
last carnival in a most improper way, and had even attempted to sell most of the family 
paintings to built a comedy theatre in his villa. These “eccentricities” revealed an 
“extravagance” which provided clear signs of an altered state of mind. But, furthermore, they 
conveyed the idea of an inner disposition towards disorder and instability, represented in a 
man who was governed by his compulsory need to spend and show off.  
If we examine this tendency against what was argued above regarding the role 
attributed to emotional turmoil in perceptions of mental incapacity, the degree to which 
prodigality constituted a mental disorder for eighteenth-century Tuscany may become clearer. 
As was argued in previous chapters, the excessive expenditure of young generations, their 
lack of respect for certain values that had ruled their fathers’ lives is not a feature unique to 
Tuscany, and was certainly not automatically associated with madness. The fact that the 
descriptions of the young prodigals are deeply entrenched in a growing conflict between 
younger and older generations regarding the value of social position and how the latter was 
concomitant with a certain financial management does not rule out the fact that older 
members of the family frequently saw the recklessness of youth as pure madness.  
The conflicts that characterized the relation between fathers and sons towards the end 
of the eighteenth century have been beautifully examined by Nicola Phillips in her study on a 
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profligate son whose, at first desperate and afterwards positively condemning, father could do 
nothing other than write a memoir to narrate his son’s descent into financial ruin, delinquency 
and moral depravation. Although her study is not concerned directly with the connection that 
can be drawn between perceptions of profligacy and perceptions of madness, her study 
illuminates how the clash of moral values between two generations also entailed a particular 
conception of what a disordered mind meant. This young man’s father referred to his son’s 
mind by employing terms the meanings of which closely resembled the terms examined here. 
The young man’s debauchery indicated he had lost his rational self-control, governed by the 
pernicious effects of “irregular and intemperate passions.”1007 Madness was evidenced not 
only in reckless expenditure – which was not new in the eighteenth century – but in the 
emotional turmoil behind it.   
The meanings ascribed to extravagance are further revealed by its surrounding words, 
which when applied to describe middle age and old men denounced for mental incapacity, 
included behaviour (contegno), character (carattere), humour (umore), nature (naturale) and 
brain (cervello). The financial mismanagement and excessive expenditure that constituted the 
starting point of every interdiction petition was accompanied in these cases by expressions 
that described their disturbed emotional state. Extravagance came with brain, spirit, humour 
and thinking, and was accompanied with expressions denoting disturbed forms of emotional 
display, such as inquieto, furious, frenetic, uncertain temperament (temperamento incerto), 
and disconcerted fantasy (sconcertata fantasia). An extravagant behaviour was mainly 
associated with three aspects in men: a disordered mind; a disturbed emotionality that was 
non-violent and frequently assumed the form of emotional instability; and, a disturbed 
emotionality that was violent. The two latter were generally accompanied by the first, with 
expressions that pointed towards the head or mind (capo or cervello) and its thinking or ideas 
(sentimento or idee). Thus we have cervello stravagante, capo irregolare, volubilità dei suoi 
sentimenti, stravaganza del suo pensare, stravagante idee.  
The case of one Gaetano Giorgi well exemplifies this issue. Denounced by his wife, 
Gaetano Giorgi followed the patterns of a prodigal, but manifested the kind of prodigality that 
most resembled insanity. The core of this disturbance lay in his “passion” to gamble, which 
moved him to abuse his wife, act extravagantly and demonstrate his frenetic, mad and uneasy 
temper whenever she, or other relatives denied him the money for his vice. He fell into fits of 
                                                




rage, which made him capable of all kinds of indiscretions, extravagances and excesses. 
Among his extravagances, his wife listed his gambling like a mad and stupid man (forsennato 
and stolto), which made him lose huge amounts of money. His mistreatment of his wife was 
also singled out as extravagant, with an escalating aggressiveness and innumerable iniquities 
towards her. He was fierce (feroce) with her, had fits of “frenzy” and continuously 
demonstrated his “uncertain temperament and humour” and “extravagant humour”. One night, 
when he was “more furious (foribondo) and menacing than usual, after having given several 
signs of disconcerted fantasy”, he started to quarrel with his wife, and had an outburst of fury 
against her that ended with him expelling her from the house despite the fact that it was a 
“rainy day”, declaring she was not to come back ever again. His threats were said to have 
been pronounced (uttered) in an “extravagant way”, which made the wife fear for her safety 
and obey his threats.1008  
Extravagant behaviour comprised the usual features of defiance to the precepts that 
guided family life, seen in their neglect of their role of heads of family, the lack of regulation 
that characterized their daily performance, and their capricious financial decisions.1009 It is 
worth mentioning here that the term extravagance is for the most part employed by 
government officials, and much less by petitioners. The nuanced descriptions narrating the 
emotional turmoil described above, with its corollary of a lack of regulation, imprudence, and 
the capricious and disordered (sregolato) behaviours of the allegedly mentally afflicted were 
summarized by the authorities by recourse to the term extravagance. For instance, the officials 
of the Pupilli described the kind of dementia suffered by Lorenzo Baldinotti by referring to 
his “naturale furioso, stravagante, ed inquieto”, thus encompassing the different assessments 
his relatives had given of his disorder.1010 
    
7.5. Conclusion 
Scholars of madness have identified the eighteenth century as the point when a more 
nuanced medicalization of emotions arose with the introduction of new theories of madness 
that inclined towards the predominance of emotions and the mind in the aetiology of mental 
                                                
1008 ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2306, no. 293, 1766.  
1009 See for instance the interdiction of Agostino de Paola, father of seven children, whose extravagance was 
revealed through his unjustifiable act of expelling them all from home, his dissipation, lack of regulation and 
capricious selling. ASF, MPAP, Memoriali, F. 2303, no. 164, March 1754.  




disturbances. However, medical knowledge has often been seen as isolated from society. For 
instance, according to MacDonald, people’s understandings and responses to mental 
afflictions were isolated from the medical developments on mental disturbances. He identified 
a disjunction between medical theory and popular knowledge, which according to him 
deepened towards the eighteenth century. “Because English society was highly stratified 
socially and culturally, we must be sensitive to the disjunction between medical theory, which 
was written by and for the educated elite, and actual practice, which was conducted by and for 
people drawn from every social rank.”1011 In contrast, Porter has stressed that psychiatry was 
shaped “from below”, producing meanings and understandings that were continuously 
renegotiated.1012  
To approach the history of how mental disturbances were experienced, labelled and 
handled using the model of a collective process presupposes that those discourses and 
practices were culturally and “equally” constructed by the actors involved (physicians, 
magistrates, family, the mentally disturbed). The study of the Tuscan civil and criminal 
litigation of the eighteenth century on madness and mental incapacity shows that lay, legal 
and medical communities shared an understanding of mental deviance. Furthermore, this 
chapter has shown that throughout the century the different understandings of madness concur 
on the increasing importance attributed to manifestations of disturbed emotions as the 
predominant indicators of mental disturbance.   
This chapter has examined the place of emotions in eighteenth-century medical and 
lay descriptions of madness. It has argued that during the century emotional disturbances 
played an increasingly determinant role in the understandings of madness held by petitioners, 
witnesses, government authorities and medical practitioners alike. Although in most cases 
there is no evidence of the involvement of medical knowledge, lay narratives concur with 
contemporary medical writings regarding the place attributed to “disturbed” emotions as an 
important symptom evidencing mental disturbance.  
Criminal and civil records demonstrate that certain forms of emotional display were 
considered as a key to a disordered mind. The notion that strong feelings could disrupt the 
mind was a shared consensus that can be traced in a wide variety of contexts and across 
different social groups. Legally it served to argue for diminished responsibility for 
committing a crime, due to the power of passion to temporarily overshadow the rational 
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faculties. Similarly, medical knowledge gave increasing importance to strong emotions, 
referred to as passioni d’animo, for their capacity to trigger mental disturbance. But even 
more interestingly, forms of emotional distress were also placed at the centre of lay narratives, 
a centrality that was also shared and acknowledged by authorities. Interdiction narratives were 
increasingly concerned with how certain behaviours and reactions denoted a disturbed 
disposition, referred to with the terms inquietudine, volubile, irregolare or stravagante.  
Emotions came to be crucial for differentiating rational behaviour from the indicators 
of a disturbed mind. Negotiating forms of appropriate emotional display presupposed 
exploring how emotional reactions affected a person’s mind, in which situations certain forms 
of emotional excess could be accepted and in which others they had to be condemned. 
Furthermore, careful considerations had to be taken to establish how these forms of deviant 
emotional display were to be controlled, disciplined, differentiated or punished.  
The new attention to emotional disruptions as indicators of mental affliction was 
accompanied by a growing awareness of the emotional dimension of familial relations. 
Families were paying increasing attention to the emotional displays that characterized mental 
incapacity because they were preoccupied in defining sane emotional displays as well. Better 
put, narratives of madness and mental incapacity shed light on the discussions about proper 
and improper emotional displays, but also on the role of emotions in social relations and 
family life, determining nuanced sets of rules about accepted codes of reaction depending on 
the space and situation. Inquiries into mental capacity debated how a man or a woman was 
supposed to “navigate”, to use Reddy’s term, through their emotional disturbances, in 
accordance with the codes of each space, gender and age. Furthermore, interdiction narratives 
place men on the side of emotional disequilibrium, and women on the side of self-control and 











This thesis has examined the appearance of madness across different procedural and 
institutional spaces, to elaborate on how madness was understood and argued, ascribing 
particular attention to the language employed and the meanings it encoded. Largely drawing 
from inquiries into mental incapacity, but also taking into account criminal records and 
special requests to the executive powers of the Grand Duchy, it has explored the circulation of 
meanings and languages of madness, placing the family at its centre.    
The model of the itineraries of madness shows that the understandings of madness 
were of a contextual and contingent nature. Madness in the early modern period was 
measured against patterns of normality that were conditioned by variables such as age, 
gender, social role and status. This evaluation was further shaped by the requirements of each 
of the spaces in which madness was disclosed, conditioning its lexicon, typologies and 
meanings. Madness had many faces in early modern Europe, assuming forms that adjusted to 
each framework of appearance. Its meanings changed according to who was speaking, why 
and to whom. The institutional space in which mad behaviour was disclosed dramatically 
shaped the narratives and language employed. Petitioners, witnesses, government officials 
and medical practitioners knew how to adjust their language to each institutional context, and 
every party involved knew how and when it was desirable to introduce certain concepts 
instead of others.  
By and large, the legal and institutional records examined here reveal the capacity of 
early modern Tuscans to adapt their language to the needs and requirements of each context, 
whether an interdiction petition, a criminal defence, a petition for mitigation of a sentence by 
reason of insanity, a petition for confinement or a particular request made to the office of the 
Auditore Fiscale. This becomes particularly clear when we can follow the same individual 
across more than one of these institutional and legal spaces. Families resorted alternatively to 
one context or the other, depending on the results, and in each space they adapted their 
narratives accordingly. Following the itinerary also reveals that the joint effort to tame 
deviance involved many stages without a clear pattern or order. When one solution proved 




to incarceration again, and from there to exile.1013 The basic principle is that all of these 
measures were independent from one another, and could be requested simultaneously, as 
clearly expressed by the absolute disengagement between interdiction and confinement.   
This thesis has explored the circulation of notions of madness through the different 
agents that shaped the understanding of madness, taking into account the different voices, 
aims and contexts that came into play. The languages of madness under examination here 
suggest the pervasive presence of conceptions of madness that understood it as a disease of 
the mind, located in a diseased brain. Even though priests were commonly called as expert 
witnesses to assess mental incapacity, their testimonies did not regard madness as a moral 
flaw, but as a disease of the mind. This, however, did not change the fact that it was a disease 
whose primary signs were disclosed through behaviour that breached the moral codes. 
I have argued that legal categories of madness and mental incapacity were open and 
deliberately vague so as to encompass a wide spectrum of cultural meanings. This was 
particularly clear in interdiction procedures, which during the century opened their field of 
enquiry into a broader spectrum of what madness amounted to. Against a backdrop of a 
constant rise in interdiction petitions, narratives started to introduce familial and personal 
situations that were not no longer exclusively related to patrimony, such as intergenerational 
conflicts, matrimonial disputes or confrontations with the extended family. The argument of 
mental incapacity served, then, not only to prove economic mismanagement, but also to argue 
in favour of one or another side in a familial conflict, to give evidence supporting the need to 
change household dispositions or legitimize the need to end a co-residence.  
Following the itineraries of madness has allowed me to chart a more complete picture 
of how madness was understood, explained and experienced than what can be grasped by 
focusing only on one of the spaces in which it appeared, as previous studies have done. It 
demonstrates that mental disturbances were a present and increasingly demanding reality for 
Tuscan families, forcing families to resort to the different available mechanisms. But it also 
demonstrates that madness was increasingly “employed” as an argument in front of the 
authorities to settle a dispute, or to make sense of odd behaviour. Thus, although we cannot 
ascertain that mental disturbances were identified to a larger degree than in the previous 
centuries, and we certainly should not conclude that there was a rise in the incidence of 
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mental illness during the century, we can definitively demonstrate that madness acquired 
increasing visibility during the century.  
 As this thesis has argued, changes in social life and the appearance of new 
expectations of family life and conflicting agencies inside families were the conflating factors 
that explain why madness appears more in the eighteenth-century records. The new ways in 
which intergenerational and matrimonial disputes were managed during the century finds an 
interesting parallel in inquiries into mental capacity and special requests to control mental 
deviance. It shows that litigants resorted to a new language to argue and settle their disputes, 
where notions about madness played a new role.        
I have suggested that the relatively marginal involvement of medical practitioners is 
thus not grounds enough to argue against the medicalization of madness. Quite the contrary, 
although it appears clear that the involvement of medicine in mental diseases was still highly 
exploratory (as it would continue to be for most of the nineteenth century), scholars have 
convincingly argued for the gradual involvement of medicine in this field during the early 
modern period. But the point under discussion here is slightly different. When we take as a 
starting point the circulation of languages to assess the shaping of new notions of madness, 
the development of psychiatry and the medicalization of emotions assume a more nuanced 
form. On the one hand, the medical profession appears much more connected to social 
conceptions of insanity but, on the other hand, the language in itself appears disconnected. To 
put it differently, while the medically specialized language of madness appears not to have 
been subject to wide circulation, the meanings enclosed in a medical lexicon can be widely 
found in social language. Whether through the use of medical terms such as delirio 
melanconico, turbazione di fantasia, fissazioni, or through the socially embedded concepts of 
stravaganza, alterazioni or soppressioni di spirito, inquietudine or volubilità, medical, legal 
and lay narratives share a conception of insanity that placed the mind and altered emotional 
states as its leading features.  
Even if medical categories to classify mental disorders appear at first glance 
completely dissociated from lay language, their contents and meanings were not. Centuries of 
litigation and contact with medical practitioners had from way back given families the 
necessary means to categorize and explain a situation that they historically had been the first 
ones to identify. Madness, as this study shows, was a distinctly present reality for early 
modern families, who had given sense and had recourse to every available mechanism to cope 




of the eighteenth century was colonizing a field that had traditionally been the prerogative of 
families and, by their request, of justice. Not because it was not considered a disease, but 
because early modern society was more concerned with controlling its consequences than 
with finding a cure.   
Scholars working on madness in early modern Europe have warned us that mental 
disorders were widely conceived by lay society as a disease by the sixteenth century. Notions 
of the pathological origins of deranged behaviour were not a novelty of the eighteenth 
century, so medicine was not creating a new conception, but rather ascribing new names to it. 
What medical practitioners called fixations, delusions, melancholic delirium, etc., were well 
known realities for those who lived with these manifestations of mental derangement. In the 
previous centuries they had been framed under the interpretative model provided by humoral 
theory, by the eighteenth century they were explained using the theory of the nerves. Lay 
society, on the contrary, was much more confortable with their factual explanations centred 
on behaviour as the only true path to assess someone’s state of mind, to which descriptions of 
altered emotional states were progressively added as the preferred proof to evidence its 
presence. The connection between emotions and madness and, particularly, the role attributed 
to emotional disturbances as determinant indicators of madness became particularly visible 
towards the second half of the century. By the end of the century, emotional agitation and 
shifting moods were at the centre of the cultural understanding of madness, present both in 
medical and in lay society.   
If until roughly the first half of the eighteenth century mental incapacity was first and 
foremost recognized in financial behaviour, speech and demeanour, towards the end of the 
century it was increasingly evidenced by and illustrated with the person’s emotional displays. 
Although the effect emotional perturbations could exert on physical and mental health was 
not a novelty, the fact remains that the records evidence a shift with regards to how mental 
incapacity was argued in legal procedures. Changes intrinsic to the archives and the 
administration of the records are intermingled here with changes in the general administration 
of the Grand Duchy – specialist historiography identifies the mid-eighteenth century as the 
epoch where the changes brought about by the new dynasty became perceivable, but also with 
deeper cultural changes. Two clues might be indicative of this broader cultural background 
signalling a new codification of behaviours and emotions. Scholarship on the history of the 
family has identified the introduction of a new set of concerns regarding familial roles. This 




behind the condemnation of unequal marriages, the tightening of measures to control juvenile 
unruliness, sexual misbehaviour and debauchery, or the spread of a religious discourse 
condemning passionate behaviours and proclaiming emotionally controlled familial roles.  
The eighteenth century brought new spaces of sociability that were accompanied by 
unprecedented forms of self-determination, but also by supposedly stricter codes of moral 
behaviour. Efforts to control the family disorder that we have been examining throughout this 
thesis were concentrated around this contradiction between agency and norms, between a 
stricter paradigm of rationality and the continual outbursts of uncontrolled passions. A close 
examination of the language employed by Galluzzi to delineate his condemnation of the 
moral excesses manifested by the last Medici is indicative of the special concern developed 
during the eighteenth century against certain forms of emotional disturbance. The relationship 
between Cosimo III and Margherita Louisa was marked, on the one hand, by her 
“extravagances”, “caprices”, and her “unruly and turbulent spirit” and, on the other hand, his 
“weakness of his spirit”, his personal dose of melancholy and uncontrolled passions.1014 
Margherita Louisa’s extravagances and open defiance of his authority and manliness left him 
under the strains of his strong passions, agitated, for instance, by “maddening jealousy” 
(agitato dalle smanie della gelosia) and the strong desire of vengeance against her (il 
desiderio di vendicarsi con essa lo agitava continuamente).1015 Their son was equally 
portrayed as “a sensible man” (un uomo sensibile) consumed by the “violent passions” that 
continually “anguished” him, his prodigality and his uneasy character (carattere inquieto).1016  
In other words, the vocabulary we see employed again and again to portray their 
disturbed dispositions is in stark consonance with the vocabulary of mental incapacity we see 
employed in the contemporary civil and criminal records of the Grand Duchy. Stravaganza, 
carattere inquieto, pazzie, trasporti or agitazioni are all terms we see employed to describe 
the emotional disturbances that tormented the mentally afflicted. It can thus be observed how 
the concern over emotional disturbances was not restricted to the special characteristics of 
interdiction procedures or a special request to confine a family member. The tones of 
emotional instability assumed by familial disorder during these years can be traced in public 
characterizations of the family, in religious discourses and in discussions about politics. The 
disclosure of family conflicts was total.   
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By the eighteenth century, Tuscan society saw emotional disturbances as the source of 
familial conflict and mental affliction. Inquietudine, carattere irregolare, umore stravagante 
and any form of emotional instability increasingly come to the fore in discussions about 
deviant behaviour. Changing concerns and expectations about family life were intertwined 
with the debate about behavioural norms and expected patters of emotional display. The 
shaping of understandings of madness, and the role attributed to emotions as its most defining 
signs appear, once more, entrenched in the history of the family. In this sense, the debate 
about proper emotional reactions and the features of what constituted a normal emotional life, 
and when emotional reactions breached the frontiers of sanity connect us with the negotiated 
shaping of systems of feelings within Tuscan families.  
Interdiction procedures were a legal procedure devised to provide a solution for the 
financial consequences of mental incapacity. However, this thesis has argued that behind the 
primary purpose of defending the family patrimony from reckless or irrational behaviour, 
interdictions largely served to resolve familial disorder. This intervention was explicitly 
requested by the family members petitioning for the interdiction, and functioned as an arena 
for discussing appropriate codes of behaviour and emotional display, which were profoundly 
age and gender specific. The solution proposed by the Tuscan authorities for containing the 
disorder of the family tended to empower the female members of the household. Wives and 
mothers were not only the most common petitioners, but they were also entrusted with the 
management of the household until their sons or husbands regained their mental faculties. 
However, their role went beyond the administration of the interdicted patrimony, to result in a 
complete reorganization of the family structure. In fact, even when they were not appointed 
administrators, they assumed the place of the head of the family, commanding family life and 
most of all, being there for the irrational men’s recovery. Beyond the curing power of 
medicine, women were held to be able to tame, discipline and control mentally incapacitated 
men. Male irrationality was thus to be domesticated by women, who were identified as the 
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